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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JANE DOE,

;
Petitioner-Respondent,

vs.

:

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY; PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS
AND TRAINING; TED E. LEAMONS,
DIRECTOR; WILLIAM L. FLINK
and John Does I through IV,

::

Case No. 860138

::
j
:

Category No. 13b

Respondents-Appellants. •

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issue on appeal is whether the district court
correctly interpreted and applied U.C.A. Section 77-18-2 (1980)
to the fact situation at hand.
The statute, in its entirety, reads as follows:
(1)(a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime
within this state may petition the convicting court
for a judicial pardon and for sealing of his record in
that court. At the time the petition is filed and
served upon the prosecuting attorney, the court shall
set a date for a hearing and notify the prosecuting
attorney for the jurisdiction of the date set for
hearing. Any person who may have relevant information
about the petitioner may testify at the hearing and
the court, in its discretion, may request a written
evaluation of the adult parole and probation section
of the state division of corrections.
(b) If the court finds the petitioner for a period
of five years in the case of a class A misdemeanor or
felony, or for a period of three years in the case of
other misdemeanors or infractions, after his release
from incarceration, parole, or probation whichever
occurs last, has not been convicted of a felony or of
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a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and that no
proceeding involving such a crime is pending or being
instituted against the petitioner and further finds
that the rehabilitation of petitioner has been
attained to the satisfaction of the court, it shall
enter an order that all records in petitioner's case
in the custody of that court or in the custody of any
other court, agency or official be sealed. The
provisions of this subsection shall not apply to
violations for the operation of motor vehicle under
Title 41. The court shall also issue to the
petitioner a certificate stating the court's finding
that he has satisfied the court of his rehabilitation.
(2)(a) In any case in which a person has been arrested
with or without a warrant, that individual after 12
months, provided there have been no intervening
arrests, may petition the court in which the
proceeding occurred, or, if there were no court
proceedings, any court in the jurisdiction where the
arrest occurred, for an order expunging any and all
records of arrest and detention which may have been
made, if any of the following occurred:
(i) He was released without the filing of formal
charges;
(ii) Proceedings against him were dismissed, he
was discharged without a conviction and no charges
were refiled against him within 30 days thereafter, or
he was acquitted at trial; or
(iii) The record of any proceedings against him
has been sealed pursuant to Subsection (1).
(b) If the court finds that the petitioner is
eligible for relief under this subsection, it shall
issue its order granting the relief prayed for and
further directing the law enforcement agency making
the initial arrest to retrieve any record of that
arrest which may have been forwarded to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Utah Bureau of
Criminal Identification.
(c) This subsection shall apply to all arrests and
any proceedings which occurred before, as well ais
those which may occur after, the effective date of
this act.
(3) Employers may inquire concerning arrests or
convictions only to the extent that the arrests have
not been expunged or the record of convictions sealed
under this provision. In the event an employer asks
concerning arrests which have been expunged or
convictions the records of which have been sealed, the
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person who has received expungement of arrest or
judicial pardon may answer as though the arrest or
conviction had not occurred.
(4) Inspection of the sealed records shall be
permitted by the court only upon petition by the
person who is the subject of those records and only to
the persons named in the petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent stipulates to Appellant's Statement of the
Case and Statement of the Facts.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Utah "Expungement and Sealing of Records" statute,
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-18-2 (1980), is ambiguous on its
face as to its applicability to P.O.S.T..

The history and intent

of the framers was to provide a meaningful opportunity for exfelons to rehabilitate and assimilate back into society,
especially through employment.

Neither the expungement statute

nor the P.O.S.T. authorizing statute, Utah Code Annotated Section
67-15-1 et seq. (1985), provide for any but the court to
determine when an expungement should be granted, and once given,
only the pardoned person may reopen the records.

ARGUMENT
The public policy behind the enactment of Utah's
"Expungement and sealing of records" statute has been the same
since its inception, when "the legislature intended that trial
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courts should have considerable authority to reform wrongdoers."
William v. Harris, 106 Utah 387, 149 P.2d 640, 642 (1944).

See

also State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044 (1927).

In

effect, expungement embodies the age old notion of "forgiving and
forgetting", thereby providing the ex-felon an opportunity to
start over again, unhampered by the attendant disabilities of her
past conviction.

While this has been the basic premise behind

the policy of expungement, a split exists among the states as to
the actual effect an expungement.

Gough, The Expungement of

Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders:

A Problem

of Status, 1966 Wash. Univ. L.Q. 147 (1966).
In Utah, the expungement statute originated in 1943
when the legislature amended the statute on probation, to include
the following language in pertinent part:
Where it appears to the court from the report ... that
the defendant has complied with the conditions of such
probation the court may, if it be compatible with the
public interest .•. terminate the sentence or set
aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the
defendant, and dismiss the action and discharge the
defendant, (emphasis added)
U.C.A. Section 105-36-17 (1943)
The case law during this period indicated that the statute "was
enacted for the court under the unusual circumstances and for
good cause to expunge the record of crime."
121 Utah 653, 245 P.2d 222, 224 (1952).
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State v. Schreiber,

The "Expungement of records11 statute was explicitly
created in 1973 when the legislature enacted Section 77-35-17.5,
which stated in part:
(2) If the court finds that ... the rehabilitation of
the petitioner has been attained to the satisfaction
of the court, it shall enter an order that all records
in the petitioner's case ... be sealed.
(3) ... the petitioner shall be deemed judicially
pardoned and the petitioner may thereafter respond to
any inquiries relating to convictions of crimes as
though that conviction never occurred.
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-35-17.5 (1973)
In the case of State v. Jones, 581 P.2d 141 (1978), the Utah
Supreme Court construed the new statute, holding that an exfelon whose record had been expunged could not be impeached as a
witness on his own account.

The Court's holding implied that

the expungement erased the ex-felon's past records.

In 1980,

both statutes described above were replaced by the present
"Expungement and sealing of records" statute, Utah Code
Annotated Section 77-18-2, when the legislature recodified the
Code of Criminal Procedure.

This most recent statute generally

remains the same as its predecessor except in the following
relevant parts:
(1)(b) If the court finds ... that the rehabilitation
of petitioner has been to the satisfaction of the
court, it shall order that all records ... be sealed.
(2)(a) In any case in which a person has been
arrested ... that individual after 12 months, ... may
petition the court ... for an order expunging any and
all records of arrest and detention which may have
been made, if any of the following occurred:...
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(iii) The record of any proceedings against him
has been sealed pursuant to subsection (1). (emphasis
added)
(3) ••. In the event an employer asks concerning
arrests which have been expunged or convictions the
records of which have been sealed, the person who
received expungement of arrest or judicial pardon may
answer as though the arrest or conviction had not
occurred, (emphasis added)
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-18-2 (1980)
A general rule of statutory construction directs
courts to ascertain the legislative intent of the statute and
favor the public interest and purpose behind the statute.
82 C.J.S. Statutes Section 311 (1953).

See

See also Utah Code

Annotated Section 68-3-2 (1985); Bateman v. Board of Examiners,
7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381 (1958).
The present Utah expungement statute is unquestionably
ambiguous as concerns the right of an agency such as P.O.S.T. to
consider the past expunged convictions of an ex-felon.
Consequently, the court must look to the legislative intent
behind the present expungement statute.
The Federal Court in Thompson v. Department of the
Treasury, 557 F. Supp. 158 (D. Utah 1982) was correct insofar as
it found that

lf

[t]here is no explanation in the legislative

history for the changes in the amended statute...."

However,

the attached affidavit of Professor Boyce provides some insight
into the legislative intent behind the enactment.

Affidavit of

Ronald N. Boyce (July 30, 1986) (discussing U.C.A. 77-18-2 on
expungement).

Professor Boyce was a member of the Utah State

Bar Code of Criminal Procedure Committee responsible for the

£

drafting of U.C.A. 77-18-2, the present expungement statute.
According to Professor Boyce, the Committee's primary concern
while drafting U.C.A. 77-18-2 was to provide a meaningful
opportunity for an ex-felon to rehabilitate and assimilate back
into society.

At the time the committee viewed employment as

the greatest bar to rehabilitation for ex-felons.

Consequently,

the intent of the committee was to remove the attendant
disabilities of a past conviction for an ex-felon, especially
with respect to employers.

This intent largely conforms with

the Model Rules, on which the committee heavily relied in
reaching its conclusion.
Under the Model Rules for Law Enforcement a provision
has been made for "Closing" or sealing the record of an
individual's past conviction:
Rule 602 Designation of a Closed Record
(B) Conviction. If a person has been arrested and
convicted, the record of that conviction shall be
designated a closed record ten years after the date of
the person's last known arrest or conviction....
Model Rules for Law Enforcement Release of
Arrest and Conviction Records, College of Law, Arizona
State University and University Police Foundation 20,
36 (1974) (Hereinafter referred to as Release
Records).
Under the Model Rules 401(v), dissemination of past
arrest records to prospective employers, even those not closed,
is permitted "to the extent expressly and specifically required
by state or federal statute or federal executive order."

7

Id. at

22.

It might be noted that prior to the alteration of Rule

401(v) which resulted in the present proscription against
dissemination, the prior subsection "permitted release when, in
the judgment of an agency head, reasons of national security so
required.11

Id. at 24.
The commentary to Rule 401 suggests that "the best

policy is for law enforcement agencies to eliminate altogether
the voluntary dissemination of record information for employment
related purposes."

Id. at 24.

It was apparently felt that

concerns for national security would be covered by statute or
executive order.

See Executive Order No. 10,450, 3 C.F.R. 936

(1953), and Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
In short, the Model Rules for Law Enforcement, upon
which U.C.A. Section 77-18-2 was patterned, provided for the
"closing of records" for any person who maintained a clean
record for ten years.

Upon the closing of a record, only the

person who was the subject of the record could re-open the file.
The drafters of the Model Rules made clear their desire to
promote the rehabilitation of ex-felons as well as their
recognition that the lack of employment opportunities was the
greatest impediment to this goal.

(See Release of Records at

20.)
The fact that impediments to employment create the
greatest barrier to rehabilitation is well supported.

In the

Report of the President's Task Force on Prisoner Rehabilitation,
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10 J. Offender Counseling, Services and Rehab. 195 (1985),
(Hereinafter referred to as Task Force), it was recommended
that:
The United States Civil Service Commission should
devise and put into operation a plan to stimulate
Federal Employment of ex-offenders. Id. at 201.
The Task Force cogently indicated that:
Surely, the very first step toward improving its
correctional process that any government -- municipal,
state or Federal — should take is to allow exoffenders to be employed by government. The
government is scarcely persuasive when it urges
industry to adopt employment policies toward exoffenders that itself is unwilling to adopt. Id. at
201 .
In light of the foregoing, it becomes clear that the
only traceable "legislative intent11 behind the expungement
statute was to promote rehabilitation by removing impediments to
employment opportunity.

It is a well recognized fact that

evidence of a past arrest record is tantamount to an automatic
foreclosure to employment.

See Schwartz and Skolnick, Two

Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 Soc. Probs. 133 (1962); Special
Project -- The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction,
23 Vand. L. Rev. 929 (1970).
The effect of allowing P.O.S.T. to consider the past
expunged convictions of an offender is to bar that individual
from state employment, as a general rule.

9

The underlying intent

behind the enactment of the Utah Code should be given effect by
denying P.O.S.T.'s request to review the respondent's past
record.
The appellant cites to Thompson v. Department of
Treasury, 557 F. Supp. 158 (D. Utah 1982), in support of the
proposition that the amendment to the expungement statute was
intended "to limit the effect of a judicial pardon and
expungement".

Id. at 167.

However, this is an erroneous interpretation of the
holding in that case.

The facts of Thompson involved an

ex-

felon who had been previously found guilty of violating 18
U.S.C.A. Section 922, a federal firearms statute.

Under the

statute it was illegal for anyone who had a prior felony
conviction to carry firearms.

Thompson, who was employed as

private firearms trainer for private security guards, obtained a
judicial pardon and an expungement of his records under Utah
law.

One of the issues in Thompson was "whether a state

expungement relieves a former convict of the Section 922
disability".

Id. at 166.

Under Title VII, which encompasses

Section 922, a provision was made for exempting any person from
the Section 1202 disability who "...has been pardoned by the
chief executive of a State and expressly been authorized by
...such chief executive ...to receive, possess, or transport in
commerce a firearm."
1203).

Id. at 164 (citing 18 U.S.C. App. Section

Such an exemption clearly distinguishes Thompson from
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the case at bar where no other relief exists for the ex-felon
except for the expungement statute.
The appellant cites several other cases to support the
proposition that P.O.S.T. cannot reasonably be regarded as an
employer and therefore, as a licensing agency, can require
disclosure of expunged convictions.

However, the cases cited do

not directly parallel the case at bar with respect to
expungements.
In Dixon v. McMullen, 527 F. Supp. 711 (N.D. Tex.
1981) the facts involved an ex-felon who had received a
gubernatorial pardon which Utah does not have.

The Texas Court,

after reviewing the history of "pardons11 concluded that n a
pardon implies guilt.11

Id. at 718.

The case of Patt v. Nevada State Board of Accountancy,
93 Nev. 548, 571 P.2d 105 (1977), did not involve an
expungement.

In Patt, the petitioner had received an honorable

discharge from probation.

Neither the statute nor the court's

discussion of it considered the removal of attendant
disabilities to a conviction.
In Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners, 34 Cal. 2d 62,
206 P.2d 1085 (1949), the petitioner had received a court order
terminating his probation and dismissing the information against
him pursuant to Section 1203.3 of the California Penal Code.
The petitioner challenged the right of the Board of Medical
Examiners to suspend his license based upon his conviction.
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The

court reviewed the respondent Board's authority to suspend the
license under Section 1203.4 which released the petitioner from
all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense.

The

court then concluded that the order did not "remove or wipe out
the conviction11, where 1203.4 contained a provision for allowing
the conviction to be used against the petitioner in any later
prosecution.

Id. at 1086, 1087.

The Utah statute specifically blocks employer
inquiries, unlike the California Penal Code which preserved the
right to use the past conviction in the future.
(4) Inspection of the sealed records shall be
permitted by the courts only upon petition by the
person who is the subject of those records and only to
the persons named in the petition.
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-18-2 (1980).
(emphasis added).
The Utah Expungement statute contains no provision
similar to that of the California penal code which clearly
allowed inspection of past convictions, thereby distinguishing
Meyer from the case at bar.
Appellant cites Amberson v. Leamons, Third District
Court No. C85-6240 (November 25, 1985), in support of the
proposition that "P.O.S.T. could properly deny certification to
an individual whose felony conviction had been expunged under
Colorado's deferred sentencing law.11

(Appellant's Brief at 10).

This proposition correctly states the law, but does not apply to
the present case.
The present case involves an expungement, not a
deferred sentence.

This distinction is critical where under the
12

Colorado deferred sentencing scheme, Colo. Rev. Stat. Section
16-7-403 (1978), required that the conditions imposed be similar
to those conditions imposed on probation.

Expungement, on the

other hand, relieves the ex-offender of any 'probationary
requirements "as though the arrest or conviction had not
occurred.11

Utah Code Annotated Section 77-18-2(3).
The case of Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc.,

460 U.S. 103 (1982) is cited as

,f

[particularly applicable to

the instant case.11 (Appellant's Brief at 10). However,
Dickerson is not applicable to the present case for the same
reasons that Thompson v. Department of the Treasury, supra, is
not.

Both cases involve a violation of the federal firearms

statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g).
In effect, the Dickerson court held that the federal
firearms disabilities imposed by Sections 922(g)(1) and (h)(1),
were not removed by a state expunction where the federal statute
provides for an "affirmative action" to remove the disability.
Dickerson at 115.
In short, both Dickerson and Thompson involved a
violation of the federal firearms statute which contained its
own provisions for removal of the firearms disability and could
not therefore be removed by a state expunction.
Finally, it is contended that where Utah Code
Annotated Section 77-18-2 does not focus on the question of
whether one is fit to be a police officer, it necessarily
follows that the expungement statute does not apply to P.O.S.T.
or the P.O.S.T. council.

This conclusion is not correct.
13

Professor Boyce indicates in his affidavit that it was
the legislative committee's intent to encourage rehabilitation
of ex-offenders by enhancing the opportunity for employment.
While it is not disputed that "a high standard of fitness and
character pertains to police officers/1 it does not follow that
P.O.S.T. is automatically authorized to second guess a court of
law and justice on the issue of the degree of rehabilitation an
individual has undergone.
Neither, the Utah expungement statute nor P.O.S.T.fs
own enabling statute, Utah Code Annotated Section 67-15-10.5(1)
provides P.O.S.T. with the authority to require that the
petitioner unseal her records.

If it had been the intent of the

legislature to cloak P.O.S.T. with such authority, it would have
done so.
The plain language of Utah Code Annotated Section
77-18-2(4) clearly indicates that the legislature did not intend
to give P.O.S.T. the authority to consider sealed records, in
stating:
(4) Inspection of the sealed records shall be
permitted by the court only upon petition by the
person who is the subject of those records and only to
the persons named in the petition.(emphasis added)
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-18-2(4) (1980)
Nowhere in this provision is P.O.S.T. allowed to inspect the
sealed records.

Furthermore, while P.O.S.T.fs enabling statute,

Section 67-15-1 (1985) sets forth as its purpose:

14

To better promote and insure the safety and welfare of
the citizens of this state ...and to provide more
efficient and professional law enforcement....
Utah Code Annotated Section 67-15-1 (1985).
and Section 67-15-10.5(1)(d) allows the director of P.O.S.T. to
bring an action to revoke/ refuse or suspend P.O.S.T.
certification against anyone who has had a "conviction of a
felony ..."

Utah Code Annotated Section 67-15-10.5 (1)(d)

(1985), these statutes do not include the consideration of an
expunged conviction.
In light of the available legislative history to have
allowed P.O.S.T. to unseal the respondent's records would have
been a blatant violation of the public policy behind
expungement, namely rehabilitation.

CONCLUSION
This Court should uphold the district court's order
and rule prohibiting P.O.S.T. from inspecting the Respondent's
sealed records.
The legislative intent behind the amended version of
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-18-2 was to promote
rehabilitation by providing fewer impediments to employment.
This intent is manifested in both Utah Code Annotated Section
77-18-2 and Section 67-15-10.5(1)(d) where the legislature did
not provide an exception for P.O.S.T. under the general
"employer" provision of Section 77-18-2(3), or provide P.O.S.T.
with the explicit authority to consider expunged convictions
under its own enabling statute.
15

Finally, to allow P.O.S.T. to consider expunged
convictions would violate the public policy of rehabilitation,
especially where no other means to purge one's .record of past
convictions exists in Utah.
P.O.S.T. is not better qualified than the court to
determine whether an ex-offender has rehabilitated.

Throughout

the history of Utah, this has remained the province of the
court, and so should remain.
DATED this

(0

day of August, 1986.

L. Z&tie G i l l
^orneY for
f o r Respondent
Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that 10 true and correct copies of
the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT were hand delivered on the
18th day of August, 1986, to the Supreme Court of Utah by my
associate, Beth Kadlec. Also, 4 true and correct copies were
hand delivered to The Attorney General's Office, 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, Attorneys for Appellants.
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APPENDIX A
CASES

I

TO

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
unty of Salt Lake - State of jah
FILEM

ITL£:

(' PARTIES PRESENT)

COUNSEL:

C85-6240

W COUNSEL PRESENT)

t
:

HICHARO D. AMBERSON
-V»-

DAvid E. Yocura

t
•

rEO E. LEAMONS, « t C .

fi

David B. Thompson

••

HON James S .

NOV 27 1985

Sawaya

-szar

DATENovembftr 2 5 , 1 9 8 5

OFFICE OF

ATTORNEY GENEfcaUf

I of Plaintiffs Petition for Issuance of an Extraordianary
The matter
frit came on regularly for hearing on the 18th day of November, 1985 with
ippearances as above indicated.

The matter was fully presented, argued

ind submitted and the decision thereon taken under advisement by the Court.
rhe Court having n ov fully considered the matter makes its ruling and
iecision thereon as follows:
The Court is of the opinion that under the uncontroverted facts and the
:ircumstances of thismatter the P.O.S.T.

Council denial of certification

*as justified under the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. 67-15-10.5(1)(d). flne
rlear intent and purpose of the legislature to deny certification under
fact3 as these seems apparent to the Court»
noral character of the applicant.

The principal issue being the

The statutory proccedure for subsequent

dismissal of charges following entry of a guilty plea, under Colorado lav,
rfould not work contrary to the obvious intent of the legislature,
BA3ed upon the foregoing

and upon the grounds and reasons stated in

the defendants memorandum the Petition of the Plaintiff is denied.
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E. Alton BATEMAN and State Board of
Education, Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
BOARD OP EXAMINERS OF the STATE
OF UTAH, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 8457.

2. States $=»I73
The State Board of Examiners has
power beyond mere auditing. Const, art.
7, § 13.*
3. Statutes <£=>223.l
A preference should be given to later
statutes over prior ones where there is a
conflict.8

Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 28, 195a

Declaratory judgment act by the UniTersity of Utah against State Board of
Examiners and the State Finance Commission, wherein the State Board of Education intervened. From judgment entered
by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt
bkc County, Martin M. Larson, J., the
State Board of Examiners appealed. The
Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that short
of any capricious or arbitrary action, State
Board of Examiners and its administrative
inn, the Commission of Finance, have authority to examine into and approve or disapprove of proposed expenditures, to adopt
reflations pertaining generally to salary
schedules and personnel in accordance with
statutes conferring such powers upon them,
and that Superintendent of Public Instruction and Board of Education are subject
thereto in a similar manner to other departments of State government
J
i

Judgment in accordance with opinion.
;

,

.

I Constitutional Law *=>50
* The fundamental power of government rests in the legislature.1
L Parkinson v. Watson, 4 Utah 2d 191, 291
r P.2d400.
1 Thoreton v. 8tate Board of Examine**,
21 Utah 187, 60 P.2d 982; Burrows v.
Kimball, 11 Utah 149, 41 P. 719; Marionmi T. Cutler, 82 Utah 475, 91 P. 855;
State ex rel Davis v. Edwards, 88 Utah
143, 93 P. 720; State ex rel. Davis v.
Cttler, 34 Utah 99, 95 P. 1071; Uintah
State Bank v. AJaz, 77 Utah 455, 297 P.

4. Statutes *=»223.4
Where statutes are conflicting, the
more specific takes precedence over the
general.4
5. Constitutional Law <S=>70(3)
Statutes $=»2I4
Usually Supreme Court is not concerned with questions of policy nor with
wisdom of legislation, but where there is
confusion because of conflict between statutes, it is permissible to look to general
governmental policies and purposes to interpret the legislative intent
6. States $=>I73
Short of any capricious or arbitrary
actions, State Board of Examiners and its
administrative arm, the Commission of
Finance, have authority to examine into
and approve or disapprove of proposed expenditures, to adopt regulations pertaining generally to salary schedules and personnel in accordance with statutes conferring such powers upon them, and Superintendent of Public Instruction and Board of
Education are subject thereto in a similar
manner to other departments of state
government. U.CA.1953, 53-2-8, 53-3-7,
53-3-8, 53-3-9, 63-2-13, 63-2-14, 63-2-20,
63-6-8, 63-6-11, 63-6-19, 64-6-1, 64-6-2,
64-7-2, 64-9-1, 67-3-1 et seq., 77-62-2,
434; State Board of Education v. Commissioner of Finance, 122 Utah 1C4,
247 PJ2d 435.
3. Nclden v. Clark, 20 Utah 382, 50 P.
524; Pacific International Express Co.
v. State Tax Commission, 7 Utah 2d 15,
816 P.2d 549.
4. University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah
457, 50 P. 90.

VVM

-

77-624; Laws 1957, c 177, | 12; Const
art. 7, H13,16; art. 10, $ &

E. I t Caflister, Atty. Gen^ H. I t Waldo,
Jr„ Asst Atty. Gen, for appellants.
Richards ft Bird and Dan 3 . BnshneO,
Salt Lake City, for respondents.
CROCKETT, Jostke.
This ease arose originally as a suit for
declaratory judgment by the University of
Utah against the State Board of Examiners and the State Finance Commission.
The dispute between the University and
those defendants was dealt with in a prior
opinion.1 The State Board of Education
intervened to determine its rights relating
to both the University and the defendants,
the issues between the University and the
Board of Education have been resolved
by stipulation. There is no dissonance between the Board of Examiners and the
Gxmnission of Finance in this action.
Their interests being parallel, for the purpose of this decision, we will proceed upon
the assumption that the Commission of
Finance is the statutorily created administrative arm of the Board of Examiners and consider the rights of the Board
of Education relative to it These parties
are hereinafter for brevity referred to
simply as "Examiners" and "Education.'*
Reduced to its simplest terms the dispute
Is this: Education claims authority to administer the State Department of Education and school system without let or
hindrance from Examiners; whereas the
latter Board claims authority to examine
and approve or disapprove of proposed expenditures, and to exercise general super1. U. of Utah v. Board of Ears* 4 Utah
2d 408, 206 PJM 848.
2. Education sets eat a net at iattaaets m
which It contends that Examiners,
Finance or the Governor bare interfered
•ritls !ta foardooa by rafaafof to make
available appropriated funds; approve
appointments of omployeos and proposed

risory control of salaries > and personnel
practices of the Board of Education.*
Both parties advance plausible arguments in support of their claims to authority based on their respective constitutional origins and legislative implementation. Resolution of the problems presented will be facilitated by examining the constitutional foundation and the statutory
structure of the authority of each separately
The constitutional authority of Education is found in Article X which provides
for the establishment of a uniform system
of public schools within the state, defines
of what it shall be comprised, and in Section 8 thereof vests "general control and
supervision of the Public School System
* * * in a State Board of Education,
consisting of the Superintendent of Public
Instruction, and such other persons as the
Legislature may provide. • • • "
The language of Article X sheds little
light as to just how the authority of Education should relate to Examiners or to
other state departments, nor can any help
be found from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, as there b no indication that the matter was ever considered or discussed. However, there was
rather extensive discussion as to whether
the Superintendent of Public Instruction
should be an elective or an appointive
position. Considerable sentiment was expressed as to the undesirability of having
it directly responsive to political pressures.1
This attitude reflected in the statement
of Delegate Carl G. Maeser, who said, *I
would like to see that office removed as
far as possible away from poUtics."« The
important responsibilities and the necessity of high qualifications of the superintendent were also stressed,* and it is also
1 M I ProcConttCoar. K» ot aeo.
(1885).
4. Ibid. p. 861.
5. Ibid. p. 1154, Delegate Kerr arged: 1
aobadt Mr. President, that the ^» • ^
Superintendent of PabSe lafeieetfon
abonld be a man of learning, • • •
who has spent years and a treat anwant

i^ieae «u raa m
true that there was no suggestion or intiSection 53-2-S gives the Superintendent
mation that the superintendent or the authority to appoint subordinates and fix
Board of Education might be subject to their salaries:
the control of Examiners.
T h e board may appoint such assistant superintendents, directors, superThe general purpose thus stated in the
visors, assistants, clerical workers, and
Constitution of establishing and maintainother employees, as in the judgment of
ing a public school system is implemented
the board may be necessary to the
tn statutes which quite fully set forth the
proper administration and supervision
powers and duties of the superintendent
of the public school system. The
and of the Board of Education.
salaries of such assistant superinSection 53-3-2 provides in part as foltendents, directors, supervisors, aslows:
sistants, clerical workers and other
T h e state board of education shall
employees, shall be fixed by the board
be charged with the administration of
and shall be paid from money apthe system of public instruction, and
propriated for that purpose." (Emwith general superintendence of the
phasis supplied.)
district schools of the state and of the
If the above statutes and constitutional
school revenue set apart and appropriprovisions stood alone and could be given
ated for their support * * • *
literal application, there would be no difSection 53-3-7 provides:
T h e state superintendent with the
approval of the state board of education shall prepare and submit to the
governor to be included in his budget
to be submitted to the legislature, a
budget of the requirements of his office
including the expenses of the state
board of education, for his own and
other salaries and wages, office and
travel expense, equipment and repairs
necessary for carrying out the duties
Imposed upon the superintendent of
public instruction and the state board
of education * * V
Section 53-3-8 provides:
T h e state auditor shall transfer to
the state general fund from the uniform school fund to the credit of
the state board of education the
amount designated by the legislature
for the operation of the office of the
state superintendent and the state
board of education, • * *."
ef BBoney la preparing • • •. It is
notttkethe • • o offlce of Governor,
wMen roouires little or no preparation.
gangster} and ess be filled by & mas
ef ordinary abffity."

ficulty in determining the scope of the
powers of Education. However, when we
look at the over-all picture of our law,
difficulty is encountered because, as will
be seen, these powers are overlapped by
others conferred upon Examiners.*
The Board of Examiners was created by
and its authority is rooted in Section 13,
Article VII of our Constitution which provides:
"Until otherwise provided by law,
the Governor, Secretary of State and
Attorney-General shall constitute a
Board of State Prison Commissioners,
* * *. [specifies duties] They shall,
also, constitute a Board of Examiners,
with power to examine all claims
against the State except salaries or
compensation of officers fixed by law,
and perform such other duties as may
be prescribed by law; and no claim
against the State, except for salaries
and compensation of officers fixed by
law, shall be passed upon by the Leg>
islature without having been consider6, Tor an excellent article em tne
of Examiner, aee Article by James W.
Bawling*, 5* Utah Law Review Mft.
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ed and acted upon by the said Board
tion, the most natural meaning would be
of Exaafeers."
that it applies on!y to the first sentence
The question of importance is the extent dealing with the membership of the Board
of the authority conferred by the language, of State Prison Commissioners, and by
* * * * * with power to examine all claims parallel reasoning, to the second sentence
against the state." This phraseology has relating only to the membership of the
given rise to much concern over the re- Board of Examiners.
Education points to the constitutional
ciprocal powus and interrelationships of
the departments of our state government convention in support of its reasoning that
In the first place, we think that the word the entire section was intended to be subM
daimn was used in its broadest connota- ject to future legislation. Sections 12
tion and we recognise that it is susceptible through 15 establish various administrative
of a variety of meanings: ranging from a agencies: Section 12, the Board of Parmoral claim; or the seeking of legislative dons; Section 13, the State Prison Comlargesse; or asserting a privilege; to as- missioners and Board of Examiners; Secserting rights to compensation for property tion 14, Insane Asylum Commissioners;
or materials furnished, or salary for serv- Section 15, Reform School Commissioners.
ices rendered, to the state. But the pivot of At the Convention, a motion was made to
the controversy has devolved upon the term strike all of the sections on the theory that
"to examine." On the one hand, Education they dealt with legislative matters. During
espouses the view that the power "to ex- subsequent debates, in which section 12 was
amine all claims against the state0 merely mast often mentioned, delegate Thurman
denotes an auditing function; and on the observed:
other, Examiners takes the position that it
"I do not see why this matter cannot
confers plenary power to examine into the
be left to the Legislature. Of course,
advisability and necessity of any expendithis leaves the matter where it is now,
ture or proposed obligation of the state.
but it gives to the Legislature the right
to create a board such as is here
The first facet of Education's argument
named, or any other kind of a board of
against the power claimed by Examiners is
pardons. * * *
that the framers of the Constitution enviMr. Varian. Mr. Chairman, taking
sioned Section 13, above quoted, as legislathe propositions in their order, I would
tive in nature, intended to be subsequently
suggest, in speaking to the substitute
modified and controlled by legislative enactoffered by my friend from Utah Counments such as the statutes conferring
ty, that there is no reason why we
powers on Education. They emphasize
should not leave it to the Legislature.
that such was the plain import of its first
clause, "Until otherwise provided by law,
* * * * which they insist modified the and at thefinalreading,firstSection 12 and
entire section. Without going into the de- then Sections 13, 14 and 15, were each
tail of the arguments pro and con on this amended by inserting at the beginning
facet of the subject it is readily seen that thereof the phrase: "Until otherwise proattempting to give that proviso application vided by law." • Thus the manner in which
to each of the subsequent parts of the sec- the initial proviso of the section was adopttion gives rise to some difficulty gram- ed is somewhat persuasive that the whole
matically. L e. it would read: "Until section was intended to be applied and inotherwise provided by law, * * * [they terpreted in accordance with subsequent
shall] • * • perform such other duties legislative enactments.
as may be prescribed by law." Absent
[1] The idea that the boards themselves
knowledge of the facts concerning its adop- were to be subject to change by the Legis*
7. n Proccedis«s Const.Conv.1890 p. 1C0S.

t. Ibid pp. 1152 et seq.
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lature also finds support in the practical with the responsibility of auditing the recof all departments of
construction which has been placed upon it ords and accounts
11
The membership of all of the other boards state government. The question as to the
provided for in the sections just referred to extent of the power of Examiners has been
has now been changed.* A conclusion that dealt with by this court in numerous decithe initial clause affects the entire section sions. They clearly demonstrate that Exwould not cast the die in favor of Educa- aminers has powers beyond mere auditing.
tion any more than it would in favor of ExOne of the earliest cases dealing with the
aminers, as will appear from our discussion problem of the authority of Examiners was
of the statutes relating to the powers of the Thoreson v. State Board of Examiners.1*
latter board. Yet it docs have an im- Mandamus was sought to direct Examiners
portant bearing on the over-all conclusion to audit and allow an unpaid balance for the
we reach in this opinion, which is based to lease of school lands. The statute provida considerable extent upon the concept that ed:
the fundamental power of government rests
"The state board of examiners are
in the legislature.1*
hereby directed to receive and audit
Another argument of Education against
and allow all just claims of persons
the claim to general supervisory powers aswho have paid monies in pursuance of
serted by Examiners is that the concluding
chapter 76 of the Session Laws of the
clause of the section of the Constitution in
territory of Utah of eighteen hundred
question, " * * * and no claim against
and ninety-two, in relation to the leases
the state, except for salaries and compensaof school lands and the state auditor is
tion of officers fixed by law, shall be passed
hereby directed to draw his warrant
upon by the legislature without having been
therefor on the state district school tax
considered and acted upon by the State
fund."
Board of Examiners" characterizes the enThe provision of the 1892 Session Laws
tire section, showing an intent that they
which had authorized leasing of school
should pass only upon unliquidated claims
M
against the state. Certain it is that one of lands had been held unconstitutional and
the
statute
was
purposed
to
reimburse
peothe functions of Examiners is to investigate
and act as a fact finder and advisor to the ple for money advanced on such leases.
legislature on claims of that nature, such The court took occasion to observe that Exas tort claims, or other claims for damages aminers is more than a perfunctory body,
or compensation claimed for property, and may exercise discretion, but held that
goods or services, by persons who would under the statute the amount paid in was a
not otherwise have legal redress available. "just claim** and therefore the only determination for Examiners to make was
[2] One of the major difficulties with whether the amount of money claimed had
Education's contention that, except as to actually been paid in and was under a
unliquidated claims against the state, Ex- mandatory duty to authorize payment of the
aminers has no discretionary authority and amount.
^n perform only an auditing function, is
The next case dealing with the scope of
that that would be but a duplication of the
duties of the state auditor who is charged Examiners' authority was Marioneaux v.
•• Sections TMO-2, T1-42-*. U.CJL19W
modify Article 7, Section 12; Section 649-1, U.CA.1953, modules Article 7, 8ec«oe 13 brtofHf ag tie Board of Prison
Commissioners In concerned. Section
W-7-2, U.CJL1953 modifies Article 7.
Section 14; and Sections 64-6-1 and 040-2. U.CA.1953 modify Article 7, Section
15.
SSSP.S4—fti

19. See Parkinson v. Watson, 4 Utah 2d
191. 291 P.2d 400.
11. Sec 16, Art. VII. Constitution; Sees.
67-3-1 et seq„ U.CA.1953.
12. 1900, 21 Utah 187, 60 P. 982,
13. Barrows v. Kimball, 11 Utah 149, 41 P.
719.
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Cutler. A district judge brought mandamus against Examiners for approval of
his claim for a mileage which they had rejected. The refusal had been justified on
the ground that the law authorizing the
tame was unconstitutional as containing
more than one subject winch position was
sustained. This case is relied upon as authority for the discretionary power of Examiners but it is to be noted that the holding, if strictly limited to the facts, says
only that they are not required to approve
the payment of a claim which is not properly grounded under the law. The question
of their discretion beyond that was not
precisely involved.
This case was followed by State ex rel.
Davis v. Edwards11 wherein a court reporter sought to compel the State Auditor
to allow his claim for mileage which the
district judge had certified as correct. The
statute stated that upon such certification
by the judge and presentation of the certificate to the Auditor a warrant should be
drawn for payment In spite of this statute the Auditor refused, relying on Sec 18>
Ch. 35, I* 1896 which required approval of
Examiners before he could draw the warrant The court held that the claim must
be presented to Examiners for approval as
required by the statute and used some very
pointed language pertinent to the instant
problem:
"The powers conferred upon tht
board of examiners, with regard to
claims against the state, by the constitutional provision quoted above, are
general and sweeping. The power
would include all claims against the
state, were it not for the exception
which excludes salaries or compensation of officersfixedby law. An exception of this character may not be enlarged nor extended by implication.
An exception which specifies the things
that are excepted from a general provision strengthens the force of the gen84. 190?, S3 Utah 475, W P, 8M,
IS. 1008, 83 Utah 243, 98 P. 720.
If. 1908, 34 Utah 90, 95 P. 1071

era! provisions of the v!aw." (Emphasis added.)
While it might be said that the case could
have been based upon the express provisions of the statute involved, yet it indicated
the conception the court had of the law and
the trend of its development in recognizing
a discretionary power in the Board of Examiners in passing on claims against the
state.
That same year in State ex ret Davis v.
Cutler ** the question of Examiners' discretionary power was judicially appraised
from a slightly different angle. Another
court stenographer brought mandamus to
compel the Auditor to allow a claim which
had been rejected by Examiners. The
court again opined that Examiners may exercise discretion in allowance of claims but
must not do so arbitrarily and that, if the
claim, " * * * is one which is admitted
to be just, and is authorized by law, and
there is no dispute with regard to any fact
involved, and the claim is presented to the
board in due form as the law requires, we
know of no law nor reason why respondents [Examiners], although acting in a
quasi-judicial capacity, should not be required to audit and allow the claim.""
The actual holding was that Examiners had
improperly refused to act, and thus the observations relating to its discretionary
powers were by way of dicta. But even so,
there was another clear expression of the
view the court took of the law respecting
the discretionary powers of Examiners.
The landmark case on this subject is that
of Uintah State Bank v. Ajax.1* Action
was brought to compel the State Auditor to
issue warrants to pay bounty certificates for
killing predatory animals (coyotes). 'The
plaintiff contended that inasmuch as the
statute fixed the amount to be paid for each
animal killed and directed the Auditor to
issue the warrant upon the certificate of the
County Clerk, and further that nothing in
the act required submission of the claims to
17. Ibid., at pag* 1074 of 96 P.
18. 1931, 77 Utah 455, 297 P. 434, 438.
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Examiners, the Auditor must issue the warit had no power or authority to effecrant upon presentation of the certificate.
tuate, and on this question the language
The bank argued that the amount having
in the case of State ex rel Davis v.
been thus "fixed by law," there was nothing
Edwards is not only appropriate, but
but the ministerial duty of paying the claim
decisive."
and hence it was unnecessary to present it
Another case which Examiners rely upon
to Examiners. This contention was reject- is the recent one of State Board of Educaed by the court, saying:
tion v. Coram, of Finance^ in which Finance refused to approve payment of the
T h e claims here are not fixed by
salary of the Superintendent of Public Inlaw in the sense that the Legislature
struction. The reasons urged were that the
has made an appropriation of an
Board of Education was not legally constiamount certain to a definite named
tuted and was without authority to appoint
person."
a superintendent and fix his salary. The
and further,
holding was for Education as to this par"all claims are subject to action by the
ticular authority, but in passing the court
board of examiners except only claims
observed:
for 'salaries and compensation of offi"The Board of Examiners * * *
cers fixed by law.'"
which must approve all salary claims
It refused to agree that Examiners should
against the State, except thosefixedby
examine only "unliquidated?' claims against
law, approved by a vote of two to one
the state, using the following language:
the request of the Board of Education
"If we should adopt petitioner's view,
to pay Dr. Bateman a salary of $10,000
it would follow that the legislature
per annum."
might designate any officer other than
again indicating the court's understanding
the board of examiners as authorized
of the law as it has developed in our state
in behalf of the state to settle, fix, or
under the decisions hereinabove discussed.
liquidate claims and agree upon the
This interpretation of the law is also conamount to be paid thereon, and thereby
sonant with the legislative conception of
exclude the board of examiners from
the powers of Examiners as manifest in the
its duty * * *. We cannot agree to
various statutes implementing the powers of
any such construction of the constituthat board. They provide for the presentational language, nor may we by contion of all claims against the state to the
struction interpolate the word 'unliquiBoard of Examiners to be passed upon;19
dated' into the Constitution [which]
that it has certain supervisory powers over
* * * has vested in the Board of
the Auditor;*1 and the unanimous consent
Examiners the power to examine and
of its members is required before officers
pass on all claims except those exemptof the state may make deficit expendied, and the Legislature is without autures.** It is expressly provided that the
thority to delegate such power to any
Department of Finance, the legislatively
other board or officer."
created administrative arm of the Board of
Examiners, is endowed with authority to
The court went on to state:
approve or disapprove of the hiring of all
"If the view is taken that the Legispersonnel;** and is also charged in broad
lature intended to make this claim paylanguage with the responsibility of investiable by the auditor without presentagating the need for existing positions in all
tion to the board of examiners, then the
departments of state government^** • *
Legislature attempted to do that which
JS. 1332, 122 UUh 164, 247 P.2d 435, 439.
» . 63-0-11, U.C.A-190S.
21. 63-6~& U.C.A.1953.

22. 33-3-1S, U.OA-I853,
23. 63-2-14, U.CJM9S3.
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•rith a view to eliminating any unnecessary
9n&9 * * • " a n d * * * * no vacancy
shall be filled until the commission [finance]
has certified to the department requesting
the creation of a new position or the filling
of the vacancy that the position is necessary
to carry on the work." **
Finance is also endowed with a general
frant of power as to all departments of
rtate government, to establish salary schediles:
• * * * for the officers, clerks,
stenographers and employees of state
offices, departments, boards and com*
missions, except where such salaries
are fixed by statute or by appropriation; and such schedule of salaries
shall have the force of law in all state
offices, departments, boards and commissions, * * V * *
Hie comprehensive nature of the authorty granted Finance is further demonstrated
>y the provision for the appointment of a
widget officer with certain supervisory duies with respect to the use of funds in the
various departments."
Further of significance is the statutory
nterdiction directed to the Board of Education :
"At the end of each month the state
superintendent shall file with the state
board of examiners an itemised account
of his expenses, including those of the
state board of education, verified by his
oath. The said board shall examine the
same, and if the account is found to be
correct and the expenditures necessary,
shall certify the same to the state auditor. The state auditor shall issue a
warrant on the state treasurer for the
amount due on such account, and at the
end of each month he shall issue his
warrant for one-twelfth of the superintendent's annual salary." ** (Emphasis
added.)
M.
W.
t*.
17.

ibid.
63-2-13, U.C.A.19S3.
05-2-20, U.OA.195S.
53-3-0, U.CJL1953.

The argument of Education, not entirely
implausible, is that it this section is con*
strued with the other statutes relating to
its powers and duties, the reasonable construction is that the account required to be
filed with and approved by Examiners relates only to the personal expenses of himself and the Board, and not to the general
costs of operation of the department The
statute admittedly could have been plainer
in meaning had the minds of its framers adverted to the possibility of the difficulties
here encountered. It is our view that if
that section is considered against the background of the law as discussed in this opinion, and particular note is made of the fact
that the final clause singles out for mandatory payment the superintendent's salary,
(which is actually fixed by statute and thus
under the exception from Examiners' authority of "salaries fixed by law,") a rather
strong implication arises that all of the
other expenses and expenditures of the department are left within the emphasized
portion of the statute just quoted and under
the discretionary power of Examiners. In
fact it seems difficult to reconcile the language, "if the account is found to be correct and the expenditures necessary" in any
other way.
[3] Education advances another argument that under the rule giving preference
to later statutes over prior ones where there
is conflict*1 it is entitled to prevail in this
controversy because Section 55-2-8, U.C.A.
1953, quoted in the forepart of this opinion,
authorizing the Board of Education to appoint and fix the salaries of the various officers and employees of the department which
was re-enacted in 1953 constitutes the most
recent pronouncement of the legislature and
is thus controlling. Generally speaking we
do not disagree with this rule, nor with the
reasoning upon which it is based. But like
all general rules it must be applied with
discernment as to whether it fits the fact
28. NeMen •. Clark, 20 Utah 882, 09 P.
824, 526; Pacific In te mountain £xpre*s
Co. v. Stat© Tax Comm., 7 Utah 2d 1ft.
816 P.2d 549.
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approved by the board of
titnation at hand and no rale should be
given force in application where the facts
plainly negative any such intent The pur[4] Nor do we see anything persuasive
pose of the re-enactment of the statute just in the rule of statutory construction that as
referred to was solely to amend the provi- to conflicting statutes, the more specific
sion relating to the Superintendent's salary. takes precedence over the general,*9 which
No change was made in the other portions strangely enough, each party here contends
of the act and it is obvious that the legisla- favors its position. While It is true that
ture did not intend any significance to the the statutes purport to give Education spere-enactment in nullifying other existing cific powers within its own department,
statutes of the state because it was later in other statutes cited above give Examiners
time.
and Finance specific authority within the
On the point of statutes taking priority
because of subsequent enactment, die fact
is that the sections hereinabove discussed
conferring supervisory powers upon Finance were all enacted in connection with
the reorganization of state government in
1941, (and some subsequent amendments
thereto,) and thus, as expressions of legislative will as to governmental policy, were
later indications thereof than the statutes
relied upon by Education. Corollary to this
and entirely consistent with the idea that
Examiners has rather broad powers in respect to all of the departments of government, including Education, is the further
clearly expressed intent in that regard is
shown in S e c 12 of each general appropriation act since the 1949 Session of the Legislature:
T h e board of examiners shall promulgate and publish rules and regulations regarding the conduct and em-.
ployment of state officers and employees covering working hours, overtime,
sick leave, vacations and other matters
of personnel policy and enforce such
rules and regulations uniformly in all
state departments * * * shall adopt
rules and regulations * * *, with
regard to the establishment of salary
schedules for all state departments and
institutions * * *. No such salary
schedule shall be put into effect until
3*. Quoted ia See. 12. Ch. 194, 8XJM9W;
•bftilar Sec*. 12 of Ch. 199, 8X.UJ953;
Ch. 123, 8-101.1061; Ch. 98, SJUU.1949;
•ame duties upon personnel officer See.
12, Ch. 177, 8X.U.1967.

particular area relating to personnel, salaries and expenditures.
[5] Usually we are not concerned with
questions of policy, nor with the wisdom
of legislation. Yet where there is confusion because of conflict between statutes,
it is permissible to look to general governmental policies and purpose to interpret the
legislative intent In that vein there are
some considerations which provide a reasonable basis for concluding that the legislature regarded it as desirable and merefore intended that Education should be subject to the same regulations as other departments of state government: It is in
keeping with the fundamental policy of
checks and balances which characterizes
our entire system of government. It also
tends to keep control close to the people,
which is a touchstone of democracy. Examiners is made up of the three top executive officers of the state, who are directly
elected by and responsible to the people.
This is contrasted to the superintendent
who is now appointed by the members of
the Board of Education, whose measbers
are elected from the various districts of the
state, and whose terms are staggered to
that in practical operation the superintendent could exercise a relatively high i
of control over them and himself be <
paratively impervious to responsibiliry to
the public. There are also advantages in
99. Nehlen v. Clark, t note 28 aa***;
University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah
407, 99 P. 90, 98.
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having aonie common standards in refard
to departmental budgets, personnel requirements, salary schedules, vacations, sick
leave and other such matters in order to
snwihnite difficulties which may arise because of lack of uniformity, or even competition in the various state departments.*1
Were we interpreting; the statutes and
constitutional provisions relating to the
Board of Examiners for the first time we
night be more impressed by arguments
proposed by Education. However, history
and experience have always been the very
bone and sinew of the law. As stated by
the great Justice Holmes: "The life of the
law has not been logic; it has been experience." *•
Looking at the problems here presented
in broad perspective it is important to realize that our legislature has met biennially
and in special sessions for many years with
both the statutory and decisional law of
this state being so understood and applied
mat in practical operation the Examiners
and Finance have exercised general supervisory powers over thefiscaland budgetary
affairs of other departments of state government and no substantial changes have
been made in the law in reference thereto.

moot, there is no point in partknlariting
them.
Notwithstanding the powers conferred
upon Examiners by the statutes hereinabove discussed, which must be recognized;
oat does not mean that it can by arbitrary
actions in budgetary matters intrude into
the internal affairs of management or control of the functions of Education within
the purview of its purpose as provided by
law. The latter alone is given the authority and charged with the duty of the "administration of the system of public instruction'' in the schools of the state, In
order to discharge that responsibility it is
essential, and the law contemplates, that it
have full control of the framing of policy
and other aspects of the internal management of that department in accordance with
such purpose.

[6] It is our conclusion mat, short of
any such capricious or arbitrary actions,
the Board of Examiners and its administrative arm, the Commission of Finance, have
the authority to examine into and approve
or disapprove of proposed expenditures, to
adopt regulations pertaining generally to
salary schedules and personnel in accordance with the statutes conferring such powOn the basis of the constitutional provi- ers upon them, and that the Superintendent
sions, legislative enactments and decisional of Public Instruction and the Board of Edlaw of our state as it has developed, we are ucation are subject thereto in a similar
constrained to reject the contention of Ed- manner to other departments of state govucation that it is entirely free from control ernment.
Respective counsel are commended for
of or responsibility to Examiners. We do
not desire to be understood as Maying that their able and thorough presentations of the
Examiners can go so far as to in effect issues involved in this case.
exercise a veto power over legislation by
No costs awarded.
arbitrarily refusing to make funds available which have been appropriated to EduMCDONOUGH, C J , and WORTHEN,
cation for either general or specific pur- J., concur.
poses. Insofar as this has been done in
WADE, Justice (concurring).
certain instances which had considerable
bearing upon precipitating this litigation,
I concur with the main opinion, but think
such actions were wrong. But inasmuch as h desirable to point out that in certain inthe funds in question have reverted to the stances in the past Examiners, Finance
general fund, and the problems are sow -sd/cr the Governor have, by arbitrary
SI. 800 report on Stat* Gorornaent to
Tax Stndy Oommittoa by G. Homer Durham, p. 23.

S2. Hotmea, Tha Common Law, (38ta Ed.)

MOTZKUS v. OARROII,
OtoaaSSSFJdSn

m*h s n

actions, and contrary to the law as set forth
The sweeping statement of Mr. Justice
in the opinion, infringed upon the preroga- WADE, if taken literal*/, would dispossess
tives of the Superintendent of Public In- the Board of Examiners and Finance Comstruction and the Board of Education by mission of any control whatsoever as to any
unjustifiably interfering in their functions. and all existing or proposed salaries or perA long list of such grievances are com- tonnd1 irrespective of budgetary control,
plained of. I set out but a few by way of statutory restriction, necessity, amount of
example:
compensation or number of personnel, since
(a) Arbitrarily reduced the moneys ap- most of such grievances had to do with
propriated to Weber College for fiscal salaries and penonncL
1953-54 by $79,027.91.
(b) Refused to make available to U.S.
A.C (now US.U.) $20,000.00 which had
been appropriated and designated as a research fund.
(c) In April, 1953, reduced the appropriation to Weber College by $5,000.00 on
the day the fund was expendable.
TUtahMMT
(d) Arbitrarily refused to approve nu- Erwla MOTZKUS aai Laclllo Motokas, his
merous salary changes proposed by Educawife, Plaintiffs aad Respeadsats,
tion for administrative and supervisory perv.
Marvta CARROLL aad Elva Dwasa Carroll,
his wife, aad Mrs. Rath Kastptae,
Dafasdaata aad Appellants,
HENRIOD, Justice.
aad
I concur. However I cannot subscribe Zlos*s Savteas Bank * Trust Company, Treato the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
ts* far Carl M. Hanson, Defeaiast
WADE where he says "in certain instances
aad Respondent
No. 870ft.
in the past. Examiners, Finance and/or
Governor have, by arbitrary actions, and
Supreme Court of Utah,
contrary to tht law as set forth in the
March 10,1958.
opinion, infringed upon the prerogatives
of the Superintendent of Public Instruction
and the Board of Education by unjustifiably
Proceeding to determine wnether
interfering in their functions. A long list
of such grievances are complained of. I boundary line by acquiescence had been
established at fence between two tracts ol
set out but a few by way of example."
land. The Third Judicial District Court,
Such language assumes that each and Salt Lake County, Stewart M. Hanson, U
every one of the grievances complained of held that boundary had not been established,
by respondent was an unlawful usurpation and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court,
of power, including the four instances Wade, J, held that where for more than
pointed out by Mr. Justice WADE. Such 45 years mere was a fence between two
assumption cannot be indulged, since most tracts, respective owners and occupants
of the fifteen grievances which were
of each tract recognized, acquiesced in, and
claimed by respondent to have been unlawtreated such fence as marking boundary
ful usurpations of power represent factual
line between two tracts and claimed land
situations giving rise to highly debatable
up to such fence but did not claim any
legal questions, and most of which, in simland beyond it, boundary line by
ilar situations, have been held by this Court
cence was established at fence line.
«*f to have been any usurpation of power
at all, but a proper exercise thereof.
Reversed.

KsKJLM V. XUUJNU.
Syllabus.
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COLE v. YOUNG ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.
No. 442. Argued March 6, 1956.—Decided June 11, 1956.
The Act of August 26, 1950, gave to the heads of certain departments
and agencies of the Government summary suspension and unreviewable dismissal powers over their civilian employees, when
deemed necessary "in the interest of the national security," and
its provisions were extended to "all other departments and agencies
of the Government" by Executive Order No. 10450. Petitioner, a
preference-eligible veteran under the Veterans' Preference Act, was
summarily suspended from his classified civil service position as a
food and drug inspector for the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare on charges of close association with alleged Communists and an allegedly subversive organization. Later, he was
dismissed on the ground that his continued employment was not
"clearly consistent with the interests of national security." His
appeal to the Civil Service Commission under the Veterans' Preference Act was denied on the ground that that Act was inapplicable
to such discharges. Held: His discharge was not authorized by
the 1950 Act and hence it violated the Veterans' Preference Act.
Pp. 538-558.
1. The 1950 Act authorizes a dismissal only upon a determination
that it is "necessary or advisable in the interest of the national
security." Such a determination requires an evaluation of the
risk to the "national security" that the employee's retention would
create, which depends not only upon the character of the employee
and the likelihood of his misconducting himself but also upon the
nature of the position he occupies and its relationship to the
"national security." P. 542.
2. The 1950 Act is not the only, nor even the primary, source
of authority to dismiss government employees, and the question
in this case is not whether an employee can be dismissed on such
grounds but only the extent to which the summary procedures
authorized by the 1950 Act are available in such a case. Pp. 543544.
3. This depends on the meaning of the term "national security,"
as used in the 1950 Act. Pp. 542-544.
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4. The term "national security" is not defined in that Act, but
it is clear from the statute as a whole that it was intended to comprehend only those activities of the Government that are directly
concerned with the protection of the Nation from internal subversion or foreign aggression, and not those which contribute to
the strength of the Nation only through their impact on the general
welfare. Pp. 544-548.
5. This conclusion is supported by the legislative history of the
Act. Pp. 548-551.
6. A condition precedent to the exercise of the dismissal authority
conferred by the 1950 Act is a determination by the agency head
that the position occupied is one affected with the "national security," as that term is used in the Act. P. 551.
7. No determination was made that petitioner's position was
one in which he could adversely affect the "national security," as
that term is used in the Act. Pp. 551-558.
(a) Executive Order No. 10450 treats an adverse determination as to the loyalty of an employee as satisfying the statute,
irrespective of the character of his job or the effect his continued
employment might have upon the "national security." Pp. 551556.
(b) The failure of the Executive Order to state explicitly
what was meant is the fault of the Government, and any ambiguities should be resolved against the Government. P. 556.
(c) From the Secretary's determination that petitioner's employment was not "clearly consistent with the interests of national
security," in the light of the Executive Order, it may be assumed
only that the Secretary found the charges to be true and that they
created reasonable doubt as to petitioner's loyalty. Pp. 556-557.
96 U. S. App. D. C. 379, 226 F. 2d 337, reversed and remanded.

David L Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the brief were James H. Heller and Osmond K.
Fraenkel.
Donald B. MacGuineas argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Burger, Samuel D. Slade and
Benjamin Forman.
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Opinion of the Court by MH. JUSTICE HARLAV
announced by MR. JUSTICE BURTON.
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Petitioner, a preference-eligible veteran under § 2 of
the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 387, as
amended, 5 U. S. C. § 851, held a position in the classified
civil service as a food and drug inspector for the New York
of the United States whose employment is suspended under the
authority of this Act, shall be given after his suspension and before
his employment is terminated under the authority of this Act, (1) a
written statement within thirty days after his suspension of the
charges against him, which shall be subject to amendment within
thirty days thereafter and which shall be stated as specifically as
security considerations permit; (2) an opportunity within thirty
days thereafter (plus an additional thirty days if the charges are
amended) to answer such charges and to submit affidavits; (3) a
hearing, at the employee's request, by a duly constituted agency
authority for this purpose; (4) a review of his case by the agency
head, or some official designated by him, before a decision adverse
to the employee is made final; and (5) a written statement of the
decision of the agency head: Provided further, That any person
whose employment is so suspended or terminated under the authority
of this Act may, in the discretion of the agency head concerned, be
reinstated or restored to duty, and if so reinstated or restored shall
be allowed compensation for all or any part of the period of such
suspension or termination in an amount not to exceed the difference
between the amount such person would normally have earned during
the period of such suspension or termination, at the rate he was
receiving on the date of suspension or termination, as appropriate,
and the interim net earnings of such person: Provided further, That
the termination of employment herein provided shall not affect the
right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in
any other department or agency of the Government: Provided
further, That the head of any department or agency considering the
appointment of any person whose employment has been terminated
under the provisions of this Act may make such appointment only
after consultation with the Civil Service Commission, which agency
shall have the authority at the written request of either the head of
such agency or such employee to determine whether any such person
is eligible for employment by any other agency or department of
the Government.
"SEC. 3. The provisions of this Act shall apply to such other departments and agencies of the Government as the President may,
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Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, affirmed.
96 U. S. App. D. C. 379, 226 F. 2d 337. Because of
the importance of the questions involved in the field of
Government employment, we granted certiorari. 350
U. S. 900.
Section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act, 58 Stat.
390, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 863, provides that preference eligibles may be discharged only "for such cause as
will promote the efficiency of the service" and, among
other procedural rights, "shall have the right to appeal
to the Civil Service Commission," whose decision is made
binding on the employing agency. Respondents concede
that petitioner's discharge was invalid if that Act is controlling. They contend, however, as was held by the
courts below, that petitioner's discharge was authorized
by the Act of August 26, 1950, supra, which eliminates
the right of appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
Thus the sole question for decision is whether petitioner's
discharge was authorized by the 1950 Act.
The 1950 Act provides in material part that, notwithstanding any other personnel laws, the head of any
agency to which the Act applies
"may, in his absolute discretion and when deemed
necessary in the interest of national security, suspend, without pay, any civilian officer or employee
of [his agency] . . . . The agency head concerned
may, following such investigation and review as he
deems necessary, terminate the employment of such
suspended civilian officer or employee whenever he
shall determine such termination necessary or advisable in the interest of the national security of the
United States, and such determination by the agency
head concerned shall be conclusive and final: . . . ."
The Act was expressly made applicable only to the Departments of State, Commerce, Justice, Defense, Army,
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Navy, and Air Force, the Coast Guard, the Atomic Energy
Commission, the National Security Resources Board, and
the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. Section 3 of the Act provides, however, that the Act may be
extended "to such other departments and agencies of the
Government as the President may, from time to time,
deem necessary in the best interests of national security,"
and the President has extended the Act under this authority "to all other departments and agencies of the Government" * While the validity of this extension of the Act
depends upon questions which are in many respects common to those determining the validity of the Secretary's
exercise of the authority thereby extended to her,3 we will
restrict our consideration to the latter issue and assume,
for purposes of this decision, that the Act has validly been
extended to apply to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
The Act authorizes dismissals only upon a determination by the Secretary that the dismissal is "necessary or
advisable in the interest of the national security." That
determination requires an evaluation of the risk of injury
to the "national security" that the employee's retention
would create, which in turn would seem necessarily to be
a function, not only of the character of the employee and
the likelihood of his misconducting himself, but also of
the nature of the position he occupies and its relationship
to the "national security." That is, it must be determined whether the position is one in which the employee's
misconduct would affect the "national security." That, of
course, would not be necessary if "national security" were
*§ 1, Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489, set forth in the
Appendix, past, p. 558.
8

Secretary Folsom, the present Secretary of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, has been substituted as respondent
for the former Secretary Hobby.
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used in the Act in a sense so broad as to be involved in all
activities of the Government, for then the relationship to
the "national security" would follow from the very fact of
employment. For the reasons set forth below, however,
we conclude (1) that the term "national security" is used
in the Act in a definite and limited sense and relates only
to those activities which are directly concerned with the
Nation's safety, as distinguished from the general welfare; and (2) that no determination has been made that
petitioner's position was affected with the "national security," as that term is used in the Act. It follows that his
dismissal was not authorized by the 1950 Act and hence
violated the Veterans' Preference Act.
I.
In interpreting the 1950 Act, it is important to note
that that Act is not the only, nor even the primary, source
of authority to dismiss Government employees. The
general personnel laws—the Lloyd-LaFollette4 and Veterans' Preference Acts5—authorize dismissals for "such
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service," and
the ground which we conclude was the basis for petitioner's discharge here—a reasonable doubt as to his
loyalty—was recognized as a "cause" for dismissal under
those procedures as early as 1942.* Indeed, the President's so-called Loyalty Program, Exec. Order No. 9835,
12 Fed. Reg. 1935, which prescribed an absolute standard
of loyalty to be met by all employees regardless of position, had been established pursuant to that general authority three years prior to the 1950 Act and remained in
4

§6, 37 Stat. 555. as amended, 5 U. S. C. §652.
§ 14, 58 Stat. 390, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 863.
6
Civil Service War Regulations, § 185 (c) (7), September 26, 1942,
5 CFR, Cum. Supp., § 182 (c) (7).
5

COLE v. YOUNG.
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relations, internal security, and the stock-piling of strategic materials. Nor is this conclusion vitiated by the
grant of authority to the President, in § 3 of the Act, to
extend the Act to such other agencies as he "may, from
time to time, deem necessary in the best interests of
national security." Rather, the character of the named
agencies indicates the character of the determination
required to be made to effect such an extension. Aware
of the difficulties of attempting an exclusive enumeration and of the undesirability of a rigid classification in
the face of changing circumstances, Congress simply
enumerated those agencies which it determined to be
affected with the "national security" and authorized the
President, by making a similar determination, to add
any other agencies which were, or became, "sensitive."
That it was contemplated that this power would be exercised "from time to time" confirms the purpose to allow
for changing circumstances and to require a selective
judgment, necessarily implying that the standard to be
applied is a less than all-inclusive one.
The limitation of the Act to the enumerated agencies
is particularly significant in the light of the fact that
Exec. Order No. 9835, establishing the Loyalty Program,
was in full effect at the time of the consideration and
passage of the Act. In that Order, the President had expressed his view that it was of "vital importance" that oil
employees of the Government be of "complete and
unswerving loyalty" and had prescribed a minimum loyalty standard to be applied to all employees under the
normal civil service procedures. Had Congress considered the objective of insuring the "unswerving loyalty"
of all employees, regardless of position, as a matter of
"national security" to be effectuated by the summary
procedures authorized by the Act, rather than simply a
desirable personnel policy to be implemented under the
normal civil service procedures, it surely would not
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Wtanrtedtbe Act to adected agencies. Presumably,
uaetore, Congress meant something more by the
interest of the national security" than the general
interest the Nation has in the loyalty of even "nonaenative" employees.
We canfindno justification for rejecting this implicat e of the limited purpose of the Act or for inferring the
«£umted power contended for by the Government.
Where apphcable, the Act authorizes the agency head
wnimanly to suspend an employee pending investigation and after charges and a hearing,finallyto terminate
e
T T n e n t ' 8 u c h fetation not being subject to
appeal. There is an obvious justification for the summarysuspension power where the employee occupies a
sensitive position in which he could cause serious
damage to the national security during the delay incident to an investigation and the preparation of charges,
likewise, there is a reasonable basis for the view that an
agency head who must bear the responsibility for the protection of classified information committed to his custody
should have the final say in deciding whether to repose
hw trust ini an employee who has access to such information. On the other hand, it is difficult to justify summary suspensions and unreviewable dismissals on loyalty
grounds of employees who are not in "sensitive" positions
and who are thus not situated where they could bring
about any discernible adverse effects on the Nation's security^ in the absence of an immediate threat of harm to
the national security," the normal dismissal procedures
seem fufly adequate and the justification for summary
powers disappears. Indeed, in view of the stigma atdkmi8sed on
fortrl^rT011,8
***** grounds, the need
-ura.
safeguards
seems even greater than in other
F
n o t Hghtly assume
Z S L S V T t **"
* • * Congress
intended to take away those safeguards in the absence of
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some overriding necessity, such as exists in the case of
employees handling defense secrets.
The 1950 Act itself reflects Congress' concern for the
procedural rights of employees and its desire to limit the
unreviewable dismissal power to the minimum scope
necessary to the purpose of protecting activities affected
with the "national security." A proviso to § 1 of the Act
provides that a dismissal by one agency under the power
granted by the Act "shall not affect the right of such
officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any
other department or agency of the Government," if the
Civil Service Commission determines that the employee
is eligible for such other employment. That is, the
unreviewable dismissal power was to be used only for
the limited purpose of removing the employee from the
position in which his presence had been determined to
endanger the "national security"; it could affect his right
to employment in other agencies only if the Civil Service
Commission, after review, refused to clear him for such
employment. This effort to preserve the employee's procedural rights to the maximum extent possible hardly
seems consistent with an intent to define the scope of the
dismissal power in terms of the indefinite and virtually
unlimited meaning for which the respondents contend.
Moreover, if Congress intended the term to have such
a broad meaning that all positions in the Government
could be said to be affected with the "national security,"
the result would be that the 1950 Act, though in form but
an exception to the general personnel laws, could be
utilized effectively to supersede those laws. For why
could it not be said that national security in that sense
requires not merely loyal and trustworthy employees but
also those that are industrious and efficient? The relationship of the job to the national security being the
same, its demonstrated inadequate performance because
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of inefficiency or incompetence would seem to present a
surer threat to national security, in the sense of the
general welfare, than a mere doubt as to the employee's
loyalty.
Finally, the conclusion we draw from the face of the
Act that "national security" was used in a limited and
definite sense is amply supported by the legislative
history of the Act.
In the first place, it was constantly emphasized that
the bill, first introduced as S. 1561 in the 80th Congress
and passed as H. R. 7439 in the 81st Congress, was
intended to apply, or to be extended, only to "sensitive"
agencies, a term used to imply a close and immediate
concern with the defense of the Nation.8 Thus the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, in reporting out
S. 1561, stated:
"This bill provides authority to terminate employment of indiscreet or disloyal employees who are
employed in areas of the Government which are
sensitive from the standpoint of national security.
"[Section 3 will permit] the President to determine additional sensitive areas and include such
Ce t
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areas in the scope of the authorities contained in
this bill.
.

.

.

•

•

"Insofar as the [addition of § 3] is concerned, it
was recognized by all witnesses that there were other
sensitive areas within the various departments of the
Government which are now, or might in the future
become, deeply involved in national security. . . .
In view . . . of the fact that there are now and will
be in the future other sensitive areas of equal
importance to the national security, it is believed
that the President should have authority to make a
finding concerning such areas and by Executive
action place those areas under the authorities contained in this act." 9
The House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
reported that "The provisions of the bill extend only to
departments and agencies which are concerned with vital
matters affecting the national security of our Nation." 10
The committee reports on H. R. 7439 in the next
Congress similarly referred to the bill as granting the dismissal power only to the heads of the "sensitive" agencies.11 While these references relate primarily to the agencies to be covered by the Act, rather than to the exercise
of the power within an agency, the standard for both is
the same—in the "interests of the national security"—and
the statements thus clearly indicate the restricted sense
in which "national security" was used. In short, "national security" is affected only by "sensitive" activities.
•S. Rep. No. 1155, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 2-4.
10
H. R. Rep. No. 2264, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2.
11
H. R. Rep. No. 2330, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 2-5; S. Rep.
No. 2158,81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2.
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Secondly, the history makes clear that the Act was
intended to authorize the suspension and dismissal only
of persons in sensitive positions. Throughout the hearings, committee reports, and debates, the bill was described as being designed to provide for the dismissal of
"security risks." " In turn, the examples given of what
might be a "security risk" always entailed employees
having access to classified materials; they were security
risks because of the risk they posed of intentional or
inadvertent disclosure of confidential information.13 Mr.
Larkin, a representative of the Department of Defense,
which Department had requested and drafted the bill,
made this consideration more explicit:
"They are security risks because of their access to
confidential and classified material. . . . But if
they do not have classified material, why, there is no
notion that they are security risks to the United
States. They are security risks to the extent of
having access to classified material." "
"A person is accused of being disloyal, but is
cleared by the loyalty board, because there is not
12
E. g., S. Rep. No. 215S, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2: "The purpose
of the bill is to increase the authority of the heads of Government
departments engaged in sensitive activities to summarily suspend
employees considered to be bad security risks . . . ."
18
For example, Mr. Murray, the Chairman of the Committee on
Post Office and Civil Service, which had reported the bill, gave the
following illustration of the purpose of the bill in opening the debate
in the House: "For instance, an employee who is working in some
highly sensitive agency doing very confidential, secret defense work
and who goes out and gets too much liquor may unintentionally or
unwittingly, because of his condition, confide to someone who may
be a subversive, secret military information about the character of
work he is doing in that department. He is, by his conduct, a bad
security risk and should be discharged." 96 Cong. Rec. 10017.
14
Hearings, House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, on
H. R. 7439,81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 67.
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enough evidence against him. If that person is not
in a sensitive job, it is not of any further concern to
us. We are willing to take the view, that while we
might have misgivings aboin his loyalty, he cannot prejudice our security because he does not
have access to any of the classified or top secret
material.,, 1S
It is clear, therefore, both from ihe face of the Act and
the legislative history, that "national security" was not
used in the Act in an all-inclusive sense, but was intended
to refer only to the protection of "sensitive" activities.
It follows that an employee cac be dismissed "in the
interest of the national security" mder the Act only if he
occupies a "sensitive" position, ani thus that a condition
precedent to the exercise of the csmissal authority is a
determination by the agency head ihat the position occupied is one affected with the "nidonal security." We
now turn to an examination of tin Secretary's action to
show that no such determination was made as to the
position occupied by petitioner.
II.
The Secretary's action in dismisng the petitioner was
expressly taken pursuant to EEC. Order No. 10450,
18 Fed. Reg. 2489,16 promulgated in April 1953 to provide uniform standards and procedires for the exercise by
agency heads of the suspension and dismissal powers
under the 1950 Act. That Orier prescribes as the
standard for dismissal, and the disnissal notice given to
petitioner contained, a determinsion by the Secretary
that the employee's retention in employment "is not
clearly consistent with the interests of national secuM

Id., at p. 72.

lf

The relevant portions of the Executive Order, as it stood at the
time of petitioner's suspension and disaarge, are printed in the
Appendix, post, p. 558.
380673 0—56
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rity." n Despite this verbal formula, however, it is our
view that the Executive Order does not in fact require
the agency head to make any determination whatever on
the relationship of the employee's retention to the
"national security1' if the charges against him are within
the categories of the charges against petitioner—that is,
charges which reflect on the employee's loyalty. Rather,
as we read the Order, it enjoins upon the agency heads the
duty of discharging any employee of doubtful loyalty,
irrespective of the character of his job and its relationship to the "national security." That is, the Executive
Order deems an adverse determination as to loyalty to
satisfy the requirements of the statute without more.
The opening preamble to the Order recites, among
other things, that "the interests of the national security
require" that "all" Government employees be persons "of
complete and unswerving loyalty." It would seem to
follow that an employee's retention cannot be "clearly
consistent" with the "interests of the national security"
as thus defined unless he is "clearly" loyal—that is, unless
there is no doubt as to his loyalty. And § 8 (a) indicates
that that is in fact what was intended by the Order. That
section provides that the investigation of an employee
pursuant to the Order shall be designed to develop
information "as to whether . . . [his employment] is
1T
Section 6 of the Order, which formally prescribes the standards
for "termination," in terms adopts the very language of the statute,
"necessary or advisable in the interests of the national security."
Section 7, however, provides that a suspended employee "shall not
be reinstated9' unless the agency head determines that reinstatement
is "dearly consistent with the interests of the national security."
Since nonreinstatement of a suspended employee is equivalent to
the termination of bis employment, it is apparent that the "clearly
consistent" standard of § 7 is the controlling one. See also §§ 2, 8,
and 3 (a). In the view we take of the case, we need not determine
whether the "clearly consistent" standard is, as petitioner contends,
a more onerous one than the "necessary or advisable" standard.
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clearly consistent with the interests of the national security," and prescribes certain categories of facts to which
"such" information shall relate. The first category,
§8 (a)(1), includes nonloyalty-oriented facts which, in
general, might reflect upon the employee's reliability,
trustworthiness, or susceptibility to coercion, such as dishonesty, drunkenness, sexual perversion, mental defects,
or other reasons to believe that he is subject to influence
or coercion. Section 8 (a)(1) expressly provides, however, that such facts are relevant only "depending on the
relation of the Government employment to the national
security." The remaining categories include facts which,
in general, reflect upon the employee's "loyalty," such as
acts of espionage, advocacy of violent overthrow of the
Government, sympathetic association with persons who
so advocate, or sympathetic association with subversive
organizations. §8 (a)(2)-(8). Significantly, there is
wholly absent from these categories—under which the
charges against petitioner were expressly framed—any
qualification making their relevance dependent upon the
relationship of the employee's position to the national
security. The inference we draw is that in such cases
the relationship to the national security is irrelevant,
and that an adverse "loyalty" determination is sufficient
ex propria vigor e to require discharge.
Arguably, this inference can be avoided on the ground
that § 8 (a) relates only to the scope of information to be
developed in the investigation and not to the evaluation
of it by the agency head. That is, while loyalty information is to be developed in all cases regardless of the
nature of the employment, that does not mean that
the agency head should not consider the nature of the
employment in determining whether the derogatory
information is sufficient to make the employee's continued employment not "clearly consistent" with the
"national security." No doubt that is true to the extent
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that the greater the sensitivity of the position the smaller
may be the doubts that would justify termination; the
Order undoubtedly leaves it open to an agency head to
apply a stricter standard in some cases than in others,
depending on the nature of the employment. On the
other hand, by making loyalty information relevant in all
cases, regardless of the nature of the job, § 8 (a) seems
strongly to imply that there is a minimum standard of
loyalty that must be met by all employees. It would follow that the agency head may terminate employment in
cases where that minimum standard is not met without
making any independent determination of the potential
impact of the person's employment on the national
security.
Other provisions of the Order confirm the inferences
that may be drawn from § 8 (a). Thus § 3 (b) directs
each agency head to designate as "sensitive" those positions in his agency "the occupant of which could bring
about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material
adverse effect on the national security." By definition,
therefore, some employees are admittedly not in a
position to bring about such an effect. Nevertheless, the
Order makes this distinction relevant only for purposes
of determining the scope of the investigation to be
conducted, not for purposes of limiting the dismissal
power to such "sensitive" positions. Section 3 (a) is more
explicit. That provides that the appointment of all
employees shall be made subject to an investigation the
scope of which shall depend upon the degree of adverse
effect on the national security the occupant of the position could bring about, but which "in no event" is to be
less than a prescribed minimum. But the sole purpose of
such an investigation is to provide a basis for a "clearly
consistent7' determination. Thus the requirement of a
minimum investigation of all persons appointed implies
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that an adverse "clearly consistent7 determination may
be made as to any such employee, regardless of the potential adverse effect he could cause to tie national security.
Finally, the second "Whereas" claise of the preamble
recites as a justification for the Crder that "all persons . . . privileged to be employee . . . [by the Government should] be adjudged by mraially consistent and
no less than minimum standards," this implying that the
Order prescribes minimum standard? that all employees
must meet irrespective of the chara;ter of the positions
held, one of which is the "complete and unswerving
loyalty" standard recited in the first "Whereas" clause of
the preamble.
Confirmation of this reading of tie Order is found in
its history. Exec. Order No. 9835, sipra, as amended by
Exec. Order No. 10241, 16 Fed. R*g. 3690, had established the Loyalty Program under vhich all employees,
regardless of their positions, were nade subject to discharge if there was a "reasonable doibt" as to their loyalty. That Order was expressly revoked by § 12 of the
present Executive Order. There in no indication, however, that it was intended thereby *o limit the scope of
the persons subject to a loyalty stancard. And any such
implication is negatived by the renurkable similarity in
the preambles to the two Orders and JI the kinds of information considered to be relevant to tie ultimate determinations.18 In short, all employees ws-e still to be subject
to at least a minimum loyalty staidard, though under
18

Executive Order No. 9835 recited that it was "of vital importance" that all employees be of "complete md unswerving loyalty";
Exec. Order No. 10450 recites that "the uterests of the national
security require" that all employees be of * complete and unswerving
loyalty." Executive Order No. 9835 HsteL six factors to be considered "in connection with the determinaxon of disloyalty" (Pt. V,
§ 2); these are repeated in substantially idemcal form in §§ 8 (a) (2),
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other finding was required to support the Secretary's
action.1*
From our holdings (1) that not all positions in the
Government are affected with the "national security" as
that term is used in the 1950 Act, and (2) that no determination has been made that petitioner's position was
one in which he could adversely affect the "national security," it necessarily follows that petitioner's discharge was
not authorized by the 1950 Act. In reaching this conclusion, we are not confronted with the problem of reviewing
the Secretary's exercise of discretion, since the basis for
our decision is simply that the standard prescribed by the
Executive Order and applied by the Secretary is not in
conformity with the Act.20 Since petitioner's discharge
19

That the Secretary similarly interpreted the Executive Order
and did not in fact determine that petitioner's job was a "sensitive"
one is confirmed by the respondents' concession that petitioner "did
not have access to Government secrets or classified material and was
not in a position to influence policy against the interests of the Government." Respondents' Brief, pp. 3-4; Record, p. 40.
20
No contention is made that the Executive Order might be sustained under the President's executive power even though in violation
of the Veterans' Preference Act. There is no basis for such an argument in any event, for it is clear from the face of the Executive
Order that the President did not intend to override statutory limitations on the dismissal of employees, and promulgated the Order
solely as an implementation of the 1950 Act. Thus § 6 of the Order
purports to authorize dismissals only "in accordance with the said
Act of August 26, 1950," and similar references are made in §§ 4, 5,
and 7. This explicit limitation in the substantive provisions of the
Order is of course not weakened by the inclusion of the "Constitution," as well as the 1950 and other Acts, in the omnibus list of
authorities recited in the Preamble to the Order; it is from the
Constitution that the President derives any authority to implement
the 1950 Act at all. When the President expressly confines his action
to the limits of statutory authority, the validity of the action must be
determined solely by the congressional limitations which the President
sought to respect, whatever might be the result were the President
ever to assert his independent power against that of Congress.
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was not autiwmed by the 1950 Act and hence violated the
Veterans Preference Act, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
[For dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE CLARK, joined
y

p. ^t\
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APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450.
(18 Fed. Reg. 2489, as amended by Exec. Order No. 10491, Oct 13
1953, 18 Fed. Reg. 6583.)
' '
WHEREAS the interests of the national security require that all persons privileged to be employed in the
departments and agencies of the Government, shall be
reliable trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and
of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United Statesand
'
WHEREAS the American tradition that all persons
should receive fair, impartial, and equitable treatment at
the hands of the Government requires that all persons
seeking the privilege of employment or privileged to be
emp oyed in the departments and agencies of the Government be adjudged by mutually consistent and no less
than minimum standards and procedures among the departments and agencies governing the employment and
retention m employment of persons in the Federal service •
i? W 'u T ^ EREF0RE ' b y V i r t u e o f t h e authority vested in
me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States
including section 1753 of the Revised Statutes of the

536

Appendix to Opinion of the Court.

United States (5 U. S. C. 631); the Civil Service Act of
1883 (22 Stat. 403; 5 U. S. C. 632, et seq.); section 9A of
the act of August 2,1939, 53 Stat. 1148 (5 U. S. C. 118 j) ;
and the act of August 26, 1950, 64 Stat. 476 (5 U. S. C.
22-1, et seq.), and as President of the United States, and
deeming such action necessary in the best interests of the
national security, it is hereby ordered as follows:
SECTION 1. In addition to the departments and agencies
specified in the said act of August 26,1950, and Executive
Order No. 10237 of April 26, 1951, the provisions of that
act shall apply to all other departments and agencies of
the Government.
SEC. 2. The head of each department and agency of
the Government shall be responsible for establishing and
maintaining within his department or agency an effective
program to insure that the employment and retention in
employment of any civilian officer or employee within
the department or agency is clearly consistent with the
interests of the national security.
SEC. 3. (a) The appointment of each civilian officer or
employee in any department or agency of the Government shall be made subject to investigation. The scope
of the investigation shall be determined in the first instance according to the degree of adverse effect the occupant of the position sought to be filled could bring about,
by virtue of the nature of the position, on the national
security, but in no event shall the investigation include
less than a national agency check (including a check of
the fingerprint files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation), and written inquiries to appropriate local lawenforcement agencies, former employers and supervisors,
references, and schools attended by the person under
investigation: Provided, that upon request of the head
of the department or agency concerned, the Civil Service
Commission may, in its discretion, authorize such less
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investigation as may meet the requirements of the
national security with respect to per-diem, intermittent,
temporary, or seasonal employees, or aliens employed
outside the United States. Should there develop at any
stage of investigation information indicating that the
employment of any such person may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, there
shall be conducted with respect to such person a full field
investigation, or such less investigation as shall be sufficient to enable the head of the department or agency
concerned to determine whether retention of such person
is clearly consistent with the interests of the national
security.
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been conducted a full field investigation under Executive
Order No. 9835 of March 21,1947, and, after such further
investigation as may be appropriate, shall re-adjudicate,
or cause to be re-adjudicated, in accordance with the said
act of August 26, 1950, such of those cases as have not
been adjudicated under a security standard commensurate
with that established under this order.
SEC. 5. Whenever there is developed or received by
any department or agency information indicating that
the retention in employment of any officer or employee
of the Government may not be clearly consistent with
the interests of the national security, such information
shall be forwarded to the head of the employing department or agency or his representative, who, after such
investigation as may be appropriate, shall review, or
cause to be reviewed, and, where necessary, re-adjudicate,
or cause to be re-adjudicated, in accordance with the said
act of August 26,1950, the case of such officer or employee.
SEC. 6. Should there develop at any stage of investigation information indicating that the employment of any
officer or employee of the Government may not be clearly
consistent with the interests of the national security, the
head of the department or agency concerned or his representative shall immediately suspend the employment of
the person involved if he deems such suspension necessary in the interests of the national security and, following such investigation and review as he deems necessary,
the head of the department or agency concerned shall
terminate the employment of such suspended officer or
employee whenever he shall determine such termination
necessary or advisable in the interests of the national
security, in accordance with the said act of August 26,
1950.
SEC. 7. Any person whose employment is suspended or
terminated under the authority granted to heads of de-
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partments and agencies by or in accordance with the said
act of August 26, 1950, or pursuant to the said Executive
Order No. 9835 or any other security or loyalty program
relating to officers or employees of the Government, shall
not be reinstated or restored to duty or reemployed in
the same department or agency and shall not be reemployed in any other department or agency, unless the head
of the department or agency concerned finds that such
reinstatement, restoration, or reemployment is clearly
consistent with the interests of the national security,
whichfindingshall be made a part of the records of such
department or agency: Provided, that no person whose
employment has been terminated under such authority
thereafter may be employed by any other department or
agency except after a determination by the Civil Service
Commission that such person is eligible for such
employment.
SEC. 8. (a) The investigations conducted pursuant to
this order shall be designed to develop information as to
whether the employment or retention in employment in
the Federal service of the person being investigated is
clearly consistent with the interests of the national security. Such information shall relate, but shall not be
limited, to the following:
(1) Depending on the relation of the Government
employment to the national security:
(i) Any behavior, activities, or associations which
tend to show that the individual is not reliable or
trustworthy.
(ii) Any deliberate misrepresentations, falsifications, or omissions of material facts.
(iii) Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral,
or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use
of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, or sexual
perversion.

Appendix to Opinion of the Court.

(iv) An adjudication of insanity, or treatment for
serious mental or neurological disorder without satisfactory evidence of cure.*
(v) Any facts which furnish reason to believe
that the individual may be subjected to coercion,
influence, or pressure which may cause him to act
contrary to the best interests of the national security.
(2) Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage,
treason, or sedition, or attempts thereat or preparation
therefor, or conspiring with, or aiding or abetting, another
to commit or attempt to commit any act of sabotage,
espionage, treason, or sedition.
(3) Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist,
or revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret
agent or representative of a foreign nation, or any representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be
inimical to the interests of the United States, or with
any person who advocates the use of force or violence to
overthrow the government of the United States or the
alteration of the form of government of the United States
by unconstitutional means.
(4) Advocacy of use of force or violence to overthrow
the government of the United States, or of the alteration
of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
(5) Membership in, or affiliation or sympathetic
association with, any foreign or domestic organization,
•After the date of petitioner's discharge, this paragraph was
amended, by Exec. Order No. 10548, Aug. 2, 1954, 19 Fed. Reg.
4871, to read:
"(iv) Any illness, including any mental condition, of a nature
which in the opinion of competent medical authority may cause
significant defect in the judgment or reliability of the employee, with
due regard to the transient or continuing effect of the illness and
the medical findings in such case."

COLE t;. YOUNG.
Appendix to Opinion of the Court.
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of this order, and the Department of Justice shall continue to furnish the information described in paragraph 3
of Part III of the said Executive Order No. 9835, but
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T H E WHITE HOUSE,

April 27, J95S.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK, with whom MR. JUSTICE REED and
MR. JUSTICE MINTON join, dissenting.

Believing that the Court should not strike down the
President's Executive Order on employee security by an
interpretation that admittedly "rests upon a chain of
inferences," we cannot agree to the judgment of reversal.
In our opinion, the clear purpose of the Congress in enacting the Summary Suspension Act, 64 Stat. 476, is frustrated, and the Court's opinion raises a serious question
of presidential power under Article II of the Constitution
which it leaves entirely undecided.
Petitioner, a food and drug inspector employed in the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, was
charged with having "established and . . . continued a
close association with individuals reliably reported to be
Communists/' It was further charged that he had "maintained a continued and sympathetic association with the
Nature Frienda of America, which organization" is on
the Attorney General's list; and "by [his] own admission, donated funds" to that group, contributed services
to it and attended social gatherings of the same. Petitioner did not answer the charges but replied that they
constituted an invasion of his private rights of associa-
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tion. Although advised that he could have a hearing,
he requested none, and was thereafter dismissed. The
Secretary made a formal determination that petitioner's
continued employment was not "clearly consistent with
the interests of the national security/' a determination
entrusted to her by the Suspension Act. Although "such
determination by the agency head concerned shall be
conclusive and final" under the Act, the Court, by its
interpretation, finds "that not all positions in the Government are affected with the 'national security' as that
term is used . . . and that no determination has been
made that petitioner's position was one in which he could
adversely affect the 'national security.'" It, therefore,
strikes down the President's Executive Order because
"the standard prescribed by [it] and applied by the
Secretary is not in conformity with the Act." This
compels the restoration of the petitioner to Government
service. We cannot agree.
We have read the Act over and over again, but find no
ground on which to infer such an interpretation. It flies
directly in the face of the language of the Act and the
legislative history. The plain words of § 1 make the Act
applicable to "any civilian officer or employee," not, as
the majority would have it, "any civilian officer or employee in a sensitive position." The Court would require
not only a finding that a particular person is subversive,
but also that he occupies a sensitive job. Obviously this
might leave the Government honeycombed with subversive employees.
Although the Court assumes the validity of the President's action under § 3 extending the coverage of the Act
to all Government agencies, the reasoning of the opinion
makes that extension a fortiori unauthorized. The limitation the Court imposes deprives the extension of any
force, despite the fact that § 3 has no limiting words whatever. And this is done in the face of legislative history
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showing that Congress clearly contemplated that the
coverage might be extended without limitation "to such
other departments and agencies of the Government"
that the President thought advisable. Senator Byrd
commented, "Section 3 gives the President the right to
classify every agency as a sensitive agency . . . . He
could take the whole Government." And Senator Chapman remarked, "I do not see why the whole Government
is not sensitive as far as that is concerned." Hearings
before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess., on H. R. 7439, pp. 15-16. Also, Congressman Holifield, during debates in the House, stated
that the Act "applies potentially to every executive
agency, not only the sensitive ones. . . . There is no
distinction made in the bill between so-called sensitive
employees, that is, employees who have access to
confidential and secret information, and the regular
employees." 96 Cong. Rec. 10023-10024.
The President believed that the national security
required the extension of the coverage of the Act to all
employees. That was his judgment, not ours. He was
given that power, not us. By this action the Court so
interprets the Act as to intrude itself into presidential
policy making. The Court should not do this, especially
where Congress has ratified the President's action. As
required by the Act, the Executive Order was reported to
the Congress and soon thereafter it came up for discussion
and action in both the House and the Senate. It was the
sense of the Congress at that time that the Order properly
carried out the standards of the Act and was in all
respects an expression of the congressional will. 99 Cong.
Rec. 4511-4543, 5818-5990. In addition, Congress has
made appropriations each subsequent year for investigations, etc., under its provisions. This in itself "stands as
confirmation and ratification of the action of the Chief
380673 0 - 3 6
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Executive." Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber
Co., 331 U.S. I l l , 116.
The President having extended the coverage of the
Act to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, it became the duty of the Secretary to dismiss any
employee whenever she deemed it "necessary or advisable in the interests of national security." She made
such a finding. It is implicit in her order of dismissal.
Her "evaluation as to the effect which continuance of
[petitioner's] employment might have upon the 'national
security'" has been made. She decided that he should
be dismissed. Under the Act this determination is "conclusive and final."
There is still another reason why we should sustain the
President's Executive Order. By striking it down, the
Court raises a question as to the constitutional power
of the President to authorize dismissal of executive
employees whose further employment he believes to be
inconsistent with national security. This power might
arise from the grant of executive power in Article II of the
Constitution, and not from the Congress. The opinion of
the majority avoids this important point which must be
faced by any decision holding an Executive Order inoperative.* It is the policy of the Court to avoid constitu*The majority excuses its failure to pass on this question by saying
that no contention was made that the President's Order might be
sustained under his executive powers. We cannot agree. The Government specifically asserted that "if Congress had meant to prohibit
the President from acting in this respect under [the Act] a serious
question as to the validity of that enactment would arise." It
devoted eight pages of its brief to this point. Furthermore, the
Court of Appeals noted that if it "thought the President's Order
inconsistent with the act . . . [it] would have to decide the constitutional question thus presented." 96 U. S. App. D. C. 379, 382, 226
F. 2d 337, 340. As further justification, the majority contends
that the President acted here only under the directions of the
Act. In answer, we need quote only the enacting clause of the Presi-
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tional questions where possible, Peters v. Hobby, 349
U. S. 331,338, not to create them.
We believe the Court's order has stricken down the
most effective weapon against subversive activity available to the Government. It is not realistic to say that
the Government can be protected merely by applying the
Act to sensitive jobs. One never knows just which job
is sensitive. The janitor might prove to be in as important a spot security-wise as the top employee in the building. The Congress decided that the most effective way
to protect the Government was through the procedures
laid down in the Act. The President implemented its
purposes by requiring that Government employment be
"clearly consistent" with the national security. The
President's standard is "complete and unswerving loyalty" not only in sensitive places but throughout the Government. The President requires, and every employee
should give, no less. This is all that the Act and the
Order require. They should not be subverted by the
technical interpretation the majority places on them
today. We would affirm.

dent's Order: "Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in
me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States . . . and
as President of the United States." Executive Order No. 10450,
18 Fed. Reg. 2489. In issuing the Order, the President invoked
all of his powers, and since his Order is voided by the majority
as not being in conformity with the Act, the question of the scope
of his other constitutional or statutory powers is presented.
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22A-23A. Although the instructions left the issue of intent
to the jury, the plurality finds that neither we nor the state
courts may assess the effect of the presumption on the jury's
verdict. It imposes instead an automatic reversal rule that
would be applicable even when proof of intent to murder is
established beyond any doubt. See n. 6, supra. Such a rule
is precisely what Chapman rejected.
V
For the reasons stated, I think this Court properly could
decide the question of harmless error. Normally, however,
this is a question more appropriately left to the courts below.
Hie Connecticut Supreme Court did not address the question, nor has it been briefed extensively here. There may be
facts and circumstances not apparent from the record before
is. I therefore would reverse the judgment and remand the
:ase for consideration of whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Syllabus

DICKERSON, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL,
TOBACCO AND FIREARMS v. NEW BANNER
INSTITUTE, INC.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 81-1180. Argued November 29, 1982—Decided February 23, 1983
Title IV of the Gun Control Act of 1968,18 U. S. C. §§ 922(g)(1) and (hXD,
makes it unlawful for any person "who has been convicted . . . o f . . . a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" to
ship, transport, or receive any firearm or ammunition in interstate commerce. Title IV also makes it unlawful to engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms without a licensefromthe
Secretary of the Treasury. One ground for denial of a license is where
the applicant is under the prohibitions imposed by §§ 922(g)(1) and (h)(1),
and if the applicant is a corporation, a license will be denied if a person
with power to direct the management of the corporation is under such
prohibitions. One Kennison, the chairman of the board and a shareholder of respondent corporation, after plea negotiations, pleaded guilty
in an Iowa state court to the state crime of carrying a concealed handgun. This crime was punishable by afineor imprisonment for not more
than five years, or both. The state court, however, pursuant to an Iowa
statute, "deferred" entry of a formal judgment and placed Kennison on
probation. At the completion of his probation term he was discharged,
also pursuant to a state statute, and his record with respect to the deferred judgment was expunged. Subsequently, respondent applied to
the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(Bureau) for licenses as a firearms and ammunition dealer and manufacturer, but did not disclose Kennison's plea of guilty to the Iowa concealed
weapon charge. The licenses were issued but were later revoked when
the Bureau learned of the Iowa charge. The District Court upheld the
revocation, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that although
Kennison had been "convicted" of an offense that triggered firearms disabilities, that fact could not serve as a predicate for a Gun Control Act
violation or license revocation because the conviction had been expunged
under the Iowa deferred judgment procedure.
Held: The firearms disabilities imposed by §§ 922(gXl) and (hXl) apply to
Kennison and were not removed by the expunction of the record of his
guilty plea to the concealed weapon charge. Pp. 110-122.
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(a) For purposes of the federal gun control laws, a plea of guilty to a
disqualifying crime and its notation by a state court, followed by a sentence of probation, is equivalent to being "convicted" within the language of §§ 922(gXD and (hXD. Pp. 111-114.
(b) Iowa's expunction provisions, as carried out in Kennison's case
prior to respondent's license applications, did not nullify his conviction
for purposes of the federal statute. Expunction under state law does
not alter the legality of the previous conviction, does not open the way to
a license despite the conviction, and does not signify that the defendant
was innocent of the crime to which he pleaded guilty. Expunction in
Iowa means no more than that the State has provided a means for the
trial court not to accord a conviction certain continuing effects under
state law. Pp. 114-115.
(c) Provisions of the federal gun control laws other than the provisions
in question, as well as related federal statutes, support the conclusion
that Congress did not intend expunction of a state conviction automatically to remove the firearms disabilities imposed by §§ 922(g)(1) and
(hXl). Pp. 115-118.
(d) There is nothing in the legislative history of Title IV or related
federal statutes to suggest an opposite intent. Title IV's purpose to
curb crime by keepingfirearmsout of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them because of age, criminal background, or incompetency, would be frustrated by a ruling that gave effect to state expunctions. In the absence of a plain indication to the contrary, it is assumed
that Congress did not intend to make the application of Title IV dependent on state law. Title IV is carefully constructed gun control legislation. Congress knew the significance and meaning of the language it
employed. Pp. 118-121.
(e) A rule that would give effect to expunction under varying state
statutes would seriously hamper effective enforcement of Title IV.
Pp. 121-122.
649 F. 2d 216, reversed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C. J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, and POWELL, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR,

JJ., joined, post, p. 122.

Deputy Solicitor General Geller argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee,
Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Samuel A. Alito, Jr.,
William Ranter, and Douglas Letter.
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Lewis C. Lanier argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief was Jack R. McGuinn.*
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whetherfirearmsdisabilities
imposed by 18 U. S. C. §§ 922(g) and (h) apply with respect
to a person who pleads guilty to a state offense punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year, when the record of the
proceeding subsequently is expunged under state procedure
following a successfully served term of probation.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN

I
Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 226, was amended by the Gun Control
Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1214, and now appears as 18 U. S. C.
§921 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V). Title IV makes it unlawful for any person "who is under indictment for, or who
has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" * to ship, transport, or receive anyfirearmor ammunition in interstate commerce. §§ 922(g) and (h). Title IV also makes it unlawful to
engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms without a license from the Secretary of the
Treasury. §§ 922(a) and 923(a). One ground, specified by
the statute, for denial of a license is the fact that the applicant is barred by §§ 922(g) and (h) from transporting, shipping, or receiving firearms or ammunition. § 923(d)(1)(B).
The same statute provides that where the applicant is a corporation, partnership, or association, a license will be denied
*David T. Hardy and Richard E. Gardinerfileda brief for the National
Rifle Association of America as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
1
The Act provides exemptionsfromits proscriptions for certain business
and commercial crimes, such as antitrust violations, punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, and for nonfirearms and nonexplosives
state offenses classified by the State as misdemeanors and punishable by
imprisonment for two years or less. 18 U. S. C. § 921(a)(20). These exemptions are of no relevance here.
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an individual possessing, directly or indirectly, the power
direct the management and policies of the entity is under
e prohibitions imposed by §§ 922(g) and (h). Title IV also
akes it a crime to violate any of its provisions or to make
willful misrepresentation with respect to information retired to be furnished. § 924(a).
Although, as noted above, Title IV imposes disabilities
ion any "person who has been convicted... of a crime punlable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," it
es permit certain persons in that category to apply to the
eretary for relief from those disabilities. Under § 925(c),
e Secretaiy may grant relief "if it is established to his sataction that the circumstances regarding the conviction, and
B applicant's record and reputation, are such that the applint will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public
fety and that the granting of the relief would not be conury to the public interest." When the Secretary grants ref, he must publish notice of his action promptly in the Fedil Register, together with a statement of reasons. Ibid.
II
David F. Kennison, a resident of Columbia, S. C , is a dirtor, chairman of the board, and a shareholder of respondt New Banner Institute, Inc., a corporation. In Septemr 1974, when Kennison was in Iowa, he was arrested and
urged with kidnaping his estranged wife. After plea negotion, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 40-41, he pleaded guilty to the
te crime of carrying a concealed handgun, and the kidnapcharge was dismissed. The concealed weapon offense,
ier then Iowa law, see Iowa Code §§695.2 and .3 (1977),
s punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by
)risonment for not more than five years, or both.2 In acrhe court, however, in its discretion, in the case of a first offense, could
ace that punishment. See Iowa Code §695.3 (1977). Sections 695.2
.3 were repealed effective January 1, 1978, and are now replaced by
a Code §§ 724.4 and 903.1 (1981).
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cord with the provisions of Iowa Code §789A.l (1977), then
in effect,8 the state court entered an order reciting that
Kennison had "entered a plea of guilty to the charge of carrying a concealed weapon," that "the defendant has consented
to a deferment of sentence in this matter," that "he has
stable employment," and that there were "unusual circum1

Section 789A.1 then read in pertinent part:
"The trial court may, upon a plea of guilty, verdict of guilty, or a special
verdict upon which a judgment of conviction may be rendered, exercise
either of the options contained in subsections 1 and 2. However, this section shall not apply to the crimes of treason, murder, or violation of [other
specified statutes].
"1. With the consent of the defendant, the court may defer judgment
and place the defendant on probation upon such terms and conditions as it
may require. Upon fulfillment of the terms of probation the defendant
shall be discharged without entry of judgment. Upon violation of the
terms, the court may enter an adjudication of guilt and proceed as otherwise provided.
"However, this subsection shall not be available if any of the following is
true:
"[Here are recited specific exceptions to the availability of the procedure
outlined in subsection 1.]
"2. By record entry at time of or after sentencing, the court may suspend the sentence and place the defendant on probation upon such terms
and conditions as it may require.
"Before exercising either of the options contained in subsections 1 and 2,
the court shall first determine which of them will provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant and protection of the community from further offenses by the defendant and others. In making this
determination the court shall consider the age of the defendant, his prior
record of convictions, if any, his employment circumstances, his family
circumstances, the nature of the offense committed, whether a dangerous weapon or force was used in the commission of such offense, and such
other factors as shall be appropriate. The court shall file a specific written statement of its reasons for and the facts supporting its decision to
defer judgment or to suspend sentence and its decision on the length of
probation."
Section 789A.1 was enacted by 1973 Iowa Acts, ch. 295, § 1. It was repealed by 1976 Iowa Acts, ch. 1245, § 526, effective January 1,1978. The
current replacement statutes are Iowa Code §§907.3, .4, and .5 (1981).
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stances" in the case* The order then stated that the court
'deferred" entry of a formal judgment and placed Kennison
m probation.
Kennison returned to South Carolina where he completed
ds probation term. When that term expired in February
976, he was discharged pursuant to Iowa Code §789A. 6
1977), then in effect,4 and the Iowa court's record with refernee to the deferred judgment was expunged.
In May 1976, respondent filed three applications with the
Veasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firerms (Bureau), for licenses as a dealer infirearmsand ammuition, as a manufacturer of ammunition, and as a collector
f curios and relics. On the application forms, respondnt listed Kennison as a "responsible person," that is, an inividual possessing direct or indirect power to control the
lanagement and policies of respondent. See 18 U. S. C.
923(d)(1)(B). In answering an inquiry on the forms as to
hether such person had been convicted of a crime punishile by a prison term exceeding one year, respondent did not
sclose the Iowa events or Kennison's plea of guilty in that
tate. The requested licenses were issued.
The Bureau, however, subsequently learned of the Iowa
•ncealed weapon charge and the plea of guilty. In conformf with the provisions of §§ 923(e) and (f)(1) and of 27 CFR
'Section 789A.6 then read in pertinent part:
t^mZ
* ! ? the ^ 0Ult d e ^ r m i n e s t h a t the purposes of probation have
m fulfilled, the court may order the discharge of any personfromproba1 ; ^ K wf1*8011 °* * £ b e e n di8cha H?ed from probation shall no
S L ^ i i ? ^ T / W ^ ° f f e i ^ - u Pon dischai^efromprobation,
ord with reference to the deferred judgment shall be expunged. The
ord maintained by the supreme court administrator required by section
'A.1 shall not be expunged. . . . "
7? ?Q7?fK '**?" **}naCted i n i m a n d w a s "V*1"*' effective Jany l, 1978, by the same Iowa statutes cited in the last paragraph of n. 3,
jm. The current statute replacing §789A.6 is Iowa Code §907.9

203

Opinion of the Court

§178.75 (1982), it mailed respondent Notices of Contemplated Revocation of Licenses. After an informal hearing,
the Bureau's Regional Regulatory Administrator issued the
revocation notices. Respondent, pursuant to § 923(f)(2),
then requested and received a formal hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. At that hearing, the Bureau contended that respondent's licenses should be revoked because
respondent had failed to reveal that Kennison had been convicted of a felony and also because respondent had not been
entitled to the licenses in the first place.
The Administrative Law Judge recommended against revocation. App to Pet. for Cert. 41a. Although he concluded
that Kennison's plea of guilty "represented a conviction . . .
within the meaning of Section 922(g) and (h)," id., at 47a, he
also concluded that respondent's statements in the applications did not justify revocation because its representatives
had a good-faith belief that Kennison had not been convicted
within the meaning of the federal statute.
On review, the Director of the Bureau, petitioner here,
ruled that willful misrepresentation had not been shown; that
Kennison, however, possessed the power to direct respondent's management and policies; that Kennison had been convicted in Iowa of an offense that brought him within the prohibitions of §§ 922(g) and (h); and that the licenses should be
revoked because respondent was ineligible for them under
§ 923(d)(1)(B). App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a. The Director
ordered the issuance of Final Notices of Revocation. Id.,
at 40a.
Respondent then filed a timely petition for review in the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. See § 923(f)(3). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Director's motion was granted. On respondent's
appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed. 649 F. 2d 216 (1981). It concluded, id. 9 at 219, that although Kennison indeed had been
"convicted" of an offense that triggeredfirearmsdisabilities,
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t feet could not serve as a predicate for a Gun Control Act
lation or license revocation because the conviction had
in expunged under the Iowa deferred judgment proce•e. The court acknowledged, id., at 220, that other
irts of Appeals entertained contrary views.5 Because of
Importance of the issue and the obvious need for its resoon, we granted certiorari. 455 U. S. 1015 (1982).
Ill
his is not the first time the Court has examined firearms
visions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
and of the Gun Control Act. See Lewis v. United States,
U. S. 55 (1980); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U. S.
(1977); Barrett v. United States, 423 U. S. 212 (1976);
idleston v. United States, 415 U. S. 814 (1974); United
bs v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336 (1971).
espite the fact that the slate on which we write is thus
a clean one, we state once again the obvious when we
j that, in determining the scope of a statute, one is to look
at its language. Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S., at
United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 580 (1981). If
language is unambiguous, ordinarily it is to be regarded
3nclusive unless there is "'a clearly expressed legislative
it to the contrary.'" Ibid., quoting Consumer Product
ty Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108
0). It would seem, therefore, from the clear words of
statute ("any person . . . who has been convicted"), that,
espondent to be deprived of its licenses, Kennison must
i been "convicted" of the type of crime specified by the
ite, and the Iowa deferred judgment procedure and "exe United States v. Bergeman, 592 F. 2d 533 (CA9 1979); United
> v. Mostaa\ 485 F. 2d 199 (CA8 1973), cert, denied, 415 U. S. 947
I; United States v. Lehmann, 613 F. 2d 130 (CAS 1980). See also,
United States v. Podia, 584 F. 2d 85 (CA5 1978); United States v.
692 F. 2d 352 (CA5 1982); United States v. Nord, 586 F, 2d 1288
1978); United States v. Kelly, 519 F. 2d 794 (CA8), cert, denied, 423
926 (1975).
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punction" must not have operated to nullify that conviction.
If Kennison was not "convicted" in the first place, or if he was
and that conviction somehow was rendered a nullity, respondent should not be ineligible for licenses on the grounds
asserted by the Bureau.
A
We turn first to the issue of conviction. The salient fact is
Kennison's plea of guilty to a state charge punishable by
more than a year's imprisonment. The usual entry of a formal judgment upon a jury verdict or upon a court's specific
finding of guilt after a bench trial is absent. Present, however, are (a) the charge of a crime of the disqualifying type,
(b) the plea of guilty to that charge, and (c) the court's placing
Kennison upon probation.
In Lewis v. United States, supra, we had under consideration § 1202(a)(1) of Title VII of the 1968 Act, 18 U. S. C.
App. § 1202(a)(1), a gun control statute similar to and partially overlapping §§ 922(g) and (h). The language of § 1202
(a)(1) that is pertinent for present purposes is familiar, for it
concerns any person who "has been convicted . . . of a felony." The Court there characterized the language of the
statute as "sweeping." 445 U. S., at 60. Despite the fact
that Lewis' conviction was subject to collateral attack on constitutional grounds, the Court held that conviction to be disabling. What was important to the Court was the presence
or fact of the conviction. In speaking of Title VII, we said:
"No modifier is present, and nothing suggests any restriction
on the scope of the term 'convicted.'" Ibid. Still further:
" 'Nothing on the face of the statute suggests a congressional
intent to limit its coverage . . . . ' " Ibid., quoting United
States v. Culbert, 435 U. S. 371, 373 (1978). And, finally:
"Actually, . . . we detect little significant difference between
Title IV and Title VII." 445 U. S., at 64.
Whether one has been "convicted" within the language of
the gun control statutes is necessarily, as the Court of Appeals, in the present case correctly recognized, 649 F. 2d, at
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219, a question of federal, not state, law, despite the fact that
the predicate offense and its punishment are defined by the
law of the State. United States v. Benson, 605 F. 2d 1093,
1094 (CA91979). This makes for desirable national uniformity unaffected by varying
state laws, procedures, and definitions of "conviction.1'
In Lewis, the possible, and indeed probable, vulnerability
of the predicate conviction to collateral attack on constitutional grounds did not affect the disqualification. This followedfromthe statute's plain language andfroma legislative
history that, as we have repeatedly observed, makes clear
that "'Congress sought to rule broadly—to keep guns out of
the hands of those who have demonstrated that "they may
not be trusted to possess afirearmwithout becoming a threat
to society."'" 445 U. S., at 63, quoting Scarborough v.
United States, 431 U. S., at 572. Like considerations apply
here with respect to whether Kennison was one who was
"convicted" within the meaning of the federal statute.6 He
voluntarily, in negotiation, entered a plea of guilty to a disqualifying crime. In some circumstances, we have considered a guilty plea alone enough to constitute a "conviction":
"A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere
•To be sure, the terms "convicted* or "conviction" do not have the
same meaning in every federal statute. In some statutes those terms
specifically are made to apply to one whose guilty plea has been accepted
whether or not afinaljudgment has been entered. See, e. g., 15 U. S. C.
$J 80*^2(10) and 80k-2(6). In other federal statutes, however, the term
"convicted" is clearly limited to persons against whom a formal judgment
has been entered. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 4251(e) and 28 U. S. C.
§ 2901(f).
The term "convicted" in |§ 922(g) and (h) is not there defined, but we
have no reason whatsoever to suppose that Congress meant that term to
apply only to one against whom a formal judgment has been entered.
Congress' intent in enacting §§ 922(g) and (h) and § 1202 was to keep firearms out of the hands of presumptively risky people. See United States v.
Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 345 (1971). In this connection, it is significant that
§§ 922(g) and (h) apply not only to a person convicted of a disqualifying
offense but also to one who is merely under indictment for such a crime.
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admission or an extrajudicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is not
required; the court has nothing to do but give judgment
and sentence.n Kercheval v. United States, 274 U. S. 220,
223 (1927). Accord, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 242
(1969).7
Here, we do have more. The state judge who noted Kennison's plea placed him on probation. To be sure, there
was no written adjudication of guilt and there was no formal
pronouncement of a sentence of imprisonment for a specified
term. But that was due to special provisions of Iowa statutory law and procedure. It was plainly irrelevant to Congress whether the individual in question actually receives a
prison term; the statute imposes disabilities on one convicted
of "a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year." § 922(g) (emphasis supplied). It is also plain
that one cannot be placed on probation if the court does not
7
As noted in n. 6, supra, the meaning of the terms "convicted" and "conviction" vary from statute to statute. In Lott v. United States, 367 U. S.
421 (1961), for example, the Court had under consideration Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 34 and a plea of nolo contendere, rather than a plea of
guilty. The question was whether the time within which certain motions
could be made began to run at the time the nolo plea was entered or at the
time judgment was pronounced and sentence imposed. The Court spoke
of the possibility of the plea's being withdrawn before sentence was imposed and therefore said that I t is the judgment of the court—not the
plea—that constitutes the 'determination of guilt.'w Id., at 427. In construing Rule 34, of course, the Court had before it no evidence of a congressional intent to rule broadly to protect the public comparable to that animating Title IV. Moreover, in Lott the Court did not deal with the
situation where probation is imposed on the basis of the plea. Under the
Iowa expunction statute, one who has pleaded guilty is treated identically
to one who has been found guilty by a jury. See n. 3. supra. There is no
suggestion in the Iowa statutes, and respondent has not suggested, that
once the plea was noted and probation imposed Kennison could withdraw
his plea. Indeed, it was a negotiated plea accompanied by the dismissal of
the kidnaping charge.
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however, expunction under state law does not alter the historical fact of the conviction, and does not open the way to a
license despite the conviction, as does positive or "affirmative
action," ibid., by way of the Secretary's consent on the conditions specified by § 925(c). In Lewis, it is true, we recognized an obvious exception to the literal language of the statute for one whose predicate conviction had been vacated or
reversed on direct appeal. 445 U. S., at 61, n. 5; see Note,
Prior Convictions and the Gun Control Act of 1968,76 Colum.
L. Rev. 326, 334, n. 42 (1976). But, in contrast, expunction
does not alter the legality of the previous conviction and does
not signify that the defendant was innocent of the crime to
which he pleaded guilty. Expunction in Iowa means no
more than that the State has provided a means for the trial
court not to accord a conviction certain continuing effects
under state law. Clearly, firearms disabilities may be attached constitutionally to an expunged conviction, see Lewis
v. United States, 445 U. S., at 65-68, and an exception for
such a conviction, unlike one reversed or vacated due to trial
error, is farfromobvious. In Lends we held that the exception for convictions reversed or vacated on direct appeal did
not make ambiguous the statute's clear application to convictions arguably vulnerable to collateral attack. We perceive
no more ambiguity in the statute here than we did in Lewis.
IV
Other provisions of the federal gun control laws and related federal statutes fortify our conclusion that expunction
of a state conviction was not intended by Congress automatically to remove the federal firearms disability.
1. Even conviction is not necessary for disqualification.
The mere existence of an outstanding indictment is sufficient
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§ 1203(2). Except § 925(c), permitting the Secretary to remove the disabilities in specified circumstances, there is no comparable provision in
Title IV. By regulation, the Secretary has given Presidential pardons,
but not gubernatorial pardons, automatic enabling effect under Title IV.
27 CFR § 178.142 (1982).
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under §§ 922(g) and (h). Congress was reaching far and was
doing so intentionally.
2. Sections 922(g) and (h) impose the same disabilities
upon a person who "is under indictment" for certain crimes,
or who "is a fugitive from justice," or who "is" a drug addict
or an unlawful user of certain drugs, or who "has been convicted in any court" of certain crimes, or who "has been adjudicated as a mental defective," or who "has been committed
to a mental institution" (emphasis supplied). This use of the
respective tenses is significant and demonstrates that Congress carefully distinguished between present status and a
past event. We have noted this distinction in tenses in § 922,
ind its significance, before:
"Congress knew the significance and meaning of the language it employed. It used the present perfect tense
elsewhere in the same section . . . , in contrast to its use
of the present tense ('who is') in §§ 922(h)(1), (2), and (3).
The statute's pattern is consistent and no unintended
misuse of language or of tense is apparent." Barrett v.
United States, 423 U. S., at 217.
\nd in Scarborough v. United States, 431 U. S., at 570, we
observed: "It is obvious that the tenses used throughout Title
V were chosen with care."
3. The imposition, by §§ 922(g)(4) and (h)(4), of continuing
Usability on a person who "has been" adjudicated a mental
lefective or committed to a mental institution is particularly
nstructive. A person abdicated as a mental defective may
stter be adjudged competent, and a person committed to a
lental institution later may be deemed cured and released,
fet Congress made no exception for subsequent curative
vents. The past adjudication or commitment disqualifies.
Congress obviously felt that such a person, though unfortuate, was too much of a risk to be allowed firearms privi»ges. See United States v. Bass, 404 U. S., at 344-345. In
lie face of this fact, we cannot believe that Congress in-
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tended to have a person convicted of a firearms felony under
state law become eligible for firearms automatically because
of a state expunction for whatever reason.
4. Section 925(c) empowers the Secretary to grant relief
from these disabilities in certain cases. The Secretary may
not grant such relief, however, to one convicted of a crime
involving the use of a firearm or of a federal firearms offense,
and may not grant relief in any event unless specific conditions are met to his satisfaction. Again, it is highly unlikely
that Congress intended to permit its own circumscription of
the ability of the Secretary to grant relief to be overcome by
the vagaries of state law. That would be too easy a route
to follow in order to circumvent the federal statute. See
S. Rep. No. 666, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1965).
5. Provisions of Title VII, enacted simultaneously with
Title IV, are helpful to our analysis. We have treated Titles
VII and IV as in pari materia in construing statutory language identical to that at issue here. Lewis v. United
States, 445 U. S., at 61-62. Title 18 U. S. C. App. § 1203(2)
exempts from Title VII "any person who has been pardoned
by the President of the United States or the chief executive
of a State and has expressly been authorized by the President
or such chief executive, as the case may be, to receive, possess, or transport in commerce a firearm." Thus, in that
statute, even a pardon is not sufficient to remove the firearms disabilities unless there is express authorization to have
the firearm. It is inconceivable that Congress could have so
provided and yet have intended, as the Court of Appeals concluded, 649 F. 2d, at 220-221, to give a state expunction a
contrary and unconditional effect. After all, expunction devices were not unknown or unusual when Title IV came into
being in 1968. See Comment, Expungement in California:
Legislative Neglect and Judicial Abuse of the Statutory Mitigation of Felony Convictions, 12 U. San Fran. L. Rev. 155,
161 (1977); 1909 Cal. Stats., ch. 232, §1. And the Federal
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fouth Corrections Act, in which Congress itself provided for
junction in certain circumstances, see 18 U. S. C. §5021,
ras enacted as far back as 1950. See 64 Stat. 1089.
6. Title 21 U. S. C. § 844(b) is a federal expunction statute
providing that a first offender found guilty of simple possesion of a controlled substance may be placed on probation
rithout entry of judgment, and that, upon successful eompleion of the probation, the court shall discharge the defendant
nd dismiss the proceeding against him. But Congress also
pedfically provided in § 844(b)(1) that such discharge or disussal "shall not be deemed a conviction for purposes of disualifications or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction
f a crime . . . or for any other purpose." This provision
ould be superfluous if Congress had believed that expuncon automatically removes the disqualification. Congress
yriously knew the plain meaning of the terms it employed in
atutes of this kind, and when it wished to create an excepon for an expunged conviction, it did so expressly.
V
"As in all cases of statutory construction, our task is to inrpret the words of [the statute! in light of the purposes
mgress sought to serve." Chapman v. Houston Welfare
igkts Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 608 (1979). In our pre3us cases we have recognized and given weight to the Act's
oad prophylactic purpose:
"When Congress enacted [18 U. S. C. §921 et seq.] it
was concerned with the widespread traffic in firearms
and with their general availability to those whose possession thereof was contrary to the public interest. . . .
The principal purpose of federal gun control legislation,
therefore, was to curb crime by keeping 'firearms out of
the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them
because of age, criminal background, or incompetency/ "
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Hvddleston v. United States, 415 U. S., at 824, quoting
S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 22 (1968).
See also Barrett v. United States, 423 U. S., at 220-221.
In order to accomplish this goal, Congress obviously determined thatfirearmsmust be kept awayfrompersons, such as
those convicted of serious crimes, who might be expected to
misuse them. Such persons are also barred from obtaining
licenses to deal in firearms or ammunition. This latter provision is particularly important because Title IV and federal
gun laws generally funnel access to firearms almost exclusively through dealers. See Hvddleston v. United States,
415 U. S., at 825. "The principal agent of federal enforcement is the dealer." Id., at 824.
Although we have searched diligently, we have found nothing in the legislative history of Title IV or related federal
firearms statutes that suggests, even remotely, that a state
expunction was intended automatically to remove the disabilities imposed by §§ 922(g)(1) and (h)(1). See, e. g., S. Rep.
No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1968); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1956,90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968); H. R. Rep. No. 488, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
This lack of evidence is significant for several reasons.
First, the purpose of the statute would befrustratedby a ruling that gave effect to state expunctions; a state expunction
typically does not focus upon the question with which Title
IV is concerned, namely, whether the convicted person is fit
to engage in the firearms business or to possess a firearm.
Second, "'[i]n the absence of a plain indication to the contrary, , . . it is to be assumed when Congress enacts a statute
that it does not intend to make its application dependent on
state law.'" NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility Dist., 402 U. S.
600, 603 (1971), quoting NLRB v. Randolph Electric Membership Corp., 343 F. 2d 60, 62-63 (CA4 1965). This is because the application of federal legislation is nationwide and
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stances surrounding the expunction of his conviction provide
little, if any, assurance that Kennison is a person who can be
trusted with a dangerous weapon.
VI
Finally, a rule that would give effect to expunctions under
varying state statutes would seriously hamper effective enforcement of Title IV. Over half the States have enacted
one or more statutes that may be classified as expunction
provisions that attempt to conceal prior convictions or to remove some of their collateral or residual effects. These statutes differ, however, in almost every particular. Some are
applicable only to young offenders, e. g., Mich. Comp. Laws
§§780.621 and .622 (1982). Some are available only to persons convicted of certain offenses, e. g.f N. J. Stat. Ann.
§2C:52-2(b) (West 1982); others, however, permit expunction of a conviction for any crime including murder, e. g.t
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 276, §100A (West Supp. 19821983). Some are confined to first offenders, e. g., Okla.
Stat., Tit. 22, §991c (Supp. 1982-1983). Some are discretionary, e. g., Minn. Stat. §638.02(2) (Supp. 1982), while
others provide for automatic expunction under certain circumstances, e. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. §13-912 (1978).
The statutes vary in the language employed to describe what
they do. Some speak of expunging the conviction, others of
"sealing" the file or of causing the dismissal of the charge.
The statutes also differ in their actual effect. Some are absolute; others are limited. Only a minority address questions such as whether the expunged conviction may be considered in sentencing for a subsequent offense or in setting
bail on a later charge, or whether the expunged conviction
may be used for impeachment purposes, or whether the convict may deny the fact of his conviction. Some statutes,
too, clearly were not meant to prevent use of the conviction
in a subsequent prosecution. See, e. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-907 (1978); United States v. Herrell, 588 F. 2d 711 (CA9
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1978), cert denied, 440 U. S. 964 (1979). These and other
differences provide nothing less than a national patchwork.
In this case, for example, although the Court of Appeals
referred to Iowa's deferred judgment statute as "unconditional and absolute," 649 F. 2d, at 221, it is obvious from the
face of the statute that that description is not entirely accurate. At the time of expunction, a separate record is maintained, not destroyed, by the Supreme Court administrator.
Iowa Code §907.4 (1981). See TV. of Oral Arg. 44. In addition, all "criminal history data" may be released to "criminal
justice agencies.* Iowa Code §§692.1(5) and 692.2 (1981).
In short, the record of a conviction expunged under Iowa law
is not expunged completely.
Under the decision below, perplexing problems would confront those required to enforce federal gun control laws as
well as those bound by their provisions. Because, as we
have noted, Title IV "is a carefully constructed package of
gun control legislation," Scarborough v. United States, 431
U. S., at 570, Congress, inframingit, took pains to avoid the
very problems that the Court of Appeals' decision inevitably
would create, such as individualized federal treatment of
every expunction law. Congress used unambiguous language in attaching gun control disabilities to any person "who
has been convicted" of a qualifying offense. We give full effect to that language.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting.

The Gun Control Act provides that any person "who has
been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" is ineligible for a federal license to ship, transport, or receive anyfirearmor ammunition in interstate commerce. 18 U. S. C. §§ 922(g) and
(h). Thus, as the Court points out, "[i)f Kennison was not
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'convicted9 in the first p l a c e . . . respondent should not be ineligible for licenses on the grounds asserted by the Bureau."
Ante, at 111. Contrary to the conclusion reached by the
Court, I do not believe that Kennison was "convicted." Accordingly, I dissent.
I agree with the Court that whether one has been convicted within the meaning of the Gun Control Act is a question of federal, rather than state, law. Ante, at 111-112.
Congress did not, however, expressly define the term "conviction" in the Act. Where Congress has defined the term,
the Court recognizes that it has given the term different
meanings in different statutes. Ante, at 112, n. 6. In the
Investment Company Act of 1940, Congress expressly provided that the term "convicted" includes "a verdict, judgment, or plea of guilty, or afindingof guilt on a plea of nolo
contendere, if such verdict, judgment, plea, or finding has
not been reversed, set aside, or withdrawn, whether or not
sentence has been imposed." 15 U. S. C. §80a-2(a)(10).
The same definition was used in the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940. 15 U. S. C. §80b-2(a)(6). Congress used a more
narrow definition in two sections of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, providing that "*[c]onviction' and
'convicted' mean thefinaljudgment on a verdict orfindingof
guilty, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere, and do
not include afinaljudgment which has been expunged by pardon, reversed, set aside, or otherwise rendered nugatory."
18 U. S. C. § 4251(e); 28 U. S. C. § 2901(f). Finally, in the
Federal Youth Corrections Act, Congress has provided that
the term "'conviction* means the judgment on a verdict or
finding of guilty, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere." 18 U. S. C. § 5006(g).
Thus at the most, Congress has required the entry of a formal judgment as the signpost of a "conviction." At the least,
Congress has required the acceptance of a plea. In this case,
we have neither. The Court relies on Kercheval v. United
States, 274 U. S. 220 (1927), and BoyHn v. Alabama, 395
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U. S. 238 (1969), for the proposition that "[i]n some circumstances, we have considered a guilty plea alone enough to
constitute a 'conviction/" Ante, at 112. The Court concludes that in this case " w e . . . have more," because the state
trial judge "noted" the plea and placed Kennison on probation. Ante, at 113. I cannot agree.
Even if Kercheval and Boykin would otherwise be relevant
to our interpretation of the Gun Control Act, both cases
spoke of an accepted guilty plea. Whatever a trial court
joes when it "notes" a plea, it is less, instead of more, than an
acceptance of the plea which is preceded by an examination of
ihe defendant to insure that the plea is voluntary.
Where the Iowa deferred judgment statute can be used,
'[t]he trial court may, upon a plea of guilty [and] fwjith the
consent of the defendant . . . defer judgment and place the
lefendant on probation." Iowa Code §789A.l (1977) (em)hasis added) (current version at Iowa Code §907.3 (1981)).
Congress has never before considered such circumstances
mfficient for a finding of a "conviction"; there is nothing in
he Gun Control Act to infer that Congress has adopted such
i standard now. It is likely that at the most Congress inended that a "conviction" be represented by a formal entry
>f judgment, or at the least an acceptance of a guilty plea.
Jut in either case, such criteria are absent where, following a
uilty plea, the Iowa deferred judgment statute is invoked.*

•The Court points out that respondent acknowledged in oral argument
lat during the period of Kennison's probation, respondent was disqualified
r a license Ante, at 114, n. 8. This disqualification, if it existed, how'er, would be based on the provision of the Gun Control Act applying to
iy person "who is under indictment," 18 U. S. C. §§ 922(g) and (h), rather
an on a conviction."

Syllabus

CITY OF LOCKHART v. UNITED STATES ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
No. 81-802. Argued November 3, 1982—Decided February 23, 1983
Prior to 1973, appellant Texas city was a "general law" city governed by a
commission consisting of a mayor and two commissioners, all serving the
same 2-year terms. These offices were filled in even-numbered years
through at-large elections using a "numbered post" system whereby the
two commission posts were designated by number, and each candidate
specified the post for which he or she sought election. In 1973, appellant became a "home rule" city, and adopted a new charter whereby it
would be governed by a mayor and four councilmen serving staggered
2-year terms, with the mayor and two councilmen being elected in evennumbered years through at-large elections using the numbered-post
system and the other two councilmen being similarly elected in oddnumbered years. Forty-seven percent of appellant's population are
Mexican-American, but, as of 1977, less than 30% of the registered voters were Mexican-American. A Federal District Court in Texas, in a
1979 suit by the individual appellee and other Mexican-Americans, enjoined further elections under the new plan pending preclearance of electoral changes in the charter under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
The Attorney General precleared the changes except to the extent that
they incorporate at-large elections, the numbered-post system, and staggered terms for councilmen. Appellant then filed suit under § 5 in the
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a declaratory judgment that the remaining changes did not have the purpose or
effect of denying the voting rights guaranteed by § 5. The District
Court compared the new plan to what the old practice would have been
without numbered posts on the ground that under Texas law appellant as
a general-law city was not entitled to use a numbered-post system. The
court held that numbered posts and staggered terms each have the effect
of discriminating against protected minorities, particularly in view of the
history of racial bloc voting in the city.
Held:
1. Appellant's entire 1973 election plan is subject to preclearance
under § 5. Appellant admits that the addition of two seats to its governing body and the introduction of staggered terms are subject to § 5. Appellant also changed the nature of the "continuing" seats, since council
posts one and two are not identical to the old commission posts one and
two. Moreover, the discriminatory effect of the new seats cannot be de-
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allegations in the complaint, taken as true,
unambiguously exclude coverage/* Stated
previously, National's insurance policy excludes coverage of any bodily injury to employees covered under workmen's compensation. Sears & Singer's complaint, taken
as true, specifically denies that Baughman
was an employee of Berry. Such allegation, taken as true, is sufficient to raise the
issue concerning the duty of National to
defend Berry against Sears & Singer's third
party demand. Thus, National was under a
duty to defend Berry since the allegations
in the third party complaint, taken as true
did not "unambiguously exclude coverage."
This is true, even if it may ultimately be
determined that coverage does not exist,
since "the duty of an insurer to defend its
insured under a policy of liability insurance
is of greater scope than the insurer's duty
to pay." Bandy at 903. In support of this
holding, the court adopts the reasoning of
the court in Bandy v. Avondale Shipyards,
Inc.:
The 'failure of an insurer to defend a suit
is contemplated by the policy renders the
insurer liable for all expenses incurred by
an insured in defense of the action, including reasonable attorney's fees.'
Smith v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania,
supra, 161 So.2d [903] at 918. The insurer
may, if it chooses, refuse to defend the
suit, relying on its own assessment of the
allegations in the complaint It does so,
however, at the risk of becoming liable to
the insured for attorney's fees and expenses incurred by the insured in his defense in the event of an ultimate determination that the duty to defend was
present

to liability' . . . *[T]he duty of an insurer
to defend its insured under a policy of
liability insurance is of greater scope than
the insurer's duty to pay . . . Although
it may ultimately be determined that coverage does not exist, the duty to defend
nevertheless exists if the allegations of
the petition taken as true would result in
liability which the insurer is obligated to
discharge on behalf of the insured.'
458 F.2d at 902-903.
It is hereby decreed that National Surety
Company is responsible for all expenses incurred by Berry in defense of Sears & Singer's third party claim, including reasonable
attorney's fees. Counsel for both National
Surety Company and Berry shall submit to
the Court within ten (10) days from the
date of this Order Memoranda suggesting
what amount would be an appropriate
award in this case.

The issue of coverage is related to the
duty to defend in that . . . the allegations
in the initial complaint, unless they unambiguously exclude coverage, determine
the duty to defend, thus necessitating a
preliminary evaluation of coverage by the
insurer or by the court in order to assess
the duty to defend. The insurer may, of
course, 'deny coverage [and preserve its
options on that issue] and yet furnish its
insured with a defense [thus fulfilling its
duty to defend] without subjecting itself

Nov. 18, 1981.
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KEY NUMBER SYSTEM}
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Delmas W. DIXON, Plaintiff,
K. P. McMULLEN, Jr., et aL,
Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 4-80-443.
United States District Court,
N. D. Texas,
Ft. Worth Division.

Convicted ex-felon brought civil rights
case alleging abridgement of his constitutional rights when he was denied certification as police officer by State Commission
on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and
Education. The District Court, Belew,
J., held that: (1) pardon granted to plaintiff
by Governor removed some, but not all,
legal disabilities, and (2) statute automati-
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catty excluding ex-felons from certification
as police officers was constitutional.
Order accordingly.
L Municipal Corporations «~ 184(2)
State Commission on Law Enforcement
Officer Standards and Education is delegated responsibility by Legislature to establish
minimum educational, training, physical,
mental and moral standards for admission
to employment and certification as reserve
police officer. Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.St
art 441* (29ua).
2. Crril Rights * ~ 13.4(1)
Convicted ex-felon who challenged
statute which automatically excluded exfelons from certification as police officers
met applicable principles for federal district
court to note probable jurisdiction over his
civil rights action for denial of his certification.
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enhancement, impeachment, denial of ball
to habitual offender, denial of probation,
proving possession of firearm by convicted
felon and proving possession of burglary
tools by convicted felon.
10. Pardon and Parole *»9
Federal laws do not necessarily obey
effect of state pardon.
11. Constitutional Law «»252£
When statute affects everyone's rights,
it » question of substantive due process
under Fifth Amendment U.S.CAConst
Amend. 5.
12. Constitutional Law «a»2U(l)
When statute treats some people differently than others, it is matter of equal
protection under Fourteenth Amendment
U.S.CA.ConstAmend. 14.

13. Constitutional Law «»25L3
Fourteenth Amendment stands for
proposition that Government must act,
3. Pardon and Parole *»9
when it acts, in manner which is neither
Undisputed legal effect of pardon is to arbitrary nor unreasonable. U.S.C.A.Const
restore civil rights to ex-felon.
Amend. 14.
4. Constitutional Law *=»79
14. Constitutional Law <*=»213.I(1)
Governor cannot overrule judgment of
Challenged classification is subject to
court of law; he has no "appellate" jurisdic- strict scrutiny only if suspect class is disadtion.
vantaged or when it impermissibly interferes with exercise of fundamental rights.
5. Pardon and Parole *»9
Final conviction does not disappear U.S.CA.ConstAmend. 14.
upon grant of pardon.
15. Constitutional Law *»213.1(l)f 224(1)
If gender classification or illegitimacy
& Pardon and Parole «=»9
is involved in governmental classification,
Pardon implies guilt
there must be fair and substantia] relation
7. Pardon and Parole •=»$
to important government objectives. USGranting of pardon does not in any C.A.ConstAmend. 14.
way indicate defect in process.
16. Constitutional Law «B»213.1(2)

8. Pardon and Parole *»9
Granting of pardon may remove some
disabilities, but does not change commonlaw principle that conviction of infamous
offense is evidence of bad character.

Any designation in governmental classification other than gender or illegitimacy
requires only rational relation to legitimate
governmental interest
U.S.CA.Const
Amend. 14.

9. Pardon and Parole *»9
Prior conviction for which one has received pardon, absent showing that such
pardon was granted for subsequent proof of
innocence, may be utilized for purposes of

17. Constitutional Law *=»240(6)
State imay regulate professions which
affect public interest as long as regulation
rationally furthers legitimate state purpose
or interest U.S.C.A.ConstAmend. 14.

18. Constitutional Law «»7<U(3)
Courts do not sit as super-legislature to
judge considerations of legislative policy
made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect
lines. U.S.CA.ConstAmend. 14.
19. Constitutional Law «=> 208(1)
Legislature has great latitude in making statutory classifications involving social
or moral legislation.

26. Constitutional Law *»25L3
Fourteenth Amendment provides independent right to demand that government
act in nonarbitrary manner at all times.
U.S.CA.ConstAmend 14.
27. Constitutional Law *»27M(2)
State cannot exclude person from occupation in manner or for reasons which contravene due process clause. U.S.CA.Const
Amend. 14.

28. Constitutional Law *»318(1)
Due process requires that action by
state through any of its agencies must be
consistent with fundamental principles of
liberty and justice. U.S.CA.ConstAmend.
14. *
2L Officers and Public Employees «=»27 29. Constitutional Law *»274(1)
Government, as vital part of state's
Even though government purpose be
police power, must have authority to scruti- legitimate and substantial, such purpose
nize hiring of personnel based on conduct cannot be pursued by means which broadly
occurring prior to their employment, so as stifle fundamental personal liberties when
to insure that persons publicly employed in end can be more narrowly achieved. U.S.C.
emergency or dangerous situations are so- A.ConstAmend. 14.
ber and alert and possess qualities such as
30. Constitutional Law *»251.1
honesty, integrity, reliability and obedience
Due process is not technical concept
to the law.
with fixed content unrelated to time or
circumstances, and its very nature negates
22. States *=»74
State police are charged with enforce- any notion of inflexible procedures univerment of law, not for themselves or their sally applicable to every imaginable situaclients as in private practice, but for benefit tion. U-S.C.A.ConstAmend. 14.
and safety of people at large.
31. Constitutional Law *>274(1)
Due process does not require hearing in
23. Municipal Corporations «s» 184(2)
every conceivable case of governmental imIntegrity and trust are prerequisites
pairment of private interests. U.S.GA.
for employment as police officer.
ConstAmend. 14.
24. Municipal Corporations •=» 184(2)
32. Constitutional Law *»251.6
State's legitimate concern for mainGenerally, there is no violation of due
taining high standards of professional con- process if statute gives person of ordinary
duct extends far beyond initial licensing of intelligence fair notice that his contemplatPolice officers.
ed conduct is prohibited. U.S.CA.Const
Amend. 14.
25. Constitutional Law *»23&S
33. Licenses *»20
Municipal Corporations *» 176(3)
State can require high standards of
There was no equal protection violation
J* grounds of overbreadth or underbreadth qualification for profession such as good
m statute prohibiting certification of con- moral character as long as it has rational
victed ex-felons as police officers. Vernon's connection to applicant's fitness or capacity,
Ann.Tex.Civ.St art 4413(29aa); U.S.C.A. especially when discussing "true" profession, like law, medicine, or law enforcement,
ConstAmend. 14.

20. Municipal Corporations «=» 184(1)
Officers and Public Employees *»8
There is no constitutional right to public employment, including employment as
policeman.

SX7rs*pp~-l7
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where ethics AouJd be most minimal of
qualifications.
M. CWftutka*! U w ««2KL5
In action alleging deprivation of interest without proper due process of law. it is
first necessary to consider nature of interest U&OA.GmstAmena\ 14.
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40. Municipal Corporations • » 176(3)
Statute which automatically excluded
ex-felons from certification as police officers was constitutional. Vernon's AntiTex.
Civ.St art. 4413(29aa).

David R. Richards and Mary F. Keller,
American Civil Liberties Union, Austin,
85. Constitutional U w e-254.1, 277(1)
In delineating boundaries of interest Tex., for plaintiff.
alleged to have been deprived without propMark White, Atty. Gen. of Tex^ Ann
er due process of taw. it is standard for Kraatx, Asst Atty. Gen., Gerald C Caruth,
court to ascertain whether interest invaded, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for defendif at all, k -liberty" or "property" interest ants.
U^.aA.ConstAmend. 14.
36. Constitutional U w €»254.1
Although there is no constitutionally
Protected right to government employment
there is liberty interest in right to engage
in any of common occupations of life. U.S.
C.A.ConstAmend. 14.

DIXON v. McMULLEN

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BELEW, District Judge.
This is a civil rights case. Plaintiff, a
convicted ex-felon, who was pardoned
twenty years later by the Governor of the
State of Texas, alleges that his constitutional rights were abridged because he was
37. Constitutional U w *»254.1
denied certification as a police officer by
Due^ process protection attaches to the Texas Commission on U w Enforcement
"generaT right to engage in chosen occupa- Officer Standards and Education. The trial
tion, but not to specific right to particular was before this Court and lasted one day.
position. U.S.OA.ConstAmend. 14.
The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are entered according to Feder38. Constitutional U w «=» 287.2(5)
al Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a) and 58.
Where state action denies person
license or opportunity to practice his chosen
profession, due process may require that he /. Factual Background
be given hearing and chance to respond to
These material facts are not in dispute:
charges against him. particularly where ap1. Delmas W. Dixon was born on Octoplicant has no procedural due process rights ber 13, 1938 in Fort Worth, Texas.
apart from those which agency has chosen
2. In 1957, Plaintiff was honorably disto create by its own regulations. U.S.C.A.
charged from the United States Navy after
ConstAmend. 14.
two years of service.
39. Constitutional U w *»4<K1)
3. On November 14, 1960, Plaintiff pled
Before convicted ex-felon could raise guilty to a charge of robbery in Tarrant
question of being denied procedural due County, Texas, and was sentenced to conprocess by failure of State Commission on finement in the State Penitentiary for five
U w Enforcement Officer Standards and (5) years. That sentence was probated.
Education to grant him hearing on his qual4. On March 10,1964, Delmas Dixon was
ifications to become certified as policeman, discharged from probation. Consequently,
he was required to request hearing and Plaintiffs motion for new trial was grant*
have such request denied by Commission. ed, and his case dismissed in accordance
Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.St art 4413(29aa); with Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art &'
U.SXXA.ConstAmend. 14.
12(7XVernon 1979).

5. In 1975, Plaintiff entered the River pointment be terminated for whatever reaOaks Police Academy, and later completed son, his certification automatically would
the training. On either false or incomplete expire. If the officer sought appointment
information submitted to the Texas Com- with another law enforcement agency, he
mission on U w Enforcement Officer Stan- would be required to once again seek certidards and Education [hereinafter "the Com- fication.
mission"] relating to his criminal record.
Plaintiff was certified by the Commission. //. Parties
Plaintiff Delmas A. Dixon is a citizen of
Thereafter, he began his duty with the City
of River Oaks. Texas as a reserve police Fort Worth, and Tarrant County, Texas.
Defendant Ken P. McMullen, Jr., is the
officer.
6. From 1976 until 1979, Plaintiff Chief of Police of Blue Mound, Tarrant
worked as a full-time officer with the City County, Texas. He did not hire Plaintiff
of Axle, Texas, eventually rising to the rank because he had been denied certification
of Patrol Sergeant In 1979, Mr. Dixon pursuant to the Texas Statute. Defendant
resigned and re-entered private business. McMullen is sued in his official capacity
7. On June 9,1980, Plaintiff was grant- only.
Defendant Fred Toler is the Executive
ed a general pardon by the Governor of the
State of Texas. However, the pardon was Director of the Texas Commission on Law
not granted on the basis of subsequent Enforcement Officer Standards and Education, and as such, is responsible for the
proof of innocence.
8. In approximately August, 1980, Plain- enforcement of its rules and regulations.
tiff was re-hired by the City of River Oaks, He is sued in his official and individual
Texas. He worked a couple of weeks and capacity.
Defendants Dewey Presley, Dan Saunthen resigned. On November 17, 1980,
Plaintiff was denied a certification to be a ders, Walter Rankin, James Adams, Dr.
reserve police officer for the City of Blue Kenneth Ashworth, Allan Bowen, David
Mound, Texas. The denial was based on Collier, Henry Gardner, Richard Ingram,
Rex Kelly, Emil Peters, Mark White, and
Plaintiffs prior felony conviction.
[1] 9. The Commission is delegated the Louise Wing are responsible for establishresponsibility by the Texas Legislature to ing rules and regulations for the certificaestablish minimum educational, training, tion of police officers. They are sued in
physical, mental, and moral standards for their individual and official capacities.
Defendant State of Texas is sued as the
admission to employment and certification
as a reserve police officer, pursuant to Tex. Governmental entity responsible for deprivRev.Civ.StatAnn. art 4413(29aaXSupp.l9- ing Plaintiff of his civil rights by enforcing
a statute which automatically excludes any
80).
10. Article 4413(29aa) provides that no and all felons from consideration as police
Person convicted of a felony may be certi- officers.
fied as a police officer.1 Article 4413(29aa)
*lso provides that once certified, a police
officer retains such certification, absent its
revocation by the Commission. Should a
police officer resign, be fired, or his ap-

t Sec 8A. (a) No person who has been convicted of a felony wider the laws of this state,
or the United States may be certified by the
ComattMkMi as qualified to be a peace officer,
or a jailer or guard at a county jail.
(b) Final conviction of a felony under the
laws of this state, another state, or the United

Ill Plaintiff Allegations
Plaintiff asserts he should be certified as
a police officer because of the effect of his
pardon. As a result of the denial, he allegStates disqualifies a person previously certified
by the Commission as qualified to be a peace
officer, or a jailer or guard at a county Jail, and
the Commission shall immediately revoke the
certification of a person so convicted.
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**&*&** at ike tquMJ protection and due quent proof of innocence is irrelevant; (5)
process daosea. Under the equal protection there is no legal support for a right to a
•TO"»tnt, Plaintiff contends (1) there is no hearing and a case-by-case analysis; (6)
rational relationship underlying his criminal there is no violation of the equal protection
»"«»rd a»d his ability to be an effective clause as Plaintiff is not a member of a
poKet officer, (2) he was rejected solely suspect classification, and thus the concern
because of his felon status, and thus arbi- for public health, safety, and morals undertrari,
y *»<* irrationally treated differently; scores the rational relationship standard;
(8) that the statute is simultaneously over- (7) there is no procedural due process violabroad (not tuflicientJy specifically tailored tion, as the statute is not an arbitrary and
to limit the statute to conform to a legiti- unreasonable exclusion; and (8) Defendants
mate state interest) and underbroad (allow- assert this is a frivolous lawsuit and request
ing those with numerous misdemeanors to attorney's fees.
be police officers, while denying those with
one felony); and (4) arbitrarily certifying V. Jurisdiction
those ex-felons before 1975, yet excluding
[2] This case is brought under 42 U.S.C.
those after 1976.
S§ 1983, 1988, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343,2201,
Under the due process argument, Plain- 2202, and the Fourteenth (14th) Amendtiff asserts his procedural due process rights ment There was no request made for a
were violated because no hearing was al- three-judge panel, as possible under 28
lowed. Specifically, that such factors as U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284. Connor v. Hutto, 516
the nature of the offense, recentness of the F.2d 853, 855 (8th Cir. 1975); Mildner v.
offense, subsequent dismissal from the Gulotta, 405 F.Supp. 182, 184 (E.D.N.Y.
court's docket, Plaintiffs involvement in 1975), affirmed, 425 U.S. 901, 96 S.O. 1489
the offense, any rehabilitation, i.e., his un- 47 L.Ed.2d 751 (1976). The Court will not
blemished record for twenty years, public abstain, see Railroad Commission v. Pullaervice as a police officer for four years, man Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.CL 643,85 L.EA
*nd a full pardon by the Governor of Texas, 971 (1941); Duncan v. Poythress, 657 R2d
were not considered in order to provide for 691 (5th Cir. 1981); High 01' Times v. Busan individualized analysis. Thus, Plaintiff bee, 621 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1980); Younger
alleges there is no possibility of demonstrat- v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct 746, 27
ing that he now satisfies the underlying L.Ed.2d 669 (1971); U. S. v. Composite
purposes of the statute.
State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 656 F.2d 131
Plaintiff prays for this Court to assume (5th Cir. 1981), and regarding the exhausjurisdiction, to restrain and permanently tion doctrine, the Court is satisfied Plaintiff
enjoin Defendants from enforcing the stat- has met the applicable principles, see generute, to determine the statute unconstitu- ally: Patsy v. Florida Eastern University,
tional, and to award damages and attor- 634 R2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981). This Court,
ney s fees.
therefore, notes probable jurisdiction.
Issue I
JV. Defendants Response
What is the legal effect, under Texas
Defendants assert several contentions:
law, of a pardon granted by the Gover(1) the Court should abstain to first permit
nor?
Texas courts to consider the issues of state
law; (2) the complaint fails to state a cause VI. Pardon
of action against these Defendants in their
The Texas Constitution gives the Goverindividual capacity; (3) the Court lacks jur- nor of Texas power to grant pardons in
isdiction to entertain a suit for damages criminal matters. "In all criminal cases,
against the State of Texas and the individu- except treason and impeachment, the Goval Defendants in their official capacity; (4) ernor shall have power, after conviction, on
a pardon based on anything besides subse- the written signed recommendation and ad-
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rice of the Board of Pardons and Paroles,
w
. . . , to grant . . . pardons
Article
Four, Section Eleven; see also: Tex.Code
Crim.Pro.Ann. art 48.01 (Vernon 1979);
Hsnkamer v. Tcmplin, 143 Tex. 572, 187
&W.2d 549, 550 (1945). The only civil power he possesses is to remit fines and bond
forfeitures.
The meaning of a pardon is both interesting and historical Originally, under English law, there were several kinds of pardons: general, special or particular, conditional, absolute, and statutory. The King
of England had the power to set aside orders of the Court He alone could do so for
the Court had no power over its final judgment As Lord Coke once wrote, "A pardon is a work of mercy, whereby the King,
either before attainder, sentence, or conviction, or after, forgiveth any crime, offense,
punishment, execution, right title, debt or
duty, temporal, or ecclesiastical.'* 3 Inst
233. Prior to the Revolution, the American
Colonies, being in effect under the laws of
England, were accustomed to the exercise
of it in various forms. Hence, when the
words "to grant pardons" were used in the
United States Constitution, they conveyed
to mind the authority as had been exercised
by the English Crown. See Article Two,
Section Two, Clause One. No effort was
made to define or change its meaning.
Years passed and differing language in
cases caused confusion among the courts as
to the American effect of a pardon. Com2. In the year September 1. 197S to August 31.
1979, the Board received 3906 requests, recommended 162, and the Governor's office (Dolph
Briscoe and William P. dements, Jr.. after January 1, 1979) approved 90. In the year September 1. 1979 to August 31. I960, the Board
received 3311 requests, recommended 144, and
the Governor's office approved 91. In the year
September i, idSO, to August 31, 1381, the
Board received 3142 requests, recommended
137, and the Governor's office approved 118.
Statistics courtesy of the Office of the Board of
Pardons and Paroles, Mrs. Gladys Sommers,
Austin, Texas and the Office of the Governor.
Mr. John McCotlum, Assistant General Counsel. Austin. Texas: October, 1961.
*• In lobbying against a broad interpretation of
* pardon, the Governor's office expressed fear
that if the door was opened for one group of
individuals (pardoned ex-fdonsX then all ex-fel-
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pare: Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall 833,880, 71
U.S. 333,380,18 L.Ed. 866 (1860) ("blots out
the existence of guilt") with Burdick v.
United States, 236 U.S. 79,91, 35 S.Ct 267,
269,59 L.Ed. 476 (1914) ("confession of guilt
implied in the acceptance of a pardon**);
and Bennett v. State, 24 Tex.App. 78, 79, 5
S.W. 527, 529 (1887) (stating a full pardon
absolves the party from all legal consequences of his crime) with Jones v. State,
141 Tex.Crim. 70,147 S.W.2d 508,510 (1941)
("does not obliterate the fact of the commission of the crime").
Today, the offenses for which a pardon is
usually requested are burglary, rape, robbery, forgery, drugs, and occasionally even
murder. The process generally works this
way. After serving sentence (either full,
probated, etc), anyone may make application for a pardon. The' applicant forwards
his request, along with letters of recommendation, to the Board of Pardons and Paroles. A decision is made; if the Board
denies the request, the process is of course
over, but the applicant may apply again. If
the Board approves the request, it is forwarded to the Governor's Clemency Staff.2
The Staffs recommendation is then almost
always approved by the Governor.1
[3-8] The undisputed legal effect of a
pardon is to restore the civil rights to an
ex-felon (suffrage, jury service, and the
chance to seek public office). See ISasterwood v. State, 34 Tex.Crim. 400, 31 S.W.
on* might assert exceptions to the rule. The
argument also has been raised that many exfelon*, who might seek a "tough-guy" line of
work, now go into the Army. However, if
exceptions to this statute were allowed, so goes
the thinking, they might apply for police officer
work. In fact, the Governor's office contended
and strongly suggested that If they knew many
of those now seekifig pardon status could in
fact become police officer*, their percentage of
approvals would significantly drop. That feeling to mainly based on the belief that while
many applicants might list their reasons for
wanting a pardon as the right to vote, the
desire to clear their family name, etc, at the
time of the application; in two years or whenever, after they had been granted a pardon,
circumstance* might have changed and they
would then be eligible for officer certification.
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»*• » • (1896); 44 TexJurJd Pardon, Re* conviction of an infamous offense it evipnew^EUL, §13(1968); TexJLtt'y Gen.Op^ dence of bad character.* Bennett v. State,
No. MW-14S (I960). However, the Gover- supra, 24 Tex.App. 79, 5 S.W. at 529.
nor cannot overrule the judgment of a court
[9, It] The bottom line on the effect of
of l*w. Re has no -appellate" jurisdiction.
***** v. State, 672 S.W.2d 889,841 (Tex. a pardon is7that it restores some civil rights,
CnnxApp.1978); Jones v. Stmte, supra, 141 but not all. The following decisions estabTex.Crim. 70,147 S.W.2d at 511. There can lish that a prior conviction for which one
be no doubt but that a final judgment was has received a pardon absent a showing
entered against the ex-felon. Regardless of that such pardon was granted for subsethe post-judgment procedural maneuver- quent proof of innocence, may be utilized
ing,4 a final conviction does not disappear. for purposes of enhancement, Donald v.
A pardon implies guilt Texas Courts may Jones, 445 F2A 601, 606 (5th Cir.X cert
forgive, but they do not forget The fact is denied, 404 U.S. 992, 92 S.Ct 537, 80
not obliterated1 and there is no "wash". L.Ed.2d 548 (1971); Watkins v. State, suDiaz v. Chasen, 642 F.2d 764, 765-66 (5th pra, 572 S.W.2d at 341; impeachment,*
Cir. 1981); Gurleski v. United States, 405 Gurleski v. United States, supra, 405 R2d
F.2d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 1969), cert denied, at 266; Sipanek v. State, 100 Tex.Crim. 489,
272 S.W. 141, 142 (1925); denial of bail to a
895 US. 981, 89 S.Ct 2140, 23 L.Ed.2d 769,
habitual offender. Ex Parte Smith, supra,
rehearing denied sub nom. Smith v. United
548 S.w\2d at 414; denial of probation,
States, 896 US. 869, 90 S.Ct 87, 24 L.Ed.2d
Watkins v. Thomas, 623 F.2d 387, 388 (5th
124 (1969); Watkins v. State, supra, 572
Cir. 1980); proving possession of a firearm
S.W.2d , t 341; Ex Parte Smith, 548 S.W.2d
by a convicted felon, Runo v. State, 556
410, 414 (Tex.Oim.App.1977). Moreover, S.W.2d 808, 809-10 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977);
the granting of a pardon does not in any United States v. Castellana, 433 RSupp.
way indicate a defect in the process. It 1309,1316 (M.D.Fla.1977); and proving posmay remove some disabilities, but does not session of burglary tools by a convicted
change the common-law principle that a felon, Logan v. State, 448 S.W.2d 462, 463*\_5?? Te*-Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art 42.12(7)
which states:
At any time, after the defendant has satisfactorily completed one-third of the original
fractionary period or two years of probation, whichever is the lesser, the period of
Probation may be reduced or terminMted by
We court Upon the satisfactory fulfillment
OTthe conditions of probation, and the expi™**<* a * Period of probation, the court.
*y orferjduly entered, shall amend or modify
tnc original sentence imposed, if necessary,
wcoworai to Che probation period and shall
«*eharge the defendant. In case the defend,
ant has been convicted or has entered a plea
orguBty or a plea of nolo contendere, and the
o°wt has discharged the defendant hereunoe^soch court may set aside the verdict or
P*™* the defendant to withdraw his plea,
and shall dismiss the accusation, complaint,
information or indictment against such de««dant. who shall thereafter be released
from aO penalties and disabilities resulting
™ " U* offense or crime of which he has
been convicted or to which he has pleaded
gufity,except that proof of his said conviction
or plea of guilty shall be made known to the
court should the defendant again be convicted of any criminal offense.

and the Tex.AUy Gen.Op., No. MW-148 (I960)
analysis of it.
S. An employee, for example, could not say to
an employer during the hiring process that be
had never been convicted of a felony.
«. See Mho: Doe K Webster, 606 FJ2d 1226,
1239 n.51 (D.C.Cir.1979) One must also consider the liability exposure of the State. If It
were commanded to clothe an ex-felon with the
general authority a police officer carries, and
he were to abuse that (i.e. as an example, s
pardoned burglar or rapist), a private dtlren
could turn around and sue the state claiming K
knowingly allowed such to occur.
7. Many ex-fekms may and should be able to
vote, etc.; they Just cannot be certified as police officers.
8. One of the most important assets a poHce
officer possesses is his ability to testify about
an event A )my will usually accord his testimony significant credibility. However, an exfelon police officer loses that testimonial power. Although his pardon may be used to bolster on re-direct, most likely the damaging impression has set in.
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64 (Tex.CriiiLApp.1969). Additionally, federal laws do not neoessarily obey the effect
of a state pardon. See also: Diaz v. Chawen, supra, 642 F.2d at 765, United States v.
Padia,584F.2d85,86(5thCir.l978); racovone v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 1028,1035-46 (D.C.
Cir.1981); United States v. Castellana, supra, 433 F.Supp. at 1317.
The Court cites six cases as consistent
with its reasoning, Barsky v. Board of Re*
gents ofN.Y., 347 U.S. 442, 74 S.Ct 650,98
L.EA 829 (1953) (New York statute stated a
physician convicted of any crime would
have his license suspended); Diaz v. Chasen,
642 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1981) (A customhouse
cartman's license was revoked as a result of
bis felony conviction of possession of stolen
goods, even though a Louisiana statute automatically pardoned a first offender upon
completion of his sentence); Hankamer v.
Templin, 143 Tex. 572,187 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.
1945) (Where an attorney had been disbarred following his conviction of a felony,
a pardon by the Governor did not reinstate
his privilege to practice law, nor restore his
former office as an attorney); Cooper v.
Texas Board of Medical Examiners, 489
S.W.2d 129 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1973,
writ refd n.r.e.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1072,
94 S.O. 585, 88 L.Ed.2d 478 (1974) (Doctor
was convicted of a felony offense; the
Court found Tex.Rev.Civ.StatAnn. art.
4505(2) (1976) gave sufficient power to the
State Board of Medical Examiners to
refuse, cancel, revoke, or suspend a license
for such an offense); Jones v. State, 141
Tex.Crim. 70, 147 S,W.2d 508 (1941); Dee
Wayne Thompson v. Texas Commission on
L*w Enforcement Officer Standards and
Education, No. 311, 698 (DistCt of Travis
County, 200th Judicial District of Texas,
April 24,1981) (Plaintiff sought judicial review of an administrative order entered by
the Commission revoking his Police Officer
Qualification certificate previously issued as
* result of his felony conviction for the
offense of arson); and one as distinguishable, Warren v. State, 121 Tex.Crim. 71, 74
•. Until 1975. the Commission excluded SH felons except one who had pled guilty, served his
in fact innocent, and had received a full pardon. Plaintiff would not have

S.W.2d 1006 (1941) (In Jones, the Court of
Criminal Appeals analyzed the earlier Warren decision and stated if that majority had
desired to assert a pardon wiped out the
existence of the fact, it easily could have
clarified its opinion; undoubtedly, the majority did not disclose such a willingness.).
In conclusion, this Court has to wonder if
maybe there should not be categories of
pardons. Those might include a conditional
pardon (limited to any specific situation), a
general pardon (everything but the earlier
enumerated exceptions and police officer
certification), and an unconditional pardon
(i.e. a total elimination of any disability).
Such a system would have prevented this
problem, but more importantly, any future
ones which could be far more delicate.
Issue (2)
Did the Texas Legislature, which automatically excluded any convicted felon9
from the possibility of being certified as a
police officer, violate Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights
(equal protection under the laws and procedural due process)?
VII. Equal Protection
[11-131 This case involves the Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights.
When a statute affects everyone's rights, it
is a question of substantive due process
(Fifth Amendment). When a statute treats
some people differently than others, then it
is a matter of equal protection. Thompson
v. Gallagher, 489 F2d 443, 447 (5th Cir.
1974); Upshaw v. McNamara, 435 F.2d
1188, 1190 nJ (1st Cir. 1970). The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States provides, in pertinent
part, " . . . nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, . . . ; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.** It stands
for the proposition, therefore, the Government must act, when it acts, in a manner
which is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.
been eligible for the exception as he pled guilty
to a charge of robbery, and his sentence was
probated, so that he never served any "time".
(See Plaintiffs exhibits 14. IS. and 17).
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[M-16] There exists three standards of City of Alameda, 502 F.Supp. 1108, 1111
****** »wkr traditional Fourteenth (ND.Calif.1980). Thus, in the context of
Amendment analysis. Seoane v. Ortho occupational licensing, the Supreme Court
Pharmaceuticals, Jnc, 000 FJM 146 (5th Cir. has formulated a test which requires that
1961). A challenged classification is subject any qualification only "have a rational conto strict scrutiny only if a suspect class is nection with the applicant's fitness or cadisadvantaged, Graham v. Richardson, 403 pacity" to perform the job. Schware r.
VS. 865, 91 &Ct 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 Board of Bar Examiners, 853 VS. 232, 239,
(1*71) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 888
77 S.Ct 752, 756, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957). In
U.S. 1,87 S.Ct 1817,18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967)
other words, a state may regulate profes(race); Oyama r. California, 832 VS. 633,
sions which affect the public interest as
68 S.Ct 209, 92 UEd. 249 (1948) (naUonal
long as the regulation rationally furthers a
origin); or, when it impermissibly interlegitimate state purpose or interest
feres with the exercise of a fundamental
right, Shapiro v. Thompson, 894 VS. 618,89
[18,19] Turning to the facts and applyS.O. 1822, 22 LJ5a\2d 000 (1969) (right to ing the minimal rationality standard, the
travel); Bullock v. Cuter, 405 VS. 134, 92
question is: can one uphold the statute in a
S.Ct 849, 81 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972) (right to
manner consistent with the equal protection
vote); Zabhcki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 874, 98
clause? Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74, 92
S.O. 678, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978) (marriage);
S.Ct 251, 253, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971); AnNAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct
drews v. Drew Municipal Separate School
U63, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) (freedom of
District, 507 R2d 611, 614 (5th Cir. 1975),
association); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93
cert dismissed, 425 U.S. 559, 96 S.Ct 1752,
SCt 705, 85 L.EA2d 147 (1973) (right of
48 L-Ed.2d 169 (1976). Some cases have
privacy). If gender classification or illegitistruck
down various statutes on the ground
macy is involved, then there must be a fair
and substantial relation to important there was insufficient evidence presented to
government objectives, Crafe v. Borent 429 justify the classification. However, lest one
V.S. 190, 97 S.Ct 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 forgets the late 1930's, Courts do not sit as
(1976); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 a super-legislature to judge the consideraS.Ct 1509, 20 UEdL2d 486 (1968), respec- tions of legislative policy made in areas that
tively. Any other designation would only neither affect fundamental rights nor prorequire a rational relation to a legitimate ceed along suspect lines. City of New Orlegovernmental interest San Antonio School ans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 aCt
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct 2513, 2516,49 L.Ed2d 511 (1976); Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.a 726, 729, 83 aCt 1028,
1278, 36 L.EdL2d 16 (1973).
1030, 10 L.Ed.2d 93 (1963); West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish, 800 U.S. 379,899, 57 aCt
[17] The Supreme Court's standard of 578, 585, 81 LEd. 703 (1937); Laketon Asless than strict scrutiny " . . . has consist- phalt and Refining, Inc. v. United States,
ently been applied to state legislation re- 476 RSupp. 668, 675 (N.D.Ind.1979). A
stricting the availability of employment op- Legislature has great latitude in making
portunities," Dandridge r. Williams, 897 statutory classifications involving social or
U.S. 471.485,90 S.Ct 1158,1161,25 L.Ed.2d moral legislation. United States v. Neary,
491 (1970); Smith v. Fussenith, 440 F.Supp 552 F.2d 1184, 1189 (7th Cir.), cert denied,
1077, 1079 (D.Comm.l977)f as well as to 434 U.S. 864, 98 S.Ct 197, 54 L.Ed.2d 189
classifications based on a criminal record. (1977); United States v. Weatherford, 471
Miller v. Carter, 547 FJM 1314, 1321 (7th FJ2d 47, 51 (7th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 411
Cir. 1977) (Campbell, concurring), affirmed
U.S. 972, 93 a c t 2144, 36 L.Ed.2d 695
by an equally divided court, 434 U.S. 356,98
(1973), Laketon Asphalt and Refining Inc.
S.Ct 786, 54 L.Ed.2d 608 (1978); Kindem v.
v. United States, supra, 476 F-Supp. at 675.
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[20-121 There is no constitutional right
to public employment1* AfcGarvey v. District of Columbia, 468 F.Supp. 687,680 (D.C
1979); Carlyh v. Sitterson, 438 F.Supp. 956,
959 (D.N.C.1975). A Government must
have authority to scrutinize the hiring of
personnel based on conduct occurring prior
to their employment Dew v. Halaby, 317
YM 582, 586 (D.C.Cir.1963); Carlyle v. Sitterson, supra, 438 F-Supp. at 963. It is a
vital part of the state's police power, Barsky v. Board of Regents of N.Y., supra, 847
U.S. at 449, 74 S.Ct at 654 (1953). The
rationale is to insure that those persons
publicly employed in emergency or dangerous situations are sober and alert, and possess qualities such as honesty, integrity, reliability and obedience to the law.11 After
all, state police are charged with the enforcement of the law, not for themselves or
their clients as in private practice, but for
the benefit and safety of people at large.
In Talent v. City of Abilene, 508 S.W.2d
592, 597 (Tex.1974), regarding a fireman
who was dismissed for failure to submit to
a polygraph examination after he had been
charged with a criminal offense. Justice
Reavley in a five-four dissent said,
'The Fire Chief had a responsibility to
Fireman Talent: to respect the rules of
job tenure and to treat Talent fairly. He
also had a responsibility to the other 127
people in his department when discipline
and mutual trust are necessary. He had
the people of Abilene to serve. Abilene's
ordinances provide that its firemen and
policemen must be persons of good moral
character . . .
[I] would say that the Legislature and
City of Abilene recognized that policemen
and firemen should be credible and trustworthy/*12
[23,241 Policemen are just simply a sperial category. Integrity and trust are pre-

requisites. The law clothes an officer with
authority to handle many critical situations,
including those that occur in a lightning
moment and which never can be re-enacted
or reversed. There are so many far-reaching implications that the Legislature, in order to exclude a majority of undesirable
applicants, while acknowledging it might
deny a minority of acceptable ones, simply
had to draw a line. That line prevents
ex-felons from being certified as police officers. It does not prevent them from other
work; in fact in other areas, society encourages their rehabilitation. Under the facts
of this case, it is especially apparent as
Plaintiffs felony conviction (robbery)
would directly reflect on his qualifications
for the job (investigating robberies, etc).
Butts v. Nichols, 381 F.Supp. 573, 580 (&D.
Iowa C.D.1974). A state's legitimate concern for maintaining high standards of professional conduct extends far beyond the
initial licensing. Barsky v. Board of Regents of NY., supra, 347 U.a at 451, 74
S.Ct at 655.
The Court cites two examples of cases
which are consistent with its reasoning. Upshaw v. McNamara, 435 F.2d 1188 (1st Cir.
1970) (action by a rejected ex-felon, who
was later pardoned, for a police appointment); Foley v. Connelie, 419 F.Supp. 889
(S.D.N.Y.1976) (Irish alien brought a class
action for declaration that New York statute was unconstitutional, insofar as it excluded aliens from employment as New
York State Troopers); and four which are
distinguishable, Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 358 U.a 282, 77 S.Ct 752, 1
LEd.2d 796 (1957) (applicant was excluded
from the practice of law; in fact, applicant's past criminal record included only
arrests, and he was never tried or convicted
for any single offense); Andrews v. Drew

TempUn, supra, 143 Tex. 572, 187 S.W26 at
It, Or, as Judge (Uter Justice) Holmes once
551 (1945).
said, The petitioner may have a constitutional
right to talk politic*, but he has no constitution,
al right to be a policeman.*' McAuUffe v May- 12. See also: Richardson v. City of Pasadena,
500 S.W.2d 175. 177 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston
or of City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216. 29
(14th Dtst) 1973). reVd on other grounds. 513
N.E. 517 (1892).
S.W.2d 1 (Tex.1974). afTd with orders. 523
S.W^d 506 (Tex.Ov.App.—Houston (14th
11. Compare: Better v. MkUcndorf. 632 ¥2d
Dist.J 1975).
788, 812 (9th Cir. 1978): and Hankamer v.
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" V a n u * chOdfairth m»y occur and which

who have been convicted of serious crimes
in the past have demonstrated a greater
potential for abuse of their right to possess
firearms.
[25] The general principles enunciated
in Giles under its facts bear a significant
similarity to the facts and theories of this
case. The Court, therefore, concludes there
was no equal protection violation.11

Sfc£.^Sfon" P"rent's p ^ " 1

VIII. Procedural Due Process
Plaintiff contends his due process rights
were violated because there was no oppor^ S ^ * ' ~ n c e '"""* -V mu- tunity
for any hearing to allow the Commisi ? - - f c ° ' ! 0 W M e * * " « • unconrtituUonof
othe| sion to evaluate his individual record. On a
0
more theoretical level, Plaintiff would as"P*™ ™
^ J ^ ^ LWher
* * " * * " «»>q««ti<H.«bly sert he is now unable to demonstrate to the
™Ll?!!3
" « • * • • • * *"*•* the Commission he can satisfy the underlying
J * ^ « J opportarty for , „ y employment purposes of the statute.
•«^ta«'to b.n * . „ rtatate p r o h i b i t i e m .
The Fourteenth Amendment to the UnitW W of cotmcM felon, in civil service ed States Constitution provides, in pertiP ^ ^ J o w . .ututory scheme had nent part, ". nor shall any State deprive
* ^ ^ b ^ P-Wbition against the em- any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." After closely
Civil Krvice
studying the issue, the following general
principles seem applicable.
C Urtrelie on
d ^ ^ L ^

0

' - " " » W i * * " * * custo-

aJS^???

ESX

i S ' * ^ °

^^

-

*" '" ""

* * • ^ ^ i"

^ r ^ ^ ^ t .
In G/fes. Defendant challenged the constitutionality of a
£ * £ .tatute which made unl.Ju. the

[26-29] The Fourteenth Amendment
provides an independent right to demand
that the government act in a nonarbitrary
manner at all times. Thompson v. Gallagher, supra, 489 F.2d at 44G-47; Kindem v.
City of Alameda, supra, 502 F.Supp. at
1113. A state cannot exclude a person from
an occupation in a manner or for reasons
which contravene the due process clause.
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra,
353 U.S. at 238-39, 77 S.Ct at 755-56.
Further, due process requires that action by
a state through any of its agencies must be
consistent with the fundamental principles
of liberty and justice. Buchalter v. New
York, 319 U.S. 427, 429. 63 S.O. 1129, 1130,
87 LEd. 1492 (1942). Even though the

n?LZl?mm * * convicted fe,<»>£ « M i e n d e d rtrtrte had substituted a
Vk>,ent w otne
ZZZZ' ""Hf p r e d , e «»">t''t"tive
standard

S
T ^ L2T
""~.
* * b puwriable by imprtaonment for
mora t h w o n , ye*J for a nam,wer. some«*«t imprecise qualitative s t a n d i (con^ o n o f . "crime* violence"). Deckling
£ taue under the ^
„.„„£
pnJkm
ute h£ " " " l - ^ y concluded the statS n ^ s o ^ -*»">nship to the p i
congress sought to promote. i.e. persons
' ^ ^ T * ^ " * -

" • « • 547 F i d . , ,314

0
n oHemtt
•Si^T
'2^license.
r~"* "« a VS£lL
public chauffeur's
The•"
M

(including one convicted of a prohibited offente

but concealing the fact and obtaining a license,
and still remaining eligible to keep the HcenseX
the ordinance violated equal protection. However, those kinds of potential discrepancies are
not possibleft under the Texas Statute as Article
4413<29aaK AXb) states a final conviction of »
felony disqualifies any person previously certified.
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U.S. at 571, 92 S.Ct at 2705; Thompson v.
Gallagher, supra, 489 F.2d at 446, but rather fall on a "life, liberty, or property'* analysis. Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, 406
U.S. at 569, 92 S.Ct at 2705.
[34-38] In an action alleging a deprivation of an interest without proper due proc[30-32] Due Process, unlike some legal ess of law, it is first necessary to consider
rotes, is not a technical concept with a fixed the nature of that interest Lindsey v.
content, unrelated to time or circumstances. NormeU 405 U.S. 56, 74, 92 S.Ct 862, 874,
Its very nature negates any notion of in- 31 L.Ed.2d 86 (1972). Delineating those
flexible procedures universally applicable to boundaries, it is standard for a Court to
invaded, if at
every imaginable situation. Cafeteria ascertain whether the interest
u
,,
Workers v. McElroy, 867 U.S. 886, 895, 81 all, is a "liberty," or prope^ty interest?
While
there
is
no
constitutionally
protected
S.Ct 1748, 1748, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961);
McDowell v. State of Texas, 465 F.2d 1342, right to government employment, Orr v.
1348 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert denied, Trinter, 444 FAI 128, 133 (6th Cir. 1971),
410 U.S. 943, 93 S.Ct 1371, 85 L.Ed.2d 610 cert denied, 408 U^. 943, 92 S.Ct 2847, 88
L.Ed.2d 767 (1973); Roseboro v. Fayette(1978). It does not require a hearing in
ville City Bd. of Ed., 491 F.Supp. 113, 117
every conceivable case of governmental im(E.D.Tenn.1978), there is a liberty interest
pairment of private interests. Board of
in the right "to engage in any of common
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 92
** Board of Regents
S.Ct 2701, 2705, 33 LEdJM 548 (1972); occupations of life
McDowell v. State of Texas, supra, 465 F.2d v. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 572, 92 S.Ct at
at 1348. For example, generally, there is 2706; Giordano v. Roudebush, 448 F.Supp.
no violation of due process if a statute gives 899,904 (S.D.Iowa 1977), affirmed, 617 F.2d
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice 511 (8th Cir. 1980). In Roth, the court
distinguished between a "general** right to
that his contemplated conduct is prohibited,
engage in a chosen occupation, and a specifUnited States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114,
ic right to a particular position, and deter123, 99 S.Ct 2198, 2203, 60 L.Ed.2d 755
mined due process protection only attaches
(1979); United States v. Giles, supra, 640
to the former interest See also: Orr v.
F.2d at G2&-29.
Trinter, supra, 444 FJ2d at 133. Therefore,

government purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by
means which broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved. Police Department v.
Mosky, 406 U.S. 92, 101 n.8, 92 S.Ct 2286,
2293 1^8, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972).

[33] A state can require high standards
of qualification for a profession such as
good moral character, as long as it has a
rational connection to the applicant's fitness
or capacity (especially when discussing a
H
1rven profession, like law, medicine or law
enforcement, where ethics should be the
most minimal of qualifications). Schware
v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra, 858 U.S.
*t 239, 77 S.Ct at 756. When a state
exercises such a right, the question often
•rises: does due process require any kind of
* hearing? M In answering that, Courts no
longer can rely on a privilege-right distinction, Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408

it would seem that where state action denies a person a license or opportunity1S to
practice his chosen profession, due process
may require that he be given a hearing and
a chance to respond to the charges against
him. See, e^., Greene v. McElroy, 860 U.S.
474, 79 S.Ct 1400, 8 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1957);
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra,
353 U.S. at 232, 77 S.Ct at 752, 1 L.Ed2d
796. This may be especially relevant when
the applicant "has no procedural due process rights apart from those which the agency has chosen to create by its own regulations.** Schwartz v. Fed. Energy Reg.
Com'n., 578 F.2d 417, 420 (D.C.Cir.1978).

!*» Compare Occupations, Profession* and U»la. See Gosnty v. Sonora Independent School
cwsfs Pteisom with Criminai Background*, District, 603 F.2d 522. 825 (5th Or. 1979);
Thorn** v. Bd. of Trustees, Etc, 515 F.Supp.
Vernon's Texas Session Law Service- 1961
280. 287 (S.D.Tex.1981).
TenSessXaw Serv.. ch. 267. § 13(c), at €84.
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• » » Ftofatiff has never requested . hear» » b M w i h p d that the lost opportul % CM«d him humiliation or embarrass
• " • * • * * • • „ „ „ . mmplaintd
of
•»«tUehedtohl,repiltatj0nl,
u £
I ™ L « i « * • »>» question of being
d«fed procedure due process, he must re!

the state, particularly if an alternative
state forum were available to the plaintiff."
Upshaw v. McNaman, supra, 485 F.2d at
1192.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

STs!
",d have *uchre^uestd e•"> °y »«?7*
e Commission."
d

O.

Cbacftafon

<(fj?£

*s>

wwrnctsrsTof

t J ' S J i ' 1 "* Court', hoW,',« f»t (i)

IT9**** ****** «o the Plaintiff by the
£ * * • * «w<*»w tome, but not all, legal
* * « " ' « * (2) the statute automatfcal* £ * * • * ^-felons from certification as
pence officers is constitutional.
rfiSi!'?1.1"*'? " * follo »i'W station sue
« * t | y ttate. tlu. Court's position in regard
to ewe, .uch as this being filed in federal
court,
" . . . we note that the issues involved in
thta case might have best been raised in
« ^ e r forum The rights with which

Lloyd MORRIS, Plaintiff,
v.
Tk* CITY OF NEW YORK PARKING
VIOLATIONS BUREAU, Defendant
No. 80 Civ. 0012 (PNL).
United States District Court,
S. D. New York.
Nov. 18, 1981.

nghtsof pardoned felons under [Texas]
taw Federal tasues are at best secondary
Nonresident automobile owner brought
and hinge upon our interpretation of
action claiming to have been denied due
•Utelaw. Since there is only one Massachuaetts.case, [a. was the number of Tex- process and equal protection by seizure of
his automobile after a default judgment for
• r i T E 1 ! * * ****** thi» "••* «** thenunpaid parking violations. Cross motions
only briefly, we are handicapped in our for summary judgment were filed. The
mterpretotion; |„ f u t u r e e ^
^ ^ District Court, Leval, J, held that (1) plainmfeht expand the rights of pardoned feltiff was not denied due process by failure of
Parking ticket to warn of possibility of exe•WortI [PlamUff] more procedural proteccution after a default judgment had been
tion than we think the federal Constitutaken for parking violations, and (2) there
» « ^ u i r « . I„ the future we would be
was no equal protection violation by virtue
tempted * abstain from deciding similar
of fact that those individuals who reside in
« * » in whfch the federal right, were
a state which does not provide New York
«*«Ktory and baaed on rights granted by
with a computer tape identifying the auto,

^t^H^5T5>e

C o a r t htm

SO^im tZJ^

i£<£um'

*•*«• that a liberty

^

US

693

' 701/96

IU,C Wl FJd

**" '

»• »

o f ^ ™ f h S ? ^ ^ 8 k > n Both are matter,
of great public concern This Court note, that

the statute which once autoiiiatically barred a
convicted felon from continuing to practice as
an attorney has been abolished, Tex.Rev.Ov.
Stat.Ann. art 311 (repealed 1979) Thus. It
•**«• «ny convicted felon who may be an
applicant for the bar or an attorney who ha.
been disbarred because of a felony conviction
and seeks reinstatement after serving his sentence and being pardoned will probably be given a hearing

Ot«ttS27F.Sa»p.724 (1M1)

mobile registrants do not receive preexecutkm notice that default can result in execution.
Defendant's motion granted; plaintiff, motion denied.
L Automobiles *»349
Constitutional Law «=»315
Although original summons left on a
motor vehicle does not state that default
judgment can result in execution on the
vehicle for failure to pay parking violations
and although no additional notices are sent
to residents of states that do not provide
New York with a computer tape identifying
automobile registrants until seizure is effected, such procedure does not deny due
process to a resident of a noncooperating
state as at least three parking tickets must
be collected before seizure, postseizure notice is given in time to allow a hearing prior
to sale and to require earlier notice to registrants of noncooperating states would impose such costs as would exceed revenues
from enforcement 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983;
U.S.C.A.ConstAmends. 5, 14; N.Y.Vehicle
and Traffic Law § 241.
2. Constitutional Law *=» 249(8)
There is no equal protection violation in
New York's dividing parking violators into
two classes, with one class being New York
residents and residents of states which provided New York with computer tapes identifying automobile registrants and second
class being residents of ten states which do
not provide computer tape, as any difference in treatment, i.e., residents of noncooperating states not receiving preaeizure notice that default can result in execution of
the vehicle, is rationally related to securing
compliance with parking laws and there is
no animus toward nonresidents. 42 VS.
C.A. § 1983; U.S.C.A.ConstAmends. 5, 14;
N.Y.Vehicle and Traffic Law § 241.
James I. Meyeraon, Thomas Hoffman,
New York City, for plaintiff.
Carl Sanders and Judah Harris, Corp.
Counsel, New York City, for defendant
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OPINION AND ORDER
LEVAL, District Judge.
Plaintiff brings this action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, claiming to have been denied
due process and equal protection of the laws
by the seizure of his automobile after a
default judgment for unpaid parking violations under § 241 of the New York Vehicle
and Traffic law and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
Plaintiff claims to be a resident of North
Carolina. Although plaintiffs residence is
disputed, it is not disputed that his car was
registered in North Carolina. North Carolina is one of ten states that do not provide
New York with a computer tape identifying
their automobile registrants. Plaintiff was
issued and did not respond to several parking summonses in New York City. A default judgment was obtained against him.
The judgment was executed upon by the
Marshal, who seized plaintiffs car. The car
was released to him when he paid the
amount of the judgment, plus fees and impounding charges.
Plaintiff claims not to have received any
of his many original summonses. Plaintiff
claims also that the original summonses,
even if received, would not provide sufficient notice, because, while they do say
Failure to answer this summons within 7
days will be deemed an admission of liability. Additional penalties will be added
and may lead to a default judgment
they do not mention that a default judgment could result in execution upon property.
Each party moves for summary judgment; plaintiff also moves for class certification.
Section 241 provides as follows: When
the operator or owner of a car has failed to
plead or appear in response to a parking
violation, a default judgment may be entered. If the owner is a New York resident, he or she must be notified, by firstclass mail, of the violations charged, of the
impending default judgment, where the default would be entered, and that it could be
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an exception to the rule relied on". Funk
v. Campbell, 15 Cal.2d 250, 251, 100 P2d
762; California Delta Farms v. Chinese
American Farms, 201 Cal. 201, 255 P. 1097.
[3,4] Section 663a provides that a motion utider section 663 must be made "within ten days after notice of the entry of
judgment, served upon the adverse party".
There is no limitation, as suggested by the
respondent, that such motion be made within 60 days after entry of judgment. Nor
does this rule allow "every unsuccessful
litigant to set his own time for appeal", for
the prevailing party by serving notice of
entry of the judgment may limit the time
within which his adversary is entitled to
proceed under section 663. An order denying a motion made under that section is appealable, Funk v. Campbell, supra; California Delta Farms v. Chinese American
Farms, supra, and the record in the present
action shows that the notice of appeal was
timely filed.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.

against him. Health and Safety Code, §
11164; Government Code, § 11512; Pen.
Code, §§ 1203.3, 1203.4; Business and
Professions Code, § 2383.
2. Criminal law @=»998
Physicians and surgeons $=>ll(2)
The trial court's action in setting aside
verdict of conviction and dismissing prosecution after discharging convict from probation mitigates his punishment by restoring
certain rights and removing certain disabilities, but does not obliterate fact that he
wasfinallyadjudged guilty of crime, so that
State Board of Medical Examiners is not
precluded from suspending license of physician convicted of crime involving moral
turpitude and discharged, from probation,
with such accompanying statutory relief,
whether before or after such disciplinary
order. Pen.Code, §§ 1203 et seq., 1203.3,
1203.4; Business and Professions Code, §
2383.
CARTER, SHENK and SCHAUER, JJ.,
dissenting.
»

GIBSON, C. J., and SHENK, CARTER,
Appeal from Superior Court, Los Angeles
TRAYNOR, SCHAUER, and SPENCE,
County;
Clarence M. Hanson, Judge.
JJ.f concur.
Proceeding by Paul Oliver Meyer against
the Board of Medical Examiners of the
State of California, its secretary and mem*
bers, for a writ of mandate to review thf
board's action in ordering suspension oi
plaintiff's license as a physician and surgeon.
From a judgment denying a peremp34 Cal.2d 62
tory
writ,
plaintiff appeals.
MEYER v. BOARD OF MEDICAL
Affirmed.
EXAMINERS et al.
L. A. 20929.
Prior opinion, Cal.App., 200 P.2d 128.
French & Indovina and F. Walter
Supreme Court of California, in Bank.
French, Santa Monica, for appellant.
June 15, 1949.
Rehearing Denied July 14,1948.
I. Physicians and surgeons $=>ll(2)
An order of State Board of Medical
Examiners, suspending physician's license
for unprofessional conduct by reason of his
conviction of offense involving moral turpitude in unlawfully selling morphine preparation, was not improper as imposing penalty
for such offense, in violation of statute,
after superior court discharged physician
frxi I'rcbation and dismissed accusations

Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, and
Bayard Rhone, Deputy Attorney General,
for respondents.
SPENCE, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment denying a peremptory writ of mandate in a
proceeding brought to review the action of
the respondent Board of Medical Examiners of the State of California in ordering
the suspension of appellant's license as a

physician and surgeon. Appellant challenges the propriety of the respondent
board's order, but his position cannot be
sustained in the light of applicable statutory
law as construed in relation to the problem
at hand.
So far as here material, the facts in
chronological order appear as follows: On
February 17, 1947, appellant, a licensed
physician and surgeon, upon entry of a
plea of guilty, was conricted of a violation
of section 11164 of the Health and Safety
Code (furnishing narcotics "to an addict,
or to any person representing himself as
such, except as permitted**). A sentence
of six months' imprisonment is the county
ja3 was imposed, but the execution thereof
was suspended and appellant was placed
on probation for a period of two years upon condition that he pay a $500.00 fine. On
August 5, 1947, respondent board filed an
accusation against appellant for his criminal dereliction, and on August 22, 1947, the
matter was tried before a hearing officer as
provided by statute. Gov.Code, sec 11512.
On January 23,1948, respondent board made
an order rejecting the hearing officer's proposed decision of December 4, 1947, and
specifying it would consider the matter
"upon the record, including the transcript,
without taking additional evidence, and upon written argument presented to" it.
Upon completion of one-half of the probationary period theretofore prescribed and
in response to appellant's motion made on
February 20, 1948* the superior court ordered that his "probation be terminated and
[he be] discharged therefrom under Section 1203J Penal Code, that plea of 'Guilty*
be changed to 'Not Guilty* and that cause
be dismissed under Section 1203.4 Penal
Code" On March 2, 1948, appellant presented to respondent board at its regularly
scheduled meeting a certified copy of the
court's order. However, said board concluded that such order "terminating probation and dismissing the information" did
not in the disciplinary proceeding before
it "remove or wipe out the conviction
suffered by" appellant; and upon reciting
the facts "resulting in the conviction*—
that appellant had made a sale of "two vials
containing forty tablets of a preparation of

morphine" to a state narcotic officer for
-$125.00 in marked money"—said board determined that appellant had been convicted
of "an offense involving moral turpitude"
and by reason of such conviction was
"guilty of unprofessional conduct* Accordingly, respondent board as of March
15, 1948, ordered the suspension of appellant's license for ninety days and placed
him on probation for three years. Appellant thereupon applied to the superior court
for a writ of mandate to compel respondent board to set aside its order and decision. Argument was had upon respondent
board's demurrer filed in return to appellant's petition, and it was sustained without
leave to amend. The court then entered
its judgment denying relief to appellant.
From such judgment this appeal is taken.
[1] The sole question to be determined
is the effect of section 1203.4 of the Penal
Code upon the authority of respondent
board to order the suspension of appellant's
license. As here material, said section prorides: "Every defendant • * * who
shall have been discharged from probation
prior to the termination of the period thereof, shall at any time thereafter be permitted by the court to withdraw his plea of
guilty and enter a plea of not guilty; * * *
and * • * the court shall thereupon
dismiss the accusations or information
against such defendant, who shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from tlte offense or crime
of which he has been convicted." (Emphasis added.) Appellant concedes that respondent board could have found him guilty
of unprofessional conduct without reference
to the criminal proceeding, but he contends
that inasmuch as said board elected to base
its decision wholly upon appellant's prior
conviction, its action was an improper imposition of a penalty contrary to the italicized language of the statute, following the
dismissal of the criminal charge against
him under the prescribed procedure. But
such contention cannot be sustained in
challenge of respondent board's order as a
disciplinary measure reflecting considerations of appropriate punishment by reason of the adjudication of appellant's guilt,
and so without the scope of the so-called

"expunging of penafty" premise of the cited tion of guilt is the basis for the order of
statute.
disbarment in tins case. That final judg[2] Respondent board has authority to ment of conviction is a fact; and its efsuspend the license of a physician who is fect cannot be nullified for the purpose here
found to be guilty of unprofessional con- involved, either by the order of probation
duct, and it b expressly provided by stat- or by the later order dismissing the action
ute that "conviction * * * of any of- after judgment."
The rationale of the Phillips case is sigfense involving moral turpitude constitutes
unprofessional conduct," with the "record nificant in that it was decided at a time
of the conviction" serving as "conclusive when the State Bar Act referable to conevidence" thereof. Bus. & Prof. Code, sec viction of a crime involving moral turpitude
2383. There is no question here but that as cause for suspension or disbarment (Bus.
appellant's violation of section 11164 of the & Prof. Code, tecs. 6101-6102, Stats. 1939,
Health and Safety Code was an offense in- ch. 34, sec 1, p. 357) was essentially the
volving moral turpitude. So pertinent is same as the present provisions of the Medthe case of In re Phillips, 17 Csl2d 55, 109 ical Practice Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, sec.
P2d 344,132 AXJt 644, holding that an at- 2383, Stats.1937, ch. 399, p. 1275), and the
torney disbarred after his conviction of a plea or verdict of guilty was deemed the
crime involving moral turpitude was not en- "record of the conviction" in "conclusive
titled to have his name restored to the roll evidence" of the unprofessional conduct.
of practicing attorneys upon dismissal of After the date of the Phillips decision, secthe criminal proceeding against him in pur- tion 6102 of the Business and Professions
suance of section 1203.4 of the Penal Code. Code was amended (Stats.1941, ch. 1183,
After noting that "the order granting prob- sec 1, p. 2942) to provide for the disbaration is based upon the premise of the de- ment "irrespective of a subsequent order
fendant's guilt," this court discussed the ef- under the provisions of Section 1203.4 of
fect of the probation procedure as follows, the Penal Code." Such amendment served
17 Cal.2d at page 61, 109 P2d at page 347, to settle the question of legislative intent
132 A.UR. 644: "The powers possessed by in conformity with what this court had
the trial courts under the probation statutes, held was the proper construction of the
Penal Code, § 1203 et seq., are concerned probation statute as a nonoperative factor
with mitigation of punishment and confer in relation to a disbarment order as the outdiscretion upon the courts in dealing with growth of a disciplinary proceeding.
a convicted defendant The power of the
Appellant argues that the Phillips c a s e court to reward a convicted defendant who involving an attorney—does not present
satisfactorily completes his period of proba- parallel considerations to the instant c a s e tion by setting aside the verdict and dis- involving a physician—because this court in
missing the action operates to mitigate his the exercise of its inherent judicial power
punishment by restoring certain rights and may discipline its own officers without interremoving certain disabilities. But it cannot ference from the legislature, while respondbe assumed that the legislature intended ent board as an administrative agency
that such action by the trial court under sec- created by the legislature is not likewise
tion 1203.4 should be considered as obliterat- free from legislative restraint; so that its
ing die fact that the defendant had been suspension of a physician's license could
finally adjudged guilty of a crime. This is properly be construed as a "penalty" or "dismade dear by the provision that the fact of ability" released under the probation statthe defendant's conviction can be used ute. But such consideration in connection
against him in any later prosecution, despite with the Phillips case was simply "noticed"
dismissal of the action under section 1203.4 as a "preliminary point" of observation, 17
In brief, action in mitigation of the defend- CaL2d pages 59-40, 109 P^d 344, 132 A.
ant's punishment should not affect the fact L i t 644, citing In re Lavine, 2 CaL2d 324,
chat his guiit has been finally determined 41 P-Zd 161,42 PJSd 311, and did not constiaccording to law. Such a final determina- tute the premise of the decision—that the

757-758, 125 P.2d 521); and>(3) not only
the fact of previous conviction was properly raised in a second prosecution for
failure to provide for a minor child (Pen.
Code, s e c 270) after dismissal of the
first upon satisfactory completion of probation, but all matters inherent in such
conviction were admissible in evidence—
the adjudication that the defendant was
the father of the child as conclusive on
the issue of parentage. People v. Majado, 22 CaI.App.2d 323, 324, 325, 70 P.2d
1015. As the release of the "penalties
and disabilities" clause of the probation statute has been so qualified in its application, it does not appear that k was
thereby intended to obliterate the record
of conviction against a defendant and purge
him of the guilt inherent therein (cf.
Sherry v. Ingels, supra, 34 Ca!.App.2d 632,
94 P.2d 77) or to "wipe out absolutely" and
for all purposes the dismissed proceeding as
a relevant consideration and "to place the
defendant in the position which he would
have occupied in all respects as a citizen if
no accusation or information had ever
been presented against him." People r.
Mackey, 58 CaLApp. 123, 130, 208 P. 135,
138. From this standpoint, appellant's theory that the import of the probation statute
and the dismissal proceeding is to expunge
the record of the crime, Sherry v. Ingels,
supra; People v. Mackey, supra, cannot
Like views have prevailed in other situ- prevail.
ation's limiting the effect of a dismissal
Consistent with the foregoing consideraafter conviction, insofar as the existence
of guilt by reason of commission of the tions, it is our conclusion that the respondcriminal act is recognized, despite the bene- ent board was clearly acting in the premises
fits accorded by the probation statute. pursuant to its statutory authority, and that
Thus (1) an express proviso in section appellant's subjection to such disciplinary
121)3.4 of the Penal Code makes the convic- proceeding and the consequences thereof
tion count against the defendant under the cannot be construed as a "penalty" or "disprior conviction statutes if he is subse- ability" which was released under the proquently convicted, People v. Hainline, 219 bation statute. In re Phillips, supra, 17
Cat. 532, 535, 28 P 2 d 16; People v. Bar- Cal.2d 55, 61, 109 P 2 d 344, 132 A.L.R. 644.

discharge from probation and the dismissal
of the criminal proceeding could not obliterate the fact of adjudication of guilt in support of a disciplinary order, 17 Cal.2d page
61,109 P.2d 344, 132 A . L R . 644. Nor is the
Phillips case, as appellant maintains, "invalidated as an authority" in this case in
that the disbarment there antedated the dismissal of the criminal proceeding against
the attorney under the provisions of the
probation statute, while here the reverse situation prevails in that respondent board,
though having had the disciplinary action
against appellant pending before it for
some time, did not make its order of suspension against him until after he had been
accorded the statutory relief in question.
Such variant course in the chronology of
the proceedings is an immaterial consideration, for whether the discharge from probation and the accompanying relief granted
by the trial court precede or follow the disciplinary order, its propriety stems from the
adjudication of guilt constituting the basis
of the "conviction" and, as such, it is not
a "penalty" or "disability" within the contemplated release of the probation statute.
As so analyzed, the Phillips case in principle of decision is determinative of this
case, and appellant's effort to distinguish it
allegedly upon "two separate grounds," one
legal and the other factual, is of no avail.

The judgment is affirmed.
wick, 7 CaUd 696, 699, 62 P.2d 590, or if
it is offered for impeachment purposes in
a subsequent prosecution, People v. James,
GIBSON, C J „ and EDMONDS and
40 Cal.App.2d 740, 746, 105 P2d 947; (2) TRAYNOR, JJ., concur.
the conviction must be considered for the
purpose of suspending or revoking a drivCARTER, Justice (dissenting).
er's license. Veh.Code, sec. 309, nullifying
I dissent.
the rule of Sherry v. Ingels, 34 Cal.App.2d
632, 635, 94 P.2d 77; see Ellis v. DepartThe construction placed upon section
ment of Motor Vehicles, 51 Cal.App.2d 753, 1203.4 of the Penal Code by the majority of
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this Court is wholly unwarranted and is, and Professions Code, ordered the suspenfurthermore, directly opposed to the rea- sion of appellant's license for ninety days,
son for the enactment of the section.
and placed him on probation for three
Section 1203.3 of the Penal Code reads, years. Section 2383, Bus. & Prof. Code,
in part: "The court shall have authority provides t h a t : "The conviction of a felony
a t any time during the term of probation or of any offense involving moral turpitude
to revoke, modify, or change its order of constitutes unprofessional conduct within
suspension of imposition or execution of the meaning of this chapter. The record
sentence. / / may at any time when the of the conviction is conclusive evidence of
ends of justice will be subserved thereby, such unprofessional conduct"
The majority rely heavily on the case of
reform of
shall war- In re Phillips, 17 Cal.2d 55, 109 P2d 344,
probation 132 A.L.R. 644. I did not agree with the
* * *." majority in that case, and I most certainly
am not in favor of extending the harsh
rule there laid down so that it may be apSection 1203.4 of the Penal Code proplied to a factual situation such as is here
vides: "Every defendant who has fulfilled
presented. In the Phillips case, the order
the conditions of his probation for the enof disbursement was made before the contire period thereof, or who shall have been viction had been set aside. In the instan:
discharged from probation prior to the ter- case, the Board made the order of suspenmination of the period thereof, shall at any sion and probation after the conviction
time thereafter be permitted by the court had been set aside. Not only that, but the
to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter action was based on a judgment of convica plea of not guilty; or if he has been con- tion which was no longer in existence
victed after a plea of not guilty, the court except for the exception made in the statshall set aside the verdict of guilty; and ute. That exception has no application
in either case the court shall thereupon here. Appellant concedes that the Board
dismiss the accusations or information could have taken disciplinary
measures
against such defendant, who shall there- against him because of his prior conduct,
after be released from all penalties and dis- but contends that all of the counts of the
abilities resulting from the offense or crime accusation filed against him, with the exof which tie has been convicted. The pro- ception of the one based on the judgment
bationer shall be informed of this right and of conviction, were dismissed.
privilege in his probation papers. The proIn the Phillips case, the majority opinbationer may make such application and
change of plea in person or by attorney au- ion stated [17 Cal.2d 55, 109 P.2d 348]:
thorizing [authorized] in writing; provid- " * * * action in mitigation of the deed, that in any subsequent prosecution of fendant's punishment should not affect the
such defendant for any other offense, such fact that his guilt has been finally determined according to law." This holding,
prior conviction may be pleaded and proved
which is approved by the majority in this
and shall have the same effect as if procase, nullifies the effect of the proceeding
bation had not been granted or the accusahad in the Superior Court under section
tion or information dismissed."
1203.4 of the Penal Code, and, in effect,
The Superior Court, on February 20, obliterates the section. In the original ac1948, pursuant to the above provisions, or- tion, appellant was fined, sentenced and
dered that appellant's probation be termi- placed on probation for two years. This
nated and that he be discharged therefrom, conviction was set aside under the section
that his plea of guilty be changed to one providing that he be released from all
of "not guilty" and that the cause be dis- "penalties and disabilities." Notwithstandmissed. Thereafter, respondent Board, re- ing this action, this Court allows the relying solely on the record of conviction, spondent Board to impose even greater
pursuant to Section 2383 of the Business penalties and disabilities upon appellant
and when the good conduct and
the person so held on probation
rant it, terminate the period of
and discharge the person so held
[Emphasis added.]

tha* those to which he had been subjected statute, but falls squarely within the one
by reason of his convktis*.
there contained. The Court in the James
The •Decision" of respondent Board case said [40 CaLAppJM 740,105 P.2d 951]:
states that it is based upon "the record, tn- I t seems highly probable that by the
cmding the transcript, without taking addi- amendment to this section (the exception)
tional evidence, and upas written argu- after the decision in People v. Mackey,
ment presented to the Board." [Emphasis supra, the legislature intended to broaden
added.] Since die accusations or informa- the section in its application and particulartion against the defendant bad been dis- ly provided that in any subsequent prosecumissed by the Superior Court prior to the tion of the defendant prior convictions
decision of the Board, how could the rec- may be pleaded and proved." [Emphasis
ord of die original trial be used as the that of die court] It was also said that
basis for die Board's decision? The statute "We therefore conclude that where a de(Penal Code, sec 1203.4) makes one ex- fendant who has been previously convicted
ception, and only one, where the subse- of a felony and granted probation and a
quently dismiised conviction may be used dismissal obtained as in die instant case,
against a defendant. This Court has added and is subsequently prosecuted for another
offense, in becoming a witness in his own
another.
behalf, he subjects himself to impeachment
Mr. Justice Shenk, in his dissenting opin- upon the ground that he has been conviction in the Phillips case, pointed out that ed of a felony.* [Emphasis that of the
the majority had deviated from the rule Court]
laid down in a number of previous cases.
And in People v. Majado, supra, the deAt the present time, the Business and Professions Code, section 6102; is in line with fendant was found guilty, under section
the decision in that case, but the Code has 270 of the Penal Code, of failure to pronot been so amended with respect to phy- vide for a minor child. The only question
raised there was whether the Court erred in
sicians and surgeons.
admitting in evidence the record of a prior
The majority point out that the Legisla- conviction which had been subsequently disture could not have intended that the pro- missed pursuant to section 12014 of the
ceeding under Section 1203.4 of the Penal Penal Code. Note that this case, too, falls
Code was to wipe out the defendant's guilt squarely within the exception to the secbecause (1) of the express proviso con- tion and is not additional thereto. Both
tained in the section; (2) because the con- People v. James, and People v. Majado,
viction may be used for impeachment pur- supra, cite with approval statements made
poses, People v. James, 40 Cal.App.2d 740, in the case of People v. Hainline, 219 Cat
746, 105 V2d 947; (3) because it may be 532, 28 P2d 16. In that case it was said,
used for the purpose of suspending or re- 219 CaL at page 534, 28 P.2d at page 17:
voking a driver's license (Vehicle Code, "If, prior to the 1927 amendment, any doubt
sec 309); (4) because it may be used in a existed in the minds of lawyers, judges,
second prosecution for failure to provide and laymen as to the status of those who
for a minor child, and because all matters committed a second felony, such doubt was
inherent in the conviction (that is, the ad- removed by said amendment (St 1927, p.
judication on the issue of parentage) were 1493), which strips them of all the priviadmissible in evidence. People v. Majado, leges and rights which were restored to
22 CaLAppJZd 323, 70 PJ2d 1015.
them by the provisions of the original act
I would like to point out, in this con- upon the completion of their probationary
nection, that in People v. James, supra, term. * * *
the defendant was charged with the crime
T h e concluding portion of the act which
of grand theft The fact that he had been provides that if the probationer commits a
previously convicted and the conviction second offense he shall forfeit all the rights
dismissed pursuant to section 1203.4 of the with which he was clothed at the time
Penal Code was used to impeach him. This the court ordered the information dismissed,
case does not add another exception to the constitutes the amendment of 1927. * * *

Said amendment simply and justly provides
that persons who have refused to profit by
the grace extended to them upon the first
offense shall, upon conviction of a subsequent felony, suffer the penalty of the law
as prescribed for the punishment of all
other offenders." [Emphasis added.]
Section 309 of the Vehicle Code is an
express additional statutory exception to
the Penal Code section under consideration.
It reads as follows: MA termination of
probation and dismissal of charges pursuant to Section 1203.4 of the Penal Code
shall not affect any revocation or suspension
of any license of the probationer under the
provisions of this chapter. The probationer's prior conviction shall he considered a
conviction for the purpose of revoking or
suspending any license issued to him on
the ground of two or more convictions.'*
If appellant's suspension and probation
is to be based upon die dismissed conviction, it would seem that he had gained no
rights and no privileges of which he could
be stripped. If the defendant is to be
considered guilty for ail purposes, despite
the fact that there are only two statutory
provisions whereby he may be so considered, it would seem that section 1203.4 of
the Penal Code makes provision for a useless procedure.
It appears to me to be obvious that the
Legislature intended that a person whose
conviction has been set aside, and the accusation against him dismissed, should not
suffer the stigma usually attached to such
a conviction unless he is later prosecuted
for another offense. If the Legislature did
not so intend, why is the defendant permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty and
enter one of not guilty? The section clearly contemplates giving the offender a second chance to take his place in the community. Inherent in this contemplation is
the thought that he shall not be branded
a pariah, having paid his debt to the satisfaction of the Court In holding to the
contrary, the majority appear to be oblivious to the broad and liberal humanitarian
concept embraced within the above quoted
sections of our Penal Code

ttOnUL»>SIS»
Ex parte MEAD.
Or. 2147.

District Court of Appeal,
Third District California,
June 21, lftift.
1. CrlaUaal law «=M 202(1)
Where conviction in another state was
of larceny, and property taken was of value
of $20, and California statute then defined
grand larceny as the taking of property of
value of more than $50, the conviction
could not be considered as a felony conviction within statute prescribing punishment for habitual criminals. Pen.Code, §
644.
2. Pardon *=*
Statutory provision that persons previously adjudged to be an habitual criminal
under section 644 of the Penal Code, as
that section read prior to effective date of
statutory provision, shall be eligible for release on parole after serving seven years of
prison term, is not applicable to a person
convicted of primary offenses enumerated
in section 644 as it read prior to 1945, and
as amended in 1945, PenCode, & 644,
304a5.
3. Ceastltatloaal law *>»2fS

Since allegation, in information under
which defendant was sentenced as an habitual criminal, that defendant was an habitual criminal would have been but the allegation of a conclusion, failure of information to charge defendant with having
been an habitual criminal was not a denial
to defendant of due process of law. Pen.
Code, § 644.

Proceeding in the matter of the application of Elzia Edward Mead for a writ of
habeas corpus.
Writ discharged with direction to Adult
Authority.

Elzia Edward Mead, Represa, for appellant
Fred N. Howser, Arty. Gou, Gail A.
SHENK and SCHAUEK, JJ„ concur. Strader, Sacramento, for respondent
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OPINION
Seymour Harold PATT, Appellant,

PER CURIAM:
On the authority of, and for the same
reasons stated in, Sheriff v. Byron, 93 Nev.
— , 571 ?2d 103 (1977 Adv. Opn. No.
179, filed today), the order of the trial court
which granted respondent's petition for a
writ of habeas corpus is reversed.

v.
NEVADA STATE BOARD OF
ACCOUNTANCY, Respondent
No. 9758.
Supreme Court of Nevada.
Nov. 16, 1977.
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SHERIFF, CLARK COUNTY, Appellant,
v.
Betty BYRON, Respondent
No. 9948.
Supreme Court of Nevada.

Appeal was taken from an order of the
Second Judicial District Court, Washoe
County, William N. Forman, J., dismissing
an accountant's petition requesting judicial
review of the State Board of Accountancy's
revocation of his certified public accountant's certificate based upon his conviction
of embezzlement. The Supreme Court held
that the propriety of the disciplinary action
stemmed from the adjudication of guilt
constituting the basis of the conviction and
as such was not a "penalty" or "disability"
which would be released by the accountant's honorable discharge from probation.
Appeal dismissed.

Nov. 16, 1977.
Appeal from Eighth Judicial District
Court, Clark County; Paul S. Goldman,
Judge.
Robert List, Atty. Gen., Carson City,
George E. Holt, Dist. Atty., and H. Douglas
Clark, Deputy Dist. Atty., Las Vegas, for
ippellant.
Morgan D. Harris, Public Defender and
lobert D. Amundson, Deputy Public Detender, Las Vegas, for respondent.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:

Licenses «=»38
Propriety of proceedings to suspend or
revoke business or professional license
stems from adjudication of guilt constituting basis of conviction and as such it is not
a "penalty" or "disability" which is released
by honorable discharge from probation.
N.R.S. 176.225, subd. 1, 628.390, subds. 5, 6.

David Dean, Reno, for appellant.
Laxalt, Berry & Allison, Carson City, for
respondent.

OPINION
On the authority of, and for the same
PER CURIAM:
rasons stated in, Sheriff v. Byron, 93 Nev.
- , 571 P.2d 103 (1977 Adv. Opn. No.
Appellant was convicted of embezzlement
IB, filed today), the order of the trial court (NRS 205.300) and placed on probation for a
Aich granted respondent's petition for a term of one year. Upon the satisfactory
vrit of habeas corpus is reversed.
completion of probation, the district court
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set aside the verdict of guilty and dismissed
the information against him pursuant to
NRS 176*225(1).1 Based on the embezzlement conviction, the Nevada State Board of
Accountancy revoked appellant's certified
public accountant's certificate pursuant to
NRS 628.890(5) & (6).'
A petition, requesting judicial review of
the revocation, was dismissed by the district
court and in this appeal the central contention is that the honorable discharge from
probation released appellant from "all penalties and disabilities resulting from the
offense" and, thus, the Board is precluded
from considering the conviction as grounds
for disciplinary action. Respondent, arguing the disciplinary proceeding and consequences thereof cannot be construed as a
penalty or disability which was released
under NRS 176.225(1), has moved to dismiss.

"propriety [of the disciplinary action] stems
from the adjudication of guilt constituting
the basis of the 'conviction* and, as such, it
is not a 'penalty' or 'disability1 within the
contemplated release of the probation statute." 206 ?M at 1088. Accordingly, we
grant respondent's motion and
ORDER this appeal dismissed.
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Connie SHIELDS, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Nevada, Respondent
No. 9856.
Supreme Court of Nevada.

Although we have not had occasion to so
construe NRS 176.225(1), sister state decisions involving virtually an identical statute
are legion. Those cases, which we find to
be well reasoned, hold that proceedings to
suspend or revoke business or professional
licenses are not included among the penalties and disabilities that are released by an
honorable discharge from probation. See,
& gu Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners,
84 Cal^d 62, 206 P.2d 1085 (1949), and its
progeny. See alao In re Phillips, 17 CaL2d
55, 109 ?M 844 (1941).
We elect to adopt, as appropriate and
applicable here, that portion of the Meyer
opinion where the court wrote that the

The First Judicial District Court, Carson City, Frank B. Gregory, J., entered
judgment of conviction and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court held that sentence was not subject to being disturbed on
claim that parole and probation report contained unsubstantiated information so long
as record did not demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information
or accusations founded on facts supported
only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence.
Affirmed.

1. NRS 176.225(1) provides:
M
l. Every defendant who:
**(») Has fulfilled the conditions of his probation for the entire period thereof; or
"(b) Is recommended for earlier discharge by
the chief parole and probation officer, or
*'(c) Has demonstrated his fitness for honorable discharge but because of economic hardship, verified by a parole and probation officer,
has been unable to make restitution as ordered
by the court, may at any time thereafter be
permitted by the court to withdraw his plea of
guilty or nolo contendere and enter a plea of
not guilty; or, if he has been convicted after a
plea of not guilty, the court may set aside the
verdict of guilty; and in either case, the court
shall thereupon dismiss the indictment or infor-

mation against such defendant, who shall
thereafter be released from all penalties and
disabilities resulting from the offense or crime
of which he has been convicted." (Emphasis
added.)
2. NRS 628.390(5) & (6) provide in pertinent
part:
"After notice and hearing . . . , the
board may revoke . . . any certificate issued . . .
for any one or any combination
of the following causes:
«<
"5. Conviction of a feiony under the laws of
any state or of the United States.
"6. Conviction of any crime, an element of
which is dishonesty orfraud,under the iaws of
any state or of the United States."

Nov. 16, 1977.

STATE . JONES
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a t e as 51 I P.2d 141

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.

leggie Lyndon JONES, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 15450.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 6, 1978.

2. Criminal Law <*»5
It is prerogative of Legislature to prescribe what shall be penalties and burdens
for commission of crime, as well as for any
amelioration thereof.
3. Witnesses <*=>345(4)
Expungement of record of witness'
crime precluded impeaching witness for
conviction of the offense. U.C.A.1953, 7735-17.5, 77-35-17.5(lXc), 78-24-9; Rules
of Evidence, rule 21.

Defendant was convicted in the Sevi District Court, Carbon County, Edi Sheya, J., of possession of marijuana
Marlynn B. Lema, Price, for defendant
he appealed. The Supreme Court, and appellant.
ikett, J., held that: (1) affidavit in
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Craig L.
A narcotics enforcement officer swore
Barlow, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
., based upon information from three
for plaintiff and respondent.
irate sources, he had knowledge that
tndant was cultivating and/or selling
CROCKETT, Justice:
ijuana and which described defendant's
ience as white over blue trailer with
Defendant Reggie L. Jones appeals from
ain license number, located near desig- his conviction by a jury of possession of
sd place gave sufficient facts concerning marijuana.1 He was sentenced to five
ience of evidence of crime and described years in prison, with the sentence to be
* to be searched with reasonable partic- suspended on condition that he participate
ity, and (2) expungement of record of in a probation and rehabilitation program
less* crime precluded impeaching wit- at Halfway House in Salt Lake City.
i for conviction of the offense.
Defendant contends that the trial court
Affirmed.
committed error in (1) its denial of his
motion to suppress the seized marijuana
because there had been no justification for
:riminal Law *=» 394.4(6)
the
issuance of a warrant for the search of
Affidavit in which narcotics enforcedefendant's
residence; (2) refusing to allow
it officer swore that, based upon inforcross
examination
of a witness for the state
ion from three separate sources, he had
regarding
his
prior
conviction of crime
wledge that defendant was cultivating
which
conviction
had
been
expunged.
/or selling marijuana and which describOn January 21, 1977, Everett Johnson, a
lefendant's residence as white over blue
ler with certain license number, located narcotics enforcement officer, went to a
r designated place, gave sufficient facts magistrate to procure a search warrant.
serning presence of evidence of crime He swore to an affidavit stating that based
described place to be searched with upon information from three separate
jonable particularity; thus defendant sources he had knowledge that the defend» not entitled to suppression of marijua- ant was cultivating and/or selling marijuaseized on theory that there had been no na. It described the defendant's residence
ification for issuance of warrant for as a white over blue trailer with a certain
rch of defendant's residence. U.C.A. license number, located near the Mountaineer Club in Wellington.
3, 58-37-8(lXaXi), 77-54-7.
1. Sec. 58-37-8(1 )(a)(i), U.C.A., 1953.
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[1] That the affidavit met the requirements of giving sufficient facts concerning
the presence of evidence of crime and of
describing the place with reasonable particularity,* la so obvious as to hardly justify
comment on defendant's contention to the
contrary.1
Defendant's other claim of error relates
to the court's refusal to permit impeachment of one Barry Becker, who was called
as a state's witness at the hearing on the
motion to suppress the evidence. On questioning it was brought out that he had
previously been a police officer in San Jose,
California, and he admitted that he had
been discharged and had been convicted of
providing false information to the police.
But he had served a probationary period,
consequent to which the record of his crime
had been expunged as permitted by California law.4 Thereupon, the trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection and refused to allow further questioning on that
matter. We do not deal with the question
of the propriety of impeaching a witness for
conviction of that particular offense, if it
had not been expunged.1 The question here
confronted is as to the effect of the expungement
[2,3] It is the prerogative of the legislature to prescribe what shall be the penalties
and burdens for the commission of crime, as
well as for any amelioration thereof.1 It
has provided that under certain circumstances convictions for crime may be expunged; 7 and it further provides that when
that is accomplished:
Upon the entry of the order in those
proceedings, the petitioner shall be
deemed judicially pardoned and the peti2. Sec. 77-54-7, U.GA., 1953.
3. The affidavit contained sufficient facts such
that a neutral and detached magistrate could
independently make a determination that probable cause existed to believe that there was
marijuana at the defendant's residence.
4. California has an expungement statute similar to our own in parts material here, and we
assume that the laws of sister states are the
same as our own unless the contrary is shown;
See California Penal Code Ann. (West) Sec
1203.4. 1973.

tioner may thereafter respond to any inquiries relating to convictions of crimes
as though that conviction never occurred.1
The purpose of that statute is obvious and
its intent is clearly stated: that even after
a person is convicted of a crime, in appropriate circumstances he may comply with
prescribed procedures which shall have the
effect of a judicial pardon; and that thereafter he may respond to any inquiry concerning his record as though that conviction
had never occurred.9 What was done in
this case is in conformity with the express
provisions of that statute; and therefore no
error was committed in that procedure.
Affirmed. No costs awarded.
ELLBTT, C. J., and HALL and WILKINS, JJ., concur.
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in result

( o I KEVIttNI8EtSYSTtM>

8TATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v,
Michael Jeffrey LIMB, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 15438,
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 12, 197&
Defendant was convicted before the
Fourth District Court, Utah County, J. Rob5. Sec 78-24-9, U.C.A., 1933; Rule 21 Utah
Rules of Evidence.
6. 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, Section 577.
7. See Sec 77-35-17.5 which in part states
"Any person who has been convicted of any
crime within this state may petition the convicting court for a judicial pardon and for the
expungement of his record in that court."
S. Sec 77-3o-17.5()Xc), U.CJL, 1953.
9, Id
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STATE T. SCHREIBER

STATE v. SCHREIBER.
No. 7737.

WADE, Justice.

August Schreiber, appellant herein, who
had been for some years a practicing naturSupreme Court of Utah.
opath, was on March 18, 1949, convicted of
the crime of abortion on a young woman.
June 6, 1052,
On May 14, 1949, he was sentenced to an
Proceeding to »et aside order setting aside indeterminate term of not less than two
conviction for abortion, on the ground that
nor more than ten years in the state prison.
defendant had violated a condition. The
This sentence was suspended and appelThird Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, Ray Van Cott, Jr., J n revoked the lant placed on probation the same day. In
order setting aside conviction and defendant October, 1949, appellant, through his attorappealed. The Supreme Court, Wade, J., ney made an application to the court for an
held that evidence was Insufficient to sup- order setting aside his conviction, dismissport court's finding that a fraud had been ing the action and discharging him from
practiced on court because the order bad custody. After a hearing on this applicabeen procured on representation that defend- tion at which evidence was introduced to
ant would permanently leave the State on
the effect that appellant and his young son
account of bis ill health, but that defendant
were very ill and that a removal to a warmnever had any intention of so doing.
er climate would be beneficial to both and
Judgment reversed.
that appellant who was a naturopathic physician licensed to practice in Florida intendI. Criminal Law «=»998
In proceeding- to revoke order setting ed to move there permanently and practice
aside conviction for abortion, evidence was there as much as his health would permit,
insufficient to support finding that a fraud and it also appearing that there was a rehad been practiced on court because the or- port from the Utah Adult Probation and
der had been procured on representation Parole Department that appellant had fully
that defendant would permanently leave the complied with the conditions of his probastate on account of his ill health, but that tion and that it would support any action
defendant never had any intention of so do- the court might take in setting aside the
ing. U.C.A.1943, 105-36-17.
conviction, the court ordered the conviction
set aside and the appellant discharged from
2. Criminal Law €=»998
further supervision of the parole departThe court has the power to vacate an ment.
order or judgment procured by extrinsic
fraud.1
On May 29,1951, the district attorney for
the Third Judicial District Court filed a pe3. Criminal Law e=*98
tition to vacate and set aside this order beIn absence of proof of fraud either ex- cause the order had been made on the contrinsic or intrinsic, the court could not propdition that appellant permanently remove
erly vacate an order setting aside conviction
from the state of Utah and appellant had
for abortion merely because of court's beviolated this condition by returning to relief that fraud had been practiced. U.CA.
side and practicing in Salt Lake City, Utah.
1943,105-36-17.
At the hearing of the district attorney's
petition to vacate the order it appeared that
appellant had failed to move -from Utah imGrant Macfarlane, Clifford L. Ashton, mediately as the court had understood he
Leonard J. Lewis, Salt Lake City, for ap- would do and that he actually did not leave
pellant.
until the latter part of December, 1949, aftClinton D. Vernon, Atty. Gen., Mark K. er the court had repeatedly told appellant's
Boyle, Allen B. Sorensen, Asst. Attys. Gen., attorney that it was being advised of his
for respondent
continued presence in the state and finally
f. Ctintwcll v. Thatcher Bros. Banking
Co., 47 Utah 150, 151 P. 088; Anderson

v. 8tate, 65 Utah 512, 238 P. 557; Rice
v. Rice, Utah, 212 P.2d 085.
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told the attorney to warn him to get out of
the state by Christmas or he would revoke
the order. There was no evidence this
warning was related to appellant Appellant testified that his reasons for failing to
leave the state sooner was the necessity of
disposing of his practice and his illness
which caused him to be bedridden during
most of that period. After appellant and
his family moved to Florida they remained
there about eight months but his health
failed to improve and they decided to go to
California. On his way to California he
passed through Salt Lake City and while
there he consulted one of the judges of the
Thhrd Judicial District on the legality of
passing through Utah. This judge advised
him that there was nothing in the order of
the court which prohibited him from passing through or remaining in Utah, if he so
chose. Appellant went to California but
finding that his health did not improve
there, he came back to Salt Lake where his
wife bought a home and he intended to resume his practice.

and therefore had practiced a fraud on the
court in procuring the order.
[2] It is well established that the court
has the power to vacate an order or judgment procured by extrinsic fraud, 31 Am.
Jur., Judgments, Sec. 735; Cantwell v.
Thatcher Bros. Banking Co., 47 Utah 150,
151 P. 986; Anderson v. State, 65 Utah 512,
238 P. 557; and Rice v. Rice, Utah, 212 P.
2d 685.

Under the provisions of Sec. 105-36-17,
U.C.A.1943, as amended in S.L/43, c. 24, to
terminate appellant's sentence the court was
required to find that he had complied with
the conditions of his probation and such termination was compatible with the public interest. The probation officer's report indicated that the conditions of his probation
had been complied with and the evidence
showed that appellant and his young son
were both ill and their physician recommended a different climate and appellant
expressed a desire to remove from Utah
permanently. On this evidence the court
concluded that the termination would be
[1] The court revoked the order on the
compatible with the public interest.
ground that a fraud had been practiced on
it because the order had been procured on
[3] At the hearing to vacate the order
the representation that appellant would per- which had previously been made setting
manently leave the state on account of his aside the sentence, the only evidence before
ill health, but that appellant never had any the court was that of appellant. It was to
intention of so doing. This may well have the effect that he had not left Utah sooner
been the fact but there is insufficient evi- because of delay in disposing of his practice
dence in the record upon which to base such and the fact that he claimed that he was too
ill to travel; and further that the Florida
a finding.
The order of the court was: "That the climate had not proved beneficial to his
conviction of the defendant, August Schrei- health because of which he had returned to
ber, * * * be set aside and that the Utah. While the trial court apparently besaid action against said defendant be dis- lieved that he did not intend to leave Utah
missed and that the said defendant be dis- permanently at the time the sentence was
charged from further supervision of the vacated, so far as the record is concerned,
parole department of the State of Utah." this belief is apparently based upon suspiThis order was final and unconditional. Al- cion rather than an affirmative showing in
though the preamble states that it was the evidence. From an examination of the
granted because appellant, on account of ill record, taken in the light most favorable to
health, desired to move permanently from the finding of the trial court, we are comthe state the order was not conditioned on pelled to conclude that there is a failure to
that premise. The order was not revoked prove fraud either extrinsic or intrinsic.
for failure to comply with a condition but In the absence of such proof, the court
because the cOurt found from the facts and could not properly vacate the order merely
circumstances of appellant's late departure because of its belief that fraud had been
and early return to Utah that appellant had practiced. The instant case is an example
never intended to permanently leave Utah of misuse of S e c 105-36-17, U.C.A.1943, as
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amende* In S.L.U. Chap. 24, 1943, which
hich
was enacted for the purpose of permitting
ting
the court under unusual circumstances aand
nd
for good cause to expunge the record, of.
crime. It should be observed that the ffact
act
that the record was so changed does not
in
)t i n
any way gainsay the fact that the accused
ised
was convicted of the crime of abortion nnor
or
the fact that the crime was actually comom
"
mitted even though by his representations
and tht procedure above indicated, he suc*°"*
ceeded in getting the record expunged.
Judgment reversed.

at all times been under the control of the defendant and not available to plaintiff for Inspectfon, showing was sufficient for granting
of motion for discovery.
Case remanded for farther proceedings.
Wolfe, C. J., dissented,
| # T r J a | «s>388(2) Findings of fact are required In equity
as well as in law cases. 1

2. Appeal and Error *=*3I(4)
Where findings of facts were not made
for interlocutory order which allowed a
discovery, Supreme Court was not proWOLFE. C. J.f and McDONOUGH,
-._. hibited from reviewing order but would
CROCKETT and HENRIOD, JJ., concur.' assume trier of facts found them in
u
* accord with its decision and would affirm
decision if from evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to support it. Rules of
^»» */***** ' * * **
Civil Procedure, rules 49(a), 52(a); Const
art 8, § 9.*
3. Discovery <*=>90

In Rules of Gvil Procedure relating to
discovery of "any part of the writing** that
reflects on attorney's mental impressions,
NO. 7478.
conclusions, opinions or legal theories, the
absolute prohibition on discovery of all such
Supreme Court of Utah.
matters is clear, positive and without exJune 5, 1952.
ception. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
Action by Amy 11 Mower, Adm'x of the 30(b).
estate of Amasa N. Mower, deceased, against
Wilson McCarthy and another, trustees of 4. Dlseovtry $=>90
The Denver and Rio Grande Western BallRailroad's records o f conclusions stated
road Company, and another. The Third Ju- by its experts as to cause of railroad accidicial District Court, Salt Lake County, dent in which plaintiffs husband was killed
Roald A. Hogenson, J., granted interlocuwere not discoverable even though denial
tory order directing defendant railroad company to produce and to permit plaintiff to In- of discovery would cause prejudice, hardspect and copy a transcript of testimony tak- ship or injustice. Rules of Civil Procedure,
en by railroad In Its investigation of acci- rules 26(b), 30(b), 34.
dent in which plaintiff's decedent was killed, 5. Discovery 4»9Q
and defendant appealed. The Snpreme
In Rules oi Civil Procedure which
Court, Wade, J., held that, although plaintiff's showing on motion for discovery was allow discovery of various documents but
that her case was weak and was not neces- which prohibit discovery of "any part of
sarily that she had been unable to obtain the writing" which is attorney's work
evidence of the cause of the accident yet product, use of the words "the writing" was
in view of the fact that witnesses who knew proper and correct to refer to the writing of
the facts were employed by defendant and which discovery is sought, the reference
that until recently many of them bad been being to a definite writing, and prohibiunknown to plaintiff, and that the facilities
and equipment involved in the accident had tion would be so construed to be in harmony
with the purpose of protecting the work
MOWER v. MCCARTHY et a t

I. In re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17,
85, 200 P. 103; In re Rafciaha Estate,
48 Utah 128, 141, 158 P. 705.

% In re Gibhs, 4 Utah 97, 6 P. 525; Wright
v. Union P. R. Co., 22 Utah 838, 02 P.
317.

M O W E B T . MCCARTHY
Cite as 245 P.ld 224

product of the attorney. Rules of Gvil
Procedure, rules 26(b), 30(b), 34.
6. Discovery *=HK)

Under Rules of Civil Procedure, writing which reflects the conclusions of an expert based on assumed facts, but not containing evidence of events, conditions, circumstances and similar matters, is not discoverable. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules
26(b), 30(b), 34.
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facts were employed by defendant and that
until recently many of them were unknown
to plaintiff and that facilities and equipment
involved in the accident had at all times
been under control of defendant and had not
been available to plaintiff for inspection,
showing was sufficient for granting of motion. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 26(b),
30(b), 34.
11. Discovery <3=28

The objects and purposes of the Rules
of Civil Procedure concerning discovery
Question whether portions of writings
are to develop the truth and prevent
sought by discovery come within prohibisurprise. Rules of Gvil Procedure, rules
tions protecting attorney's work product and
26(b), 30(b), 34.
expert's conclusions should be determined
without permitting opposing counsel to see 12. Disco very <£=>90
Where transcript of testimony given by
the questioned matter and, to do this, the
parts of the transcript which it is claimed railroad employees in railroad's own inare not discoverable should be submitted vestigation of railroad accident did not
to the court for it to decide. Rules of Civil constitute the reports of railroad accidents
required by Federal statutes, discovery of
Procedure, rules 26(b), 30(b), 34.
transcript under Rules of Civil Procedure
& Discovery «=»90
was not prohibited by those Federal statWhere denial of discovery of document utes. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 26(b),
would have caused prejudice, hardship and 30(b), 34; 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 38, 40, 41.
injustice, document was discoverable without regard to whether it was prepared in
anticipation of litigation or in preparation
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy,
for trial. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules
Gilford L. Ashton, Salt Lake Gty, for
26(b), 30(b), 34.
appellant.
7. Discovery <t=>97(6)

9. Discovery <S=>97(I)

Elements of prejudice, hardship, or injustice necessary to the discovery of documents prepared in anticipation of litigation
or in preparation for trial are sufficiently
shown where party seeking discovery is,
with due diligence, unable to obtain evidence
of some material facts, events, conditions
and circumstances which the discovery will
probably reveal, and where, because of this
situation, the party is unable to adequately
prepare the case for trial. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rules 26(b), 30(b), 34.
«0. Discovery *=>»?( i)

On motion for production of transcript
of testimony by railroad employees given in
railroad's investigation of 1944 accident, although plaintiff's showing on motion was
only that her case was weak and was not
necessarily that she had been unable to obtain evidence of the cause of the accident,
in view of fact that witnesses who knew
l « P.Jd—15

Rawlings, Wallace, Black, Roberts &
Black, Dwight L. King, King Be. Anderson,
Emmett L. Brown, Salt Lake City, for respondent
WADE, Justice.
The defendant, The Denver and Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company, appeals from an interlocutory order directing
it to produce and permit plaintiff to inspect
and copy a transcript of the testimony of
witnesses taken by it while investigating a
derailment accident by which plaintiffs decedent was killed. Because of the importance of the question and once the inspection and copying was made a reversal
on appeal would not restore the parties to
their present status, we granted the appeal.
It involves a construction of the discovery
provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, especially Rules 26, 30 and 34.
Hereafter, the term °Rnle n or "Rules" un-
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STATE v. 20LANTAKIS.

(No 4458.)

Supreme Court of Utah. Sept 15, 1927.
1. Criminal law <§=» 1001—District courts have
Inherent power to suspend sentences only for
definite period and specifio temporary purpose.
In absence of statutory authority, district
courts do not have inherent' power to suspend
sentences except for definite period and for
some specific temporary purpose.!
2. Criminal law <@=> 1001—Statute does not authorize suspension of sentence as matter of
favor or grace (Laws 1923, c. 74)f
Laws 1923, c. 74, gives trial court authority
to suspend sentences, not as matter of favor
or grace, but only when compatible with public
interest.
3. Criminal law $=»1001—Judgments of courts
of competent jurisdiction, including suspensions of sentence, determine parties' rights.
Judgments rendered by courts of competent
jurisdiction, including suspensions of sentence,
fix and determine rights of parties to proceedings.
4. Criminal law <§=>I00I—One whose sentence
is suspended during good behavior, without
reservations, has vested right to rely thereon
during good behavior (Laws 1923, c. 74).
One whose sentence is suspended during
good behavior, without reservations, has Vested right to rely thereon, so long as such condition is complied with; purpose of Laws 1923,
c. 74, permitting suspension of sentence, being reformatory.

(Utah

comes discretionary only after such right has
been substantially and fairly exercised.
8. Criminal law $=>l 1701/2(5)—Refusal to permit cross-examination of state's witnesses, st
hearing on question of revoking suspension of
sentence, held prejudicial error.
Trial court's refusal to permit defendant
to cross-examine state's witnesses, at hearing
on question of revoking suspension of sentence
during good behavior, held prejudicial error.
9. Criminal law • » ! 177—Overruling of objections that defendant was arrested before
service of oitation to show cause why suspension of sentenoe should not be revoked,
and was not advised of facts relied on before hearing, held prejudicial error.
Overruling of timely objection to proceedings to revoke suspension of sentence, on
grounds that defendant was arrested before
citation to show cause was served upon him
and was not advised of facts relied on by state
until evidence was offered at hearing, held
prejudicial error.
Cherry and Gideon, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake
County; W. S. Marks, Judge.
Peter Zolantakis pleaded guilty of, and
was given a suspended sentence for, being
a persistent violator of the Prohibition Act
From a judgment vacating the suspension
and ordering defendant's commitment to the
state prison, he appeals. Reversed, and defendant ordered discharged.
P. W. James, of Salt Lake City, for appellant.
5. Constitutional law <£=>83(I)—Personal libHarvey H. Cluff, Atty. Gen., and L. A.
erty may not be alternately granted and de- Miner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
nied as by granting and revoking suspension
of sentencef without just cause.
HANSEN, J. The defendant prosecutes
The right to personal liberty may no£ be
alternately granted and denied, as by granting this appeal from a judgment of the district
and revoking suspension of sentence, without court of Salt Lake county whereby a suspension of a sentence was vacated and the
just cause.
defendant ordered committed to the state
6. Criminal law $=>10OI«—One granted sus- prison for the crime of being a persistent
pended sentence during good behavior, with- violator of the prohibition law of the state.
out limitation, is entitled to judicial hearing
on question of his compliance with oonditlon The case was heretofore argued and submitted to this court and an opinion renbefore revocation of sentence.
One whose sentence is suspended during dered by a divided court affirming the judggood behavior, without any limitation, is en- ment. Thereafter defendant filed a petition
titled to hearing on question whether he has for rehearing, which was granted. The macomplied with conditions imposed, in accordance jority of the court at the time the rehearing
with established rules of judicial procedure, was granted, and as now constituted, are
after filing of affidavit, motion, or other writ- not in accord with the conclusions reached
ten pleading, setting forth facts relied on for by the majority of the court in the original
revocation of suspension, with opportunity to
answer or plead to charge made, and right of opinion.
On July 28, 1925, Peter Zolantakis pleaded
cross-examination.
guilty to a charge of being a persistent vio7. Witnesses <$=»266, 267—Right of cross-ex- lator of an act prohibiting the manufacture
amination is absolute, and becomes discretionary only after it has been substantially and use of intoxicating liquors and regulating the sale and traffic therein, and particuand fairly exercised.
In judicial investigation, the right of cross- larly sections 8343, % and 3345 of title 54,
examination is absolute right, not a mere priv- Comp. Laws Utah 1917, as amended by Laws
ilege of party against whom witness is called, . Utah, 1919, c. 66. Thereupon the court proand allowance of further cross-examination be- [nounced judgment and sentence "that the
£s»For other cases tee same
topic and KEY-NUN
f BBR in ml! Key-Numbered Digests and Index*
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defendant, Peter Zolantakls, be confined and
imprisoned in the state prison in and for the
state of Utah, for an indeterminate term, as
provided by section 9062, Compiled Laws
Utah 1917, and that said sentence be, and
the same hereby is, suspended during the
good behavior of said defendant." The crime
to which defendant pleaded guilty is a
felony.
The power of trial courts to suspend sentences is expressly granted by the provisions
vt chapter 74, Laws Utah 1923, which reads
as follows:
"Upon conviction of any crime or offense if
It appears compatible with the public interest
the court having jurisdiction may suspend the
imposition or the execution of sentence and may
place the defendant on probation for such period of time as the court shall determine. The
court may subsequently increase or decrease
the probation period and may revoke or modify
any condition of probation. While on probation
the defendant may be required to pay in one
or several sums any fine imposed at the time
of being placed on probation; may be required
to make restitution or reparation to the aggrieved party or parties for the actual damages
or losses caused by the offense for which conviction was had; and may be required to provide for the support of his wife and others for
whose support he may be legally liable."
Under date ot March 5, 1926, a citation
waa issued under the seal and signature of
the clerk of the district court of Salt Lake
county whereby the defendant was cited and
required to appear before said district court
of Salt Lake county on Saturday, the 6th
day of March, A. D. 1926, at 10 o'clock a. m.
of that day, then and there to show cause
why the suspended sentence dated July 23,
1924, should not be canceled, vacated, and
set aside. This citation was returned without having been served because, as stated
in the sheriff's return, the defendant was
absent from the state. On April 5, 1926,
a bench warrant was issued directing the
sheriff of Salt Lake county to attach the
body of the defendant and bring him before
the court forthwith. The bench warrant
was served upon the defendant on the date
of its issuance and the defendant was arrested. Under date ot April 6, 1926, another
citation was issued under the seal and signature of the clerk of the district court of
Salt Lake county whereby defendant was
cited and required to appear before said
court "on Saturday, the 10th day of April,
A. D. 1296, at 10 o'clock a. m. of that day
then and there to show cause, if any you
have, why your suspended sentence should
not be vacated and set aside." Both of
these citations and the bench warrant were
issued without any affidavit, complaint, information, motion, or other writing having
been made or filed charging the defendant
with any lack of good behavior or otherwise,
and were made returnable before a Judge
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other than the judge who passed sentence
and suspended the same.
When the case was called for hearing, the
following proceedings were had:
D. H. Clayton, a witness called by the
state, testified, in substance, that during the
month of February, 1926, he went to a point
a little south of or bpposite the place where
Mr. Zolantakls resided, and while there saw
Zolantakls come out of the rear door of the
house and walk to the back of the lot, then
back into the house, and, after remaining in
the house for a few minutes, he came out of
the side gate into an alley.
Reed Billings, a witness called by the
state, testified that he was, and for a number of years had been, a police officer of
Salt Lake City; that he was and had been
acquainted with Peter Zolantakls for the
past 7 or 8 years; that defendant resided
at 47 South Fifth West street with his family, consisting of a wife and at least two
children; that on March 2, 1926, while
crossing the street from the residence of defendant, he saw Mr. Zolantakls come out of
the side door of the house and go down towards the garage, then turn around and go
back into the house; that about 3 or 4 minutes later defendant came out of the house
again and went south on Fifth West street
to Second South street, then east on Second
South street; that this occurred about 6 or
6:30 o'clock; in the morning.
A. A. Reese, called by the state, testified
that he has known the defendant, Peter Zolantakls, by sight for about 2 years; that
defendant resided at 47 South Fifth West
street; that the wife and children of the defendant resided in his house; than on March
2, 1926, witness went to the house of the
defendant in company with Officers *feve,
O'Brien, and Black; that they had a search
and seizure warrant and made a search of
defendant's premises; that as a result of
such search they found about 30 pints of intoxicating liquors, consisting of moonshine
whisky and mestika; that some of the liquor was found in a cupboard in a cache on
the side of the wall, and some under the
floor; that the wife and daughter of the
defendant were at the house at the time of
the search; that defendant's wife said that
Mr. Zolantakls had gone up town, but would
be back again for supper; that the witness
told defendant's wife to tell her husband to
report at the office of Lieutenant Clayton
the next morning at 10 o'clock; and that
she said she would so inform her husband.
Two of the bottles which were found by
the officers in the home of defendant were
received in evidence.
Neither at the time of the hearing nor
prior thereto was defendant asked to plead,
answer, or admit, or deny any charge made
against him. Nor was the defendant advised
of any charge against him, nor of what the
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court was about to investigate. Soon after | So. 816; Ex parte Selig, 29 N. M. 430, 223 P.
the hearing began defendant's counsel moved 97; State v. Miller, 122 S. 0. 468, 115 S. E.
that the citation be dismissed for the rea- 742; Ex parte Hamm, 24 N. M. 33, 172 P.
, <
son no affidavit or complaint had been filed 190, L. B. A. 1918D, 694.
Courts of some jurisdictions seem to tako
and defendant was not apprised of any fact
or facts or charge that he was expected to] the view that the suspension of sentence is
meet The objection was overruled. The at- a mere favor or matter of grace and may
torney for the state asKed leave to amend bey revoked by the court at will.
the citation, but the request was denied. /[I-3] In the absence of statutory authority,
Defendant, through his attorney, attempted in this jurisdiction, district courts do not"
to cross-examine each of the witnesses called have inherent power to suspend sentences
by the state, but the court, upon its own mo- except for some definite period and for some
People v.
tion, denied the right of cross-examination specific temporary purpose.
for the reason, as stated by the court, it did Blackburn, 6 Utah, 847, 23 P. 759. Under
not wish the proceedings to "savor of the the statute above quoted trial courts are not
given authority to suspend sentences as a
dignity of a trial."
'Peter Zolantakis was sworn and testified matter of favor or grace, but only when "it
that be was not the defendant in this ac- appears compatible with the public intertion, and that he did not reside on Fifth est" Judgments rendered! by courts of com*
West street in Salt Lake City, on March 2 potent jurisdiction are almost uniformly
and 3, 1926. No attempt was made on the held to fix and determine the rights of the
part of the attorney for the state to cross- parties to proceedings. Indeed, that is the
I very purpose of a judgment The writer is
examine the witness Peter Zolantakis.
At the conclusion of the proceedings the unable to find any good reason why an excourt ordered the suspension of sentence va- I caption should be made in the case of a suscated and set aside and the defendant, Pe- pension of sentence.' It must be assumed
ter Zolantakis, Imprisoned in the state prison that when the trial court stated the sentence should be suspended during good beas hereinbefore indicated.
The defendant assigns as error, among havior it meant just what was said, when,
others (a) the refusal of the trial court to as in the instant case, nothing in the sendismiss the citation for the reason that there tence indicates otherwise.
[4, S] The purpose of the law permitting
was no affidavit or other basis apprising defendant of what facts he was to meet or the suspension of sentence is clearly rewhat charge was made against him; (b) formatory. If those who are to be reformed
that the court erred in denying defendant cannot implicitly rely upon promises or orthe right to cross-examine the witnesses ders contained in the suspension of sentence,
then we may well expect the law to fail in
called for the state.
That the trial court had power to sus- its purpose. Beformation can certainly best
pend sentence, under the provisions of chap- be accomplished by fair, consistent, and
ter 74, Laws Utah 1923, is clear and is not straightforward treatment of the person
questioned. The statute above quoted, it sought to be reformed. It would therefore
will be observed, grants to the trial court seem, both upon authority and principal,
broad and comprehensive discretionary pow- that when a sentence is suspended during
ers as to the terms and conditions upon good behavior, without reservations, the
which It may suspend sentence. In the in- person whose sentence is thus suspended has
Instant case, it will further be observed, the a vested right to rely thereon so long as
sentence vfas suspended during the good be- such condition is complied with. The right
havior of the defendant without any reser- to personal liberty is one of the most sacred
vations. In 16 a J. 1335, | 4141, the law is and valuable rights of a citizen, and should
not be regarded lightly. The right to perstated thus:
"A court having power to make an order sus- sonal liberty may be as valuable to one conpending the execution of its judgment in crim- victed of crime as to one not so convicted,
inal cases, necessarily, upon violation of such and so long as one complies with the condiorder, has the power to revoke the same and to tions upon which such right is assured by
enforce the original judgment by commitment; judicial declaration, he may not be deprived
and such right is not impaired or limited by
the passing of the term in which such suspen- of the same. Such right may not be altersion is made. Where, however, the suspension natively granted and denied without just
is upon conditions expressed in the judgment i cause.
the prisoner has the right to rely upon such
The next question presented and to be deconditions, and so long as he complies there- termined is whether or not the record in the
with the suspension will stand."
instant case justifies the conclusions reached
The case of Weber v. State, 58 Ohio St. in the judgment rendered. It is not contend,616, 51 N, E. U6, 41 L. E. A, 472, cited in ed on behalf of appellant that he is entitled
to a jury trial, and it is clear that the pro'the footnote, sustains the text
Similar results are reached in the follow- visions of chapter 74, supra, do not conteming cases: State v. Hemler, 157 La. 227,102 plate a. Jury trial to determine whether or
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not the suspension of a sentence should be before us, still how are we to determine, a£
vacated. It may well be that where the per- a matter of law, what the evidence would
son sought- to be imprisoned denies that he have been, had defendant, through his atis the defendant in the original action, such torney, been given an opportunity to crossperson is entitled to a Jury trial upon that examine the witnesses for the state? In a
issue. In this case the person before the judicial investigation the right of cross-excourt did deny that he was the defendant in amination is an absolute right and not a
the action, but as no point is made upon mere privilege of the party against whom the
that ground on this appeal we are not called witness is called. It is only after such right
has been substantially and fairly exercised
upon to consider this phase of the case,
[6] In some jurisdictions it is held that a that the allowance of further cross-examinacourt having jurisdiction is empowered to tion becomes discretionary. 5 Jones, Comm.
revoke the suspension of sentence without Ev. S 821. The reason for the rule is doubtgranting a trial to determine whether or not less the fact that the cross-examination of a
the condition of the suspension of sentence witness may not only modify and explain,
has been violated. Such, in substance, is but it may destroy the evidence in chief. A
the statement of the law in 16 C. J. 1335, § court is unable in advance to determine what
8142. In the state of New York, where sus- will be the result of cross-examination in a
pension of sentence is regarded as a matter given case. Legal procedure requires that
of favor or grace, the court may at will order the court hears before it condemns, and in
the suspension of sentence revoked. People such hearing cross-examination is often as
v. Trombly, 173 App. Div. 497, 160 N. Y. S. enlightening as is the examination in chief.
67. In Texas, as stated in the syllabus, We are therefore of the opinion that the
which reflects the opinion in Ex parte Law- refusal of the trial court to permit cross-exson, 76 Tex. Cr. R. 419, 175 S. W. 698, "it amination of the state's witness was prejuis only on final judgment of conviction in an- dicial to the rights of the defendant.
[9] The record in this case shows that deother case that suspension of sentence during good behavior can be set aside, and it fendant was arrested before the citation to
cannot be done pending appeal from such show cause why the suspension of his senconviction." In Louisiana, under the provi- tence should not be revoked was served upon
sions of the statutes of that state, the court him. It is not made to appear that defendant
reached the same result as was reached in was advised of any facts relied upon by the
the case of Ex parte Lawson, supra, in State state for such revocation until evidence was
v. Hemler, 157 La. 227, 102 So. 316. Other offered at the time of the hearing. No issue
courts have reached conclusions between of any fact was before the court for deterthose two extremes. In this state the ques- mination. It is therefore difficult to see how
tion here involved is one of first impression. the defendant could have been expected to
The statute involved does not point out a properly resist the revocation of the suspenmethod of procedure. ' The majority of this sion of sentence, even though he may have
court are of the opinion that a person who had a good defense to any charge of wronghas a sentence suspended during good be- doing since the sentence was suspended.
havior, without any limitation, is entitled to Timely objection was made to the proceeda hearing upon the question of whether or ings, and we are of the opinion that the
not he has complied with the conditions im- failure of the trial court to sustain the obposed; that such hearing must be accord- jections was prejudicial to the rights of deing to some well recognized and established fendant.
rules of judicial procedure; that defendant
We are therefore of the opinion that the
is entitled to have filed either an affidavit, judgment appealed from should be and the
motion, or other written pleading setting same is hereby reversed, and the defendant
forth the facts relied upon for a revocation is ordered discharged so far as these proof the suspension of sentence; that the de- ceedings are concerned.
fendant should be given an opportunity to
answer or plead to the charge made; that a
THORMAN, C. J.f and STRAUP, J., conhearing should be had upon the issags cur.
joined; and that the defendant as well as
the state be given the right of cross-examinaCHERRY, J. (dissenting). When the exetion. If we are correct in our conclusion cution of a sentence is suspended, it is not
that the defendant has a vested right to his vacated. The judgment itself is not impaired
personal liberty during good behavior when or limited. The time for its execution is
so ordered without reservation in the origi- merely deferred. While under a suspended
nal sentence, any proceeding failing in these sentence, a duly convicted person is not freed
essentials is error.
from the legal consequences of his guilt. He
[7, B] It is contended on behalf of the state is merely enjoying a conditional favor, postthat the evidence in this case justifies the poning his punishment, which may be withrevocation of the suspension of sentence. drawn. When the suspension is revoked the
Conceding such to be true upon the record convict is punished for the crime of which
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he was convicted, and not for violating the i pend sentence as before, but it can do nothing
terms of his parole. The suspension of a to preclude itself or its successor from passing
the proper sentence whenever such a course apsentence can never be demanded as a matter pears
to be proper. This, we think, is all that
of legal right It is granted at the mere will the statute intends, and that was the only effect
of the court When granted, it is not held as of the Judgment It is a power which the court
a vested right, but as a matter of favor or should possess in furtherance of Justice, to be
grace. The statute confers upon courts a used wisely and discreetly, and it is perhaps
discretionary power designed to aid in the creditable to the administration of Justice in
reformation and reclamation of convicted such cases that while the power has always
existed no complaint has been heard of its
persons. By impressing upon tbe convicted abuse."
person that he is enjoying a contingent favor, which may be withdrawn or revoked at
In 16 a J. 1886, It is said:
any time, it is sought to induce or coerce him
"When sentence has been suspended during
to amend his ways. The whole force and good behavior of the defendant either with or
virtue of the expedient lies in the reserved without statutory authority, the court has powpower of the court to revoke the favor and er to revoke such order and to impose the seninflict the penalty. And if this is hedged] tence without granting defendant a trial as to
1
about with limitations which substantially whether or not he has violated such condition. *
destroy it, the whole scheme is defeated.
In People v. Goodrich (Sup.) 149 N. 7. S.
The suspension of the sentence is not a fixed
and final adjustment amounting to a right to 406, the court ia dealing with a revocation
be revoked only upon a violation of the con- of a suspended sentence, and after holding
dition upon which it is granted, because the that the trial court did not err in not trying
statute expressly declares that "the court as an issue of fact the question whether the
may subsequently increase or decrease the defendant has violated the condition of her
probation period and may revoke or modify discharge, said:
"I think the suspension of Judgment in this
any condition of probation/1 Clearly, this
precludes the claim that the Judgment is un- case was a matter of grace, not of right to tbe
that she thereby acquired no vested
enforceable until, after due process of law, defendant
rights, and the court had the right in its disit is adjudged that the condition of probation cretion to cancel and revoke tbe same. In any
has been violated. The power of the court event, all that was required was to call to its
to revoke is not limited to when the condi- attention facts that satisfied the conscience
tions have been violated, but extends to the of the court that the defendant had violated the
modification or revocation of the condition terms of her parole."
itself.
In People v. Trombly, 178 App. Dlv. 497,160
There is nothing in the statute suggesting
that the compliance with any condition, or N. 7. S. 67, the suspension of a sentence was
the proof of any grounds, are necessary to | revoked when the court "received informathat the conditions of the suspension
authorise the revocation of on order sus- tion"
not been complied with. In sustaining
pending sentence. From the nature of the had
the revocation the court said:
subject, the whole matter of granting and revoking suspensions must rest in the discre- "It was proper at any time to revoke the ortion of the court. This view of the matter der suspending the execution of the sentence,
finds support in People ex rel., etc, v. Court and neither the Legislature nor the courts have
of Sessions, etc., 141 N. Y. 288, 86 N. E. 886, ever attempted to limit this power, except to
28 L. R. A. 856, where O'Brien, J., speaking the discretion of the court"
for the court, says:
In State v. Miller, 122 S. a 468,115 S. E.
"The power to suspend the Judgment during
good behavior, if understood as expressing a 742, it was decided in a proceeding similar
condition, upon the compliance with which the to this that the fact that a rule to show
offender would be absolutely relieved from all cause was issued without information under
punishment and freed from the power of the oath to support it did not affect the court's
court to pass sentence, Is open to more doubt Jurisdiction to enforce the original sentence.^
The Legislature cannot authorize the court* to when defendant made formal return aud was
abdicate their own powers and duties or to tie heard by counsel, and that the order suspendtheir own hands In such a way that after sen- ing sentence might be revoked without granttence has been suspended they cannot when
'
deemed proper, and in the interest of Justice, ing the defendant a trial.
In the case before us it is not claimed
Inflict the proper punishment in the exercise of
a sound discretion. Nor can the free and un- that tbe court abused its discretion or acted
trammeled exercise of this power or the right to capriciously or arbitrarily by slaking the
pass sentence according to the discretion of order complained of without sufficient
the court be made dependent upon compliance grounds, nor that on the merits the defendwith some condition that would require the ant has suffered any substantial injustice.
court to try a question of fact before it could
render the Judgment which the law prescribes. In view of the facts proved, which were not
The statute must not be understood as con- even denied by the appellant, that claim could
ferring any new power. The court may sus- I not be successfully made. Tbe complaint

Ariz.)

GRASTY v. SABIN
(269

is merely that the court committed error in
Its procedure.
In exercising the powers conferred by the
statute in question from the nature of the
subject, courts must necessarily have a large
discretion not only in respect of the grounds
upon which they act, but in the method or
procedure by which they ascertain facts and
arrive at conclusions. They are not dealing
with specific legal rights and are not bound
by the standards of legal procedure which
usually control judicial proceedings. This is
comprehended within the very generally approved rule that an order suspending sentence may be revoked without granting the
defendant a trial upon the facts., It logically
follows that courts may ascertain facts
upon which to act in any manner they see
fit, and act upon them, provided only that
their proceedings and conduct on the whole
are not capricious or arbitrary or a manifest
abuse of discretion. I think the orders appealed from should be affirmed.
GIDEON, J. I concur in the views expressed by Mr. Justice CHERRY.

GRASTY tt al. v. SAB IN. (No. 2589.)
Supreme Court of Arizona. Oct 17, 1027.
1. Master and servant $=>87—Right of action,
under Employers' Liability Law, Is not governed by rules of common-law actions for damages or to action as modified by statute.
Right of action, provided in Employers'
liability Law (Civ. Code 1913, pars. 3153-3162,
as amended by Laws 1919, c. 15) is not governed by rules applicable to common-law actions for damages or to that action as modified
by statute.
2. Master and servant $=»107(8)—Employer's
negllgenoe Is not involved In action under Employers' Liability Law (Ctv. Code 1913, par.
3154).
In action under Employers' Liability Law
(Civ. Code 1913, par. 3154), negligence of employer is not involved, in view of Const art
18, { 7.
3. Master and servant <@=>204(I)—Assumed
risk is not Involved in action undqr Employers'
Liability Law (Civ. Code 1913, par. 3154).
In actions under Employers' Liability Law
(Civ. Code 1913, par. 3154), assumed risk is not
involved, in view of Const art 18, 8 7.
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and in such action refusal to instruct on contributory negligence was not error.
5. Master and servant $=»228(I)—Employee Injured by accident due to conditions of employment can recover, under Employers' Liability
Law, though not free from negligence, and danger was known.
In action under Employers' Liability Law
(Civ. Code 1913, pars. 3153-3162, as amended
by Laws 1919, c 15) for accidental injury to
employee due to conditions of occupation, whether good or bad, plaintiff is entitled to recover,
even if through exposing himself to bad conditions he was not free from negligence, and fact
that he knew conditions were dangerous or bad
will not defeat right to compensation, in view
of Const art 18, § 7.
6. Master and servant 4=»228(I)—Employee's
negligence, defeating recovery under Employers' Liability Law, must be superimposed on
conditions by his positive aot but for which he
would not have been Injured.
Employee's negligence, to defeat action under Employers' Liability Law (Civ. Code 1913,
pars. 3153-3162, as amended by Laws 1919, c.
15), must be superimposed on conditions of his
occupation by some positive act of his but for
which he would not have been injured.
7. Trial $=»253(9)—Instruction, denying employee's recovery If failing to replace guard
covering gears, held properly refused, as ignorlng concurring cause of greasy floor on
whioh he slipped.
In action under Employers' liability Law
(Civ. Code 1913, pars. 8153-3162, as amended
by Laws 1919, c 15) for injuries to mechanic
when slipping on wet greasy floor and catching
hand in gear meshes of pump from which guard
had been temporarily removed for purposes of
repair, instruction denying recovery, if employee neglected to correct the dangerous condition by replacing the cover before undertaking to do the work, held properly refused, as ignoring concurring cause of greasy floor on which
he slipped.
8. Appeal and error «=»l033(5) — Instruction,
denying employee recovery if he failed to replace guard on pump, unless acting under employers' instructions, held favorable to employers.
In action under Employers' Liability Low
(Civ. Code 1913, pars. 8153-3162, as amended
by Laws 1919, c. 15), when mechanic was injured
by slipping on wet greasy floor and catching
hand in gear meshes of pump from which guard
had been removed for purposes of repair, instruction that if employee took guard off pump
and failed to replace it he could not recover,
unless he was acting under employers' instructions, held more favorable to employers than
they were entitled to, since it ignored the concurring cause of the greasy floor which manifestly contributed to the accident

4. Master and servant $=»228(I)—Employee's
sole negligence defeats recovery, but contributory negligence is no defense, under EmployAppeal from Superior Court, Gila County;
ers' Liability Law (Civ. Code 1913, par. 3154). C. C. Falres, Judge.
Under Employers' Liability Law (Civ. Code
Action under the Employers' Liability Law
1913, par. 3154), negligence of plaintiff, defeating right of recovery, must be bis sole negli- by Byron Sabin against B. O. Grasty and angence, and contributory negligence is no defense, other, partners doing business under the firm
€=>For othtr casta ••• same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Kty-Numbered Digests and Indexes
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diieriMin.tkm In statucase, in which Francini has made no such
^ ^ f a u o m and other governmental contention,
the court declines to make such
a finding.
^ 1 0 0 SO. 2871 2891, 85 LEA2d 784
It cannot be said that the distinction
made between Francini'a and Libron's applications was irrational, nor that it fur*• » «*«> «f denial of due process.
thered no reasonable governmental purpose.
J ^ * « d go no further. N o n e t he. Equal protection has not been denied merely because a particular discrimination works
a hardship on a given individual. See, e.g.
£ * ^ * * « » « infringement of any Slavin v. Secretary of Department off
'J™?**" rifht nor use of a suspect da*
Health, Education and Welfare, 486 RSupp.
204, 207 (S.D.N.Y.1980).
w o u K Z^Ttl
*?*»»»»««? impact
Accordingly, defendants' motion for sumn ^ t « n ? f a l t h e P o u r t e e »«> Amendmary judgment must be granted.
J f e J f l S l • "eptimate state interert.
CONCLUSION
&Ct 2618.2516-2517,49 L.EA2d 511 (1976?
To summarize: defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, pursuant to
Rule 12(bX6), Fed.RXiv.R, insofar as the
•PP™«. without seeking a change in the Amended Complaint states a claim of denial
******
**lands classification
s i of due process, is granted; defendants' mo& * » « * » ofJUbert Francini
fi^f? tion to dismiss the Amended Complaint,
pursuant to Rule 12(bX6), FedR.Civ.P., inso» « y Judgment at 4. In contrast UhZ far as the Amended Complaint states a
claim of a taking without just compensaL T 1 ? it. .ubdivudon appHcaon. tion, is granted; and defendants' motion for
J E J ? ? ? ? OPP^tion to Summary summary judgment in their favor, pursuant
Judgment at t On the basis of this
J3L to Rule 56(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., insofar as the
ed difference between the two propoX Amended Complaint states a claim of denial
the Commia«o» could rationally h W ^ t e of equal protection of the laws, is granted.
It is so ordered.
nt
, ^ t r a 5 » u * " « FVandnT.^ l l
D!"
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N ^ n A e r 1979 application, sought only ap-
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nSTL£Jf° ^ ^ ^ ^ «V PerCG.S. § 22a-42a(a). On the facto of ihfc
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Michael C. THOMPSON, Petitioner,
v.
The DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, Respondent
No. C-61-0095A.
United States District Court,
D. Utah, CD.
Dec 29, 1982.
An action was filed seeking relief from
the federal firearms disability. Onthepeti-

THOMPSON •. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Cllc M SIT FJvpfw I I I (IMS)
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tkmers motion for summary judgment, the quired to face risk of prosecution and conDistrict Court, Aldon J. Anderson, Chief viction under federal statutes in order to
Judge, held that: (1) the district court obtain adjudication of his claim. 18 U.S.
would exercise subject-matter jurisdiction C.A. § 922; 18 U.S.C.AApp. § 1202; 28
over the claim; (2) the action was not U.S.OA. § 1331; 5 U.S.C.A. § 702; 28
barred by sovereign immunity; (3) a justici- U.S.C. (1976 Ed.) § 1831(a).
able controversy was prevented; and (4) a 4. Weapons «=»4
judicial pardon and expungement granted
Judicial pardon and expungement
to the petitioner under Utah law did not granted to petitioner was not executive parerase completely the prior convictions so as don and, therefore, did not relieve previousto relieve the petitioner of the federal fire- ly convicted felon of federal firearms disarms disability.
ability. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922; 18 U.S.GA.
Ordered accordingly.
App. §§ 1202, 1203.
See also D.C., 533 F.Supp. 90.
5. Weapons ^=>4
Judicial pardon and expungement
granted to petitioner under Utah statutes
1. Weapons *»4
District court would exercise jurisdic- did not completely erase prior convictions
tion over action seeking expungement of and, therefore, petitioner was not entitled
federal firearms disability where three to relief from federal firearms disability.
years had elapsed since petitioner first U.C.A.1953, 77-18-2, 77-18-2(3); 18 U.S.
sought expungement, petitioner would face C.A. § 922; 18 U.S.C.A.App. §§ 1202,1203.
choice of either abandoning his business or
subjecting himself and perhaps his employRobert B. Sykes, Salt Lake City, Utah,
ees to potential prosecution for violation of for petitioner.
federal firearms control statute and further
D. Brent Ward, U.S. Atty., Barbara W.
pursuit of remedy through administrative Richman, Charles William Ryan, Asst U.S.
channels would be futile. 18 U.S.C.A. Attys., Salt Lake City, Utah, for respon§ 922; 18 U.S.OA.App. § 1202; 28 U.&
dent.
OA. | 1331; 5 U.S.OA. § 702; 28 U.S.C.
(1976 Ed.) § 1331(a).
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
2. United States *»12$(9)
An action seeking expungement of fedALDON J. ANDERSON, Chief Judge.
eral firearms disability was not barred by
In 1968, at the age of 21, petitioner Misovereign immunity in that Administrative chael Carty Thompson pled guilty to
Procedure Act has been amended to waive charges of fraudulent use of credit cards
sovereign immunity over review of agency and obtaining merchandise by false predecision. 5 U&OA. § 551 et seq.; 28 U.S. tenses. Under 18 U.S.C. § 922 and 18 U.&
OA.f 1331.
CApp. f 1202, Thompson's conviction made
it illegal for him to receive, transport, or
3. Federal Courts *»13
1
Action seeking expungement of federal possess firearms. Since 1968, he has not
been
convicted
nor
arrested on any criminal
fireanm disability presented justiciable
controversy in that petitioner was not re- charges.
1. Hue 18 US.C | 922(gHh) provides as follows:
(g) It shad be unlawful for any person—
(1) who is under indictment for, or who
has been convicted in any court of, a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,
Q) who is a fugitive from justice;

(3) who is an unlawful user of or addfcted
to marihuana or any depressant or sthnutant
drug (as defined in section 201(v) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) or narcotic drug (as defined in section 4731(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954); or
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental
defective or who has been committed to a
mental institution;
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Since MT4 Thompson has been the president and majority shareholder of a security
guard contracting company which employs
many security guards, some of whom carry
firearms. As part of his responsibility in
his company, Thompson was certified in
1980 by the State of Utah as a firearms
trainer for private security guards. He also
is often called upon to render "executive
protection services" for his clients, which
requires his personal use of firearms.
On January 5,1979, Thompson's attorney
secured a judicial pardon and expungement

of the 1968 misdemeanor criminal charges,
but by mistake failed to secure pardon and
expungement of the felony charges. This
was corrected on April 9, 1982.
On October 2, 1979, Thompson filed an
application for relief from his federal firearms disabilities pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 925(c).1 One year later, in October, 1980,
respondent Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms (BATF) denied his application on
the grounds that they were "not presently
satisfied that the . . . statutory requirements for granting relief have been met" *
Thompson sought judicial review of that

to ship or transport any firearm or ammuni(c) A person who has been convicted of a
tion hi interstate or foreign commerce,
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
(h) K shall be unlawful for any person—
exceeding one year (other than a crime in(1) who is under Indictment for, or who
volving the use of afirearmor other weapon
has been convicted in any court of, a crime
or
a violation of tills chapter or of the Nationpunishable by imprisonment for a term exal Firearms Act) may make application to the
ceeding one year;
Secretary for relief from the disabilities im(2) who is a fugitive from justice;
posed by Federal laws with respect to the
(3) who is an unlawful user cf or addicted
acquisition,
receipt, transfer, shipment, or
to marihuana or any depressant or stimulant
possession of firearms and incurred by readrug (as defined in section 201(v) of the Fedson of such conviction, and the Secretary
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) or narmay grant such relief if it is established to his
cotic drug (as defined in section 4731(a) of
satisfaction that the circumstances regarding
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954); or
the conviction, and the applicant's record and
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental
reputation, are such that the applicant wiU
defective or who has been committed to any
not be likely to act In a manner dangerous to
mental institution;
public safety and that the granting of the
to receive any firearm or ammunition which
relief would not be contrary to the public
has been shipped or transported in interstate
interest A licensed importer, licensed manuor foreign commerce.
facturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector
Title 18 US.CApp. § 1202(a) provides as follows:
conducting operations under this chapter,
who makes application for relief from the
I 1202. Receipt, Possession, or Transportadisabilities Incurred under this chapter by
tion of firearms Persons liable; penalties
reason of such a conviction, shall not be
for violations
barred by such conviction from further oper(a) Any person who—
atioins
under his Hcense pending final action
(1) has been convicted by a court of the
on an application for relief filed pursuant to
United States or of a State or any political
this section. Whenever the Secretary grants
subdivision thereof of a felony, or
relief to any person pursuant to this section
(?) has been discharged from the Armed
he shall promptly publish in the Federal RegForces under dishonorable conditions, or
ister notice of such action, together with the
(3) has been adjudged by a court of the
reasons therefor.
United States or of a State or any political
subdivision thereof of being mentally incompetent, or
t. The "statutory requirements" apparently re(4) having been a citizen of the United
ferred to are therequirementsthat tt must be
States has renounced his citizenship, or
established to the satisfaction of the Secretary
(5) being an alien is illegally or unlawfully
of the Treasury "that the circumstances regardfat the United States, and who receives, posing the conviction, and the applicant's record
sesses, or transports in commerce or affectand reputation, are such that the applicant wiU
ing commerce, after the date of enactment of
not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to
this Act, any firearm shall be fined not more
public safety snd that the granting of the relief
than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than
would not be contrary to the public interest"
two years, or both.
18 US.G, f 925(c). See note 2, supra, for the
entire text of this subsection.
2. Title 18 U.S.C f 825(c) provides as follows:
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decision on the grounds that it was an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion.4
In April, 1982, Thompson filed a motion
to amend the complaint and for summary
judgment The amended complaint adds
three new claims to the prior claim of abuse
of discretion: (1) a claim for declaratory
judgment that, as a result of his judicial
pardon and expungement, Thompson is free
from any firearms disabilities under federal
law; (2) a claim that there has been an
impermissible sub-delegation of authority
from the Secretary of the Treasury to the
chief of investigations with respect to the
decision denying Thompson the relief that
he requested; (3) a claim for declaratory
judgment that Title 18 U.S.C. § 922 and
Title 18 U.S.OApp. § 1202 are unconstitutional as applied to Thompson because they
violate his rights of due process of law.
Upon stipulation by the parties, leave to
amend the complaint was granted on May
24,1982. The motion that is the subject of
this order seeks summary judgment on the
amended complaint's first additional claim
that the judicial pardon and expungement
relieve Thompson from any federal firearms disability.

Motion for Summary Judgment In doing
so, the court must decide four issues: (I)
whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the expungement claim; (II)
whether the government is not protected
from that claim by sovereign immunity;
(III) whether an actual case and controversy exists, as to this claim, between the
petitioner and respondent; and (IV) if the
procedural issues are answered affirmatively, whether the judicial pardon and expungement of petitioner's 1968 conviction
relieve him of the federal firearms disability under 18 U.S.C. § 922 and 18 U.S.OApp.
§ 1202.

I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
[1] Counsel for respondent has cited
many reasons why subject matter jurisdiction over the expungement claim does not
exist in this court, and counsel for petitioner has responded with what he believes to
be several grounds for appropriate subject
matter jurisdiction, all of which has been
very helpful. However, the court is not
required to reach many of the grounds and
arguments of counsel, as it believes that
subject matter jurisdiction over the expungement claim exists at the discretion of
In the course of its consideration of this the court under 5 U.S.C. § 702, 28 U.&C.
motion the court advised counsel that it had § 1331, and NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin
serious questions about (1) its subject mat- Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 67 S.Ct 1274, 91
ter jurisdiction to hear the expungement LJtf. 1575 (1947).
claim and (2) the government's possible sovClearly the court has subject matter jurereign immunity from that claim. Counsel
have responded with memoranda address- isdiction over the original petition; Le., it
ing these issues and have further presented has authority to review the agency action
their arguments in a hearing held October denying relief from federal firearms dis18, 1962. In addition to the above two ability. When Congress amended Title 28
procedural issues, respondent has raised the U.S.C. | 1331(a) in 1976 to eliminate the
additional one of whether an actual contro- amount in controversy requirement for
versy exists between the parties regarding maintenance of "any [1331] action brought
the expungement chum. Having read the against the United States, any agency
memoranda and the authorities cited and thereof, or any officer or employee thereof
Pub.L. 94-^674, § 2,
having considered fully these procedural is- in his official capacity,"
M
sues as well as the merits of the expunge- 90 Stat 2721 (1976),* [t]he obvious effect
ment claim, the court is ready to rule on the of this modification, subject only to preclu4. Shortly after the petition for review was fued, 8. In 1980 f 1331 was further amended to eliminate the amount in controversy requirement for
respondents fued a motion for summary judgment which was denied. Thompson v. Depart- all federal question cases. Pub.L. 96-486,
ment of the 7>*asury, 533 F.Supp. 90 (D.Utah f 2(a). 94 Stat. 2369 (1980).
1981).
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sion-of-review statutes created or retained
by Congrats, [was] to confer jurisdiction on
federal courts to review agency action."
Gs/flaao r. Sanders, 480 U.S. 99, 105, 97
&Ct 980,984,61 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). However, the original concern of this court,
when it requested counsel to address the
jurisdiction question, was whether its subject matter jurisdiction extended to the expungement issue, in light of the fact that
the agency below did not consider that issue
in making its determination.* Indeed, the
expungement of petitioner's felony convictions did not take place until well after the
Bureau denied his application for relief.
The court's concern has been answered by
NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp^
881 U.S. 416, 67 S.Ct 1274, 91 L.Ed. 1575
(1947). In that case the Supreme Court
held that when circumstances "arise after
the Board's order has been issued which
may affect the propriety of enforcement of
the order, the reviewing court has discretion to decide the matter itself or to remand
it to the Board for further consideration."
831 U.S. at 428, 67 S.Ct at 1281. That is a
sound rule for review of all administrative
decisions.

to the court's discretion. In exercising that
discretion, the court concludes that it ought
to consider the matter now rather than
remand it for another lengthy cycle in the
administrative process. There are several
factors contributing to this conclusion.
First, it has already been three years since
Thompson first applied for relief from the
federal firearms disability. If the history
of this case is any guide, it will be at least
another year before he would receive a response from the BATF regarding a renewed application. In the meantime, he
must make the choice between either abandoning his business or subjecting himself
and perhaps his employees to potential prosecution for violation of the federal firearms
control statutes.7 Second, the BATF has
informed the petitioner that it does not
consider the judicial pardon and expungement to affect his disability; hence further
pursuit of aremedythrough administrative
channels would be futile. Third, though
petitioner may re-apply for relief two years
after the original denial (October, 1980), the
Bureau has refused to send him the necessary forms for re-application, citing the
pending litigation as a reason. Finally,
there is no factual dispute involved in the
In this case, petitioner's application for expungement claim; the sole issue is a
relief from disability was denied in October, question of law, of statutory interpretation,
1980. The judicial pardon and expunge- which this court is competent to decide.
ment of his conviction occurred in April, Under these circumstances, justice is best
1982. Thus, the pardon and expungement served by presently considering the effect
comprise a new circumstance arising after of the petitioner's judicial pardon and exthe administrative decision, and whether pungement on his federal firearms disabilithe court will consider the effect of that ty, without waiting for a formal determinacircumstance on the BATF's decision is left tion by the Bureau.
C Although the expungement Issue was not
considered In connection with the review of
Thompson's application for relief, since then
the respondents have steadfastly maintained
that the state expungement has no effect on
petitioner's firearms disability.
7. Thompson's employees may be subject to liability pursuant to 18 U.S.CApp. f 1202(b),
which provides:
(b) Any individual who to his knowledge and
while being employed by any person who—
(1) has been convicted by m court of the
United States or of a State or any political
subdivision thereof of a felony, or
(2) has been discharged from the Armed
Forces under dishonorable conditions, or

(3) has been adjudged by a court of the
United States or of a State or any political
subdivision thereof of being mentally incompetent, or
(4) having been a citizen of the United
States has renounced his citizenship, or
(5) being an alien is illegally or unlawfully
in the United States, and who, in the course
of such employment, receives, possesses, or
transports in commerce or affecting commerce, after the date of the enactment of this
Act, anyfirearmshall be fined not more than
$10,000 or Imprisoned for not more than two
years, or both.

is not barred by the defense of sovereign
IL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
[2] ID a letter to counsel dated June 25, immunity.
1962, the court raised another question of
in. CASE OR CONTROVERSY
Jurisdiction, expressing the view that "the
[3] Respondent's Opposition to Plainsuit may be barred by the doctrine of sovertiffs Motion for Summary Judgment aseign immunity.** Upon reviewing the memserts that petitioner's claim regarding exoranda in response to that letter, the statpungement fails to state an actual controutes and the cases cited, the court is satis- versy, since the amended complaint alleges
fied that the United States has waived its only that the Bureau "could recommend
immunity in cases such as this.
prosecution,** and that "[t]his could apply to
The same statute that amended 28 U.S.C. any number of individuals in Plaintiffs
{ 1881 to grant federal courts jurisdiction company.** Respondent insists that petito review agency decisions also amended tioner has no standing to assert the rights
the Administrative Procedure Act to waive of his employees, and as to both himself and
sovereign immunity for such a review:
his employees he has not alleged sufficient
An action in a court of the United States threatened or actual injury to bring this
seeking relief other than money damages case within the actual controversy requireand stating a claim that an agency or an ment
officer or employee thereof acted or
This assertion is answered by the holding
failed to act in an official capacity or of the Supreme Court in Doe v. Bolton, 410
under color of legal authority shall not be U.S. 179,93 S.Ct.739,35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973).
dismissed nor relief therein be denied on There physicians who would have been subthe ground that it is against the United ject to prosecution under the state antiStates or that the United States is an abortion statute were they to perform an
indispensible party.
abortion were allowed to challenge the stat5 U.S.C. § 702. Though at least one Court ute in spite of the fact that they had not
of Appeals has determined, under unique yet performed an abortion and were not yet
circumstances, that this amendment did not even subject to prosecution. The Court
waive the defense of sovereign immunity noted that the doctors "should not be reunder Section 1831, Watson v. Blumenthal, quired to await and undergo a criminal
586 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.1978), courts from oth- prosecution as the sole means of seeking
er circuits, including the Tenth Circuit, relief.** 410 U.S. at 188, 93 S.O. at 745.
have recognized that the plain intent of the Petitioner's case is stronger for adjudication
clear statutory language supported by the than Bolton was. Thompson is presently
legislative history is to waive sovereign im- subject to prosecution for violation of the
munity in actions brought to review the federal firearms statutes. Furthermore,
decisions of administrative agencies. Wa- here there are none of the federalism issues
rm F. Director, Department of the Trea- present in Bolton, where the challenged
*ury, 672 F.2d 590 (6th C'ir.1982); Carpet, statute was a state statute. To rule that
Linoleum and Resilient Tile Layers, Local Thompson's expungement claim is not a
* 419 r. Brown, 656 FAi 664 (10th Cir. ripe controversy would force him to face
1961); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F^d 788 the risks of prosecution and conviction un(9th Gr.1980), cert denied, 452 U.S. 905,101 der the federal statutes in order to obtain
S.O. 8030, 69 L.Ed.2d 405 (1981); Jaffee v. an adjudication of his claim. It would be
United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3rd Cir.1979); manifestly unjust to do so.
Sheehan v. Army A Air Force Exch. ServHaving determined that the court has
ices, 619 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir.1979), rev. on jurisdiction over the expungement claim,
*fcer grounds, — U.S.
, 102 S.Ct that the claim is not barred by sovereign
2118,72 LEd^d 520 (1982). On the basis of immunity, and that it presents a justiciable
this authority and the plain wording of the controversy, the court must now address
statute, the court concludes that this action the merits of petitioner's claim.
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IT.

RELIEF FROM FEDERAL
FIREARMS DISABILITY
Abaeat the judicial pardon and expungement, Thompson's 1968 felony conviction
clearly places him under the federal firearms disability imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 922
and 18 U&CApp. § 1202. Both § 922 and
§ 1202 proscribe the receipt of firearms by
convicted felons.9 Section 1202 reaches possession as well.
Sectioa 922 was enacted as part of Title
IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Art of 1968, PubX. 90-351, 82 Stat
197 (hereinafter referred to as "Omnibus
Crime Act"), as amended by the Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub.L. 90-618, 82 Stat
1213. That title also contains a provision,
at 18 UJB.C. § 925(c), for administrative
relief from the firearms disability.9 No
other express provision for relief or exemption from the disability is contained in the
statute.
S. For theftiDtext of the relevant provisions of
I 922 and f 1202, see note 1 supra.
9. For the text of | 925(c), see note 2, supra.
If. The full text of 18 U.S.CApp. f 1203 is as
fbDowr
§ 1203. Exemptions
This title shall not apply to—
(1) any prisoner who by reason of duties
connected with law enforcement has express'
ly been entrusted with a firearm by competent suthority of th« prison; and
(2) any person who has been pardoned by
the President cf the United States or the
chief executive of a State and has expressly
been authorized by the President or such
chief executive, as the case may be, to receive, possess, or transport in commerce a
firearm.
11. The text of the Utah Statute is as follows:
T7-1S-2. Expungement and sealing of court
and arrest records.—
(IX*) Any person who has been convicted of
any crime within this state may petition the
convicting court for a judicial pardon and for
•eattag of his record to that court At the
time the petition is filed and served upon the
prosecuting attorney, the court shall set a
date for a hearing and notify the prosecuting
attorney for the jurisdiction of the date set
for hearing. Any person who may have relevant information about the petitioner may
testify at the hearing and the court » its
discretion, may request a written evaluation
of the adult, parole and probation section of
the state division of corrections.

Section 1202 was enacted as part of Title
VII of the Omnibus Crime Act which was
added as a floor amendment and enacted
without committee consideration. Title VII
also contains a provision, at 18 U.S.CApp.
§ 1203, exempting from the § 1202 disability any person who, inter alia, "has been
pardoned by the chief executive of a State
and has expressly been authorized by . . .
such chief executive . . . to receive, possess,
or transport in commerce a firearm." N In
addition to this exemption, it is apparent
that the § 925 administrative relief may
also be applied to remove the § 1202 disability. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S.
55, 64, 100 S.Ct 915, 920, 63 L.Ed.2d 198
(1980); United States v. Kelly, 519 FJ2d 794
(8th Cir.1975).
Petitioner claims that the judicial pardon
and expungement granted to him in April,
1982, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7718-2 (1981 Supp. to Replacement Vol. 8Q "
(b) If the court finds the petitioner for a
period of five years in the case of a class A
misdemeanor or felony, or for a period of
three years in the case of other misdemeanors or infractions, after bis release from incarceration, parole or probation whichever
occurs last has not been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and that no proceeding involving such
a crime is pending or being instituted against
the petitioner and further finds that the rehabilitation of petitioner has been attained to
the satisfaction of the court it shall enter an
order that all records in petitioner's case in
the custody of that court or in the custody of
any other court, agency or official be seated
The provisions of this subsection shall not
apply to violations for the operation of motor
vehicle under title 41. The court shall also
issue to the petitioner a certificate stating the
court's finding that be has satisfied the court
of his rehabilitation.
(2X«) In any case in which a person has been
arrested with or without a warrant that individual titer 12 months provided there have
been no Intervening arrests, may petition the
court hi which the proceeding occurred, or, if
there were no court proceedings, any court in
the jurisdiction where the arrest occurred,
for an order expunging any and all records of
arrest and detention which may have been
made, if any of the following occurred:
0) He was released without the filing of
formal charges;
01) Proceedings against him were dismissed, be was discharged without a convk-

fulfill the requirements of § 1208 and, further, erase completely his prior convictions
to that he is removed from the strictures of
§ 922 as well as § 1202. Upon analysis of
the statute under which petitioner's conviction was expunged, the court cannot agree.
[4] First, it is dear that the expungement does not meet the requirements of
§ 1208. That section requires an executive
pardon, plus express authorization from the
executive to receive, possess, or transport
firearms. The specificity of the statute,
supported by its legislative history,12 seems
to admit no exceptions or substitutions for
these exemption requirements. The courts
have been unanimous in holding that state
action other than an executive pardon with
express authorization to receive, possess, or
transport firearms is insufficient to fulfill
the requirements of the § 1203 exemption
and hence relieve a previously convicted
felon of a federal firearms disability under
tion and no charges were refDed against him
within 30 days thereafter, or he was acquitted at trial; or
Oil) The record of any proceedings against
him has been sealed pursuant to subsection
(1).

§ 1202. See, a?., United States v. Kelly,
519 Y2A 794 (8th Cir.1975); United States
v. Matassini, 565 F2d 1297 (5th Cir.1978);
United States v. Sutton, 521 F.2d 1885 (7th
Cir.1975); United States v. Allen, 699 F.2d
453 (9th Cir.1982). The judicial pardon of
Thompson in April, 1982, was not an executiv
e pardon," and the court has searched
both the state expungement statute and the
state court's orders of judicial pardon and
expungement without finding anything
that could be construed as express authorization to receive, possess, or transport
firearms. Hence Thompson does not qualify for the § 1203 exemption,
[5] Petitioner's second assertion, that
his expungement completely erased his prior conviction so that the conviction can no
longer serve as a basis for either a § 922 or
a § 1202 disability, is somewhat more difficult The courts are in disagreement on
consists of remarks on the floor of the Senate
and on the floor of the House. A copy of the
entire legislative history is published as an appendix in Stevens v. United States, 440 R2d
144 (6th Or. 1971)

(b) If the court finds that the petitioner is IS. The State of Utah presents a special circumstance which may distinguish this case from
eligible for relief under this subsection, it
those dted above. Unlike the states in those
shall issue its order granting the relief prayed
cases, Utah has no provision for a "pardon by
for and further directing the law enforcement
. . . the chief executive" of the State, as reagency making the initial arrest to retrieve
quired by § 1203. See, Constitution of Utah.
any record of that arrest which may have
Art VII, | 12. In Utah's unique circumstance,
been forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Inwhere the governor does not have the power to
vestigation and the Utah Bureau of Criminal
grant pardons, ft is impossible to discern what
Identification.
Congress intended should be the procedure for
(c) This subsection shall apply to all arexempting persons from the f 1202 firearms
rests and any proceedings which occurred
disability. It may be reasonable to conclude
before, as wefl as those which may occur
that Congress, had It considered this circumafter, the effective date of this act
stance, would have intended that the functional
(3) Employers may inquire concerning arequivalent of a governor's pardon, coupled with
rests or convictions only to the extent that
the express authorization to possess firearms,
the arrests have not been expunged or the
would be sufficient to exempt a person from
record of convictions sealed under this provithe disability. However, since the judicial parsion. In the event an employer asks concerndon and expungement based on an analysis of
ing arrests which have been expunged or
the Utah expungement statute, could not be
convictions the records of which have been
considered the functional equivalent of an execseated, the person who has received expungement of arrest or judicial pardon may answer
utive pardon, and since the petitioner has not
as though the arrest or conviction had not
received express authorization to possess fireoccurred.
arms, he would not meet this modified exemp(4) Inspection of the sealed records shall be
tion requirement under § 1203. Hence, It is
permitted by the court only upon petition by
not necessary to determine whether, in Utah,
the person who Is the subject of those recthe functional equivalent of an executive pardon is sufficient to meet that requirement of
ords and only to the persons named in the
§ 1203.
petition.
12. The legislative history of Title v n of the
Omnibus Crime Act which contains | 1203,
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whether a state expungement relieves a and if Thompson had received his expungeformer eowrict«f the §922 disability. On ment under a statute providing for a comthe one hand, the Ninth Circuit and appar- plete erasure of the prior conviction, he
ently the Seventh Circuit have concluded might have been granted the relief he rethat state expungement statutes have no
quests. However, this court need not reach
effect on the firearms disability. United
the question of whether an expungement
States v. Bergeman, 592 F.2d 533 (9th Cir.
under a statute providing for complete eraW79); Thrall r. Wolfe, 503 F.2d 313 (7th
Cir.1974). On the other hand, the Fourth sure of conviction would furnish relief from
Cfrcuit and arguably the Fifth Circuit hold the federal firearms disabilities, because the
that a complete and total expungement Utah statute in effect at the time of
«"•** the prior conviction that would oth- Thompson's expungement. Utah Code Ann.
«wise trigger the federal firearms disabili- § 77-18-2 (1981 Supp. to Replacement Vol.
ty. Hew Banner Institute, Inc. v. Dicker- 8C), did not provide such complete erasure.
Perhaps the predecessor to § 77-18-2
•on, 649 F.2d 216 (4th Cir.1981). cert granted, 456 U.8.1018.102 S.Ct 1708.72 L.Ed.2d would have furnished Thompson with the
H2 (1982);" United States v. Matassini relief he seeks. Utah Code Ann. § 77-35665 F.2d 1297. 1309. n. 26 (5th Cir.1978)." 17.5 (1978 Replacement Vol. 8C). It apparThere has been no similar disagreement ently provided a complete erasure of the
•s to the § 1202 disability. To this date no prior conviction. Subsection 1 provided
court has held that a state expungement that upon a petitioner's meeting the requirelieves a former convict of this disability. sites of the statute, the court would enter
See United States v. Kelly, 519 F.2d 794 an order sealing all the records of the peti(8th Cir.1975); United States v. Sutton, 521 tioner's case. It further provided:
R2d 1385 (7th Cir.1975); United States v.
(c) Upon the entry of the order in those
Allen, 699 F^d 453 (9th Cir.1982). Howproceedings, the petitioner shall be
ever, the courts have been unanimous in
deemed judicially pardoned and the petiholding that a federal expungement under
tioner may thereafter respond to any in^ / f B d e r d Y o u t h Corrections Act. 18
quiries relating to convictions of crimes
U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026. provides relief from
as though that conviction never occurred.
both § 922 and § 1202. United States v Subsection 2 provided that if the record of
Arnngton, 618 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir.1980). conviction were expunged pursuant to subcert denied, 449 U.S. 1086.101 S.Ct 876.66 section 1. then all records of arrest and
L.Ed\2d 812 (1981); United States v. Purga- detention may also be expunged. It furson, 565 F^d 1279 (4th Or.1977); United ther provided:
States v. Fryer, 545 F.2d 11 (6th Cir.1976).
Thereafter, the arrest, detention, and any
The rationale of JVew Banner and the
further proceedings in the case shall be
Youth Correction Act cases is persuasive,f;
deemed not to have occurred, and a peti14. In New Burner, the court based its decision
» part on language from two Tenth Circuit
%!£ £?!£?*"*
* Bnoticky» 588 F^d 773
I S ? . ? * * 1 9 7 8 * ***** v- Unit** States, 579
F.2d 1219 (10th Or.1978). Brzoticky involved
UD<ter
UVT^!
* * * t h a t W M Predicated
on a conviction that had been expunged after
1
hULS^ ^
*** c**0™**** The court
S ^ d j E J L * ? * • * «*"**«» had been
«*pungea before the commencement of the fed-

or expunged.'* 579 FJZd at 1226 (emphasis In
original). Though these references are certainly not conclusive, it may be inferred from them
that the Tenth Circuit would align itself with
the Fourth.
IS. In Matassini, the court considered the effect
of a governor's pardon on § 922. However, the
rationale provided there applies equally well to
a judicial pardon and expungement 565 F2d
at 1309, n. 26.

Cr

« ? T J?./!?
«>• court held that "once
o n e i . convicted of a felony he Is within the
P^wJP^n against possession offirearmsuntil that prior conviction is actually overturned

IS. A shnflar, and likewise persuasive, rationale
is set forth In the dissent to United States v.
Bergcman. 592 F2d 533. 538-42 (9th Or. 1979)
(Takasugl, J., dissenting).
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tloner may answer accordingly any ques- the statute is the provision that the records
of the conviction may be sealed and that
tion relating to their existence.
(Emphasis added). Subsection 4 provided inspection of the records thereby sealed
that once the records were sealed, inspec- may be permitted only upon petition of the
tion would be permitted only upon petition person who is the subject of the records.
There is no explanation in the legislative
by "the person who is the subject of those
history for the changes in the amended
records."
statute,17 nor have there been any cases
A single Utah case construing the prede- construing the new statute. The new lancessor statute exists, which supports the guage, especially when construed in light of
conclusion that the statute provided a full the former language, seems to place a limiand complete expungement, legally erasing tation on the effect of the judicial pardon
the prior conviction. The Utah Supreme and expungement Though the legislative
Court, quoting the language of subsection intent is not entirely clear, the court must
1(c), above, held that a felon whose convic- conclude that the statute was changed for a
tion had been expunged could not be purpose; and that purpose, from the subimpeached as a witness on account of his stance of the change, evidently was to limit
prior conviction. State v. Jones, 581 P.2d the effect of a judicial pardon and expunge141 (Utah 1978).
ment Hence, since 1980 a judicial pardon
However, in 1980 the expungement stat- and expungement under section 77-18-2 is
ute was amended as part of the process of not a complete and unqualified expungerecodifying the Utah Code of Criminal Pro- ment that erases the prior conviction sufficedure. Eliminated from the new statute is ciently to relieve petitioner Thompson from
the language stating that "the petitioner his firearms disabilities.
shall be deemed judicially pardoned."
In an attempt to resolve the court's conEliminated also is the language stating that
"the arrest, detention, and any further pro- cerns about subject matter jurisdiction and
ceedings shall be deemed not to have oc- sovereign immunity. Thompson filed a
curred.'' In place of subsection 1(c) giving second Motion to Amend Complaint on Authe petitioner the right to answer "any gust 6. 1982. Since the jurisdiction and
inquiries relating to convictions of crimes as sovereign immunity issues have been rethough that conviction never occurred,** solved in favor of Thompson, the court does
(emphasis added) is the following provision: not see the necessity of granting the second
(8) Employers may inquire concerning ar- motion to amend. A pre-trial scheduling
rests or convictions only to the extent conference would be helpful at this point to
that the arrests have not been expunged enable the court to discuss with counsel
or the record of the convictions sealed means of expediting resolution of the reunder this provision. In the event an maining claims not disposed of by this oremployer asks concerning arrests which der.
have been expunged or convictions the
Accordingly.
records of which have been sealed, the
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitionperson who has received expungement of
arrest or judicial pardon may answer as er's Motion for Summary Judgment be dethough the arrest or conviction had not nied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the
occurred.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-l&-2(8) (1981 Supp. second Motion to Amend Complaint be presto Replacement Vol. 8C). Still included in ently denied.
,7

attention was given to the individual pro- The amendment to the expungement statute little
visions of the BUL There were no comments
was enacted on February 1. 1980, as part of
on
the
floor of either house regarding the exRoute Bill 32. which consisted of the entire
pungement provision, which was enacted by
oode of criminal procedure for the State of
Utah. The BUI was hastily enacted In a Budget L.1980. ch. 15. | 2.
Session of the Legislature, and consequently
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IT IS FUBTHER ORDERED that a pretrial seheduBag conference be set for Mooday, January 24, 1968, at UtiO turn.

«ETw5a$TSToT>

AJU ADAMS CONSTRUCTION
CO, Plaintiff,
T.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY,
Defendant
CK A. No. CV 181-SL
United States District Court,
S.D. Georgia,
Augusta Division.
Jan. 3, 1983.
Nonunion contractor brought action
against power company, challenging company's refusal to hire contractor for construction of administration building for nuclearpowered generating facility as violation of
antitrust laws and breach of contract On
cross-motions for summary judgment, the
District Court, Alaimo, Chief Judge, held
that: (1) power company was employer engaged in construction industry qualified to
negotiate valid prehire agreement in context of collective bargaining relationship
and therefore entitled to invoke exemption
from antitrust penalties under construction
industry proviso of National Labor Relations Act and nonstatutory labor exemption
from antitrust sanctions, and (2) genuine
issues of material fact precluded summary
judgment on breach of contract claim.
Ordered accordingly.
L Monopolies *»12(8)
When agreement with union forms basis of antitrust claim against employer, employer may assert nonstatutory labor exemption from antitrust sanctions if exemp-

tion would have been available to union.
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, § 1, 15 U.S.CJL
§ 1; Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.GA. § 15.
2. Labor Relations «=>S80
Valid prehire agreement satisfies requirement of collective bargaining relationship as prerequisite to application of construction industry proviso to section of National Labor Relations Act declaring it unfair labor practice for labor organization
and employer to enter into agreement to
refrain from using products of any other
employer or to cease doing business with
any other person. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(e, f), as amended, 29 U.S.OA.
§ 158(e,f).
3. Monopolies *»28(8)
Whether court in antitrust action
should consider power company's agreement with trades council, setting terms and
conditions of employment for craft workers
employed in construction of nuclear-powered generating facility, part of collective
bargaining context as prerequisite to application of construction industry proviso to
section of National Labor Relations Act declaring it unfair labor practice for labor
organization and employer to enter into
agreement to refrain from using products
of any other employer or to cease doing
business with any other person is question
of law, and whether parties apply legally
correct label to agreement is irrelevant
National Labor Relations Act, § 8(e, f)> as
amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(e, f).
4. Monopolies *»12(9)
Power company, which acted as own
construction manager, foregoing employing
general contractor in connection with construction of nuclear-powered generating facility, was an "employer engaged in the
construction industry," within meaning of
section of National Labor Relations Act declaring it not to be unfair labor practice for
employer engaged primarily in building and
construction industry to make agreement
with labor organization despite lack of majority status, qualified to negotiate valid
prehire agreement under such provision in
context of "collective bargaining relation-

ship" and therefore was entitled to invoke
exemption from antitrust penalties under
Act's construction industry proviso and nonstatutory labor exemption. Sherman AntiTrust Act, § 1, 15 U.S.CA. § 1; National
Labor Relations Act, § 8(e, f), as amended,
29 U-S.OA. § 158(e, f).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
5. Federal Civil Procedure *=»2497
On nonunion contractor's breach of
contract claim against power company,
which acted as own construction manager
in connection with construction of nuclearpowered generating facility, challenging refusal to hire contractor for construction of
facility's administration building, genuine
issues of material fact existed as to whether
parties had reached binding agreement on
all crucial terms and especially as to whether sufficient agreement had been reached
on manner in which contractor would meet
power company's requirements regarding
union status, precluding summary judgment
Ira Genberg, Atlanta, Ga., Wiley S. Obenshain, III, Augusta, Ga., for plaintiff.
Michael C. Murphy, Atlanta, Ga., Wyck
A. Knox, Jr., Augusta, Ga., for defendant

tor. In Count 1 of the complaint, plaintiff
contends that defendant's refusal to hire
plaintiff was the result of a combination
and conspiracy between defendant and others to exclude nonunion contractors from
working at the Burke County construction
site. Count 1 alleges that such a combination and conspiracy violated § 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U&C. § 1;
plaintiff, therefore, seeks to recover treble
damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15, for injuries to its business and
property caused by defendant's antitrust
violation. In Count 2, plaintiff contends
that the refusal to hire it constituted a
breach of contract by defendant
This case is presently before the Court on
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
filed October 12, 1982, and defendant's motion for summary judgment filed October
13, 1982.1 For the reasons stated below,
plaintiffs motion is DENIED, and defendant's motion is GRANTED as to Count 1
(the antitrust claim) but DENIED as to
Count 2 (the contract claim).
ANTITRUST CLAIM
A. Agreement with Trades Council

ALAIMO, Chief Judge.
On February 16, 1981, A.L. Adams Construction Company filed a civil complaint in
this Court against Georgia Power Company.
The plaintiff alleged that it was refused a
job as building contractor at defendant's
construction site in Burke County, Georgia,
because plaintiff was a nonunion contrac-

1. Facts
The following facts pertinent to plaintiffs antitrust claim are either undisputed,
are disputed without reasonable justification in the record, or may be assumed in
plaintiffs favor for purposes of defendant's
motion for summary judgment with regard
to the antitrust claim:
(a) A.L. Adams Construction Company
("Adams") is a nonunion contractor operating in the building and construction industry.
(b) Georgia Power Company ("Georgia
Power") is an investor-owned electric utility

1. Plaintiff argues that, under the terms of an
Order entered by this Court on May 10, 1982,
all motions to dismiss or for summary judgment were required to be filed by October 12,
1982, and that, since defendant's summary
Judgment motion w a s not filed until October
13, 1982, the motion was untimely and should
be denied. See Plaintiff's Brief in Response to
Defendant Georgia Power Company's Motion
tor Summary Judgment 1-4 (November 10,

1982). Since plaintiff claims no prejudice to it
resulting from the alleged late filing (plaintiff,
in fact, admits being served with a copy of
defendant's summary judgment motion on October 12) and since the Court finds considerable merit In defendant's motion, the Court believes that the purposes of justice are better
served by considering the merits of defendant's
motion than by rigidly enforcing a rather complicated series of filing requirements.

ORDER
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be tome competent evidence of violation of
the terms of probation.1 Utah Code 1943,
105-36—17.

Supreme Court of Utah.
June 16,1944.

6. Criminal law «=*82
Violation of the terms and conditions
of suspension or probation is usually a
I. Ciimhnl law «=»982
ground for revocation and imposition of
Prior to enactment of statute author- sentence. Utah Code 1943, 105—36—17.
king courts to suspend the imposition or
execution of sentence and to place a de- 7. Criminal law «=*82
fendant on probation, the courts had inWhere trial court has exercised disherent power to suspend sentence only for cretion in suspending imposition of sensome definite period and for some specific tence or in revoking probation and in imtemporary purpose. 1 Utah Code 1943, posing sentence, after a hearing, the judgment should not be molested. Utah Code
105—36-17.
1943, 105—36—17.
2. Crlmlaaf law <S=>982
Statute authorizing courts to suspend 8. Criminal law €=982
imposition of sentence and to place defendWhere trial court's first order suspendant on probation gives the trial courts much ing imposition of sentence was made for a
greater latitude in suspending imposition of definite time and defendant was placed on
sentence than was previously had, but the probation for purpose of reformation, and
courts are not thereby given authority to court made further orders suspending sensuspend sentences as a matter of grace, but tence from time to time, the court had
only when it appears compatible with public power to revoke suspension of sentence
interest. Utah Code 1943. 105—36—17.
and impose sentence upon a showing that
during the probation period defendant com3. Criminal | a w «=»982
mitted another crime in another jurisdicThe right of personal liberty and sus- tion. Utah Code 1943, 105—36—17.
pended sentence may not be alternately
granted and denied without just cause, and,
when a sentence is suspended during good
Appeal from District Court, Third Disbehavior without reservations, the person
trict, Salt Lake County; Clarence E.
whose sentence is thus suspended has a Baker, Judge.
a vested right to rely thereon so long as such
Habeas corpus proceeding by Gwen
condition is complied with.* Utah Code
1943, 105-36—17.
Williams against John E. Harris, Warden
of Utah State Prison. From a judgment
4. Criminal law <£=982
denying the writ and remanding petitioner
The right to suspend imposition of sen- to defendant's custody, petitioner appeals.
tence and to place one on probation is a
Affirmed.
discretionary right, and one placed on proDuncan & Duncan, of Salt Lake City,
bation has a right to be heard as to whether
he has violated the conditions upon which for appellant.
Grover A. Giles, Atty. Gen., and Herbert
suspension was based. Utah Code 1943.
F. Smart, A s s t Atty. Gen., for respondent.
105—36—17.
5. Criminal law e=*82
Upon a hearing on question whether a
defendant has violated conditions upon
which suspended sentence was based, the
court has discretionary power to continue
probation or impose sentence, but to authorize termination of probation there must

TURNER, District Judge.
This is an appeal from the judgment of
the District Court of the Third Judicial
District for Salt Lake County. The trial
court, after admitting evidence in support
of the petition for writ of habeas corpus,
denied the writ and remanded the peti-

1 People v. Blackburn, 6 Utah 847, 23
P. 769; In t/ic Matter of Flint, 25 Utah
338, 71 P. 531, 95 Am.St.IUp. 853; Reese
r. Olaen, 44 Utah 318,130 P. 041.

* State v. Zolimtakis, 70 Utah 200, 250
P. 1044, 54 A.L.R. 1463.
* State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 290, 290
P. 1044, 54 A.LJI. 1403; Thompson
T. Harris, Warden, Utah, 144 P.2d 761.
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doner, the appellant here, back into the pellant admitted that this was correct The
custody of John E. Harris, Warden of the judge then sentenced appellant to be imUtah State Prison, defendant in the ori- prisoned for a term of not less than one
nor more than twenty years.
ginal action and the respondent here.
In this action appellant contends that the
The facts with which the court is concerned, as shown by the transcript, are trial court in Salt Lake County which reneither complicated nor in dispute. The fused to release him upon the hearing on
appellant, with three other young men, was the writ of habeas corpus erred for the
charged with the crime of burglary in the reason that the court in Weber County
second degree in the District Court of the was without jurisdiction when it imposed
Second Judicial District in and for Weber the sentence of imprisonment as stated
County. On the 12th day of December, above; that the trial court was without
1932, plaintiff herein, one of the defendants jurisdiction, it having suspended imposition
in the above case, entered a plea of guilty. of sentence and having placed the appellant
He waived time for passing of sentence on probation for a definite period, and appellant having complied with all the conand the court then stated:
ditions of this probation, was entitled to
"Well, the Court will suspend the imposi- his discharge, and that orders of the court
tion of sentence in the case of the four of of Weber County were made after the
you, who have entered a plea of guilty, expiration of the term of appellant's prountil Monday, February 6th, 1933, at which bation, and were without any specific purtime you will report back here, or Mr. pose or object and without any reference
Quids can report for you, as to your con- or relation to appellant's further probation,
duct. I will place you in custody of Mr. and void.
Quids and it is up to you gentlemen to
We readily accept the proposition that if
straighten up. If you don't straighten out the District Court of Weber County had no
you will have to come in and be sent to the jurisdiction to pronounce sentence, the
penitentiary, where they will straighten you Court of Salt Lake County entertaining the
out"
writ of habeas corpus should have sustained
On the 6th day of February, 1933, appel- the writ and released appellant from the
lant appeared in court with Mr. Childs and State Prison.
the latter made a favorable report regardThe statute, which was in force and
ing the boy's conduct. At this time the Dis- effect, and which is now controlling in
trict Attorney stated to the court: "I do 105—36—17, U.C.A. 1943, is as follows:
not want your Honor to lose jurisdiction
"Upon conviction of any crime or ofof the boys." The court then made another
fense, if it appears compatible with the
order suspending imposition of sentence
public interest, the court having jurisdiction
until April 24, 1933, and on that date made
may suspend the imposition or the execua similar order. Several of these were
tion of sentence and may place the defendmade from a definite date to a definite date.
ant on probation for such period of time
From the record it also appears that after as the court shall determine. The court
making the first report with Mr. Childs, may subsequently increase or decrease the
this young man was released upon his own probation period and may revoke or modify
recognizance.
any condition of probation. While on proThe last time appellant was before the bation the defendant may be required to
court prior to the revocation of the order pay, in one or several sums, any fine imof probation was September 25, 1933, at posed at the time of being placed on probawhich time the court made a further order tion; may be required to make restitution
of suspension of imposition of sentence or reparation to the aggrieved party or
until December 18, 1933. On the 22nd of parties for the actual damages or losses
October, 1933, appellant was brought before caused by the offense for which conviction
the court in Weber County and appeared was had; and may be required to provide
before the judge who had made the pre- for the support of his wife or others for
vious orders. Then the court asked appel- whose support he may be legally liable."
lant regarding his plea to the charge of
[1] This statute was enacted by the
burglary and if he had not been sentenced
to the Utah State Prison recently for a Legislature in 1923. Prior to the enactment
crime committed in Utah County while of this statute, the courts in this jurisdicunder the court's order of probation. Ap- tion had inherent power to suspend sen149 F.2<1—41
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tencet only lor tome definite period and
for some specific temporary purpose. Long
before the passage of the present statute,
this court held that trial courts could suspend sentence temporarily for stated period
from time to time. See People v. Blackburn, 6 Utah 347, 23 P. 759. In this latter
case the court held that trial courts have
no power wholly to relieve convicted persons from sentence; that only the pardoning power can do that In the Matter of
Flint, 25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531, 95 Am.St.Rep.
853, this court held that a suspension of
sentence for an indefinite period is in effect
an exercise of the functions of the pardoning power which belongs exclusively to the
Board of Pardons, a separate and distinct
department of the State government This
principle of law was again stated in the
case of Reese v. Olsen, 44 Utah 318, 139
P. 941.
[2,3] It is apparent that 105—36—17,
supra, gives the court much greater latitude and power in suspending imposition
of sentence than was previously had. Notice the following provision of the statute,
"The court may subsequently increase or
decrease the probation period and may revoke or modify any condition of probation." The purpose of this section is clearly reformatory. Since the enactment of the
statute this court has held that "trial courts
are not given authority to suspend sentences as a matter of favor or grace, but
only 'when it appears compatible with public interest'" Also, it announced that the
right of personal liberty and suspended
sentence "may not be alternatively granted
and denied without just cause." Also, that
"when a sentence is suspended during good
behavior, without reservations, the person
whose sentence is thus suspended has a
vested right to rely thereon so long as such
condition is complied with." State v.
Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044, 1046,
54 A.LJL 1463.
[4-7] We think It advisable to analyze
the present matter, bearing in mind the
holdings of this court in the Zolantakis
case, supra. From the construction of the
statute it is evident that the legislature intended trial courts should have considerable
authority to reform wrongdoers. It never
intended that trial courts should implant
hope and faith into one with the right to
destroy this as a whim, without just cause.
The right to suspend imposition of sentence
and the right to place one on probation is

a discretionary right One placed upon
probation has a right to be heard as to
whether he has violated the conditions upon
which suspended sentence was based. State
v. Zolantakis, supra; Thompson v. Harris,
Warden, Utah, 144 P.2d 761, at page 767.
Upon such a hearing, the trial court has
discretionary power to continue probation
or impose sentence, but to authorize termination of probation there must be some
competent evidence of violation of the
terms of probation. Violation of the terms
and conditions of suspension or probation is
usually a ground for revocation and the
imposition of sentence. 24 GJ.S., Criminal
Law, $ 1572, p. 72; People v. Lippner, 219
Cal. 395, 26 P.2d 457. When it appears
that a trial judge has exercised discretion
in suspending imposition of sentence or in
revoking probation and imposing sentence,
after a hearing as heretofore mentioned,
the judgment of the trial court should not
be molested.
[8] The record discloses that when the
first order of suspension of sentence was
made is was made for a definite time. The
boys, including appellant, were told to
straighten up, that if they did not straighten
up they would be sent to the penitentiary.
From the record we believe the boys were
placed on probation for the purpose of
reformation. The trial judge was a man
of experience. He knew he was dealing
with boys, guilty of a serious offense, who
had previously been in the reformatory.
We do not believe that the judge when he
placed the boys in the custody of Mr. Childs
expected the time fixed then to be a full
period of probation. The trial judge was
carefully feeling his way with these boys.
He was endeavoring to save the youths
from the stigma of prison. From what
was said and done, we must conclude that
this appellant and the other boys were released from time to time under the condition that they straighten up, that they do
not violate the law. Experience tells us
that we cannot expect to change a youth
from bad habits and lawlessness to one of
good conduct and dependable worthiness in
a few days or a few weeks. Youth when
badly damaged by disease or bad influence
must have time to recover. That often
there can be recovery is justification for
suspension of sentence and probation.
We are of the opinion that the court
purposefully continued suspension of sentence from a day certain to a day certain.
It was dealing with juveniles; boys the

OTAH POULTRY PROD. COOP. A88*N v. UTAH LAB. BEL. BD.
lefFJMtfS

court hoped to keep out of the penitentiary;
doubtful cases, but worthy of care and
consideration in the opinion of the trial
judge. Before the time last fixed for him
to appear, this appellant committed another
crime in another jurisdiction. He had already admitted his guilt and had been sentenced to the State Prison when brought
before the court in Weber County for revocation of suspension. He had failed to
straighten up and was brought back, just
as he had been told, for sentence in the
event he did not straighten up.
We are of the opinion the trial court
acted within the powers granted by the
statute, and that it had jurisdiction to pronounce sentence to the State Prison as was
done.
The judgment of the lower court in this
case is affirmed.

ing their activity is no
Board. Laws 1937, c 55.
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acern of the

3. Master and servaat <t=»(5(l22)

If State Labor Relations Board's finding that employee was discharged because
of union activity was supported by substantial evidence, finding must be upheld.
Laws 1937, c 55.1
4. Master and servant «=>I5(I22)
The Utah Labor Relations Board's
finding that an employee was discharged
because of union activity was not sustained by substantial evidence, so that order requiring his reinstatement was not
warranted. Laws 1937, c 55.

Original proceeding by the Utah Poultry
Producers Cooperative Association to vacate and set aside the order of the Utah
WOLFE, C J., and LARSON, Mc- Labor Relations Board which found that
the petitioner was guilty of unfair labor
DONOUGH, and WADE, JJ., concur.
practice under Laws 1937, c 55, by discharging from its employment the comMOFFAT, J., deceased.
plainant Willis L. Jacobson. The Board
sought enforcement of its order.
Order of Board set aside, and applica•oiMMMmWO
tion of Board for enforcement thereof denied.
Harry Pugsley and Elias Hansen, both
of Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Grover A. Giles, Atty. Gen., Herbert F.
Smart, Asst Atty. Gen., and Clarence M.
UTAH POULTRY PRODUCERS COOPER- Beck, of Salt Lake Gty, for defendants.
ATIVE ASS'N v. UTAH LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tt at
No. 6659.

Supreme Court of Utah,
June 16,1944.

,

1. Master and servant *=> 15(122)

The State Labor Relations Board's
finding that independent union was dominated and controlled by employer was not
sustained by substantial evidence. Laws
1937, c 55.
2. Master ass servant *=»I5<88)

The function of State Labor Relations
Board is not to provide leadership for a
union, and unless there is evidence of employer interference in selection of union
leadership, action of union membership in
making choice of their officers and directl Building Service Employee* v. Newhouse Realty Co. et ah, 97 Utah 662, 96
P.2d 607; American Foundry ft Ma-

McDONOUGH, Justice.
By writ of review, petitioner seeks to
vacate and set aside the order of the Utah
Labor Relations Board dated September
8, 1943. A petition of the Labor Board
for an order of enforcement is also before us. The Board found that petitioner
Utah Poultry Producers Cooperative Association, hereinafter referred to as the
Association, was guilty of an unfair labor
practice by discharging from its employment the complainant Willis L. Jacobson.
It concluded that his dismissal was due to
his activity in behalf of the Independent
Union of Poultry Employees; that the Association was guilty of interfering with
and restraining employees in the exercise
of their rights, and of dominating and interfering with the administration of said
chine Co. v. Utah Labor Relation* Board,
141P.2d390.
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Criminal Proceedings

,
jr-j. article "New Legislation
ZJZm^he Mentally Disabled", see 11
£ ' u T 2131 U982). For article, "Review
mM
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of New Legislation Relating to Criminal
Law", see 11 Colo. Law. 2148(1982).

16,7-403. Deferred sentencing of defendant. (1) In any case in which the
feodaat has entered a plea of guilty, the court accepting the plea has the
>wer. with the written consent of the defendant and his attorney of record
d the district attorney, to continue the case for a period not to exceed
o years from the date of entry of such plea for the purpose of entering
Jgment and sentence upon such plea of guilty; except that such two-year
nod may be extended for an additional time up to one hundred eighty days
the failure to pay restitution is the sole condition of supervision which
s not been fulfilled, because of inability to pay, and the defendant has
own a future ability to pay. During such time, the court may place the
fendant under the supervision of the probation department.
(2) Prior to entry of a plea of guilty to be followed by deferred judgment
id sentence, the district attorney, in the course of plea discussion as pro •
ded in sections 16-7-301 and 16-7-302, is authorized to enter into a written
ipulation, to be signed by the defendant, his attorney of record, and the
strict attorney, under which the defendant obligates himself to adhere to
tch stipulation. The conditions imposed in the stipulation shall be similar
all respects to conditions permitted as part of probation. In addition, the
ipulation may require the defendant to perform community or charitable
ork service projects or make donations thereto. Upon full compliance with
ich conditions by the defendant, the plea of guilty previously entered shall
e withdrawn and the action against the defendant dismissed with prejudice. \
uch stipulation shall specifically provide that, upon a breach by the defend-,
nt of any condition regulating the conduct of the defendant, the court shalT
nter judgment and impose sentence upon such guilty plea. When, as a condi-i
ion of the deferred sentence, the court orders the defendant to make restitu-i
ion and finds that he has the ability to pay, evidence of failure to pay thei
aid restitution shall constitute prima facie evidence of a violation. Whether!
. breach of condition has occurred shall be determined by the court without!
L jury upon application of the district attorney and upon notice of hearing.;]
hereon of not less than five days to the defendant or his attorney of recordJ
Application for entry of judgment and imposition of sentence may be madei
>y the district attorney at any time within the term of the deferred judgment!
>r within thirty days thereafter. The burden of proof at such hearing shall
>e by a preponderance of the evidence, and the procedural safeguards!
•equired in a revocation of probation hearing shall apply.
Source: (2) amended, L. 83, p. 664, § 4; (1) amended, L. 85, pp. 617, 13711
§ § 8, 50.
Editor's note: Subsection (1) is amended by chapters 135 and 342, Session Laws of Colorado!
1985. Section 56 of chapter 342 provides that section 50 of the act set out in that chapter is effectivej
July 1,1985, and sectionJ4 of chapter 135 provides that section 8 of the act set out in that chaptei]
is effective July 1,1985, and applies to acts committed on or after said date.
Law reviews. For article, "Colorado Felony
Sentencing", see 11 Colo. Law. 1478 (1982).

Purpose of the written stipulation is to ensurfl
that the defendant knows prior to the entry ofl
a guilty plea the consequences of violating t h j
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State Officers and Employees

section? shall be eonstrued to relieve the state or the
political subdivision thereof in which such property
on any r part thereof is situated from its duty to
.furnish for such property or part thereof such
normal police protection as it ordinarily and customarily provides, for other property situated therein*
iff)

Chapter 13. Merit Systems
f]-l>i tarputh *7rtt-15. Repealed.

UTAH CODE
1MM9M

47-15-2; Director of dhiiloB - Appoiatment i-tu.m • t
Terai of office.' ^« - WJVIW'JM'&O::. ,i *>*/*" ^
'• The commissioner of public safetyi t^pon recommendation pf the council on peace officer standards
and training and with* the approval of the; governor
shall appoint a director of the state division of
peace offleer standards and training who shall serve
at the pleasure of the commissioner* ^ ^ u -,Ju r.i jgn

47-15-3. Director to he fall-time state officer Director's staff. -.alnamo'.)/• *?M^tf.-«* :.^r^r)l
. .The director'^hall be a'full-time officer of the
Chapter 14 Operator and Chauffeur
,r state and1 shall have the authority to appoint sues
license Examiners Civil Service Act " »<>^ deputies, consultants, clerks 'and other employees«
may be authorized from eligible lists supplied by the
^7-14.1 through 67-14-21. Repealed.' *w? .»*::l tm state office of personnel management* • .^?* 'fov MB
' - '>'» -i';, *v? ••""i••v.viii'o r*'-:ti---fi«--Vi/ *fifflo ;f';jt
Chapter
1$.
Peace
Officer
Training
™»\y*
47-15-4. Powers as^ a^ttes of director. < ^ 0 , , v ;
vs*rw m-:;^ •!•.•/. ! +:•*.• \r,-- ;•:• J.*.1-.*•:• ;?' /•<. M ; < the powers and duties of the director of the
jFMM. Dtyistoa of peace officer seaadards .aedJralalBg-^ division or^peace^ffker! standards^ and tnining,
;vCreattoa rParpoee... . , / . .,'t- *.../.,.',.• ,f.. >».;„-,• j^*,: which'shall bc'^ exercised wWi^ the advice' of the
€7454. Dliwtor of AyWea - Appouunwat- Tana of ^ V-;
council oh'pete?* officer "standards and 'training,
shall include the followingr:^Wi:-.il.^ ^iol a%v m
47-15-3. Director to he fafl-thae state officer • D i r t c t o f ' i ' r
i (i) To promulgate standards1 for the certificatka
47-15-4. P o w t n ead daties of director/
V'^ •* <W of a-peace officer-training;,academy; to certify u
« M S 4 . Bask tndaiag coarse • Saaject arterial» iBftra-U >, , academy meeting the- prescribed requirements;-aad
ycetors-Scaedaks-Miaiaiaaikafth-CoBipkdoa iii>t^- to subsequently revpkecertifKadon for cause. ^ - >
:
tt-reaajree' • Aaaaal traialag -Froaibitioa froai exarcJelag ; :
(2) To prescribe minimum qualifications for cert' n\ aoweti 9 RaiattattaMBt. '
ification ,of peace; officers appointed, or elected to
47-15^. Applicaatt for adaUssloB to tralaiag prograai or ,)•,
enforce the Jaw of this state and the subdivision*
' fef waiter fiiiaJailloa • QaallncatloBS.
thereof and prescribe, standards /or j revocation of
47-15-6.5. Haw for apptfcatioa for adatierfoa to tralaiag *
¥ iwofraaK4'^'-' :: "':" , " "•
certification for cause, u i ^ ^ "{,U v!-i/:,/>jn^' >*
47-15-7. Coaaktfoa of tralalBg'coarse or aaniag of * v ' ' -"
(3) To fesUblish} minimum requirement! for. the
tirwahrar cxaaUaaUoa fooalrai - Pereoas affected.* v'-'- S *• certification of training (instructors ,andr, standards
47-154. Wahrer of traialaf coone reqatreawet. •: i"
for revocation of certification. irf :)r -iy•*..,&„f' •,,• v
4745-f. Maaidpatttiaf saay att aigaer BOaianiai staadardt.
(4) To provide,jfof the; issuance^of appropriile
47-15-10. Lapse of certificate ^BdastattaMtat. t • • • - , . ,
certificates
to those peace, officers completing the
^7-15*10 J . Revocatioa, suspeesloa or rtfaial of certifkat-^
basic f training programs j offered} by a ; certifW
'." tea • Groaadi • Notice to eaqtoyer.
academy or to those persons who pa*»"» /waiver*
67-15-11. Coaadl oa ptacc officer staaaardi aad traialaf - ;
f
examination as provided for in this chapter,. >/.,,,
'Otatloi- f Farpo« • Meiabenajp.
' "'""
,<r
47-15-12. Coaadl - Terau of office of Bmabert - VacaaV(5) To consult and co-operate with academy adi
i . e k a . ' < > ^ r o - ' y . i . "- «.- = *. »••••,«;,,/>.<• w , .,»;--;n ministrators and instructors for .the continued deve47-15-13. Coaadl - TtnaiaatloB of certaia saeaiberf •
lopment and improvement of the' basic trainini
'4 FtUtagfacaade*. •
."<.\-.-i-\.-*n V ; »;'!«£ . V j V M i * programs'! provided' by^ thei academy cahd for; the
47-15-14. Coaadl • Officers • Qaoraai • M e e t i a f s ^ , ^ ,x\,_,n
further 'development^ and'- implementation' of
47-15-15. Coaadl • Coiapeasatioa of saesrters,
advanced
in-servi<x timining programs:1 j hns ^.ifcjx,
47r14-14. CoeaeU . Members nay holdv other
Mask office
w,i
,c
'
(6)
To
consult and cooperate wth sWe instituti^orcaploymeat, " "''
" •'** " "
•MM7. Coaactt. Detkt. : '»r W ^ r,<, *<• to *« ons of higher learning to develop specialized couno
CMM7J. Ceeadl - Recoauatedadoaf tad reports.
> •' ^ of study for peace officers' m the" areas of crimiai
47-15-1S, Coaadl - Addltkmal aowert. ' '"" «:' u;rr^O£ justice,KipoUce adniinistration; c r m ^
soda*
47-15-lf. Reoiatod.
.i-iw sciences and other rela^o^pliiies:^^ f\\
**
(7) To consult and'co^perau with" othef oepirtj
]
{
€7-1540: DoaaOooj, coBtribBtloas, graaU, gifts',r w i
Fi!fptfft ^ffffKfot' and* k>ca| • govey^wefitf* conceroei
boqaests; dettees or aadowaaasts • Aataority to * {l
with • peace officer' training! and in his discretios,
1>T
accept. Diapodtioa.
^^-'
^ ^ » - , - a<.:.wv-Jt^
make training' aids' and materials'available to ioai
47-15-21. reaalty aatataawat - AaMvat of'tralatag fee*- t v i K
; law enforcement agencies.'Ul ?**' W-> U»; **•w DepoaU wita aoH • Saspeadoa of floe or forfdtarc - , : l
* (8) • To^perfonn'5 such^ other ^acts ^ as may; ke
IcWalter of aaMBBBwat • Depoait to stale geaeral faad.* -,;->necessary' "or appropriate ^ to' develop peace officer
programs wUhin the 6ate) f ;'f <u \ v>:'y
4745-1. Diylsloa of peace officer ataadaitls aad j - ^ \ training
;
1
' (ralaiag -Oeatloo • Parpose. <^ - ^«,-,.:'• VY -.•. ^-, '" (9) To report' to the council' on peace office
standards
,and
training.
at
jpgular meetings of; the
., To better». promote and insure the. safety, and
welfare of t)te citizens of this state in their, respect- council and ^at suchuPther^rljmes.as he may st
xrf.,i
ive,communities* and to provide for more efficient required/
and professional law enforcement •* by establishing , (10) To make, recommendations to the commit*
minimum standards and,training for peace officers oner, governor,«d the. legislature frpm»(ime to hat
(hrOMghout ;the state, there is hereby created a concerning peace officer standards and training.;,
i(ll) With, the permission of the commissioner of
division of the state department of public safety to
be known u the .division of peace officer standards public safcty^to contract on. behalf of the diviska
and, training which shall be administered. by a with criminal justice .agencies to provide training fa
director appointed by and acting tinder the supervi- employees of. those agencies on condition .(hat tk
sioi^^andricontrol of the commissioner of public employees or theu^eniploying agency pay a registn>
ltloty«if:bini**»>;,: ;•»;..•'- f '.< :j:'i-)r: *I^;K a<BS3 tion fee equivalent to the cost of the training aai
on condition that the contract does not reduce *
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established, by the director. The director may. in hit be from a county having a population of less than
discretion, require •ucb a reemployed or reengaged 100,000;
. wrti in a \ Mint hut a/from
peace officer to successfully complete the bask I (d) Three incumbent polke chiefs^one of whom
training course before reissuing or reinstating
certi- shall be a representative of' the % Utah Chiefs-oJ
fication, <\ u i JM\ \ h ' J *
J r
* ISO Police Association, one of .whom shall be from s
city o f the first or second class, and one ofr whoa
67-15-10.5. Revocation, suspension or refusal of '
shall be from a city of the third class or town; / H ;
certification . Grounds - Notice to employer.
(e) < W officer from the Federal pureau of Inve(1) The director may, upon the concurrence o f stigation
appointed by the governor
upon the race,i<li
the majority of the council, and after the person or mmendatlon
of
said
agency;
^
'
'•v» •
peace officer involved has been afforded 'prior
(
0
A
representative,
of
the
Utah
Peace
Officers
notice and an opportunity for a full hearing before Association; i *! '
* *iiu fri#, ' ""'* * ' 1 "
the council, revoke, refuse, or suspend certification
(g) A n educator in the field of public administraof a person as a peace officer for cause. Any of the
tion, oiniiiuU justice, or related area; and ^ .* ""-r''
following shall constitute cause for such action:
(h) Three persons.,selected' at large by tbt
1
(a) WUJfuJ falsification o f any information to
obtain certified status; \
•°vw, t X\< il:...;i-/df.ic *.»
',< (MjEhysfcal or' mental, disability affecting the
67-15-12. Council .Terms of office of members* vf
employee's
ability fo perform his or her duties; ' ; Vacancies.
•
* s
wa,V>.iur *dti\
>v
, (c) '^Addiction ,to
or the %unlawful L use o f : The 14 members of the ^council appointed by (be
,IM
mucotoor'drugs;
. '
governor shall be appointed for terms of four yean*
u
(d)' Conviction o f a felony or any crime Any member may- be< reappointed; for additions!
involving" dishonesty,; unlawful sexual conduct, or terms. A vacancy in any of these'categories caused
physical violence; or '
by the expiration of a term»of office.oriotherwfae
t (e) Any conduct or pattern of conduct that
shall»be»filled by the t governor < from A the sane
would tend to disrupt, diminish or otherwise jeopa- category in which the vacancy occurs.'; W / . U . J L I W
rdize public trust and fidelity tJf
with regard to law
enforcement!" ; ^ • l
•
" i • ' «M
' (2) The 'director shall not suspend or revoke cert**1
lficatlonsof any peace officer prior to sending notice I My member, o f the council shall, Jmrncdfsttfr
to the'governing
.body of the political subdivision upon the termination o f his holding the officer*
employing4 the peace officer and receiving informat- employment specified In section ,67-1 $-11 which wi
ion or comments concerning the peace officer from the basis for his/eligibility*to, membership on ftf
such governing body or the agency employing such council, or, upon two unexcused absences in oat
year from regularly scheduled council, mcctiapi
officer. '>);* ( i •>t*f»» »
v/2. >
< (3) Denial, suspension, or revocation procedures cease to be a member;of the council, A vacancy
shall, not, be initiated by the council in cases In created in pne o f these ways shall be filled by the
which an officer,is terminated for infraction of his governor from ,the! category in which the vacancy
agency's policies, general orders, or similar guideli- occurs. The council k shall remain as i}'is composed
nes of operation which do not amount to any of the upon the effec^ve.date^f-this^act, Qf/the 1913
causes for denial,, suspension, or revocation enume- genera) session until the expiration of any Individual
member's term.,If a vacancy occurs In the council,
rated In fubscaion (I). , • ,^ >' v
«
appointmentrto fill that,vacancy shall be'ecccjmpti*
(4) ^Termination of a peace officer, whether
voluntary or Involuntary, does not preclude rcvoca-,
tioq or subsequent denial of peace officer certificat- 67-15-14. Council - Officers -^Quorum * Meetings,'
ion status by .the .council *if termination was for any • The council shall select a chairman and vie*
of the reasons enumerated in subsection (1). Empl-. chairman from among Its members.- Nine memben
oyment by another, agency or reinstatement of a of the advisory council shall constitute a'quanta
peace officer by his parent agency after termination, Meetings may "be* called by the chairman or, A
whether Jb*. termination was voluntary or involunt- commissioner of publk safety or the director, sai
arytAdoes^not^preclude,revocation or subsequent shall be called byv the ?chairroan Upon [the writtei
denial of peace, officer certification status by the request of nine members, but to no event shall then
council, Ik termination was for-any of the reasons be leu than two meetings per jear,. Meetings sail
enumerated in subsection (1).
; t„ vm be held at,such tiincs ( a^ peaces as'arc determine
u^^^n^tmjff
67-15-1}* .Council on peace officer standards and M ^ J>y the director,* {/*
training t Creadon«Purpose • Membership, t- <t 67-15-15. Council - Compensation of numbers: ftt
A council on peace officer standards and training ! Members of the council shall'receive per'am
by the department of adtfIs hereby established to serve as an advisory board allowance as approved
0
to, the, director of the 'division of. peace officer nistrative services. All members shall be reimbursed
training >onr matters 'relating i to, peace officer for their ** actual » and - necessary ^travel ^ expeoia
standards and training. The council shall Include tne incurred in the performance of their official duties.*''
attorney general or his designated representative, the
superintendent of the highway patrol, and 14 addit- 67-15-16: Council -Members may hold other {] 4 *
ional members appointed ,by the governor having publk office or employment.^ 7 ^* 1 ^ nvin^m^t^
qualifications, experience, or education in the field, ; Membership^on i the M ccniiv^' , shall not^disquiWj
of law enforcement as follows:, „ t , ; i i ,, ?,. any member from'holding any^public o f f l a orL em(a) One Incumbent mayors <> .
'.^ ,
ployment nor shall he forfeit any'such office Ja
i(b) One incumbent county commissioner; ,-,
employment by'^reason >K of b Jiis^ apppintmea
,(c)rThreeJncurobent sheriffs,,one of whom shall hereunder"notwithstiuidinjf the*provisions of MJ
be a representative of the Utah Sheriff! Association, general, special or local UwVordinance or dtj
one of whom shall be from a county baving a population of 100,000 or more and one of whom shall
89Qi
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Statutes \
mum
6S-3-7. Time, how computed.
04-9. Effect OB suits and prosecutions pending.
The time in which any act provided by law Is to
No suit or prosecution, pending when this repeal
takes effect, for an offense committed, or for the be done is computed by excluding the first day and
itomry of a penalty or forfeiture incurred, shall be including the last, unless the last is a holiday, and
affected by the repeal, but the proceedings may be then it also is excluded. ' ' ( , ,
'iso
conformed to the provisions of these revised statutes O-3-t. Whan a day appointed is a holiday.
at far as consistent.
aso
Whenever any act of a secular nature, other than
9
94-10. "Heretofore and 'hereafter" defined.
a work of necessity or mercy, is appointed by law
The terms "heretofore" and "hereafter" as used or contract to be performed upon a particular day,
k these revised statutes, have relation to the time which day falls upon a holiday, such act may be
men the same take effect.
< aso performed upon the next succeeding business day
with the same affect as if it had been performed
upon the day appointed. < r
aso
Chapter 3. Construction
6 1 4 * . Seal, how affixed.
& I . Gemmae law adopt**,
When the seal of a court or public officer is
^gtatstame^regelioaof
isistrasd • Rales ef tqeity tftvatt*
required by law to be affixed to any paper, the
9 4 4 . sfevlstd statutes ael retroactive.
word "seal" includes an impression pf such seal
0 4 4 . Qvg tad criminal remain sot auras*1.
upon the paper alone, as well as upon wax or a
0 4 4 . Iffoct ef rtpseMag a statate.
wafer affixed thereto. In all other cases the word
O f l \ Moafkal provirio- sfcossed a
•seal" may include a scroll printed or written. , aso
04-7. Ttet, how CMpattd.
IfcVMt. Joint authority Is authority to majority.
0 4 4 . Wbta a da? appelated is a bolder.
Words giving a Joint authority to three or more
044.ftti,e#waf!lMd.
public officers, < or other persons, are to • be
04-lt. Jeiat authority It Mteoritjr to aujority.
construed as giving such authority to a majority of
04-11. Inlet ef eoastractlea as to words aid states.
them, unless it is: otherwise expressed in the act
n-3-n, Kakt of coastroctloa at to these tttfottti
giving the authority/' 1J *^< *~*
' j * smV
04-1. Common law adopted.
The common law of England so far as it is not O ^ i l . Rnka of conttrnctioa as to words and \ j
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Constitution phrases.
f
Words and phrases are to<be construed according
or laws of the United States, or the Constitution or
to
the, context and the approved usage of the
mvs'of this state, and so far only as it is consistent
with and adapted to the natural and physical condi- language; but technical words and phrases, and such
tions of this state and the necessities of the people others as have acquired a peculiar, and appropriate
hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of meaning in law, or are defined by statute, are to be
decision in all courts of this state.
» aso construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition. U i w i; .„
Vt s aso
0 4 4 . Statutes la derogation of common law
SJS-3-12. Rake of construction as to these statutes. <•
Reran? construed • Raies of equity prevail.
In the construction of these statutes the following
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no rules shall be observed,' unless such construction
application to the statutes of this state. The statutes would be inconsistent'with the manifest intent of
or repugnant
to the context of the
establish the laws of this state respecting the the Legislature
f
s
%
subjects to which they relate, and their provisions statute. * " *'•* fc* & *, * .I*"** y
(1) "Month" means ' a'/calendar month, unless
sad all proceedings under them are to be liberally
construed with a view to effect the objects of the otherwise expressed, and the word "year," or'the
astutes and to promote justice. Whenever there is abbreviation "A.D." Is equivalent to the expression
say variance between the rules of equity and the •year of our Lord/ .* u n •>-«"! <» .* i i
(2) "Oath" includes "affirmation," and the word
rales of common law in reference to the same
natter the rules of equity shall prevail.
n o "swear* includes "affirm."' Every oral statement
under oath or affirmation is embraced In the term
0 4 4 . Revised statutes not retroactive.
\ 'testify,"* and every written one. In the term
i No part of these revised statutes is retroactive,
taless expressly so declared.
tf»
0) "Signature*'includes any name, mark, or sign
written with the intent to authenticate
any instrum* •
r
04-4. Qvil and criminal remedies not merged.
ent
or
writing.
*
<
*.
»
1
*
«
'
vWhen /the violation of a right admits of both a
(4) "Writing* includes printing, handwriting, and
dvfl and criminal remedy, the right to prosecute the typewriting.'
one is not merged in the other.
tto
(5) 'Person* includes individuals, bodies politic
and corporate, partnerships/associations,
and com
0 4 4 . Effect of repealing a statute.
»* * f«' »» ***•
' s *%
Jhe repeal of a statute does not revive a statute panies.
(6) The singular number hincludes the plural, and
previously repealed, or affect any right which has
accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, or the plural the singular.' - (7) Words
used rin one gender comprehend the
say action or proceeding commenced under or by
i
i
t
virtue of the statute repealed.
*
n o other* '' ' > i " ^ ^ )v»<
(8)
Words
used
in
the
present
tense
include
the
1
1
0 4 4 . Identical provisions
future.
'» V'»- - -•fl>m* ** » ' *
tot new enactment.
(9) 'Property' includes'both real and persona)
The provisions of any statute, so far as they are property.
V*^ **** J»JJ.T«V»«* *> •*«*» • •
aw.same,as woe* of any prior statute, shall be < (10) "Land," 'real estate,' mad "real property"
construed as a continuation of such provisions, and include land, tenements/ hereditaments, water
aot as a new enactment.
, t s o rights, possessory rights, and claims, '
*•*!**
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THE JUDGMENT
ant's probation or refuse to grant a further
stay of execution when he had abided by the
terms of his agreement with the court and
the probation department Ex parte FoUett
(1950) 119 U 98,225 P 2d 16.
In the absence of proof of fraud, a court
could not properly vacate an order setting
aside a conviction, merely because of its
belief that fraud was practiced. State v.
Schreiber (1952) 121 U 653,245 P 2d 222.
Where the probation order imposed conditions upon the defendant which were that he

77-18-2

remain in custody and supervision of his
bondsman, that he remain outside a certain
county, that he report to the court on a eertain date and that he "make every effort to
^ e e n t i r e l y g ^ ^ o r d e r contained
t e r m g 8 o m e w h a t mt variance with usual
^
indefinite and uncerb t |t
".
' " " «m W u.u«u..wiuuMuw»
**>* ** ?> ** ^enforceab e and the trial
J ^ t e •**» a heanng, could terminate the
probation. State v. Chesnut (1960) 11 U 2d
142,356 P 2d 86.

77-18-2. Expungement and sealing of records. (1) (a) Any person who
has been convicted of any crime within this state may petition the convicting court for a judicial pardon and for sealing of his record in that court
At the time the petition isfiledand served upon the prosecuting attorney,
the court shall set a date for a hearing and notify the prosecuting attorney
for the jurisdiction of the date set for hearing. Any person who may have
relevant information about the petitioner may testify at the hearing and
the court, in its discretion, may request a written evaluation of the adult
parole and probation section of the state division of corrections.
(b) If the courtfindsthe petitioner for a period offiveyears in the case
of a class A misdemeanor or felony, or for a period of three years in the
case of other misdemeanors or infractions, after his release from incarceration, parole or probation whichever occurs last, has not been convicted
of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and that no
proceeding involving such a crime is pending or being instituted against
the petitioner and further finds that the rehabilitation of petitioner has
been attained to the satisfaction of the court, it shall enter an order that
all records in petitioner's case in the custody of that court or in the custody
of any other court, agency or official be sealed. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to violations for the operation of motor vehicle
under title 41. The court shall also issue to the petitioner a certificate stating the court'sfindingthat he has satisfied the court of his rehabilitation.
(2) (a) In any case in which a person has been arrested with or without
a warrant, that individual after 12 months, provided there have been no
intervening arrests, may petition the court in which the proceeding
occurred, or, if there were no court proceedings, any court in the jurisdiction where the arrest occurred, for an order expunging any and all records
of arrest and detention which may have been made, if any of the following
occurred:
(i) He was released without thefilingof formal charges;
(ii) Proceedings against him were dismissed, he was discharged without
a conviction and no charges were refiled against him within 30 days thereafter, or he was acquitted at trial; or
(iii) The record of any proceedings against him has been sealed pursuant to subsection (1).
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(b) If the court finds that the petitioner is eligible for relief under thi
subsection, it shall issue its order granting the relief prayed for and fur
ther directing the law enforcement agency making the initial arrest U
retrieve any record of that arrest which may have been forwarded to th<
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Utah Bureau of Criminal Identifi
cation.
(c) This subsection shall apply to all arrests and any proceedings which
occurred before, as well as those which may occur after, the effective date
of this act
(8) Employers may inquire concerning arrests or convictions only to the
extent that the arrests have not been expunged or the record of convictions
sealed under this provision. In the event an employer asks concerning
arrests which have been expunged or convictions the records of which have
been sealed, the person who has received expungement of arrest or judicial
pardon may answer as though the arrest or conviction had not occurred.
(4) Inspection of the sealed records shall be permitted by the court only
upon petition by the person who is the subject of those records and only
to the persons named in the petition.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, i 2.
d-oat-Keierenceft.
Criminal identification, 77-26.
Expungement of juvenile court record,

Judicial expunction of criminal record of
convicted adult, 11ALR 4th 956.
Right of exonerated arrestee to have fingerprints, photographs or other criminal
identification or arrest records expunged or
restricted, 46 ALR 3d 900.

Collateral References.
21A AmJur 2d 561, Criminal Law (1020; 62
AmJur 2d 701, Privacy § 17.

Law Reviews.
.Comment, Arrest Record Expungement —
A Function of the Criminal Court, 1971 Utah
L. Rev. 881.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Effect of expungement.
conviction of a crime where the record of the
Witness
may not
not be
impeached on
on »a prior
prior conviction
has been expunged. State v. Jones
witness may
oe imp**«!«i
( i m ) m ? 2 d m .

77-18-3. Disposition of fines. (1) Fines imposed by the district court
shall be turned into the county treasury, except such fines as are imposed
by the district court in cases appealed from a municipal justice's court,
which fines, when collected, shall be by the county clerk covered, one-half
into the county treasury and one-half into the treasury of the city or town
from which the case was appealed; and except further, such fines as are
imposed by the district court in cases appealed from precinct justices'
courts, which fines, when collected, shall be covered by the county clerk
into the county treasury, and except further as otherwise specifically provided by law.
(2) Fines imposed by the district court in cases appealed from a circuit
court shall be paid in their entirety to the state treasury.
History: C. 1953, 77-184, enacted by L.
1980, eh. 15. { 2; L. 1981, ch. 90, f 4.

Compiler's Notes.
the 1981 amendment inserted the subsec
(1) designation; deleted "a circuit court or"
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date set for the hearing. Any person who may have relevant information
about the petitioner may testify at the hearing and the court, in its discreation, may request a written evaluation of the adult parole and probation section of the Utah division of corrections.
(2) If the court finds that the petitioner, for a period of five years in
the case of an indictable misdemeanor or felony, or for a period of one
year in the case of a misdemeanor, since his release from incarceration or
probation, has not been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and that no proceeding involving such a crime is
pending or being insituted against the petitioner and, further, finds that
the rehabilitation of the petitioner has been attained to the satisfaction
of the court, it shall enter an order that all records in the petitioner's
case in the custody of that court or in the custody of any other court,
agency or official, be sealed.
(3) Upon the entry of the order in those proceedings, the petitioner
shall be deemed judicially pardoned and the petitioner may thereafter
respond to any inquiries relating to convictions of crimes as though that
conviction never occured.
(4) Copies of that order shall be sent to each court, agency or official
named in the order.
(5) Inspection of the records shall thereafter be permitted by the
court only upon petition by the person who is the subject of those records
and only to the persons named in that petition.
Approved March 6,1973.

CHAPTER 199
H. B. No. 69

(Passed February 2, 1973. In effect February 22, 1973)

POWERS OF BOARDS OF PARDONS
An Act Amending Section 77-45-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, As
Amended By Chapter 197, Laws of Utah 1971, Relating to the Powers
of the Board o! Pardons; Providing That It Shall Have the Power
to Issue Subpoenas, Compel the Attendance of Witnesses and the Production of Books, Papers and Other Documents, and Take the Testimony of Witnesses Under Oath; Providing That the Board of Pardons
Shall Appoint A Certified Shorthand Reporter, Establishing That
Reporter's Duties and the Manner and Extent of His Compensation;
Providing That the Act Shall Not Be Applied Retroactively; Providing a Severability Clause; and Providing That the Act Shall Take
Effect Upon Approval.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:

[693]
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Section 14. Section amended.
Section 77-15-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is amended to read:
77-15-13. Closed examinations.
The magistrate must also, upon the request of the defendant, exclude
from the examination every person except his clerk, the prosecutor and his
counsel, the attorney general, the county attorney, the defendant and his
counsel, and the officer having the defendant in custody.
Section 15. Effective date.
This act shall take effect upon approval.
Approved March 19,1973.

CHAPTER 198
H. B. No. 129

(Passed March 2, 1973. In effect May 8, 1973)

EXPUNGEMENT
An Act Enacting Section 77-35-17.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953; Providing for the Expungement of Court Records After a Hearing in the
District Court Under Certain Circumstances; Providing for Notification to other Courts, Agencies and Officials; Providing that After the
Expungement, that Person May Respond to Inquiries as Though the
Conviction had not Occurred; and Providing that, After that Expungement, Records May Be Inspected Only Upon That Person's Petition.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1. Section enacted.
Section 77-35-17.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read:
77-35-17.5. Petition for judicial pardon and expungement—Hearing
-—Requirement of expungement—Copy of order—Inspection
of records.
(1) Any person who has been convicted of any crime within this
state may petition the convicting court for a judicial pardon and for the
expungement of his record in that court. At the time the petition is filed,
the court ahall art a date for a hearing and notify the prosecuting attorney for the jurisdiction of the pendency of the petition and of the

[25]
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CHAPTER 23
H. B. No. 64.

(Passed March 11,1943. In effect May 11, 1943.)

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
An Act Amending Sections 103-22-1 and 103-22-2, Utah Code Annotated
1943, Relating to Exposing to Fire or the Firing of Trees, Shrubs,
Brush, Grass, Undergrowth or Crops on Another's Land, Including
Livestock and Livestock Products, and Providing That it is a Felony
to Intentionally or Maliciously Set Fire to Trees, Shrubs, Brush, Grass,
Undergrowth, Livestock, Livestock Products or Crops; Penalties.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1. Section Amended.
Sections 103-22-1 and 103-22-2, Utah Code Annotated 1943, are
amended to read as follows:
103-22-1. Exposing Trees, Grass or Crops to Danger by Fire—Penalty.
Any person who negligently or willfully exposes any growing trees,
shrubs, brush, grass, undergrowth, cultivated crops, livestock, or livestock products on any lands, public or private, not his own property, to
danger of destruction by fire is guilty of a misdemeanor.
103-22-2. Firing Trees, Grass or Crops on Another's Land—Penalty.
Any person who negligently or willfully sets on fire, or causes or procures to be set on fire, any growing trees, shrubs, brush, grass, undergrowth, cultivated crops, livestock or livestock products on any land,
public or private, not his own property, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Provided, however, that any person who willfully or maliciously commits
the aforesaid acts as contained and described in this section, is guilty of
a felony.
Approved March 17,1948.

CHAPTER 24
S. B. No. 47.

(Passed March 11,1943. In affect March 17, 1943.)

C O D E OF CRIMINAL P R O C E D U R E
An Act Amending Section 105-36-17, Utah Code Annotated 1943, Providing for the Suspension of Sentences and the Suspension of the Imposition of Execution of Sentences, and the Placing of Defendants in
Criminal Cases on Probation, and Providing for the Manner of Terminating Such Suspension or Probation.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1. Section Amended.
Section 106-36-17, Utah Code Annotated 1943, is amended to read:
105-36-17. Suspension of Sentence—Vacate Plea—Dismissal.
Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any crime or offense, if it appears compatible with the public interest, the court having jurisdiction
may suspend the imposition or the execution of sentence and may place

Chs. 24,25,26 Code of Criminal Procedure—Corporations
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the defendant on probation for such period of time as the court shall
determine.
The court may subsequently increase or decrease the probation period,
and may revoke or modify any condition of probation. While on probation, the defendant may be required to pay, in one or several sums, any
fine imposed at the time of being placed on probation; may be required
to make restitution or reparation to the aggrieved party or parties for
the actual damages or losses caused by the offense to which the defendant has pleaded guilty or for which conviction was had; and may be
required to provide for the support of his wife or others for whose support he may be legally liable. Where it appears to the court from the
report of the probation agent in charge of the defendant, or otherwise,
that the defendant has complied with the conditions of such probation,
the court may if it be compatible with the public interest either upon
motion of the district attorney or of its own motion terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and
dismiss the action and discharge the defendant.
Section 2. Effective Date of Act.
This act shall take effect upon approval.
Approved March 17,1943.

CHAPTER 25
H. B. No. 106.

(Passed March 11, 1943. In effect March 17, 1948.)

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
An Act Amending Section 103-51-18, Utah Code Annotated 1943, Relating to the Crime of Rape and Prescribing the Penalty Thereof.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1. Section Amended.
Section 103-51-18, Utah Code Annotated 1943, is amended to read:
103-51-18. Penalty for Rape.
Rape is punishable as follows:
(a) When the female upon whom the act is committed is under the
age of thirteen years, by imprisonment in the state prison, for a term
which shall not be less than twenty years and which may be for life.
(b) In all other cases by imprisonment in the state prison not less
than ten years.
Section 2. Effective Dale of Act.
This act shall take effect upon approval.
Approved March 17, 1943.

CHAPTER 26
S. B. No. 9.

(Passed February 24, 194S. In effect May 11, 1943.)

CORPORATIONS
An Act Amending Section 18-2-17, Utah Code Annotated 1943, Relating
to Redemption and Purchase of Preferred Stock of Corporations*
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AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD N. BOYCE
PROFESSOR OF LAW
I, Ronald N. Boyce, member of the Supreme Court and
Utah State Bar Code of Criminal Procedure Committee, hereby
declare and affirm that the following is a true and accurate
statement of ray opinion and recollection of the intent of the
Committee which drafted the present Utah Statute on "Expungement
and sealing of records", U.C.A. Section 77-18-2 (1980):
The Committee fully intended to overrule State v.
Chambers, 533 P. 2d 876 (Utah 1975), which limited the scope of
the expungement statute by its somewhat confusing discussion.
Our major concern was with the past offenders1 ability to
rehabilitate and assimilate back into society by providing
employment opportunities for them.

Using the Model Rules as a

reference, we wanted to remove the attendant disabilities
associated with a past conviction, to a certain extent.

While

we recognized the state's interest in providing security in
sensitive government positions, we felt that the decision to reopen sealed records should be made on the basis of what the
interest was that motivated the inquiry concerning the prior
expunged convictions.

DATED this

day of July, 1986.

#<^gag/^

Ronald M. Boyce
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

: ss.
)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before ne this 3o
July, 1986.

^

Residing at:

My Commission Expires:

day of

. ' j ^ ^ i ^ q /^•7shC74k+y*
<#-?<-£- y
Notary Public
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STATUTES

and an attempt to revive an act is invalid in the
absence of compliance with such requirements.64
Such provisions are not violated by statutes which
do not fall within the scope of the evil intended
to be prevented/5 and are not violated by a separate,
distinct, original, and complete legislative enactment,66 which does not revive, or attempt or purport
to revive, another act 67 It has been held that such
constitutional provisions apply only to express statutory revivals and not to revivals by operation of
law,66 or by implication only ;69 but other authorities
take the view that such a provision is effective to
prohibit the revival of a statute by the repeal of
a statute repealing it 7 0

§ 310.

82 C.J.S.
Effect

A statute revived by a subsequent act it revived In
that form and with that effect which It had when it
expired.

Where an act is revived by a subsequent act,
it is revived precisely in that form and with that
effect which it had at the time when it expired71
Where a statute, reviving a statute which has been
repealed, is itself repealed, the statute which was
revived stands as it did before the revival.71 The
effect of repeal of a proviso in a statute and the
enactment of a new proviso in a later statute is i
clear expression of a legislative intention that the
proviso in the later statute shall remain in force.73

IX. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION
A. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
1, IN GENERAL

§ 311. In General
The purpoee of all rules as to the construction of
statutes Is to discover the true intention of the law.
8uch rules are useful only In case of doubt, and are
never to be used to create doubt but only to remove It.

The purpose of all rules or maxims as to the
construction or interpretation of statutes is to discover the true intention of the law,74 and the rules
or canons of construction are merely aids for as-

proposed act—Ex parte Brck. 122 8.
W.2d 1174, 137 Tex.Cr. 67.
(3) Such provision is designed to
forbid the joining of diverse or unconnected subjects in one and the
same act.—state ex rel. Oklahoma
State Highway Commission v. Horn,
105 P.2d 234, 187 Okl. 605.
•5. Ark.—Hollia & Co. v. McCarroll.
(4) Purpoee of provision is to pre140 S.W.2d 420, 200 Ark. 623—Tay- vent blind legislation.-Hollis & Co.
lor v. J. A. Riggs Tractor Co., 122 v. McCarroll, 140 S.W.2d 420. 200 Ark.
8.W.24 608, 197 Ark. 383.
523.
Mo.—State ex rel. and to Use of
(5) Provision does not require that
Bair v. Producers Gravel Co., I l l
every act which amends the statu8.W.2d 621, 341 Mo. 1106.
Pa.—In re Kadley, 6 A.2d 874, 236 tory law shall set out at length the
entire law as amended, but was inPa, 100.
Tex.—Thompson v. United Gas Corp., tended to prohibit practice of amendCiv.App., 190 S.W.2d 604, error re- ing a statute by referring to its title,
fused—Teal v. State, Civ.App., 90 and by providing that it should be
amended by adding to or striking out
S.W.2d 651.
Va.—Town of Falls Church v. Ar- certain words, or by omitting certain
lington County Board, 184 S.E. 469, language and Inserting in lieu thereof
certain other words.—Ellison v. Tex166 Va. 192.
as Liquor Control Board, Tex.Civ.
Purpoee of provision
App., 154 &W.2d 322, error refused.
(1) Constitutional p r o h i b i t i o n
(6) Provision was not designed
against a statute being revived by
reference to its title only, and requir- to embarrass legislation or defeat
beneficial
purpose for which it was
ing that the statute revived be inserted at length, is Intended to pre- adopted.—Chumbley v. People's Bank
vent covert, JncautJoua, and fraudu- & Trust Co., 60 S.W.2d 164, 166 Tenn.
35.
lent legislation.
Ark.—Taylor v. J. A. Riggs Tractor 66. Ark.—arable r. Blackwood, 22
Co., 122 S.W.2d 608, 197 Ark. 383.
S.W.2d 41» 180 Ark. 311.
N.J.—Baldwin Lumber-Junction Mill- 59 C.J. p 943 note 25.
ing v. Moskowitx, 192 A. 229, 15 N.
Statute imposing death penalty for
J J i i s c 438.
robbery with dangerous weapon un(2) Purpose of provision is to give der certain conditions not only inaetioe to members of the legislature creased the penalty for robbery but
of the subject to be affected by the] also created a new and distinct crime
64. Tex.—Thomas v. Groebl, 212 8.
W.2d 626. 147 Tex. 70.
69 OJ. p 943 notes 19-21.
Bevival by reference
A repealed law cannot be revived
by reference.—Airey v. Tugwell, 2
8o.2d 99, 197 La. 982.
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of robbery with a dangerous weapon
and. therefore, it did not fall within
the constitutional prohibition against
reviving a statute by reference to
its title only.—Hall v. State, 148 So
793. 166 Miss. 331.
•7. La.—Campagna v. City of Baton
Rouge, 116 So. 403, 165 La. 974.
59 CJ. p 943 note 26.
bearing terms of original aot tatact
The constitutional provision does
not apply to statute repealing existing act or definite portion or section
thereof or to statute leaving term*
of original act intact and merely add
ing sections thereto or extending, re
stricting. or postponing its operation
—Thompson v. United Gas Corp., Tex
Civ.App., 190 S.W.2d 504. error re
fused.
68. Pa.—In re Hadley. 6 A i d 67*
336 Pa. 100.
59 C.J. p 943 note 23.
69. Ark.—Faucette v. Patterson, 21'
S.W. 300, 140 Ark. 628.
70. Kan.—Renter v. Bauer, 3 Ear
503.
Tex.—State Bank of Barksdale \
Cloudt, Civ.App., 268 S.W. 248.
72. U.S.—The Aurora, La., 7 Graac
882, 3 L.Ed. 878.
59 CJ. p 943 note 27.
72. Ind.—Calvert v. M a k e p e a c e
Smith 86.
73. Md.—Department of Tidewate
Fisheries v. Catlin, 77 A.2d 131.
74. U.S.—Utah Junk Co. v. Porte
fim.App^ 66 S.CL 889, 328 UJSL 3
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ccrtaining legislative intent.75 The rules of construction are neither ironclad76 nor inflexible,77 and
must yield to manifestations of a contrary in-

§311

tent 7 9 Such rules are useful only in cases, of
doubt;79 they are never to be used to create
doubt, but only to remove it 1 0

ft L.E& 1071—Lambur r. Yates, a Miss—Craig v. Walker, 2 So.2d 806,
191 Miss. 424.
C.A.MO., 148 F.2d 137.
Cal.—Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Mo.—Noberg v. Montgomery. 173 S.
Employment Commission, 109 P.2d ! W.2d 387. 361 Mo. 180.
935,17 Cal.2d S21.
i Nev.—Ronnow v. City of Las Vegas,
Del.—Potter v. Potter. I A.2d 93,
65 P.2d 133. 57 Nev. 332.
• W.W.Harr. 487.
N.M.—Janney v. Full roe, Ine* 144 P.
Fla.-American
Bakeries Co. v.
2d 145, 47 KM. 423.
Haines City. 180 So. 524, 131 Fla. N.Y.—People v. Koch, 294 N.Y.S. 987.
790—Corpus Juris quoted in State
250 App.Div. 623.
ex rel. Andrews v. Gray. 169 So. Or.—Hoi man Transfer Co. v. City of
SOI, 618, 125 Fla. 1—State ex rel.
Portland, 249 P.2d 176, rehearing
Landis v. De Witt a Jones. 147
denied 250 P.2d 929.
Pa.—Rich v. Meadville Park Theatre
So. S30, 108 Fla. 613.
Corp.. 62 A.2d 1, 360 Pa. 338.
Idaho.—Corpus Juris cited in Lebrecht v. Union Indemnity Co., 22 Ascertainment of legislative intent
P.2d 1066, 1069, 53 Idaho 228.
see infra § 322.
111.—Corpus Juris cited in Illinois "General guide1*
Cent R. Co. v. Franklin County,
•'General rules of statutory con56 N.E.2d 775. 781, 387 111. 301.
struction are at best but a very genKy.—Barnes v. Anderson Nat. Bank eral guide to be used in attempting
or Lawrenceburg, 169 S.W.2d 833, to ascertain that intent.**—Kenney v.
293 Ky. 592, 145 A.L.R. 1066.
Md.—Corpus Juris cited in. Powell v. Wolff. 227 P.2d 285. 290, 102 Cal.App.
State, 18 A.2d 587, 589, 175 Md. 2d 132.
"Proliferating a purpose*9
899.
Interpretation of a statute has been
Minn.—Arlandson v. Humphrey, 27 N.
said to be "the art of proliferating
W.ld 819, 224 Minn. 49.
Mo.—State ex rel. Crutcher v. Koeln, a purpose."—Universal Camera Corp.
v. N. L. R. B., 71 S.Ct 456. 465, 340
fl 8.W.2d 750. 332 Mo. 1229.
NT.—Higbee v. Schwartz, 56 N.Y.S. U.S. 474. 95 L.Ed. 456—Brooklyn
Xat. Corp. v. C. I. R.. C.C.A.2. 157
2d 160, 186 Misc. 28.
Pa.—Rich y. Meadville Park Theatre F.2d 450, 451, certiorari denied 67 S.
Ct 96. 329 U.S. 733. 91 L.Ed. 634.
Corp. 62 A,2d 1. 360 Pa. 338.
69 OJ. p 948 note 29—32 C.J. P 814 76. Minn.—Romanchuk v. Piotkin, 9
N.W.2d 421. 215 Minn. 156.
note 2—60 C.J. p 1038 note 89-p
1140 note 17.
77. Minn.—Romanchuk v, Piotkin.
supra—Board of Education of City
Purpose of statutory construction ist
of Duluth v. Borgen, 256 N.W. 894,
(1) To ascertain the sense of stat192 Minn. 367.
utory language and not to put sense
into i t
78. Minn.—Romanchuk • . Piotkin,
U.S.—& C. Schroeder Co. r. Clifton,
9 N.W.2d 421, 215 Minn. 156.
C.OA.Okl., 163 F.2d 385, certiorari
denied 66 S.Ct 1351 and 66 S.Ct. 79. U.S.—Helvering v. Northwestern Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Min1353, 828 U.S. 858, 90 L.Ed. 1629.
neapolis. C.C.A.8. 89 F.2d 553—In
rehearing denied 67 S.Ct. 33, 329
re Boggs-Rice Co., C.CA.Va., 66 F.
U.S. 821, 91 L.Ed. 699.
2d 855—U. S. v. McMenamin, D.C.
NT.—Meltxer v. Koenigsberg, 99 N.E.
Pa., 58 F.Supp. 478.
2d 679, 302 N.Y. 523.
Okl.—In re Assessment of Champlin Del.—Delaware Steeplechase & Race
Ass'n v. Wise, 27 A.2d 357. 2 Terry
Refining Co., 99 P.2d 880, 186 Okl.
687—Potter v. Potter, 2 A.2d 93,
626.
9 W.W.Harr. 487.
(2) To expound and not to im- Fla.—Corpus Juris quoted in State ex
prove the statute.—Gibbs v. State,
rel. Andrews v. Gray, 169 So. 501,
192 So. 514, 29 Ala.App. 113, certio518, 125 Fla. 1.
rari denied 192 So. 515, 238 Ala. 692. 111.—Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Franklin
County, 56 N.E.2d 775, 387 111. 301.
TS» U.S.—Poison Logging Co. v. U. Mo.—Zinn v. City of Steelvllle, 173
8L, C.C.A.Wash., 160 F.2d 712—U.
S.W.2d 398, 351 Mo. 413.
S. r, McMenamin. D.CPa* 68 F. 59 C.J. p 944 note 30.
Supp. 478.
"Xt is fundamental that the provlad.—State ex rel. Milligan v. R a ter's Estate, 48 N.E.2d 993. 221 ince of construction of statutes lies
wholly within the domain of ambigInd. 456.
Minn.—Arlandson v. Humphrey, 27 uity."—Santa Monica Mountain Park
N.W.24 819, 224 Minn. 49—Roman- Co. v. U. S.. CC.A.Cal.. 99 F.2d 460,
chuk v. Piotkin, 9 N.W.2d 421, 215 455, certiorari dismissed 69 S.Ct 647,
Minn. 166—Board of Education of 306 U.S. 666. 83 L.Ed. 1062.
"An ambiguous statute calls for
City of Duluth v. Borgen, 256 N.\Y\
894, 192 Minn. 367.
%very source of interpretative assist*
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ance."—Santa Monica Mountain Park
Co. v. U. S., supra.
Meanlsg of words
(1) A court will not refuse to con*
sider persuasive evidence of legislative intention on the ground that
reasonable men could not differ as to
the meaning of the words used la the
statute.—U. S. v. Dickerson. CtCl..
60 S.Ct 1034. S10 U.S. 654. 84 LEd.
1356, rehearing denied 61 S.Ct 63, 311
U.a 724, 85 L.Ed. 472.
(2) When aid to construction of
meaning of words is available, there
can be no rule of law which forbids
its use, however clear the words may
appear on superficial examination.—
U. S. v. American Trucking Ass'ns,
App.D.C, 60 S.Ct 1059, 310 U.S. 534.
84 L.Ed. 1345. rehearing denied 61
S.Ct. 53, 311 U.S. 724. 85 LJEBd. 472.
(3) Danger that courts' conclusion
concerning legislative purpose will be
unconsciously influenced by Judges*
own views or by factors not considered by enacting body does not justify
acceptance of literal interpretation
dogma which withholds from courts
available information for reaching
correct conclusion.—U. S. v. American Trucking Ass'ns, supra.
80. U.S.—U. S. v. Rice. Okl., 66 S.
C t 835. 327 U.S. 742. 90 L.Sd. 982—
Mead Corporation v, C L R., CC.
A.3. 116 F.2d 187—Santa Monica
Mountain Park Co. v. U. S., C.CA.
Cal.. 99 F.2d 450, certiorari dismissed 69 S.Ct 647, 206 U.S. 666,
63 LEd. 1062—Helvering v. Northwestern N a t Bank & Trust Co. of
Minneapolis, CCA.8. 89 F.2d 553—
In re Boggs-Rlce Co., CCA-Va., 66
F.2d 855.
Del.—Delaware Steeplechase & Race
Ass'n v. Wise. 27 A.2d 367, 2 Terry
587—Potter v. Potter. 2 A.2d 93. 9
W.W.Harr. 487.
D.C.—Potomac Electric Power Co. v.
Hazen. 90 F.2d 406. 67 App.D.C 161,
certiorari denied 58 S.Ct 11, 302 U.
a 692, 82 LEd. 635—Wilbur v. U.
8. ex rel. C L. Wold Co.. 30 F.2d
871, 58 App.D.C. 347.
Fla.—State ex rel. Bie v. Swope, 30
So.2d 748. 159 Fla. 18—Corpus Juris
quoted in State ex rel. Andrews v.
Gray. 169 So. 501. 518. 125 Fla. 1.
111.—Corpus Juris cited la Illinois
Cent R. Co, v. Franklin County,
56 N.E.2d 775. 781, 387 111. 301—
People's Gas Light & Coke Co. v.
Ames, 194 N.E. 260. 359 111. 152.
Mo.—Corpus Juris cited la State v.
Hallenberg-Wagner Motor Co., 108
S.W.2d 398. 400. 341 Mo. 771.
Okl.—Smith v. Langston, 230 P.2d
736, 204 Okl. 444.
Importing ambiguity
They cannot be employed for the
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Rules as to the construction of statutes cannot be
invoked to defeat or destroy natural justice or substantial equities,81 to impair an existing right,82
to work a fraud,83 or to leave a party without a
remedy.84 A rational, rather than an arbitrary, construction is to be accorded all statutes;85 they are
not to be £iven a tortuous or illogical construction,86 and the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any
curious, narrow, or hidden sense.87 Statutes should
be given a practical,88 and not a technical,89 conpurpose of importing: ambiguity into
language where no ambiguity exists.
—In wall v. Transpacific Lumber Co.,
108 P.2d 622, 165 Or. 660.
81. Fla.—Corpus Juris quoted in
State ex rel. Andrews v. Gray, 169
So. 501, 518, 125 Fla. 1.
Ind.—Crowe v. Board of ConYrs of
S t Joseph County, 3 N.E.2d 76,
210 Ind. 404.
Ohio.—State v. Stone, 110 N.E. 627,
92 Ohio S t 63.
Effect and consequences of statute as
element in determining intention
see infra I 22 6.
82. Cal.—In re Jacobs' Estate, 223 P.
2d 898, 100 Col.App.2d 452.
N.Y.—Federal Land Bank of Springfield V. Pickard, 9 N.Y.S.2d 636, 169
Misc. 753.
8.D.—Messersmith v. Stanga, 21 N.W.
2d 321, 71 S.D. 88.
Technicality in form should not be
used to avoid a substantive right—
Dillard v. Kern County, 144 P.2d 365,
23 Cal.2d 271, 150 A.L.R. 1048.
Xiegal or constitutional rights of accused
Statutes should be interpreted so as
not to sacrifice the legal or constitutional rights of accused.—U, S. v.
Oanaposkl, D.CPa., 72 F.Supp. 982.
83. Wis.—Jones v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co. of New York* 286
N.W. 698, 282 Wis. 102.
84. N.T.—Hay v. Town of Onondaga,
87 N.Y.S.2d 473, 194 Misc. 773.
86. Ark.—Corpus Juris quoted in
Ledbetter v. Hall, 87 S.W.2d 996,
998. 191 Ark. 791.
Fla.—Corpus Juris quoted in State ex
- rel. Andrews v. Gray, 169 So. 501,
518. 125 Fla. 1.
Mo.—State ex rel. Spriggs v. Robinson, 161 S.W. 1169, 253 Mo. 271.
86. N.Y.—Neddo v. State, 85 N.Y.S.
2d 64. 194 Misc. 379, affirmed 90 N.
Y.S.2d 650, 276 App.Div. 492. affirmed 91 N.Y.S.2d 515. 275 App.Div.
982, affirmed '29 N.E.2d 253, 300
N.Y. 583.
87. U.S.—Payne v. Ostrus, CCA.
. Iowa, 50 F.2d 1039, 77 A.L.R. 531
—Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co.,
C.C.A.8, 294 F. 190.
Xnd,—State v. Griffin, 79 N.E.2d 537,
826 Ind. 279, followed in State v.

82

C.J.*

struction. All statutes are to be construed as v
tending to favor the public interest.90 An intrica
and complicated statute should be construed wi:
caution,91 and nothing decided beyond what
necessary to a determination of the particul;
case.92 Generally a statute will not be construe
unless its proper construction is involved in tl
case.98
All the rules should be considered when it is nc
essary to construe a statute,94 and no particular ru

Harvey, 79 N.E.2d 544, 226 Ind. 292,
Commission. 168 S.W. 1156, 259 M
704.
and State v. Beavers, 79 N.E.2d
544. 226 Ind. 293.
83.
Tenn.—Saylor •. Trotter, 255
Mo.—Norberg v. Montgomery* 173 S.
W. 590, 257 S.W. 93, 148 Tenn. 35
W.2d 387. 351 Mo. 180.
59 CJ. p 944 note 35.
60 C.J. p 1038 note 96.
94. Ark.—Corpus Juris cited i
88. Cal.—California
Employment
Holt v. Howard, 175 S.W.2d 38
Stabilization Commission v. Mu385. 206 Ark. 337.
nicipal Court of City and County Tenn.—O. H. May Co. v. Anderso:
of San Francisco, 145 P.2d 361, 62
300 S.W. 12. 156 Tenn. 216.
Cal.App.2d 781.
Wash.—Corpus Juris quoted in In r
111.—People ex rel. Schaefer v. New
Horse Heaven Irr. Dist, 118 P. 2
York, C & S t L. R. Co., 187 N.E.
972, 976. 11 Wash.2d 218—Corpu
443, 353 111. 618.
Juris cited in. Procter & Gamb'
Ky.—Gillie v. Anderson, 76 S.W.2d
Co. v. King County, 115 P.2d 96
279, 256 Ky. 472.
966, 9 Wash.2d 655—Corpus Juri
quoted in State ex rel. Adjustmen
89. Cal.—California
Employment
Department of Olympia Credit Bu
Stabilization Commission v. Mureau v. Ayer, 114 P.2d 168, 9 Was)
nicipal Court of City and County
2d 188.
of San Francisco, 145 P.2d 361, 62
Boles
of evidence relating to bur
Cal.App.2d 781.
N.Y.—Astor v. Watson, 71 N.Y.S.2d den of proof are inapplicable to th
332. affirmed 75 N.Y.S.2d 291, 272 interpretation of statutes.—Wallin
App.Div. 1052. and 75 N.Y.S. 2d v. California Conserving Co., DX
Cal.. 74 F.Supp. 182. affirmed, CCA
296, 272 App.Div. 1052.
Okl.—Vandeventer v. State. 79 P.2d McComb v. Hunt Foods. 167 F.2<
1032. 64 Okl.Cr. 317, reheard 84 P. 905, certiorari denied 69 S.Ct 69, 33
2d 819. 65 Okl.Cr. 239—Staley v. U.S. 845, 93 L.Ed. 395.
State, 79 P.2d 818, 64 Okl.Cr. 302, Bules existing at time of enactmtn
Statute will be interpreted to ac
reheard 84 P.2d 813, 65 Okl.Cr. 227.
Where statute is susceptible of two cord as nearly as possible with rule
interpretations, particularly in re- existing at time of enactmentspect to directory or administrative Heaney v. Borough of Mauch Chunk
features, less technical construction 185 A. 732, 322 Pa. 487.
should be adopted to end of making • o t of oongress
it possible to obviate unnecessary
(1) The meaning to be ascribed tr
hardships.—In re Tartaglione, D.C.R. an act of congress can only be de
I., 8 F.Supp. 212.
rived from a considered weighing o*
every relevant aid to construction.80. Ind.—Miller v. Barton School Tp. U. S. v. Dickerson. CtCl.. 60 S.Ct
of Gibson County, 20 N.E.2d 967, 1034. 310 U.S. 564, 84 L.Ed. 1356, re215 Ind. 510.
Pa.—Commonwealth ex rel. Shuma- hearing denied 61 S.Ct 53, 311 U.S
ker v. New York & Pennsylvania 724. 86 L.Ed. 472—U. S. v. Tot D.C
N.J., 42 F.Supp. 252, affirmed, CCA
Co.. 79 A.2d 439, 367 Pa. 40.
S.D.—Messersmith v. Stanga, 21 N.W. 131 F.2d 261, reversed on other
grounds 63 S.Ct 1241, 319 U.S. 463
• 2d 321. 71 S.D. 88.
81. Mo.—State v. Public Service 87 L.Ed. 1519.
(2) The custom of resorting to
Commission, 168 S.W. 1156, 259 Mo.
state statutes and decisions to give
704.
An unscientific and bungling stat- meaning and content to federal statute cannot be construed and inter- utes is too old, and its use too dipreted by the same strict scientific versified, to permit the court to aa>
considerations of nation-wide
rules as a consistent and scientific that
uniformity must prevail in a particuone.—Reynolds v. Bingham, 86 N.E. lar case over the court's judgment
1131, 193 N.Y. 601—59 CJ. p 944 note that it is out of harmony with oth48.
er objectives more important to the
82. Mo.—State v. Public Service legislative purpose.—Davie* Ware*
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shall be approved by the Secretary of in the conditions out of which the said
Defense. The regulations prescribed by dispute arose.
the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant
DWICHTD. EBENHOWE*
to paragraph 1 hereof shall, so far as
THE
WHITE
HOUSE,
practicable, be uniform with the regulaApril 24,1953.
tions prescribed for the other armed
forces.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450
3. No person shall be entitled to more
than one award of the National Defense
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR
Service Medal
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT
4. The National Defense Service Medal
WHEREAS the Interests of the namay be awarded posthumously.
tional security require that all persons
DWIGHT D . ElSENHOWEE
privileged to be employed in the depart*
ments and agencies of the Government,
T m WHITE HOUSE.
shall be reliable, trustworthy, of good
April 22,1953.
conduct and character, and of complete
and unswerving loyalty to the United
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10449
States, and
WHEREAS the American tradition
CtiATXNG AN EMERGENCY BOARD TO INVESTIGATE A DISPUTE BETWEEN THE NEW that all persons should receive fair, impartial, and equitable treatment at the
YORK, CHICAGO k S T . LOUIS RAILROAD COMPANY AND CERTAIN OP ITS hands of the Government requires that
all persons seeking the privilege of emEMPLOYEES
ployment or privileged to be employed in
WHEREAS a dispute exists between the departments and agencies of the
the New York, Chicago k St. Louis Rail- Government be adjudged by mutually
road Company, a carrier, and certain of consistent and no less than minimum
its employees represented by the Broth- standards and procedures among the
erhood of Railroad Trainmen, a labor departments and agencies governing the
organization; and
employment and retention in employWHEREAS this dispute has not here- ment of persons in the Federal service:
tofore been adjusted under the provisions
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the
of the Railway Labor Act, as amended; authority vested in me by the Constituand
tion and statutes of the United States,
WHEREAS this dispute, in the judg- including section 1753 of the Revised
ment of the National Mediation Board, Statutes of the United States (5 U. 8. C.
threatens substantially to interrupt in- 631); the Civil Service Act of 1883 (22
terstate commerce to a degree such as Stat 403; 5 U. S C 632, et $eq.); section
to deprive a section of the country of 9A of the act of August 2, 1939, 63 S t a t
essential transportation service:
1148 (5 U. S C. 118 j ) ; and the act of
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the August 26. 1950, 64 Stat 476 (5 U. a C.
authority vested in me by section 10 of 22-1, et tea.), and as President of the
the Railway Labor Act, as amended (45 United States, and deeming such action
U. S. C. 160), I hereby create a board of necessary in the best Interests of the
three members, to be appointed by me, national security, it is hereby ordered as
* *"
to investigate the said dispute. No follows:
member of the said board shall be
SECTION 1 In addition to the departpecuniarily or otherwise interested in ments and agencies specified in the said
any organization of employees or any act of August 26, 1950, and Executive
carrier.
Order No 10237' of April 26, 1951. the
The board shall report its findings to provisions of that act shall apply to all
the President with respect to the said other departments and agencies of the
dispute within thirty days from the date Government.
of this order.
SEC. 2. The head of each department
As provided by section 10 of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, from this and agency of the Government shall be
date and for thirty days after the board responsible for establishing and mainhas made its report to the President, no taining within his department or agency
change, except by agreement, shall be an effective program to insure that the
made by the New York, Chicago k St.
Louis Railroad Company or its employees
»8 CFR, 1951 Supp.. p. 4SO.
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employment and retention in employment of any civilian officer or employee
within the department or agency is
clearly consistent with the interests of
the national security.
BEC. 3. (a) The appointment of each
civilian officer or employee in any department or agency of the Government shall
be made subject to investigation. The
scope of the investigation shall be determined in the first instance according to
the degree of adverse effect the occupant
of the position sought to be filled could
bring about, by virtue of the nature of
the position, on the national security, but
in no event shall the investigation include less than a national agency check
(including a check of thefingerprintfiles
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation),
and written inquiries to appropriate local law-enforcement agencies, former
employers and supervisors, references,
and schools attended by the person under
investigation: Provided, that upon request of the head of the department or
agency concerned, the Civil Service Commission may, in its discretion, authorize
such less investigation as iftay meet the
requirements of the national security
with respect to per-diem, intermittent,
temporary, or seasonal employees, or
aliens employed outside the United
States. Should there develop at any
stage of investigation information indicating that the employment of any such
person may not be clearly consistent with
the interests of the national security,
there shall be conducted with respect to
such person a full field investigation, or
such less investigation as shall be sufficient to enable the head of the department or agency concerned to determine
whether retention of such person is
dearly consistent with the interests of
the national security.
(b) The head of any department or
agency shall designate, or cause to be
designated, any position within his department or agency the occupant of
which could bring about, by virtue of
the nature of the position, a material
adverse effect on the national security
as a sensitive position. Any position so
designated shall be filled or occupied
only by a person with respect to whom a
full field investigation has been conducted: Provided, that a person occupying a sensitive position at the time it is
designated as such may continue to occupy such position pending the completion of a full field investigation, subject
to the other provisions of this order:

L 0.10450

And provided further, that in case of
emergency a sensitive position may be
filled for a limited period by a person
with respect to whom a full field r e appointment investigation has not been
completed if the head of the department
or agency concerned finds that such action is necessary in the national interest, which finding shall be made a
part of the records of such department
or agency.
Sic. 4. The head of each department
and agency shall review, or cause to be
reviewed, the cases of all civilian officers
and employees with respect to whom
there has been conducted a full field investigation under Executive Order No.
8835' of March 21,1947, and, after such
further investigation as may be appropriate, shall re-adjudicate, or cause to
be re-adjudicated, in accordance with
the said act of August 26, 1950, such of
those cases as have not been adjudicated
under a security standard commensurate
with that established under this order.
SEC. 5. Whenever there is developed or
received by any department or agency
information indicating that the retention in employment of any officer or employee of the Government toay not be
clearly consistent with the interests of
the national security, such information
shall be forwarded to the head of the
employing department or agency or his
representative, who, after such investigation as may be appropriate, shall review, or cause to be reviewed, and. where
necessary, re-adjudicate, or cause to be
re-adjudic%ted, in accordance with the
raid act of August 26, 1950, the case of
such officer or employee.
Sic. 6. Should there develop at any
stage of investigation information indicating that the employment of any officer or employee of the Government
may not be clearly consistent with the
interests of the national security, the
head of the department or agency concerned or his representative shall immediately suspend the employment of
the person involved if he deems such
suspension necessary in the interests of
the national security and, following such
investigation and review as he deems
necessary, the bead of the department
or agency concerned shall terminate
the employment of such suspended officer or employee whenever he shall determine such termination necessary or
•S OFR. 1947 Supp.
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advisable in the interests of the national
security, in accordance with the said act
of August 26.1950.
SEC. 7. Any person whose employment is suspended or terminated under
the authority granted to heads of departments and agencies by or in accordance with the said act of August 26,1950,
or pursuant to the said Executive Order
No. 9835 or any other security or loyalty
program relating to officers or employees of the Government, shall not be
reinstated or restored to duty or reenw
ployed In the same department or
agency and shall not be reemployed in
any other department or agency, unless
the head of the department or agency
concerned finds that such reinstatement,
restoration, or reemployment is clearly
consistent with the interests of the
national security, which finding shall be
made a part of the records of such department or agency: Provided, that no
person whose employment has been terminated under such authority thereafter may be employed by any other
department or agency except after a
determination by the Civil Service Commission that such person is eligible for
such employment
Sic. 8. (a) The investigations conducted pursuant to this order shall be
designed to develop information as to
whether the employment or retention in
employment in the Federal service of the
person being investigated is clearly consistent with the interests of the national
security. Such information shall relate,
but shall not be limited, to the following:
(1) Depending on the relation of the
Government employment to the national
security:
(i) Any behavior, activities, or associations which tend to show that the
individual is not reliable or trustworthy.
(ii) Any deliberate misrepresentations, falsifications, or omissions of
material facts.
(iii) Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful
conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to
excess, drug addiction, sexual perversion,
or financial irresponsibility.
(iv) An adjudication of insanity, or
treatment for serious mental or neurological disorder without satisfactory
evidence of cure.
(v) Any facts which furnish reason to
believe that the individual may be subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure
Page938

which may cause him to act contrary to
the best interests of the national
security.
(2) Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition, or
attempts thereat or preparation therefor, or conspiring with, or aiding or
abetting, another to commit or attempt
to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition.
(3) Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy,
traitor, seditionist, anarchist, or revolutionist, or with an espionage or other
secret agent or representative of a foreign nation, or any representative of a
foreign nation whose interests may be
inimical to the interests of the United
States, or with any person who advocates
the use of force or violence to overthrow
the government of the United States or
the alteration of the form of government
of the United States by unconstitutional
means.
(4) Advocacy of use of force or violence to overthrow the government of
the United States, or of the alteration of
the form of government of the United
States by unconstitutional means.
(5) Membership in. or affiliation or
sympathetic association with, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination
of persons which is totalitarian. Fascist,
Communist, or subversive, or which has
adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating
or approving the commission of acts of
force or violence to deny other persons
their rights under the Constitution of
the United States, or which seeks to alter
the form of government of the United
States by unconstitutional means.
(6) Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person of security information, or of other information disclosure
of which is prohibited by law. or willful
violation or disregard of security regulations.
(7) Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so
as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests
of the United States.
(b) The investigation of persons entering or employed in the competitive
service shall primarily be the responsibility of the Civil Service Commission,
except in cases in which the head of a
department or agency assumes that responsibility pursuant to law or by agreement with the Commission. The Com-
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mission shall furnish a full Investigative
report to the department or agency concerned.
(c) The Investigation of persons (including consultants, however employed),
entering employment of, or employed by,
the Government other than in the competitive service shall primarily be the
responsibility of the employing department or agency. Departments and
agencies without investigative facilities
may use the investigative facilities of the
Civil Service Commission, and other departments and agencies may use such
facilities under agreement with the Commission.
id) There shall be referred promptly
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
all investigations being conducted by any
other agencies which develop information indicating that an individual may
have been subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure to act contrary to the
Interests of the national security, or information relating to any of the matters
described in subdivisions (2) through (7)
of subsection (a) of this section. In
eases so referred to it, the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make a full
field investigation.
8cc. 9. (a) There shall be established
and maintained in the Civil Service Commission a security-investigations index
covering all persons as to whom security
investigations have been conducted by
any department or agency of the Government under this order. The central
index established and maintained by
the Commission under Executive Order
No. 9835 of March 21,1947, shall be made
a part of the security-investigations index. The security-investigations index
shall contain the name of each person
investigated, adequate identifying information concerning each such person, and
a reference to each department and
agency which has conducted an investigation concerning the person involved
or has suspended or terminated the employment of such person under the authority granted to heads of departments
and agencies by or in accordance with
the said act of August 26,1950.
(b) The heads of all departments and
agencies shall furnish promptly to the
Civil 8ervicc Commission Information
appropriate for the establishment and
maintenance of the security-investigations index.
(c) The reports and other investigative material and information developed
.4W41 O - M - i *
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by investigations conducted pursuant
to any statute, order, or program described in section 7 of this order shall
remain the property of the investigative
agencies conducting the investigations,
but may, subject to considerations of the
national security, be retained by the department or agency concerned. 8uch
reports and other investigative material
and information shall be maintained in
confidence, and no access shall be given
thereto except, with the consent of the
investigative agency concerned, to other
departments and agencies conducting
security programs under the authority
granted by or in accordance with the said
act of August 26,1950, as may be required
for the efficient conduct of Government
business.
SEC. 10. Nothing in this order shall
be construed as eliminating or modifying
in any way the requirement for any investigation or any determination as to
security which may be required by law.
SEC. 11. On and after the effective date
of this order the Loyalty Review Board
established by Executive Order No. 9835
of March 21, 1947, shall not accept
agency findings for review, upon appeal
or otherwise. Appeals pending before
the Loyalty Review Board on such date
shall be heard to final determination in
accordance with the provisions of the
said Executive Order No. 9835. as
amended. Agency determinations favorable to the officer or employee concerned
pending before the Loyalty Review Board
on such date shall be acted upon by such
Board, and whenever the Board is not
in agreement with such favorable determination the case shall be remanded to
the department or agency concerned for
determination in accordance with the
standards and procedures established
pursuant to this order. Cases pending
before the regional loyalty boards of the
Civil Service Commission on which hearings have not been initiated on such date
shall be referred to the department or
agency concerned. Cases being heard
by regional loyalty boards on such date
shall be heard to conclusion, and the
determination of the board shall be
forwarded to the head of the department or agency concerned: Provided,
that if no specific department or agency
is involved, the case shall be dismissed
without prejudice to the applicant Investigations pending In the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Civil Service
P*it939
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Commission on such date shall be completed, and the reports thereon shall be
made to the appropriate department or
agency.
SEC. 12. Executive Order No. 9835 of
March 21, 1947, as amended, is hereby
revoked. For the purposes described in
section 11 hereof the Loyalty Review
Board and the regional loyalty boards of
the Civil Service Commission shall continue to exist and function for a period
of one hundred and twenty days from
the effective date of this order, and the
Department of Justice shall continue to
furnish the information described in
paragraph 3 of Part m of the said Executive Order No. 9835, but directly to the
head of each department and agency.
SEC. 13. The Attorney General Is requested to render to the heads of departments and agencies such advice as may
be requisite to enable them to establish
and maintain an appropriate employeesecurity program.
SEC. 14. (a) The Civil Service Commission, with the continuing advice and
collaboration of representatives of such
departments and agencies as the National Security Council may designate,
shall make a continuing study of the
manner in which this order is being implemented by the departments and
agencies of the Government for the purpose of determining:
(1) Deficiencies in the department and
agency security programs established
under this order which are inconsistent
with the interests of, or directly or indirectly weaken, the national security.
(2) Tendencies in such programs to
deny to individual employees fair, impartial, and equitable treatment at the
hands of the Government, or rights under the Constitution and laws of the
United States or this order.
Information affecting any department
or agency developed or received during
the course of such continuing study
shall be furnished immediately to the
head of the department or agency concerned. The Civil Service Commission
shall report to the National Security
Council, at least semiannually, on the
results of such study, and shall recommend means to correct any such deficiencies or tendencies.
(b) All departments and agencies of
the Government are directed to cooperate with the Civil Service Commission
to facilitate the accomplishment of the
Page 940

responsibilities assigned to it by subsection (a) of this section.
S E C 15. This order shall become effective thirty days after the date hereof.
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
THE WHITE HOUSE,

April 27, 1953.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10451
INSPECTION OF CERTAIN RETURNS BY THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE or
REPRESENTATIVES

By virtue of the authority vested in me
by sections 55 (a), 508, 603, 729 (a), and
1204 of the Internal Revenue Code (53
Stat. 29, 111, 171, 54 Stat. 989, 1008, 55
Stat. 722; 26 U. S. C. 55 (a), 508. 603,
729 (a), and 1204), it is hereby ordered
that until June 30, 1953, any income,
excess-profits, declared value excessprofits, capital stock, estate, or gift tax
return for any period to and including
1952 shall be open to inspection by the
Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, or any duly authorized
subcommittee thereof, in connection
with the inquiry authorized by the resolution of the Committee adopted Januuary 27, 1953, with reference to the
administration of the Department of
Justice and the Office of the Attorney
General of the United States, subject to
the conditions stated in the Treasury
decision 1 relating to the inspection of
such returns by that Committee, approved by me this date.
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
THE WHITE HOUSE,

AprU 28,1953.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10452
PROVIDING FOR THE PERFORMANCE BY THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF CERTAIN FUNCTIONS RELATING TO PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

By virtue of the authority vested in
me by the laws of the United States, including section 1753 of the Revised Statutes (5 U. S. C. 631) and the Civil
Service Act of January 16,1883 (22 Stat
403), and as President of the United
States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
SECTION

1. The

Chairman of

the

United States Civil Service Commission
shall, in addition to the functions conferred upon him by statute and by
'26 CFE, Part 458.

THE EXPUNGEMENT OF ADJUDICATION RECORDS
OF JUVENJLE AND ADULT OFFENDERS:
A PROBLEM OF STATUS*
AIDAN R. SOUGH**
Over the past half-century, American correctional law has focused increasingly on the rehabilitation of the individual offender and the development of means and practices appropriate to that end.1 Realistic appraisal
compels the conclusion that the system of penal law must fulfill a complex
of functions pointed toward a single ultimate goal: the ordering of society
in such a manner that each member has the fullest opportunity to realize
his human dignity through community life.1 The law must at once serve
the reconstruction of the offender, the incapacitation of the intractable
criminal, the deterrence of others from criminal conduct, and the exaction
of retribution and expiation for the offense.8 (Though often decried in
theory and rather less often disavowed in practice, the punitive aspects of
correctional policy remain an obvious reality.)4 If the offender reoffends,
none of the purposes is served.
It is clear that any program for reform must create the institutions
necessary for its realization, and that the sanctions it imposes must be
functionally apposite to the end it seeks.5 There has been surprisingly little
#
The author is indebted to Professor Lloyd L. Weinreb of the Harvard Law School
for his helpful commentary on this article.
##
Associate Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara.
1. For a critical appraisal see Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 226 (1959-60).
2. Snee, Leviathan at the Bar of Justice, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW 96 (Sutherland ed. 1956). See also Laswell & Donnelly, The Continuing Debate Over Responsibility: An Introduction to Isolating the Condemnation Sanction, 68 YALE L.J. 869, 876
(1959).

S. TAP PAN, CONTEMPORARY CORRECTION 4-13 (1951).

4. The imposition of punishment by the state is frequently justified as the political
counterpart of individual vengeance. Sir James Stephen is quoted as remarking that
"criminal procedure is to resentment what marriage is to affection: namely, the legal
provision for an inevitable impulse of human beings." SUTHERLAND & CRESS EY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 287 (5th ed. 1955); see BLOCK & GEIS, MAN, CRIME, AND

SOCIETY 568-71 (1962).
For an articulation of unconscious motivations operative in our treatment of lawbreakers see Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"—Why Not?, 72 YALE L.
J. 854, 856 n.ll (1963).
5. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 166 (1964).
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recognition of the fact that our system of penal law is largely flawed in
one of its most basic aspects: it fails to provide accessible or effective meant
of fully restoring the social status of the reformed offender. We sentence,
we coerce, wc incarcerate, we counsel, we grant probation and parole,
and wc treat—not infrcquentiy with success—but wc never forgive.* The
late Paul Tappan has observed that when the juvenile or adult offender
has "paid his debt to society," he "neither receives a receipt nor is free of
his account"* His status is that of "ex-offender"—an anomalous position
lying somewhere between the poles of social acceptance and social condemnation, though obviously closer to the latter. There is considerable
evidence to indicate that the failure of the criminal law to clarify the
status of the reformed offender impedes the objective of reintegrating him
with the society from which he has become estranged.* The more heavily
he bears the mark of his former offense, the more likely he is to reoffend
Despite relatively widespread judicial recognition of the perdurabifitjr
and disabling effects of a criminal record,9 scant attention has been given
by lawmakers and behavioral scientists to means whereby the law might in
a proper case relieve the first offender or juvenile miscreant from this
handicap. In recent years, a handful of jurisdictions have enacted legislation allowing the expungement of an adjudication record of a juvenile or
a conviction record of an adult first offender. This paper will attempt to
6. RUBIN, WEIHOFEN, EDWARDS ft ROSENZWEIO, T H E LAW OP CRIMINAL COR-

RECTION 694 (1963) [hereinafter cited as RUBIN et al.].
7. Tappan, Loss and Restoration of the Civil Rights of Offenders, in NATIONAL
PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION 1952 YEARBOOK 86, 87.

Professors Schwartz and Skolnkk have shown that conviction works a degradation
ot status which "continues to operate after the time when, according to the generalised
theory of justice underlying punishment in our society, the individual's *debt' has been
paid." Schwartz ft Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 133,
136 (1962). Aaron Nussbaum, Assistant District Attorney of Kings County (New
York), has written that Ma theory of law which withholds the finality of forgiveness after
punishment is ended is as indefensible in logic as it is on moral grounds." NUSSBAUM,
FDIST OFFENDERS, A SECOND CHANCE 24 (1956).

8. Goldstein, Polite Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Vis&ititf
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
9. E.g., United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1»5);
cf. Parker v. Ellis, 362 VS. 574, 593-94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); United
States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954) (Minton, J., dissenting).
Of course the record of a conviction for a serious crime is often a lifelong handicap.
There are a dozen ways in which even a person who has reformed, never offended again, and constantly endeavored to lead an upright life may be prejudiced
thereby. The stain on his reputation may at any tune threaten his social standing
or affect his job opportunities . . . . Id. at 519.
On the effect of juvenile court adjudication see In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787,
789-90, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952); Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 341-42,
38 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1946).
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sorvey the need for such legislation, to examine existing and proposed
statutes on both adult and juvenile court levels, and to make some evaluation of their effectiveness. It is the writer's view that providing institutional
means of restoring status after reformation is an appropriate way to harmonize "the sanctioning activities of the democratic body politic with the
ultimate value—human dignity."10
At the outset, it is necessary to limn with some particularity what expungement is and what it is not. By an expungement statute is meant a
legislative provision for the eradication of a record of conviction or adjudication upon fulfillment of prescribed conditions, usually the successful
discharge of the offender from probation and the passage of a period oi
time without further offense. It is not simply a lifting of disabilities attendant upon conviction and a restoration of civil rights, though this is a
significant part of its effect.11 It is rather a redefinition of status, a process
of erasing the legal event of conviction or adjudication, and thereby restoring to the regenerate offender his status quo ante.
The systematic study of expungement acts is hindered by the extreme
lack of uniform terminology, even within a single jurisdiction. The functional process of deleting the adjudication of guilt upon proof of reformation
b variously designated expungement;" record sealing;" record destruction;14 obliteration;15 setting aside of conviction;1* annulment of convic10. Laswcll & Donnelly, supra note 2, at 876.
"~
11. Civil right* lost on conviction are usually regained, if at all, by pardon or by
statutes providing automatic restoration upon completion of sentence. Extensive
analysis of these restorative mechanisms will be found in RUBIN et al. 613, 632; RUBIN,
CWME & JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 152 (2d ed. 1961); Tappan, supra note 7, at 96-104.
For a thorough discussion of the particular disabilities attendant upon conviction
tee Green, Post-Conviction Disabilities Imposed or Authorized by Law, 1960 (unpubfished honor paper on file in Harvard Law Library).
12. CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE | 781; UTAH CODE ANN. f 55-10-117 (Supp.

1965).
13. CAL. PEN. CODE | 1203.45; CAL. WELFARE ft INST'NS CODE | 781. Technically,

expungement imports physical destruction of the records rather than sealing. Andrews
v. Police Court, 123 P.2d 128 (Cal. App. 1942), affd, 21 Cal. 2d 479, 133 P.2d 398
(1943); 40 CAL. OPS. ATT'Y. GEN. 50 (1962). As used in this paper, the term expungement includes both destruction and sealing unless otherwise specified.
14. IND. ANN. STAT. | 9-3215a (1956).
15. Ibid.
16. MICH. STAT. ANN. i f 28.1274(101), (102) (Supp. 1965). Statutes permitting
&e setting aside of convictions are not true expungement acts, and have much more
Waited effect than the latter. See text accompanying notes 30-34 infra. The Michigan
enactment would appear to be of the tormer type, save for the provision of f 28.1274
(102) that upon entry of an order setting aside a conviction, the person "for purposes
°» the law** shall be deemed not to have suffered any previous conviction. Because of
"> uncertain scope and the possibility that the broad language may reach the status of
" • conviction, it is included here as an expungement act, albeit a deficient one.
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tion;" amnesty;19 nullification of conviction, purging, and pardon extta.
ordinary.1* Because many of these terms have wider use in other legal
contexts, it is suggested that the term expungement be adopted to avoid
confusion.
In particular, the usual denotations of amnesty and pardon must be
distinguished from expungement The former are exceptional and specific
acts of grace, usually granted by executive power, rather than processes of
regular and widespread application available through legislative provision.*
Despite confusion engendered by murky decisional language, it seems dear
—and has been widely held—that a pardon remits punishment and itmoves some disabilities, but does not erase the legal event determinative of
the offender's status qua offender, i.e., the conviction itself." It is the statu
resulting from the adjudication of guilt, more than any punishment imposed,
which is characteristic of conviction; if the disabilities of conviction are
to be removed effectively and the reformed offender restored to society, the
remedy chosen must reach the genesis of the status."
*

mspenston of political and civil rights upon conviction of a certain class
of crimes, usually felonies. These explicit disabilities include the loss of
the right to hold any public office or trust, to serve as a juryman, and to
practice various occupations and professions.** In at least forty-six states,
conviction of crime may serve as a ground for divorce.*4 Many of these
disabilities persist beyond the termination of sentence.
Every state and the federal system has some means of restoring civil and
political rights.** Usually this takes the form of a pardon granted at the discretion of the governor or the board of pardons appointed by him.** In
tome states, the courts are empowered to restore civil rights.*7 A number
of states provide for the automatic restoration of civil rights either upon
completion of a term of probation or parole or upon termination of a prison
sentence.** Both pardon and automatic restoration revive the more formal
dvfl rights, but they are unable to remove the stigmatic disabilities attaching in such crucial social areas as employment.**
Some nine states have statutes providing that upon satisfactory completion of probation and "evidence of reformation," the offender may
petition the court to have his conviction and the plea or verdict of guilty
**set aside"; he is thenceforth released from all "penalties and disabilities"
attendant upon the conviction.*0 The Federal Youth Offender Act contains

I. A N EXAMINATION OF NEED

The consequences of conviction are wide in form, some authorized expressly or implicitly by law, others attached by subtle attitudes of community rejection. Commonly, the law provides for the deprivation or
17. National Council on Crime ft Delinquency, Annulment of a Conviction of
Crime; A Model Act, 8 CRIME ft DELINQUENCY 97 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
N.C.C.D. MODEL ACT].

18. State of N.V. Ass> Bill, InL No. 233 (3d Rdg. 547, Print 5363, Rec 703)
(1965).
19. MINN. STAT. ANN. ftj 242.31, 638.02 (Supp. 1965).
20. KORN ft MoCoRKLS, CKXMINOLOOY ft PENOLOOY 600-04 (1959); SUTHERLAND

ft CHESSEY, op. tit. supra note 4, at 544-49.
21. Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51 (1914) (state mar charge at prior crinse
offense pardoned by President); People v. Bigy*, 9 Cal. 2d 508, 71 P.2d 214 (1937)
(offense in sister state deemed prior conviction despite pardon); In re Lavine, 2 Cal
2d 324, 329, 41 P.2d 161, 163 (1935) (pardon "implies guilt, and does not wash «*
the moral stain** or restore the offender's character); People ex rel. Jobissy v. Murpfcy.
224 App. Div. 834, 279 N.Y. Supp. 762 (1935); State v. Edelstein, 146 Wash. 221,
62 Pac 622 (1927). See also Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915). For
language to the contrary aee Ex parts Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380-81 (1867).
On the general history and scope of executive clemency aee Weihofen, Effect of *
Pardon, 88 U. PA. L. RET. 177 (1939); Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out GuiUh &
HAKV. L. REV. 647 (1915). For a discussion of pardon in its modern context aee
Lavinslcy, Executive Clemency: Study of a Decisional Problem Arising in the Term***
Stages of the Criminal Process, 42 CHL-KENT L. REV. 13 (1965).
22. RUBIN et aL 690. One who has received a pardon must nevertheless disclose ft*
conviction upon inquiry. 1953 N.J. Or a. ATT*Y GEN. 206.
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23. RUBIN et al. 611-32; Tappan, supra note 7.
24. A tabulation of states which regard conviction as a ground for divorce is contained in Green, op. cit. supra note 11, at 64-66. See also RUBIN et aL 614-15.
25. RUBIN et al. 632-37; Green, op. cit. supra note 11, at 75-77.
26. There is wide variation in practices from state to state. For example, Rhode
bland reserves the restoration of dvil rights apart from a grant of pardon to the
legislature, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. f 13-6-2 (1956), and Mississippi permits it alternatively to the governor or legislature, Miaa. CONST, art. 5, | 124; art. 13, | 253 (restc»«km of suffrage by legislature only); cf. Miaa. CODE ANN. | 4004-27 (1956) (governor
may restore civil rights on completion of probation).
27. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. SI 13*1 *> -*° (1953); TBNN. CODE ANN. If 16-504,

*0-*701 (1955).
28. See the tabulation and discussion in RUBIN et al. 633-34. The archetypal automatic restoration statute appears to be 9 Geo. 4, c 32, f 3 (1828), which provides that
"BBpfetion of sentence in case of a felony conviction shall have the same effect as a
Pardon **... to prevent all doubts respecting the Civil Rights of Persons convicted. . . .**
29. See authorities cited note 23 supra.
W. CAL. PEN. CODE i f 1203.4, 1203.4a; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, | 4332(i) (1953);
&**<> CODE ANN. | 19-2604 (Supp. 1965); NEV. REV. STAT. | 176.340 (1959); NJ>.
Cwr. CODE I 12-53-18 (1960); TEX. CODE Cam. Pmoc ANN. arts. 42.12 | 7, .13 | 7
(1965); UTAH CODE ANN. | 77-35-17 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. f 9.93.240

(1961); Wvo. STAT. ANN. | 7-315 (1957) (statute uses term "parole," but seemingly
tfers to probation or "court parole** only). For an invidious use of the Utah statute
** State v. Schreiber, 121 Utah 653, 245 P.2d 222 (1952), where the conviction had
bee 1
* vacated on the condition that defendant '•permanently leave the state on account
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essentially similar provisions applicable to youth offenders; however, under
the federal statute, the issuance of an order setting aside the conviction a
automatic upon the unconditional discharge of the offender before the
expiration of his sentence.*1 The effects of such statutes are not entirely
clear, and they have been subjected to interpretations quite at variance
with the post-conviction relief they purport to provide." Though the
scope of alleviation provided by them is said to be broader than that
provided by pardon," they are clearly not statutes of expungement and
do not in fact restore the offender's former status among his fellow men,
despite some judicial language to that effect.*4
of his ill health." MODEL PENAL CODE | 306.6(2) (Prop. Official Draft, 1962) penssts
discretionary vacation of conviction if the offender is discharged from probation «r
parole before expiration of the maximum term, or if he has led a law-abiding life for five
years after expiration of sentence.
CAL. WELFAAE ft INST'NS CODE SI 1179, 1772 provide that a person honorably aV
charged from the control of the Youth Authority shall be released from all penalties
and disabilities resulting from the offense. Section 1179 operates automatically, whit
| 1772 requires the discharged offender to petition the court for relief, which may be
denied. The apparent overlap of the two sections is not clarified by the statutory language, but it is the interpretation of the Youth Authority that § 1179 applies only t»
juvenile court commitments and { 1772 only to commitments from criminal coats.
Baura, Wiping Out m Criminal or JuveniU Record, 40 CAL. S.B.J. 816, 821 (1965).
MODEL PENAL CODE | 6.05(3) allows vacation of the conviction of a young adoh
offender as an alternative to providing that his conviction shall not constitute a disability.
31. 18 U.S.C. { 5021 (1964).
32. For example, note the interpretation of CAL. PEN. CODE | 1203.4 in GardsGonzales v. Immigration ft Naturalization Service, 344 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.), cert, denied,
382 U.S. 840 (1965). Despite the language of the statute that the setting aside of the
guilty plea and the dismissal of the information *'shall . . . [release the petitioner] frost
all penalties and disabilities . . .," the court ruled that the conviction was not expunged
for purposes of 8 U.S.C. { 1251 (1964), authorizing deportation of an alien convicted of
a narcotics offense. 18 U.S.C. | 5021 (1964) was similarly treated in Hernande*
Valensuela v. Rosenberg, 304 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962). See Adams v. United States,
299 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1962) (discusses CAL. WELFARE ft INST'NS CODE | 1772).

33. 18 U.S.C. | 5021 (1964) acts to "expunge the conviction" while pardon «•&
removes disabilities and restores civil rights. Tatum v. United States, 310 F.2d 8MV
856 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Bui see 1957 N.J. OPS. ATTV GEN. 143 (expungement of
record has less effect than a pardon).
34. If the conditions of probation are fulfilled, the plea or verdict of guilty msy
be changed . . . [and] the proceedings expunged from the record. . . . He has then
. . . received a statutory rehabilitation and a reinstatement to his former status in
society insofar as the state by legislation is able to do so. . . . Stephens v. Toomey,
51 Cal. 2d 864, 870-71, 338 P.2d 182, 185 (1959) (dictum).
Contra, In the Matter of Phillips, 17 Cal. 2d 55, 61, 109 P.2d 344, 348 (19*D[I]t cannot be assumed that the legislature intended that such action by the trial
court under [Penal Code] section 1203.4 should be considered as obliterating the
fact that the defendant had been finally adjudged guilty of a crime.
The Phillips case involved a lawyer disbarred upon conviction of a misdemeanor «•*
volving moral turpitude; the court held that relief under CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.4 dm
not work reinstatement. It is not entirely dear whether the decision turned upoa • •

It is not the explicitly articulated disabilities which are most troublejone to the reformed offender. It is rather the less-direct economic and
social reprisals engendered by his brand as an adjudicated criminal. T h c
vagaries of public sentiment often discriminate against persons with a criminal past, with very little regard for the severity of the offense, and they
do not frequendy distinguish between persons arrested and acquitted or
otherwise released and persons convicted." This is particularly true in
the vital matter of employment, which perhaps as much as anything eke
influences a man's concept of himself and his worth, and accordingly influences the values which guide his conduct.
A recent study found that only eleven per cent of employers who were
seeking to hire were willing to consider a man convicted of assault** Only
one-third would consider a man who had been charged with the same
crime and acquitted. Despite the small sample used (25 employer* of
whom 9 had need of employees), the crippling effects of the stigma ensuing
from criminal adjudication are immediately apparent.
Not only will the offender have trouble finding unskilled employment,
bat his difficulty will increase directly with the skill level of the job sought
!Jnastudy of the employment experiences of 258 men with criminal records
Boa-obliteration of thc judgment or upon the fact that the court viewed disbarment as
outside the "penalties and disabilities* clause of the statute. MODEL PENAL COO» J 3 ^ $
(Prop. Official Draft, 1962) provides that the order vacating the conviction *,,»% no V
inter alia, preclude proof of conviction whenever relevant to the exercise of official
discretion, nor does it justify a defendant in denying conviction unless ht *\%,t ^ j ,
attention to the order.
35. Cf. RUBIN et of. at 630-31. As a partial solution to the problem, **»* ttates
«quire the destruction of fingerprints and arrest data upon acquittal or 4itchars«
without trial, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. | 749.2 (1950), or their return to tU p ^ n
involved, «. f ., I L L . ANN. STAT. ch. 38, | 206-5 (Smith-Hurd 1964). Often *+ j , n g c r .
pnnts are not returned unless requested. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV, { 29-1S MS',8)
Absent a statute, return or destruction has been denied even when the arrest has been
found patently improper. In Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal
fcptr. 696 (1962), a woman was arrested under a city ordinance prohibitum the defrauding of a taxicab operator when the driver refused to change a twenty drjflar bill
^ttpite her judgment against the cab company for false arrest and malicious protscut*00. return of the fingerprints and "mug shots" from police files was deaed See
tfnerally Note, 42 I I I . L. REV. 256 (1947); Note, 27 TEMP. L.Q. 441 (1954) - An™*
M AX.R. 127 (1933).
'
^
3& Schwartz ft Skolnick, supra note 7, at 134-38. In conducting this portion of the
•tody, the authors prepared four hypothetical application files, which were submitted
J° Prospective employers by an employment agent Three of the files reflected an arrest
•Gf usauit: the first file showed a conviction and satisfactory completion of semence,
* • »econd an acquittal, and the third an acquittal with a personal letter fr*>m the
**&& verifying thefindingof not guilty and stressing the legal presumption of ssaoosnee
*&* fourth file made no mention of any criminal record. All applications *•?> for
**tst-!evel

positions as unskilled laborers.
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the participants were asked whether a criniinal record truly handicaps a
person in seeking employment, and whether criminal conduct is stimulated
by discriminatory rejection of those with past records of offense. Ninety,
four per cent of the men replied affirmatively to each qucsttonTjWhcn the
same questions were put to 223 businessmen, 57% responded affirmatively
to the first query and 84% to the second^^\nother oft-cited study surveyed 44 business and professional employers: 16% expressed a policy of
total exclusion of persons with any criminal past, while 84% would hue
a former offender for unskilled labor.*8 However, only 64% would coo.
sider such a person for a skilled labor position; only 40% for clerical work;
and only 8% for sales jobs. ffJone would consider a person with a record
of criminality for a position as an accountant, cashier, or executive?*) The
principal determinants in the policy of complete exclusion may have
been the assumptions, first, that any former offender was by definition
untrustworthy, and, second, that the engagement of such a person would
undermine the morale of the present employees.40
37. Wallerstein, Testing Opinion of Causes of Crime, 28 Focus 103 (1949), cited
in Tappan, supra note 7, at 89.
38. Melichercik, Employment Problems of Former Offenders, 2 N.P.P.AJ. 43 (1956).
See also RUBIN, op, eit. supra note 11, at 151-54.
39. In the course of several informal interviews with personnel administrator! of
companies located on both the east and west coasts, the writer gained the impresswa
that personnel officers regard the picture given by this study as unrealistic Most wA
that they had no definite policy of exclusion, but wanted full disclosure of the details
of the offense in order to weigh each case "on the merits" and to match the individual
to the job. Several expressed distrust of an expungement procedure, and indicated
that they would not look favorably on someone who had invoked it As one man pot
it: "We probably wouldn't fire the guy outright [i.e., in the event of subsequent <&•
covery of the offense], but I think we'd be rather hurt that he didn't feel he couM
come and tell us about it"
Administrators of two of the concerns (a major university and a nationwide temporary-help service) indicated that they did not ask the applicant about prior offense**
but relied exclusively upon the recommendations of former employers. (This woo*
effectively foreclose those who had been incarcerated and could not "account v*
their past") On the other hand, firms in the electronics field typically made flean^
inquiry of all applicants, even those applying for the most menial positions. presunuW*
this practice reflects the companies* concern over security risks, but in some cases u*
probing exceeds relevant inquiry. In one firm, an applicant for the position of nvctowave tube assembler (two dollars/hour) was required to list all arrests or convict**
and give full details, indicate in detail any other "misconduct" with which he or *j
had been charged (presumably relating to employment but not clearly), account for *"
past absences from work, explain all garnishments or other credit impairment, and *0
an "agreement" that he or she could be immediately discharged without recourse
any information given was found to be "false or misleading." (Application ft**
possession of the author.)
40. Melicherdk, supra note 38, at 48-49.
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flic ex-offender's chances of employment by public or governmental
fgtadca—even in the most ordinary positions—are no brighter. One
undy has concluded that nearly one-half of the states, and the federal
government, do not automatically exclude a person with an adjudication
a\ criminal guilt from consideration for public employment41 This is by
go means indicative of the extent of former-offender employment, because
denial of hire usually results from the exercise of administrative discretion
ty the examining or certifying agency.48 Only one state expressly provides
that a rehabilitated offender shall not be barred from public employment
by his conviction.48 Exclusion from employment may result either from
rejection because of a former offense or from dismissal because of the commission of a present offense. Surely these situations are different, and different policies should apply.
It would be naive in the extreme to suggest that the governmental employers of our nation drop their bars and become a haven for unregenerate
brigands, and no such proposal is put forth here. The public good demands
die utmost probity of its servants. It also demands, however, the reassimibtkm into full social status of all who have offended against it The removal
of the stigma of conviction by annulling it upon proof of reform would
open large areas of public employment now closed to the rehabilitated
offender.
It is necessary to differentiate, moreover, among the kinds of positions
iought. This need applies to licensing mechanisms as well as to direct
employment, and in general it is not met Surely the considerations that
require exclusion of former offenders from law enforcement and public
»fety positions do not thrust with the same force in the case of a truckdriver, or an engineering aide, or a forest firefighter. There are valid and
necessary reasons for permanently foreclosing those with records of violative
«mduct from certain critical and highly sensitive positions in the public
*rvice, but surely some account must be taken by the law of the gravity
j j h c offense, and some reasonable criteria—other than the shopworn
*1. RUIIM et ml at 628-30; tee Wiie, Public Employment of Persons with a Criminal
w£?'' 6 N P P A J - 197 » l9B ( 1 9 6 °)- * u W n '« «*»«« *** t»«xl largely upon
*>ddifield, The State Convict, 1952 (unpublished doctoral thesis on file at Yak
J*w School Library). Variant results were reported by Green in a study conducted in
J^^orty-two states were reported as having no rule completely prohibiting emfkflnent of ex-offenders. However, only twenty-eight states indicated that they did
*wet hire such persons, usually in positions of unskilled labor. Green, op. eit. supra
j * * J 3, at 74. This survey also included a limited inquiry into municipal hiring practices.
*2. RUBIK at al. at 625,
43

628.

- Mn. AMK. CODE art. 64A, f 19 (1957). The appointing authority may consider
^^vJctkrn in granting employment
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dichotomy of felony and misdemeanor—must be developed.44 Not ink*

pent of the battered garbage can and suitable apologies to its owners. His
probation was satisfactorily completed; he graduated from college, went
on to a large law school, and graduated with honors near the head of his
f>«. Save for this casual and unfortunate incident, his record is otherwise without blemish. Would it really make sense to require that for the
itst of his life he be foreclosed from the practice of his profession?** The
labels of "malicious mischief," "disturbance of the peace," "drunk in
public," and "contributing to the delinquency of a minor" (this last particularly opprobrious and connotative of moral turpitude) are surely not
properly descriptive of his offense, or of his moral character. Yet, he must
bear them the rest of his life, listing them on credit and job applications,
and otherwise having them dredged up in a host of ways.
Should such persons—and no one can estimate successfully how many
there may be—be forced to bear forever the stain of their immature and
impulsive conduct? To take a few examples: someone in the shoes of
this young man, if he were a barber, would likely lose his license in
Michigan or California.4* Apparently, he could not work as a physical
therapist or practice optometry or chiropractic in Minnesota.4* He could
be denied a license to breed or raise horses or to process or sell horsemeat
in Illinois,*0 and might lose his cosmetologist's license in Wisconsin." Without the aid of an expungement statute, he would be compelled to bear the
mark of his past mistake. Statutes permitting the setting aside of convictions
are no help here;82 it is not uncommon for the law to provide that despite
the vacation of conviction under such an act, the conviction may nevertheless be considered for licensing and disciplinary purposcs.•,
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quently the disability of a record for even a single offense bars nulhar/
enlistment, though the selection standards vary with the national need for
service manpower."
^
The effects of criminal stigma are felt perhaps even more strongly In
the area of licenses and government-regulated occupations than they ait
in the sector of public employment. Green lists some fifty-nine occupation!,
from accountancy to yacht selling, in which a license is required and from
which a reformed offender may be barred; his list is only illustrative, not
exhaustive.*4 The relevance of an offense of petty theft to the practice of
the profession or trade may be immediately apparent, as in the practice of
law, or may be recondite in the extreme—if there at all—as in the case of
barbering. Even though the offense may be relevant, this is not to say that
it should be determinative of entry into the trade or profession.
A few years ago, a young man of twenty-one celebrated his college's
basketball victory with more enthusiasm than good sense, and with two
cohorts—all in a happy state of bibulosity—broke into the rear service
porch of a vacant apartment, from which he abstracted a large metal
garbage can. When the police arrived shortly thereafter, he was busily
engaged in rolling it up and down the rear stairs of the apartment, to
the vast annoyance of the building's occupants. His comments to the police
were not of the politest sort. He was arrested on charges of burglary,
malicious mischief, disturbance of the peace, public intoxication, and contributing to the delinquency of minors (his companions were below the
age of twenty-one). The burglary charge was dropped; he pleaded guilty
to the other counts, and was granted probation conditioned upon replace44. For discussion on the need for an expungement statute to make some differentiation on the basis of the gravity of the offense and the criticality of the purposes for
which the information is sought see text accompanying notes 132-44 infra.
45. Broadly speaking, persons convicted of felonies are excluded. Major commands*
may grant waivers to persons convicted of ksser offenses if they have been free of si
t forms of civil control for at least six months. Adjudicated juvenile and youthful offendtn
may be granted waivers by main station commander*, who may delegate their authority
to recruiting main station commanders. The latter may grant waivers for certata
single minor offenses such as drunkenness and truancy. 32 C.F.R. | 571.2(eM"
(1962). See generally MacCormick, Defense Department Policy Toward Former Of**
ders, NATIONAL PROBATION AND PA»OLE ASSOCIATION 1951 YEAABOOK 1.

46. Green, op. eit. supra note 11, at 26. For a more enlightened example of statutory
exclusion from occupation see | 504 of die Labor-Management Reporting and J***
closure Act, 29 U.S.C. I 504 (1964), which bars persons convicted of specified criff*
from holding various positions in labor unions. It should be noted that even in *°
"high-risk" an occupation, the ban is not perpetual but extends only five years from <***
viction. The statute recognises the possibility of reformation.
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47. This roughly describes a case known to the author. The young man in question
"as admitted to the bar examination after giving a full explanation and now enjoys a
**cestful practice.
48. GAL. BUS. & PXOF. CODE | 6576 (disqualification on conviction of crime of moral
fcwpitude); MICK. STAT. ANN. { 18.106 (1957) (disqualification upon conviction of
»ay crime).
49. MINN. STAT. ANN. | f 147.02 (optometrist), 148.10 (chiropractor), 148.75
(Physical therapist) (Supp. 1965).
50. I I I . RSV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, | 242.2 (Supp. 1965) (disqualification on convic•°a of felony or "any crime opposed to decency or morality**).
5.1. Wis. STAT, f 159.14 (1961) (disqualification on conviction of any crime).
*2. See text accompanying notes 30-54 supra.
33. See, e.g., exceptions to the stated effect of CAL. PEN. COOS | 1203.4 in GAL. BUS.
* P*or. CODS | | 1679 (dentist*), 2383, 2384 (physicians), 2963 (psychologists),
6,
°2 (attorneys), 6576 (barbers), 10177(b) (real estate brokers), 10302(b) (business
opportunity brokers), 10562(b) (mineral, oil, and gas licensees); CAL. EDUC CODS |
*^i0 (teachers); CAL. VEHICLS COOS | 13555 (revocation of driver'* license).
* * also Epstein v. California Horse Racing Board, 222 Cal. App. 2d 831, 35 Cal. Rptr.
* 2 (1963).
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In ways more indirect than employer rejection or legal restriction, the
stigma of a former offense is likely to militate against successful employment
of the redeemed offender. He may be denied union membership, although
apparently no union admits to a hard-and-fast policy of exclusion. Moreover, many positions require bonding as a precondition of hire, and former
offenders are generally not bondable, whatever the relevance of their offense
to the risk covered by the bond. One young man who fights another on
the street over the hitter's interference with his lady fair, and who is
convicted of assault and battery or disturbing the peace as a result of Ins
passions, should not necessarily be marked thereafter as an employment
risk, unworthy of trust. The problem is particularly acute in companies
using low-cost "blanket bonds" which commonly contain provisions voiding protection if the employer hires any person with an offense record, at
least without the prior consent of the surety.8*
«J
Similarly, a person with a record of criminal conduct may experience
substantial difficulty in obtaining automobile liability coverage (or in getting
inclusion under his employer's liability policy), and may be foreclosed from
any work requiring the use of a car either in the course of the job or in
getting to and from his place of employment Alternatively, he may not
be precluded from coverage but may be treated as an "assigned risk,"
whatever his offense." Although this has the advantage of giving the
former offender access to insurance, it has the disadvantage of subjecting
him to perhaps prohibitive expenses at a time when he can least likely
afford them. Further, a person with an arrest or conviction record may in
54. Frequently, it is said that hiring of an offender will void all coverage. See FryBi
The Treatment of Recidivists, 47 J. Cant. L., C. ft P.S. 1 (1956). The following ii»
typical liberal "blanket bond" provision:
The coverage of this bond shall not apply to any employee from and after tht
time that the Insured or any partner or officer thereof, not in collusion with suck
employee, shall have knowledge or information that such employee has committed
any fraudulent or dishonest act in the service of the Insured or otherwise, whether
such act be committed before or after the date of employment by the Insured.
Lykke, Attitude of Bonding Companies Toward Probationers and Parolees, 21 Fed.
Prob. 36 (1957).
This study suggests that the surety companies may be willing to examine indMdsw
cases and permit the employer to assume the risk himself, and the wording of the bosp
would import that the cancellation of protection would apply only to the iiidividaw
and not to the concern as a whole. This is preferable to blanket invalidation, bat •
nevertheless requires uncommon understanding and effort on the part of the employ*1
and there is no guarantee that the consent of the surety will be given. The bond***
firms interviewed in the course of Lykke's study felt that their alleged unwillingness *
give coverage was more often than not used as an excuse to mask the employer's hoe*™1
toward hiring persons with an offense record.
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jouie jurisdictions be denied a vehicle operator's license (or even, apparently, afishinglicense ). M
Typically, a former offender who is called as a witness is subject to
impeachment of his credibility on the basis of his prior conviction." This
may be so despite an order "setting aside" or vacating a conviction and
releasing him from "all penalties and disabilities."** Once a person has
been cast as an offender, he seems always to be suspect as a liar.** Let us
suppose that the young purloiner of garbage cans, whose fate is recounted
above, observes a traffic accident some five years after his conviction and
is asked whether he has pertinent testimony. It is not beyond the bounds
of reason to suppose that he would be strongly tempted to deny that he
had seen anything, that he would do whatever he could to avoid the
witness stand and the possibility of public exposure and humiliation. Last,
but as usual not least, the former offender becomes a target for future
investigation and suspicion. This is simply a fruit of his error, and he
should bear it—up to a point. Unfortunately, that point may be passed,
and the former offender may be subjected to unwarranted harassment
by a law enforcement agency whose standards of courtesy and professional
practice have not caught up with its zeal.w It is not at all unreasonable
for a young man who burglarized a service station one month before to be
quizzed regarding a burglary perpetrated by similar modus operandi at
another station—providing his rights are respected and he is handled with
the courtesy incumbent upon a police officer. It is highly unreasonable for
him to be "rousted" on a service station break-in five years later, when
the events of the interim indicate that he is comporting himself as a lawabiding citizen.
The point distills to this: should we permanently maintain, as a matter
of social policy, the stigmatic ascriptions of a single adjudication? How
56. See the commentary to the N.C.OD. MODEL ACT, supra note 17, at 98.
57. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 89-94 (1954). There are very great variation* among
** *tate§ as to the crimes that will serve as a ground of impeachment.
5*. *4* People v. O'Brand, 92 Cal. App. 2d 752, 207 P.2d 1083 (1949); People
•• James, 40 Cal. App. 2d 740, 105 P.2d 947 (1940). The new California Evidence
Cod
* (to take effect on January 1, 1967) codifies in | 788(d) the dictum of People
*• Mackay, 58 Cal. App. 123, 208 Pac 135 (1922), that a conviction set aside under
7**~ Pan. CODE | 1203.4 cannot be used to impeach unless the person is the de•*•**« in * subsequent criminal proceeding. The present state of the law is by no
***»« clear, and the Mackay case has been seriously eroded by later holding*; these
***» are discussed in Comment, 2 STAN. L. REV. 222 (1949).
«yen under the new California Evidence Code the offender who has erred in a state
***"*»; a vacation or expungement statute would be open to attack in a California court
*>• Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.BJLJ. 1017 (1965).
•k W. at 1021.
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long is enough? I n the recent case of DeVeau v. Braistedf1 the Supreme
Court of the United States sidestepped this question in affirming the exclusion of petitioner from the position of secretary-treasurer of a longshoreman's local under § 8 of the New York Waterfront Commission Act of
1953" Petitioner had pleaded guilty to attempted grand larceny thirty-five
years before his removal from office and had received a suspended sentence.
Though terming the result "drastic," the Court noted the long history of
abuses on the New York waterfront and upheld the application of the Act
While one cannot quarrel with the Court's assessment of the "high risk" of
the occupation, one must regret the Court's failure to confront the problem
of how long disqualification resulting from an adjudication of criminal
guilt should endure.**
It is not for the confirmed recidivist that primary concern about restoration ol status is due, but for the first offender—the "accidental" criminal,
if you will—whose violative conduct never reoccurs. Though an accurate
count is impossible, the number of such persons is staggering. Nussbaum
has estimated that in the United States today there are nearly 50,000,000
persons with offense records; he concludes that between 15,000,000 and
20,000,000 are first offenders who do not recidivate.*4 His calculations
are based upon extrapolations from the number of arrests per 100,000
population as determined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform
Crime Reports in 1953 and 1954 (assuming a recidivism rate of 63%),
projected over one generation of 30 years. ^He places the number of firsttime offenders arrested each year at roughly 1,600,000?5
It is beyond the present capacity of the social sciences to verify these
estimates; adequate statistical information is not available. Nussbaum's
61. 363U.S. 144(1960).
62. N.Y. UWCONSOL. LAW* | 99S3 (McKinney 1961).
63. For a suggestion that the problem if one of due process see Green, op. cii. smfrt
note 11, at 31-35. It must be remarked that petitioner had not obtained a certifies*
of good conduct, N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW | 242, following his discharge from sentence;
if he had, he would have escaped the bar of | 8. There is no indication that he w*
•ware of the availability of this relief.
^
64. NUSSBAUM, FaaT OFFENDERS, A SECOND CHANCE 8-11

(1956).

The am*

rate per 100,000 population in 1953 is given as 4,231.6. 1954 FBI UNIFORM CM**
REP. 52-53 (table 17). The most recent rate (for the year 1963) is shown as 3,460.41964 FBI UNIFORM CHIME REF. 106-07 (table 18). Frym estimates that there • *
10,500,000 persons with offense records exclusive of traffic matters. Frym, **P™ "J*
54, at 3. While Nussbaum's estimate seems excessive, Firm's seems too low, hi
light of the F.B.I. figures.
65. NuaaaAUM, op. tit. suprm note 64, at 9. The F.B.I. indicates that 41% « {*
arrests reported nationally are of persons under the age of 25. 1964 FBI UNIFORM &***
REF. 108-09 (table 19) (1,919,641 arrests out of 4,685,080 below age of 25).
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totals may be faulted for assuming too high a redvidism rate,**^t one
Kudy being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicates
that the rate may be as high as 76% in the case of persons who commit
jnajor crimes." Further, it is apparent that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's base figures are not accurate indices of the incidence of crime and
arrest; many police agencies do not report at all, or do so sparse&J The
totals commonly exclude vagrancy, drunkenness, peace disturbance, and
other low-order offenses, and they generally do not include arrests of
juvenile offenders. The imprecision of our count is obvious, but however
imprecise it may be, the conclusion is surely apt that there arc millions
of persons in the United States who bear the opprobrium of a criminal
record despite their reformation and avoidance of further crime.
To say that the prevention of crime is served by the ^socialization of
the offender is to utter the obvious, and yet the proposition is largely gainsaid by present penal practice. From the nearly impenetrable morass of
conflicting theories regarding the etiology of crime, we may at least—
without pretending causational expertise—extract the common sense printipk that if a man is permanently marked a criminal outcast, he will be
isolated from social groups whose behavior patterns and values are anticriminal. Sutherland and Cressey have stated
When he is effectively ostracized, the criminal has only two alternatives: he may associate with other criminals, among whom he can find
recognition, prestige, and means of further criminality; or he may
become disorganized, psychopathic, or unstable. Our actual practice
is to permit almost all criminals to return to society, in a physical
sense, but to hold them off, make them keep their distance, segregate
them in the midst of the ordinary community.**
H the offender is to be rehabilitated, two things must be done: he must
** made a part of groups emphasizing values conducive to reform and
«w-abiding conduct, and he must concurrently be alienated from groups
w
hose values are conducive to criminality.** Neither of these goals is
farthered by the failure of the law to provide means of restoring status.
ft- Note 65 supra,
67. 1964 FBI UNIFORM CRIME R I F . 26-29. Of a special study group of 92,869
•"fenders, 76% had a prior arrest record. On the other hand, any statistical measurett nt
* of rehabilitation is extremely difficult, because it involves Use determination of
^native factor, that is, the absence of arrest or conviction over a given period of tone.
/. Glajcr, Differential Association and Criminological Prediction, 8 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 6
(i960).
**• SUTHERLAND ft CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 318 (5th ed. 1955).
W
- Cressey, Changing Criminals: The Application of the Theory of Differential
*'******, 61 AMERICAN J. SOCIOLOGY 116 (1955).
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In sum, there has been insufficient recognition of the responsibility of
the penal law in alleviating the corrosive effects of the stigma its application necessarily creates. Dean Joseph Lohman of the University of California School of Criminology, a former sheriff of Cook County, Illinois,
has written:
There is too little concern with the stigmatizing and alienating effect of arrests of such violators [minor offenders, especially first offenders]. We equate them with bank robbers and murderers. Once a
youngster has a police record, this fact, in the eyes of the law—and
potential employers—is more real than the person himself. People
stop looking at a young man. They look at his record, his "sheet" as
it is called. Over and over boys told me, "It isn't me; it's the sheet
They won't listen to me." We have pushed these boys on the other
side of the law. They may well stay there.10
In a very real sense, the problem is one of the "self-fulfilling prophecy":
the offender initially moved toward reform becomes what we condemn htm
to be. The failure of the law to treat the former offender as a person with
the potential to become a law-abiding and useful member of society, by
omitting means of removing the infamy of his social standing, deprives
him of an incentive to reform. To the extent that this shortcoming contributes to the repetition of criminal conduct, it renders the system of penal
law a "monument to futility" and tends to erode public confidence in the
legal order/1
II. T H E ANNULMENT OF ADULT CONVICTIONS

To date, few jurisdictions have adopted expungement laws permitting
the annulment of conviction upon proof of reform, and, of those that have,
fewer still provide truly effective relief.1* Because so little information on
such statutes is available, a summary survey of existing laws may be helpful;
the outline below excludes statutes dealing with juvenile court adjudication,
which are discussed in part III.
r
70. Lohman, Upgrading Law Enforcement, 9 POLICE 19 (1965). For psychiatric
comment to the Mine effect tee Erickson, The Problem of Ego Identity, 4 J. A******
PSYCHOANALYTIC A. 56 (1956).
•;5!
71. Correctional policy mutt be viewed not only fat terms of its direct effect «P°*
criminal activity but alto in terms of its effect upon other value systems of society, w*
BLOCK * GEM, MAN, Gams ft Socnrr 494 (1962).
72. The first offender's need for expungement has been recognised in at least ta«
other legal systems. Japanese law provides that after five years in the case of a n w *
crime and after ten years in the case of a serious crime, the Msentence [conviction] 1<"*
its effect** if there has been no further offense. PENAL COOS OF JAFAN, art. 54-2, 2 EJ*-*
LAW BULL. 10 (Ministry of Justice transl. 1961).
,
Interestingly, among the most comprehensive provisions for the cancellation ^
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CaBfomid: CaL Pen. Code § 1203.45 provides that a person under the age
of twenty-one committing a misdemeanor
may petition the court for an order sealing the record of conviction
and other official records in the case, including records of arrests resulting in the criminal proceeding, and including records relating to other
offenses charged in the accusatory pleading, whether defendant was
acquitted or charges were dismissed.
: the order is granted, the "conviction, arrest or other proceeding shall
i deemed not to have occurred, and the petitioner may answer accordingly
iy question relating to their occurrence."
The section is expressly inapplicable to traffic violations, registrable sex
fenses,T* and narcotics violations. It seems further to be limited to persons
who (1) were not convicted on the charge they seek to have expunged, or
(2) if convicted, were eligible to have the conviction set aside under
lection 1203.4 or section 1203.4a of the Penal Code (respectively, satisfactory completion of probation or satisfactory completion of misdemeanor
sentence where probation was denied). It is not wholly clear whether the
relief is available to one who has had a prior conviction, though the thrust
of the kss-than-pellucid language and the history of the statute would suggest that it is not.'4 It is also not clear just how the operation of section
1203.45 overlaps that of the "setting-aside" provisions, sections 1203.4 and
1203.4a. The latter provide for the abolition of all "penalties and disabilities" resulting from a conviction; section 1203.45 does not so specify, but
tbe provision that the arrest or conviction shall be deemed never to have
occurred must surely include this, if the language is to have any consistency
of meaning.
Notable in this statute is the lack of any provision directing the court's
orier of sealing to the attention of arresting or repository law enforcement
agencies who may have records of petitioner on file. The expungement
"faue records are those of the Soviet Union. The law specifies various probationary
roods, based on the severity of the original sentence, during which there must be no
*w offense. Upon cancellation of the record of conviction, the offender reverts to his
iorn
*r status; the relief is not necessarily limited to first offenders. RSFSR Cant. COD*
**• ^7, hi BsaMAN, SOVIBT CRIMINAL LAW ft PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR Coosa 173-75
U966). The cancellation is initiated by petition of the offender or of a social organiza*0°» and the cause is heard by the district people's court at the offender's place of
**dence, Notice must be given to the procurator, and tbe presence of the offender at
oc r
* «g is apparently jurisdictional. If the petition is denied, a new petition may
* * he lied for one year. RSFSR CODE OF CJUM. PROCEDURE, art. 370, in BERMAN,

•*• «*. snpra, at 402.
79
> Persons convicted of specified sex offenses are required by GAL. PEN. CODE f 290
***ter with local police departments.
74
« See Baum, supra note 30, at 823.
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statute relating to juvenile courts™ so provides, and experience has shown
it to be necessary, in order to give the law full effect. If one agency retains
unsealed an arrest or crime report, fingerprint card, "mug shot," or other
record naming petitioner, a check is likely to reveal it, and the expungement
will be rendered nugatory.7' Further, section 1203.45 does not provide for
examination of records so sealed upon subsequent petition of the person
who is their subject; the juvenile court expungement statute has such i
provision." At first examination, this would seem highly anomalous, probably derogative of the intent of the enactment. It has become apparent,
however, that there may be situations in which the person who has had
his record sealed has made disclosure—such as in security clearance applications—and finds it impossible to prove that his record was in fact expunged." The order of the court sealing the records is by common practice
sealed with the other material in the case.
A further point may be noted with respect to the California enactment
which is equally applicable to the other acts discussed, save for the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency Model A c t " Though such an action
would quite evidently be in conflict with the spirit of the act, an employer
or licensing agency is apparently able to compel a former offender to disclose whether he has ever sought the relief provided by the statute.*0
75. CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE $ 781.

76. The author was informed of a recent case in which a young man had been
granted relief under | 1203.45 following his conviction for gasoline theft The arresting
police agency had learned of the sealing order and had closed its files, as had the
State Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation. However, in the partsculv
county where the young man was arrested, the booking of all prisoners is handled it
the county jail and separate records are kept by the sheriff's department. The booking
record reflecting the theft came to light in a record check prior to a military appointment. Because the military authorities not unnaturally raised the question of wilful
concealment of the record, the young man was in a worse position—at least until fuB
explanation could be given—than he would have been had no sealing order bees
entered.
77. CAL. WKLPAEB ft Iitrr'Na COD* |

781.

78. On the desirability of full disclosure of record in applications for certain criocw
positions, see text accompanying note 135 infra.
79. N.C.OD. MODEL ACT, 8 CHIME ft DELINQUENCY 97, 100 (1962). Of the «d*i*
or proposed enactments found in the course of this study, only the Model Act prohiW
employers or licensing bureaus from inquiring into the fact of expungement CAL. P**j
CODE | 1203.45 has been interpreted, however, to require any official agency *[
records which have been sealed to answer any inquiry: **We have no record oni*j*
named individual." 41 CAL. Ora. ATTV GEN. 102, 104 (1963); ef. 40 CAL. Or*
ATT'Y GEN. 50 (1962).
*
80. Baum, supra note 30, at 824. Several California probation officers «"**
cated to the author that they had encountered instances of such questioning, *"**.
expungement becomes more widely invoked one would expect the practice to spre**
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A major consideration in evaluating the effectiveness of any expungement
jtatute is its realistic use: does it in fact afford an accessible relief, actually
invoked, or does it simply sit as dressing upon the statute books? It is
impossible to determine the proportion of eligible offenders who utilize
section 1203.45 but there appears to be a steadily rising use of the section,
1,066 actions being received by the Department of Justice during the last
focal year.*1 Of these, 862 were reported to have been processed to completion. During the last six months of 1965, 732 such closures were completed, as compared to 243 in the period from July 1962 through June
1963. On the basis of these figures, the conclusion that the relief is relatively
accessible is not inappropriate."
Michigan: Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.1274(101) (Supp. 1965) provides that
any person who pleads guilty to or is convicted of not more than one
offense occurring before he is twenty-one (other than traffic violations
and crimes punishable by life imprisonment), may, when five years have
elapsed from the time of conviction, move the court to set aside judgment.
As previously indicated," this alone would not be considered an expungement statute without the provisions of Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.1274(102)
(Supp. 1965), which specify that upon entry of such an order vacating
judgment, the applicant shall "for purposes of the law" be deemed not to
have been previously convicted. This language is broad but has not yet been
subjected to interpretation. Insofar as this section fails to indicate the disposition of the records and on its face omits to cover the problem of proper
answer to inquiry, it fails as an effective expungement statute.
Under these provisions, notice must be served upon the prosecuting attorney, who must be given the opportunity to contest the setting aside of
Ac judgment. Since the statutes were enacted in 1965,*4 no statistical information relative to their invocation is available.
The inquiry may take various forms, from "Have you ever had an offense record
espunged?" to "Have you ever appeared as a moving party in any court? E*pl^in
fully." Cf. Note, 79 JUav. L. REV. 775, 800 (1966).
81. Letter from Ronald H. Beattey, Chief, Bureau of Criminal Statistics, California,
Department of Justice, to the author, January 17, 1966. The Bureau reports 2,917 actions
fled under section 1203.45 in the period from July 1962 through December 1965. Of
™e»e, 2,379 were processed to completion and the identification files closed; in the re**ining cases, the Bureau was unable initially to identify the defendant, and the order
"*d therefore to be returned with a request for more information.
82
- Whether it is accessible enough, and how it might be made more accessible, is
^^dered in part IV below.
•*. Note 16 tuprm.
•*• Mich. Laws 1965, act 213, at 1134.
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Minnesota: Under Minn. Stat Ann. § 638.02(2) (Supp. 1965), any p ^
son convicted of a crime may upon discharge from his sentence petition the
Board of Pardons for a •'pardon extraordinary." This the Board may gnu*
if it finds that he is a first offender ( " . . . not convicted of [any crime] other
than the act upon which [his present conviction was] founded") tad
determines that he is of good character and repute. The pardon extnu*.
dinary restores all civil rights and sets aside and nullifies the conviction,
"purging" the offender. The statute specifically provides that petitioner
shall never thereafter be required to disclose the conviction at any tmy
or place other than in subsequent judicial proceedings. Since the judical
proceedings in which the conviction may be raised are not limited to those
in which petitioner is a defendant, it would seem that the record might be
revived for impeachment purposes in a later civil or criminal proceedng
where petitioner is a witness.
The statute does not treat the problem of police and arrest records,
fingerprint cards, and the like, and it is probable that a routine check of
enforcement agencies would turn up the fact of arrest, thus frustrating the
enactment's intended end.**
Prior to 1963, the law applied only to those under twenty-one years of
age. M There is apparently no limitation as to kind or type of offense for
which expungement may be had, although the statute has been interpreted
to be inapplicable to traffic violations."
The Minnesota law is distinctive in providing for expungement by administrative action rather than judicial order. Since an effective expungement process requires the sealing of court and agency records, court action
would appear preferable.
New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:164-28 (1953) permits the court to
order expungement when petitioner (1) has received a suspension of sentence or a fine not exceeding $1,000 and (2) has suffered no subsequent
conviction. Ten years must elapse from the date of conviction before application for expungement can be made, and the remedy is unavailable to persons convicted of treason or misprision thereof, anarchy, any capital offense,
kidnapping, perjury, any crime involving a deadly weapon including tbe
carrying of such a weapon concealed, rape, seduction, aiding or conceafing
persons convicted of high misdemeanors, aiding the escape of prisoners,
embracery, arson, robbery, or burglary. The petitioner must pay all cosr
85. See note 76 suprm.
86. In 1963, the law was extended to mil first offenders regardless of age. Min«- * *
Laws 1963, ch. 819, at 1441-42.
87. 1949 MINN. OPS. Arr*y Gut. 328-B.
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of die expungement proceeding, and notice must be served upon the
prosecutor and police department(s) concerned. No provision is made for
the expunging or sealing of police and enforcement agency records.
The exact utility of this statute is open to much doubt No figures as
to its invocation could be found, but the long period of time before relief
is possible (ten years) and the fairly extensive catalogue of ineligible of*
(eases restrict both the efficacy of the relief and the likelihood of its being
sought More to the point, the statute has been construed as "lacking the
force and effect of a full pardon" (whatever that may be), apparently on
tbe basis that to grant the law any greater effect would be to impinge upon
die pardoning power of the governor.** Since New Jersey has taken the
position that a pardon does not permit the recipient to respond in the
negative to questions about his conviction,*' it would seem a fortiori that a
successful petitioner under section 2A: 164-28 would also be constrained to
disclosure. In terms of restoring the essential status of the former offender,
the relief afforded K Ms enactment is limited at best and illusory at worst.
There is one £u oser provision of New Jersey law upon which comment
must be made: after five years (presumably from the date of entry), the
records of "disorderly pcrsons,, on file in the office of the county clerk may
be destroyed.*0 This appears to be a "housekeeping" provision rather than
in enactment designed to affect the status of such "disorderly persons"—
which is doubtful, to say the least A "disorderly person" has been defined
as one guilty of a "quasi-criminal act," something below a misdemeanor,
who is spared "the brand of being adjudged a criminal with all of its
political, business and social implications. . . ."" It is hard to see how he
is so spared when he is subject to immediate arrest without process,** may
be summarily tried without indictment or jury,** and may be imprisoned.**
Since <<being a disorderly person" is something less than committing a crime,
such person is apparently ineligible even for the meagre relief of section
2A:164-28.M
«8. 1951-53 NJ. OP«. ATTV GIN. 143.
**. Id. at 206.
90. N.J. STAT. ANN. | 47:3-9(i) (Supp. 1965).
91. In rt Garofone, 80 NJ. Super. 259, 271, 193 A-2d 398, 405 (1963), •fa\ 42
N
J- 244, 200 A.24 101 (1964) (possession of barbiturates).
92. NJ. STAT. ANN. f 2A: 169-3 (1951).
93. In u Garofooe, 80 NJ. Super. 259, 193 A.2d 398, (1963), • # % 42 NJ. 244,
200
A.2d 101 (1964).
94. KJ. STAT. ANN. f 2A: 169-5 (1951).
**5. Parenthetically, the scope of the disorderly person classification is disturbingly
bro
*d- In one startling case, a disgruntled husband procured a revolver, jimmied the
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Tixas: Though not an expungement act Insofar as it fails to provide ft*
the destruction or sealing of records, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 42.13,
§ 7 (1966) deserves mention if only because it does not classify easily.
Subsection (a) provides that upon completion of probation following conviction of a misdemeanor, the court shall enter an order setting aside the
finding of guilt and dismissing all accusatory pleadings. By subsection (b),
the offender'sfindingof guilt may not be considered for any purpose (italics
in the statute) except to determine entitlement to probation in a trial for
a subsequent offense. The relief is available only to misdemeanants.
It will be noted that the statute appears to be (like the Michigan enact*
ment discussed above) simply a "setting-aside" provision, which does not
reach the status of an offender.** However, provisions similar to subsection
(b) are not found in article 42.12, section 7, the cognate statute permitting
the setting aside of felony convictions. It is thus inferable that the legislature intended the broader relief of article 42.13, section 7 to extend to the
status itself. The section may well go farther in giving the reformed offender
protection against forced divuJgence of his record to employers and licensing
agencies than would most expungement acts. The great lack of this hybrid
statute—in terms of its efficacy—lies in its failure to provide for the closure
of court and agency records.
III. EXPUNGEMENT AND THE JUVENILE COURT

A. The Need
Every state, most territories, and the United States have provided special
adjudicative and dispositive procedures in the case of juvenile offenders.
It is truistic to say that the juvenile court is not a criminal court, and that
adjudications, since not convictions, are not productive of criminal disabilities. Nearly every jurisdiction so provides." All but a handful of states
screen of hit long-estranged wife's bedroom with a putty knife, and shot her lover wbea
the latter attacked him with an axe. His argument of self-defense was denied on the
ground that by carrying implements of entry (the putty knife) and the revolver, he was •
"disorderly person who was subject to immediate arrest, which the deceased was staplf
trying to effect--with the axe. State v. Agnesi, 92 N.JX. 53, 104 Atl. 299 (1918), «#%
92 N.JX. 638, 106 Atl 893, 108 Atl. 115 (1919). Just what are the bounds of "qua*
criminality*'?
96. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
97. ALA. COD* t i t 13, | 378 (1958); ALASKA STAT, f 47.10.080(g) (1962); AEBRav. STAT. A N N . | 8-228A (1956); CAL. WELFARE ft INST*NS CODE f 503; COLO. R>*

STAT. | 22-8-1(3), -13 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. { 17-72 (1958); DEL. Cot*
ANN. tit 10, | 982(b) (1953); D.C. Com ANN. | 16-2308(d) (Supp. IV, 1965); FuSTAT, f 39.10(3) (1961); GA. CODE ANN. f 24-2418 (1959); HAWAII REV. LAW* I
333-1 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. ! 16-1814(5) (Supp. 1965); I I I . REV. STAT. ch. 37,
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expressly prohibit public access to records of the juvenile court, and many
extend the restrictions to the files of law enforcement and social agencies.*9
Commonly, the fact of adjudication in juvenile court and any evidence
given in connection therewith are inadmissible against the minor in any
other court,*00 and a large number of states provide that such adjudication
is no bar to future military service or public employment.1*1
| 702-9 (1965); IND. ANN. STAT. S 9-3215 (Supp, 1966); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. |
38*01 (1964); Kv. REV. STAT. { 208.200(5) (1962); LA. R E V . STAT, f 13-1580
(1952); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 15, | 2502(1) (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art 26, | 54
(1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS A N N . ch. 119, |

53

(1958); MICH. STAT. A N N . |

27.3178(598.1) (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. M 242.12, 260.2110) (Supp. 1965); Miss.
CODE ANN. | 7185-09 (Supp. 1964); Mo. REV. STAT. | 211.271(1) (1959); MONT.
KIT. CODES ANN. { 10-611 (Supp. 1965); NEV. REV. STAT. $ 62.190(3) (1963); N i l .
Riv. STAT. ANN. | 169:26 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. $ 2A:4-39 (1951); N.M. STAT.
ANN. { 13-8-65 (Supp. 1965); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT i 781; N.C. GEN. STAT. $ 110-24
(1959); NJ>. CENT. CODE | 27-16-21 (1960); OHIO REV. Cot* ANN. | 2151.35 (Page
Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT, tit 20, f 891 (1961); ORE. REV. STAT, f 419.543 (1963);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit 11, § | 261, 269-417 (1965); P.R. LAW« ANN. tit 34, § 2011
(Supp. 1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. f 14-1-40 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. f 15-1202
(1962); SJ>. CODE ( 43.0327 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. \ 27-267 (Supp. 1965) (by
implication); T E X REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 2338-1, | 13 (Supp. 1965); UTAH CODE
ANN. I 55-10-105(2) (Supp. 1965); VT. STAT. ANN. t i t 33, \\ 601, 627 (1958) (by
implication); VA. CODE ANN. f 16.1-179 (1950); V.I. Coo* ANN. t i t 5, f 2506
(1957); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. | 13.04.240 (Supp. 1965); W. VA. CODE ANN. |
4904(83) (1961); Wis. STAT, f 48.38(1) (1961); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 14-109(d)
(1957). The federal provision is found in 18 U.S.C. $ 5032 (1564).
98. Only Iowa, Maryland, Nebraska, and Vermont appear to lack statutes explicitly
governing juvenile court records. In these states, the matter may be covered by court
nue. C/. MD. ANN. CODE art 26, f 64 (1957). Miss. CODE ANN. f 7185-20 (1942)
prohibit* divulgence of the names of minors for statistical reputing purposes, but does
not expressly protect police or court records from public inspection. MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. { 10-633 (Supp. 1965) limits disclosure of identity and opening of hearing to cases
*here the minor is charged with a felony. See Geis, Publication of the Names of Juvenile
Felons, 23 MONT. L. REV. 141 (1961). In several states, <xJy the probation officer's
sports are withheld from public access. E.g., N.M. STAT. AK*. ( 13-8-66 (1953); cf.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.321(3) (1959) (discussed pages 177-78 infra). In Ohio, the
exclusion of persons other than parents, child, or counsel of record is implicit rather than
«*press. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. { 2151.18 (Page Supp. 1H5).
99. I I I . REV. STAT. ch. 37, 702-8(3) (1965); MINN. STAT. ANN. | 260.161 (Supp.
1965); and N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT | 784 are typical statutes requiring police department
ac T
& cgation of juvenile files and prohibiting public disclosure. The Minnesota statute has
"cen interpreted as forbidding the furnishing of police records to governmental agencies,
»t least without court order. 1965 MINN. Ors. ATT»Y GEN. 2W-L. A number of states
•**e statutes regulating the taking and transmission of fingerprints and identification
l^otafraphs in juvenile cases. See MYEEN ft SWANSON, POLICE WORE WITH CHILDREN

*?-80 (1962).
100. On the use of juvenile court adjudication records in kter adult proceedings sec
>°t, 96 A.LJL2d 792 (1964); Note, 32 So. CAL. L. REV. 207 (1959).
]
pi. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, f 60 (1965/ (no disqualification for
Public service either under the Commonwealth or in any politic*! subdivision thereof);
Aja
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In the face of this panoply of statutory insulation to shield the youthful
offender from the criminalization that would normally attach to him, the
question must be put: are expungement procedures needed for juvenile
records, and if so, why? One may conjecture that those jurisdictions which
have provided for the annulment of adult conviction records and have
omitted such provision for juvenile adjudications—such as Alaska, Minnesota, and New Jersey—have done so because it was believed such protection
was unnecessary and superfluous.10*
The plain fact is that expungement provisions are necessary to effectuate
the intent of the juvenile court acts, because society does not make the fine
semantic distinctions attempted by the law. As a recent survey put it, "the
results of . . . [statutory classification of juvenile court records as confidential] have been so unsatisfactory that it may fairly be characterized as a
failure.*'10* In the public eye, an offender is an offender, be he juvenile or ^
adult. The cliches of noncriminality and lack of stigma attendant upon
the juvenile court process104 have so often been repeated that we have
become piously obtuse to the fact that the enlightened instrumentality of
the juvenile court is frequently not as felicitous in practice as it is in
theory.10*
UTAH CODE ANN. | 55-10-105(2) (Supp. 1965) (no disqualification for any civil or
military service appointment). Several Massachusetts probation officers informed the
author that the law is ineffective as a real aid to employment because it fails to cover
private hiring. An attempt to deal with private employment would probably be ineffective unless it restricted the scope of permissible questioning of an applicant Some
jurisdictions expressly preserve the right to examine Juvenile records when application it
made for a law enforcement position. E.g., I I I . REV. STAT. ch. 37, { 702-9(3) (Supp.
1965).
102. Cf. ALASKA STAT, f 47.10.060(e) (1962) which provides for expungement of die
record of any minor tried as an adult on a waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction. No
comparable provision is available for juvenile court adjudications. See also MINN. STAT.
ANN. I 242.31 (Supp. 1965).
103. Note, 79 HA»V. L. RET. 775, 800 (1966).
104. £-/., In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 604, 109 AJtd 523, 525 (1954): "No sugft*
tkm or taint of criminality attaches to anyfindingof delinquency by a juvenile court"
105. MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 73 (1964). The problem is not limited to **
United States. In Great Britain, expungement procedures were proposed in 1960; these
were rejected by the Committee on Children and Young Persons on the ground thst
there was not "a record" in the case of a juvenile delinquent, but in fact many recordsWhile the Committee was sympathetic to the need, it apparently felt an expungement
law would be ineffective. COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN ft YOUNO PERSONS, REPORT, Cn»

No. 1191, at 74-75 (1960-61).
*
In Finland, on the other hand, the law permits the "abolition*' of all accusatory p ^ j *
ings and adjudication records where a punishable offense occurred before the offcoders
eighteenth birthday. Ddlling, "Finnish Juvenile Penal Law" (Das Finnische Jugeo*
strafrecht, Rcchtd. Jugend [1961], 9/21, at 325-28), abstracted in 2 EXGEETTA Cat*INOLOOICA 501-02, No. 1221 (1962).
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Recognition of the stultifying effect of juvenile court adjudication was
forcefully given in the much-cited case of In re Contreras:
While the juvenile court law provides that adjudication . . . [as] a
ward of the court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of crime,
nevertheless, for all practical purposes, this is a legal fiction, presenting a challenge to credulity and doing violence to reason. Courts cannot and will not shut their eyes to everyday contemporary happenings.
It is common knowledge that such an adjudication . . . is a blight
upon the character of and is a serious impediment to the future of such
minor. Let him attempt to enter the armed services of his country or
obtain a position of honor and trust and he is immediately confronted
with his juvenile record.10*
The considerations set forth in the preceding discussion of the adult offender's plight of status apply with equal force to a juvenile. In fact, they
may thrust with more force in his case, because he may more surely be foreclosed from the education and training needed to fit him for a useful and
productive life.107 As well, he may more likely be discouraged from applying
for military service.10*
Additionally, there are three factors in juvenile cases which especially
compel an expungement statute reaching not only police and arrest records
but all juvenile records, including those of dependency and neglect
First, the arrest records of the referring enforcement agencies are the
principal source of knowledge of a minor's past. Because the court records
arc commonly made confidential by statute or court practice,10* employers,
licensing agencies, and other persons seeking information usually resort to
106. 109 CaL App. 2d 787, 789-90; 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952); accord, Jones v.
Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 341-42, 38 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1946). In a mordant distent
»In u Holme*, 379 Pa. 599, 612, 109 A.2d 523, 529 (1954), Musmanno, J., terms the
notion that a juvenile record does its owner no lasting harm a Mmost disturbing fallacy"
•ad a "placid bromide." He colorfully describes a juvenile record as
•lengthening chain that its riveted possessor will drag after him through childhood, youthhood, adulthood and middle age . . . . It will be an ominous shadow
following his tottering steps, it will stand by his bed at night, and it will hover
over him when he dozes fitfully in the dusk of his remaining day.
107. NUSSBAUM, FIRST OFFENDERS, A SECOND CHANCE 4 (1956), quotes the applica-

fcoa form of a leading university as asking, "Have you ever been placed on probation or
P**oIe, or had any other penalty, scholastic or disciplinary, imposed?** The application for
8*»*»te fellowship assistance under Title IV of the National Defense Education Act
*3uires full reporting and certification of all crimes other than those committed before
~* *PpHeant*s sixteenth birthday and minor traffic violations. U.S. Dep't of Health,
J*"- * Welfare, form OE 4149. The NDEA application, however, provides that all in•Jnaation will be "treated confidentially" and will be weighed "only as to the suitability
* * • applicant as a . . . Fellow."
'08. For a discussion of military regulations see note 45 supra.
'°9. Note 98 supra and accompanying text.
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police fifes, where they all too often gain access.119 The effect on an adult
of arrest without conviction has already been remarked.111 It is apparent
that the devastation of arrest may well be much greater in the case of a
juvenile, because the confidentiality of court records may preclude verification of non-involvement. The inquirer is more likely to stop with the arrest
record and draw his own conclusions regarding guilt.11* Even if the dismissal by the juvenile court is reflected (as it should be) upon the police
record, the observer is likely to conclude that the minor did something, at
feast, and the court "let him off light."
Further, many—if not most—juvenile cases are disposed of at the police
level, without referral to juvenile court11* Of those that are referred, many
are "settled at intake," or are placed on informal supervision in lieu of immediate adjudication. Because of widely varying practices and policies, no
meaningful national figures can be given, but California has reported that
only 42.5% of boys and 42.2% of girls referred to the juvenile courts for
delinquent acts are handled by court hearing.114 In virtually all cases, police
arrest or contact records exist.
The second factor making the need for an expungement statute particularly acute in juvenile cases is closely tied to the first: the labels or offense
designation on the police department's records (or even the juvenile court's,
for that matter) may not fairly reflect the minor's conduct While this is
true for adult offenders, it is even more the case in juvenile matters. Not
uncommonly, the more serious of two possible crime classifications will be
selected, either in honest doubt as to which is applicable or in an effort to
make the clearance rate for the more serious offense appear higher.11* There
110. Cf. Note, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775, 785-86 (1966).
111. Note 35 supra and accompanying text.
112. Authority cited note 110 supra.
113. The F.B.I. estimate* that 51.5% of all juvenile caaet are settled without referral
to the court, either within the police department itself (47.2%), referral to a welfare
agency (1.6%), or referral to another police agency (2.7%). 1964 FBI Umrom*
Cams Rar. 102 (table 13). On the informal handling of delinquents see Tappaa*
Unofficial D<linqu*ncy, 29 Naa. L. Rav. 547 (1950).
114. GAL. DEP'T or JUSTICE, DELINQUENCY AND PROBATIOK m CALIFORNIA 92-9*

115. A common example is the choice between "grand theft auto" (commonly a M"
ony) and the lesser offense of "joyriding" (commonly a misdemeanor). The author * *
informed by official* of the Office of Economic Opportunity on the West Coast that to*
was a particularly troublesome dichotomy, since some police agencies and juvenile court*
classified all automobile thefts by minors as felonious, while others classified them as joT
riding unless there were aggravating circumstances. The net effect of these dispart**
policies is to exclude some youths from Job Corps placements while permitting the •**
mission of others who committed precisely the same act but did so in a more lento*
jurisdiction.
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js leas chance that the officer will be called in a juvenile case to account
other for his judgment or the evidence to support it.
Extreme cases, while they may make bad law, can be apt examples, and
two may serve to illustrate the point In one case handled in 1958 by the
author as a probation officer, an eleven year old boy was placed in juvenile
hall for burglary: he had stolen a package of bologna from a grocery store
to sustain himself while running away from home, because of conflict with
Ids present "Uncle." The California definition of burglary technically includes entry into an open place of business with intent to steal,11* and when
die young man told the policeman he had gone into the store intending to
shoplift the meat, the officer (under some pressure from the ired shopkeeper) concluded he was indeed a burglar. The minor was presented to
the court as a dependent child, but there nevertheless remains an apprehension record for burglary in the police files.
In an even more ludicrous case, the author was informed of a highly respected and capable police juvenile sergeant who had contacted the juvenile court for assistance in shedding a record of apprehension for "child
nxriesting," which had occurred when he was fourteen years old. While
walking home from school with his thirteen year old inamorata, he had succumbed to his vernal urges and kissed her—in public view upon the street
His heinous conduct was espied by the city's sole juvenile-aid-officer cum
pursuer-of-truants, and he was hustled to the police station, where appropriate forms were filled out before he was sternly admonished and his parents
called. The section under which he was "charged" deals with conduct
arousing or tending to arouse the passions of a child under the age of
fourteen years! 1 " The arrest record remained in the police department's
"fes. He obviously had little trouble in obtaining public safety employment
ty divulgence and explanation, but the significant point is that the record
*as there, buried in some dust-covered bin, and that it turned up and
**eded explanation.
Manifestly, the moral of these tales is not that outlandish results occur
juvenile cases and that we should therefore protect their subjects. It is
ttther that records of very real offenses do exist in a variety of places from
w
Wch they can be retrieved, and that without the protection of an expunge"fcnt statute reaching them, the bromidic recitals of the juvenile court's

m

!1

6. CAU PEN. COO* {

459.

**7. CAL. PEN. COOK | 288. The municipality in question, it may be noted in passJ?^*«at to have displayed singular concern over the oscillatory activity of its citizens.
J^'tedly, it had upon its books until very recently an ancient ordinance prohibiting
* I j *"° l , c r , o n , f r o m k»»ng unless each first wiped the lips of the other with carbolized
'"•e-water.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

EXPUNGEMENT OF ADJUDICATION RECORDS

non-punitive philosophy win not save the juvenile from the records' stigma.
The third reason underlying the especial need for expungement in juvenile cases is shortly stated. The distinction between delinquency and dependency is blurred enough in theory and frequently not drawn at all in
fact The public often identifies the juvenile court with delinquency and
assumes a child under its care to be an offender.11" Further, even a status of
dependency or neglect carries its own special measure of opprobrium which
the child should not have to bear.
i

fatal. The relief extends to children referred for dependency and neglect
is well as to those referred for delinquent conduct Either the person intolved or the probation officer may file the petition, which cannot be done
nntil five years have elapsed from the termination of jurisdiction (in cases
of court disposition) or from the date of referral (in informal dispositions).u* The relief is mandatory if the court finds that the petitioner has
not since been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude, and has attained rehabilitation "to the satisfaction of the court"
The sealing is expressly extended to records and files in the possession of
other agencies, and the application for the order requires the applicant to
1
1st agencies he thinks may possess records. The order is directed to each
such agency, and requires it to seal its records, advise the court of its compfiance with the order, and then seal the order of sealing itself. m The law
specifies that after sealing, the events shall be deemed never to have oc?
curred, and the person "may properly reply accordingly" to any inquiry.
The statute does not preclude inquiry as to the fact of expungement, nor
does it specify whether official agencies may disregard its provisions and
press for information, though its plain wording would seem to compel the
conclusion that they could not The statute has been interpreted to require
an official agency whose files have been sealed to respond to any inquiry:
"We have no record on the named individual."1*1
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B. The Existing Law
j
In recognition of the need, a few states have enacted expungement provisions of varying efficacy. As in the case of the acts applicable to criminal
convictions, some extended comparison may prove helpful.
*
Alaska: Alaska Stat § 47.10.060(e) (1962) permits a minor who has been
tried as an adult after waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction to petition the
court for the sealing of his record. The petition may not be filed until the
sentence has been successfully completed and five years have elapsed. (It is
not clear whether this period is to be measured from the date of conviction
or from the date of completion of the sentence.) The petition may be made
by the Department of Health and Welfare on his behalf, and the order restores all civil rights. The statute provides that no person may ever use the
records so sealed for any purpose, but is silent on the appropriate response
to questions regarding the past offense.
No comparable provision exists for actions under the juvenile court law,
and the section does not reach police records.
Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. § 8-238 (1956) provides for mandatory
destruction of the court records upon the expiration of the period of
probation or after two years from the date of discharge from an institution,
unless before that time the minor has been convicted of another offense.
By implication, this relief is not available to dependent or neglected children, and the law is silent as to the effect of the sealing. The language
("records of the proceeding") would not seem to reach police records. '
California: Under Cal. Welfare & Inst*ns Code § 781, any person who
has been the subject of a petition in juvenile court or of a citation to apnea*
before a probation officer, or who has been taken to a probation offieeii
may petition for the sealing of his records. The section does not apparently
cover the minor whose case has been concluded by the police without reu s . REPORT OF GAL. SPECIAL STUDY COMIC, ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, pt. U •*
(1960).
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H9. In a number of counties it it the practice for the probation department to offer
to file the petition for expungement. This reflect* recognition of the need to make the
persons involved aware of the possibility of such action and to minimise expense and red
upe.
120. The intricacies of these provisions have not insured their uniform success, and a
number of ploys have been developed to circumvent them. In one police department tur***** by the writer, the "sealing" ii accomplished by stamping "seated" upon the face
of the master index card (the so-called "alpha card") and then replacing it in the file.
**» Angeles County reportedly interprets the statute as narrowly as possible and ieals
f°ly the records of the particular offense or situation which resulted in wardship or adindication as a dependent chad, leaving untouched any prior or subsequent entries.
**«« the case hat been transferred between counties, Los Angeles county—and appar""ly others following its lead—altegedly will not honor an expungement order from
**J*her Juvenile court, but will require the institution of new proceedings in its own
fraction.
(It has not been possible to verify these practices because the writer's in****** to the county in question have gone unanswered.)
. Upon
occasion a minor is first brought to municipal court and man is certified to
mnile court when his age is established. The author was told of two instances where
** Municipal court refused at first to honor the sealing order of the juvenile (superior)
court
. *ha probation department personnel interviewed indicated, however, that such eva*** tactics are relatively rare, and from the author's observations, the general level of
^ '•operation has been quite high.
*21. 40 CAU O n . ATT>Y GEH. 50 (1962).
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The statute uniquely provides that the person whose records are sealed
may at a later time petition the court to grant the right of inspection to persons named in the application, apparently to effectuate security clearances
and other investigations for high-risk employment.1**
Far less utilization has been made of this relief than that afforded by
CaL Pen. Code § 1203.45 to misdemeanants under twenty-one. The records
of the Bureau of Criminal Statistics indicate that for the period July 1962December 1965, 791 requests for file clearance were received by the Identification Bureau; 545 were processed to completion.1" The possibility that
this is due to a large number of juvenile referrals who become recidivists
and are ineligible does not seem to be borne out in fact; probably the best
guess is that somewhere between 60% and 85% of delinquents do not become adult violators.1*4 A more plausible explanation is threefold: minors
are not as aware as more mature offenders of the possibility of expungement; they less frequently have the advice of counsel; and there is no required lapse of time before relief is possible under section 1203.45. It is
likely that by the time five years have elapsed since the jurisdiction of the
court was terminated (frequently if not typically at age eighteen) the person
involved may feel the relief is too delayed to be worth the effort.1*8
Indiana: Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3215(a) (Supp. 1966) empowers the court to
order the destruction or obliteration of the record of any child adjudged a
delinquent but never committed to a public or private institution, provided
he has not been arrested for a delinquent act or "cited for any offense," is
reformed, and has been of good behavior for at least two years after judgment. The order of obliteration may be made upon the court's own motion
or upon the motion of the probation officer, cither with or without formal
hearing. The court, at its discretion, may order law enforcement agencies
to produce their records for destruction, and may continue the case for one
year before ruling on the motion for obliteration. The section is not applicable to children handled for dependency and neglect and is silent as to the
effect of destruction.
122. Cf. text accompanying note 78 supra. Only Utah has a similar provision. Set
UTAH CODE ANN. f 55-10-117 (Supp. 1965) (discussed in text accompanying *****
128-31 infra).
123. See note 81 supra.
124. MATZA, op. eit supra note 105, at 22.
125. "(TJhe period of time that must elapse before the procedures are available *
often that in which the existence of the record is most important—the time of higher
education, military service or initial employment'* Note, 79 HARV. L. R*V. 775, 800
(1966).
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jfomjar. Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 38-815(h) (1964) provides that when a
record is made of any public offense committed by a boy under sixteen years
of age or a girl under eighteen, the juvenile court in the county where the
record is made may order either a peace officer or a judicial officer having
such records to destroy them. A unique feature of this law is that it provides
for use of the contempt power to enforce compliance. It docs not reach
dependency or neglect records, but does reach records of police agencies
even where the child was not referred to the court."* The statute requires
any person making a record to notify the juvenile court both of the fact of
the record and its substance. The law sets down no criteria for the exercise
of the court's discretion, and this is one of the most troublesome facets of
expungement acts. It must be presumed that a "standard of reformation"
guides the judge in his decision."1
Minnesota: Minn. Stat Ann. § 242.31 (Supp. 1965) permits the "nullifying" of adjudication records if a minor is committed to the care of the
Youth Conservation Commission and discharged before the expiration of
his maximum term, or if he is placed on probation. In the former case, the
nullification is at the discretion of the court. The order of nullification has
the effect of "setting aside" the conviction and "purging the person thereof."
The conviction shall not thereafter be used against him except when "otherwise admissible" in a subsequent criminal proceeding. The precise scope of
the section is unclear, and the relief available under it apparently overlaps
that afforded by Minn. Stat Ann. § 638.02(2) (Supp. 1965), discussed
above.
While this enactment applies to juveniles, by its terms it does so only
upon conviction of crime. Under Minn. Stat Ann. §§ 242.12, 260.211
(Supp. 1965), juvenile court proceedings are not criminal in nature and do
not result in conviction. Thus, the anomalous conclusion is compelled that
a minor can have his record nullified only if he commits an act sufficiently
grave to warrant waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction and trial as an adult.
A. fortiori, the law does not reach neglect adjudications.
The section makes no provision respecting police or other agency records,
and it is not clear whether the conviction is actually to be removed from the
judgment record.
Missouri: Though it is sometimes referred to as an expungement statute,
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.321 (3) (1959) does not have the full effect of wiping
126. The Attorney General hat ruled that a
information from juvenile records even before
(1958).
127. The difficulties in application of such
*no should be excluded from expungement are

sheriff or county attorney cannot disclose
expungement. See 6 KAN. L. RET. 396
a standard and the Gordian question of
taken up in greater detail in part IV.
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the slate clean and should not properly be so termed. It provides that the
court may destroy, in January of each year, the social histories and information other than the official court file pertaining to any person who has
reached the age of twenty-one. Though other subdivisions of this section
impose confidentiality on both court and law enforcement records, it it apparent that the statute leaves untouched the essential adjudication of status.
Utah: Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-117 (Supp. 1965) permits anyone whose
case has been adjudicated in a juvenile court (seemingly including dependents) to petition the court for sealing of records after one year from the
termination of court jurisdiction or release from the state industrial school
The section provides that the court shall order the sealing if petitioner has
not since been convicted of (and does not have pending) any felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, and if the court is satisfied as to his
rehabilitation. The language of the statute appears quite similar to that of
the California law, specifying that upon entry of the order, the proceedings
are deemed never to have occurred and the petitioner may so respond to inquiry. The sealing order may be extended to law enforcement records, and
subsequent inspection of records is permitted only upon request of petitioner. Since the statute was enacted in 1965,"* it is too soon to assess its
effects. There is indication, however, that the courts regard the relief afforded by the section as exceptional, rather than viewing it as regularly to
be given absent some affirmative reason to the contrary.**• The latter position is apparently taken by the California courts.1*0
In some states, physical destruction of court records may be effected at
the court's discretion, but there is no indication that such destruction affects
the status or nullifies the adjudication.1*1
IV. Two PROPOSEO LAWS AND SOME THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE

Two recently proposed acts represent especially significant attempts to
readjust the status of the reformed first offender: the New York "Amnesty
Law for First Offenders" proposed in 1965"* and the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency's Model Act for the Annulment of a Conviction
128. UTAH CODB ANN. | 55-10-117 (Supp. 1965).
129. Note, 79 HABV. L. REV. 775, 800.
130. Ibid.
131. Compart WASH. Rav. CODB ANN. \ 13.04.230 (Supp. 1965),
GODB ANN. | 16.1-193 (1950). The latter permiti destruction of juvenik
records at the clerk's discretion, after the passage of varying periods of time
on the seriousness of the offense.
132. State of N.Y. Ass'y BUI, Int. No. 233 (3d Rdg. 547, Print. 5363,
(1965).

with Va.
and • * *
depend***
Rec 70S)
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cfCrime. m The two proposals adopt different means of achieving roughly
the same end. Taken in comparison, they point up three of the most pressing considerations of policy that must be met in constructing an expungement law: whether the relief should be automatic or a matter of discretion;
whether the record should be required to be revealed in some circumstances;
and by what means the purpose of the statute is best achieved.
The New York bill very nearly became law. After passage by both the
Assembly and Senate of New York, the act was vetoed by Governor Rockefeller on the ground that it was "unsound" because "too broadly concaved."1*4 The enactment provided for the automatic amnesty of all first
offenders—adult, youthful, or juvenile—who had not been convicted of a
felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude during a "probationary
interval" immediately following completion of sentence. Before amnesty
could be granted, the offender was to file an affidavit of eligibility in the
court of original conviction.1** The probationary period was established as
five years in the case of felony, three years in the case of misdemeanor, and
one year in the case of an adjudication as a youthful offender, wayward
minor, or juvenile delinquent."*
The act specifically restored to the amnestied first offender his accreditation as a witness, his right of franchise, his right to hold public office, and
his right to have issued or reinstated any license granted by federal, state,
or municipal authority (provided, of course, that he were otherwise qualified).1" The amnestied offender was granted the "absolute right to negate"
the fact of his arrest or conviction whenever inquiry was made by either
private persons or public authority.,w All records including fingerprints,
photographs, and the like would be sealed against disclosure by the grant
133. 8 G U M I ft DELINQUENCY 100 (1962). The Model Act w u drafted in response
to recommendations of the National Conference on Parole. NAT*L PROBATION ft PAROLE
AM*W, PAROLE IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 136 (1937).

134. New York Times, July 23, 1965, p. 1, col. 7; p. 32, col. 6. A revised version of
** bill hat been introduced in the 1966 legislative session. State of N.Y. Sen. Bill, Int.
No. 1146 (Print. 1159) (1966). It removes the -automatic amnesty** provision of its
l**<kcesior, and provides for the initiation of proceedings by a verified petition. Under
* » modified bill, the petitioner would be entitled to amnesty if he "reasonably establishes**
* the court's satisfaction that amnesty -would best serve and secure his rehabilitation
* * would best serve the public interest.** Id. at f 91. Cf. note 147 infra, and accoml^nying text This bill was reported passed by the Senate on March 8, 1966. New York
T
«>*», March 9, 1966, p. 30, col. 2. To avoid confusion, all references in the text are to
*** 1963 bffl.
135. State of N.Y. Ass'y Bill, supra note 132, at if 90-91.
*36. Id. at | 90(6).
13
*. W . a t | | 9 2 ( 3 ) - ( 6 ) .
,3
«- Id. at f 92(2).
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of amnesty, but express provision was made for retention, use, and disclosure
by law enforcement personnel actually engaged in investigation of crime.1*1
Expungement was extended to the records of persons arrested and released
without charge or acquitted after the lapse of a probationary interval of one
year.14* Provision was made for acceleration of amnesty for first offenders
released on probation or parole, at the discretion of the sentencing court,141
and the amnestied status of any first offender granted relief under the statute
was to be forfeited on subsequent offense. ,u
The N.C.C.D. Model Act differs from the New York bill in several ways.
The relief of annulment of conviction is not restricted to first offenders, as it
is under the New York legislation."* The Model Act provides that the
order may be entered immediately upon discharge from sentence; the proceedings may be initiated either by the individual or the court.1*4 The
granting of the relief is discretionary rather than automatic, though it is
submitted that this is a difference somewhat more illusory than real: the
New York bill in effect provided automatic issuance after the court's discretion had been exercised. It is nevertheless true that the New York approach makes the grant more a matter of right. The Model Act by implication permits the court to withhold some or all civil rights, though it provides
that the person shall be treated in all respects as if he had never suffered
conviction.
The most striking feature of the Model Act is its provision to protect the
offender whose record has been expunged from the bind of disclosure of his
past In any application for employment, license, or "other civil right or
privilege," or in any appearance as a witness, a person may be questioned
about his previous criminal conduct only in language such as the following:
"Have you ever been arrested for or convicted of a crime which has not
been annulled by a court?"14* This approach to the very difficult balance
of disclosure against denial has not been adopted in any existing enactment,
and seems eminently sound. As will be later discussed, it lends itself to the
solution of the problem of high-risk employment.1** To date, no jurisdiction
has adopted the Model A c t
139.
140.
141.
142.
Human
194.

Id. at f 93.
"
~~~~
Id. at | 99.
Id. at H 97, 98.
Id. at | 95. Enforcement of the bill wa« vested in the State Comminioo f<*
Rights, and specific penalties were provided for violation of Its provisions. M **

143. 8 CRIME * DELINQUENCY 100

(1962).

144. Ibid. Presumably, the offender would be required to file a petition in «*tbef
case.
145. Ibid.
146. See p. 183 imfr*.
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In vetoing the New York bill, the Governor remarked its failure to distinguish among the various grades of crime, and its apparent grant of relief
jtgardless of the individual's efforts at rehabilitation.147 In part, these critioans are pertinent; in part, they miss the mark of the bill. A significant
aspect of the bill was its express reservation to the court of the power to
deny amnesty in the case of a "dangerous offender," defined as one deemed
by the court "to be suffering from a serious personality disorder indicating
t marked propensity towards continuing criminal conduct or activity."14*
For the realistic protection of the community, such a provision is indispensable and this standard of classification seems far preferable to differentiation
<m the basis of felony versus misdemeanor, or even on the basis of crimes
against person versus crimes against property. The young man who, on
impulse, attempts to hold up a candy store with a toy pistol and is charged
with armed robbery may be far less a menace to the community's safety than
the would-be cat burglar who sets out to "hot prowl" an apartment, is
found loitering on the rear stairs under suspicious circumstances, and is
charged with disorderly conduct (very likely on the agreement that he will
"cop a plea"). Under the usual grade-of-crime standard, the former would
(h is assumed) be ineligible for amnesty or expungement, and the latter
would be qualified.
Manifestly, some safeguard must be built into an expungement statute
against the erasure of criminal records in improper cases, but the safeguard
must be grounded on rational criteria. The vice of the "dangerous offender" standard adopted by the New York bill is in its vagueness, but
therein may be precisely its strength as well. The legislature cannot fix with
exactness every case that it wishes to exclude from the operation of the law.
If the law is to work realistically and effectively, the enactment must enunciate the standard and leave its application to the courts.
In the author's view, the yardstick of the "dangerous offender" as a
measure of exclusion would be improved by eliminating the "serious personality disorder" term and expanding the "clear and present danger" test
embodied in the standard of "marked propensity towards continuing criminal conduct" The test of serious personality disorder requires a finding
that the trial court is ill-equipped to make, at least without more effective
Psychiatric assistance than is presently available. The expansion of the
*andard of clear and present danger to the community would require that
U* court be empowered, in the case of specified serious crimes (murder,
forcible rape, vicious assaults, and the like), to find the person a "dangerous
H7. New York Times, July 2S, 1965, supra note 134.
148. State of N.Y. A » > Bill, supra note 132, at | 90(2).
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offender" ineligible for expungement simply on the gravity of the offense,
without specific finding on the likelihood of further criminality.
Such a standard would permit a more realistic discrimination between
offenses than can be gained by the use of a felony-misdemeanor formula.
Practically speaking, the likelihood of a person committing a crime of such
serious magnitude seeking expungement seems small.
The assertion that the New York bill granted expungement without regard to rehabilitative effort is chimerical and overlooks the presumption
obviously indulged in by the legislature; t.*., that if the person has completed the probationary interval without conviction, he has in fact made
efforts toward rehabilitation. If the requirement were added that the judge
could not grant expungement without a finding of "sincere effort toward
rehabilitation," by what other criteria would this be measured and by what
other evidence could it be proved? Surely the best evidence of rehabilitative
effort is the avoidance of future criminality.
Two examples are frequently chosen to illustrate the unrealistic "dogooder" spirit and visionary blindness to danger often claimed for those who
advocate expungement statutes: the embezzler could deny his past in seeking a position at a bank, and a school teacher could conceal a sex offense.
These illustrations of the breadth of the proposed New York law were used
by Governor Rockefeller, and the point is by no means invalid. There is no
easy answer to i t What it comes to is this: are we willing to run the risk of
the embezzler's resumption of his larcenous habits in return for the opportunity to restore a very large number of persons to a useful social state? The
risk of the repetition of the school teacher's offense upon one of his charges?
Surely it is immediately apparent that these risks arc of vastly different
magnitude and cannot be singly answered. In order to have any sensibk
assessment of the risk, the offense cannot be viewed in vacuo, but only in
terms of the individual who committed the offense and the drcumstances
in which he committed i t It is precisely here that the "dangerous offender"
discretion of the court is essential.

a prior offender from police employment because he may be unable to with*
stand the stresses of his position; the risks to the public from his defalcation
are too great (But again, the risk cannot be intelligently weighed in abstraction from the offense and the offender. Some of the most compassionate and effective policemen of the author's acquaintance have had rather
besmirched pasts. Lacking any sure calculus of risk, we are remitted to the
sound and understanding discretion of the hiring agency, and it would seem
necessary to have full disclosure.) To require a former offender to divulge
his past offense in seeking police employment is not to say that he cannot
reform, or even that he will likely reoffend. It is rather to say that by his
past difficulty, he has indicated possible instability and lack of judgment,
and the appointing authority must be made aware of the risk before it places
him in a position requiring coolness of head and firmness of self-control to
accompany the loaded sidearm. This is a very different thing from forever
holding him a social outcast because of his past.
Even greater risks exist in the area of the national security and defense,
and here too full disclosure seems essential. Consider the position of an airman charged with responsibility for a missile or other vastly lethal piece of
modern armament To prevent an unauthorized detonation or launch, it
is imperative that the personnel chosen for control operate at a continued
high level of reliability. Those who are possibly unreliable must be excluded."* Since a prior unlawful act may be indicative of an impulsive
character, and an individual who possibly could not cope with the tremendous pressures of such an assignment, its commission must be divulged.
The antagonistic desiderata of abolition of record on the one hand and
required revelation of it in particular circumstances on the other are not as
irreconcilable as they seem. If an expungement statute only authorizes a
response denying any record, it fails to meet the problem and throws the
whole matter upon the person whose record is expunged. Per contra, if the
statute adopts the "limitation on inquiry" mode of the Model Act, it is
possible not only to permit the regenerate offender to take advantage of his
°cw status, but also to protect the overriding interests of public security.
This might feasibly be done with provisos, excepting from the limited
"equity enjoined by the statute any cases where the person granted expunge*
m
ent makes application (for example) for a position involving the super*
v&on of children, for a position in law enforcement, or for a position

Beyond this, however, is another consideration: we cannot lose sight of
overriding values society wishes—and n«eds—to protect We value so highly
the sacrosanctity of the child's person that we may very well wish to preclude a former sex offender from again dealing with children, on the ca
chance that he may reoffend. The possibility of serious harm is too gf****
though the probability of reoffense might be small. By the same token, d*
harm caused by a repetition of embezzlement is more easily insured again*
and more easily borne, and this risk we may wish to assume.
As a mztter of policy in view of the risk, we may deem it necessary to b**
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U9. On the compelling need for pertontJ stability in a "dispenser of lethal power**
** U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, Guidancg /of Implementing th§ Human R****%ty Program, AFM 160-55 (1962), in KATZ, GOLDSTEW ft DWSHOWITZ, MATMUALS
° * PSYCHOANALYSIS ft LAW 577-92 (5th temp, mimeo. ed. 1965) (cited with pennmion
^tfce author*).
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sensitive in terms of national security. The use of the limited inquiry would
do much to facilitate employment and would eliminate the circumvention
of the expungement order save in the few excepted cases.
The contrast of the New York bill and the Model Act is instructive in raising another difficult point: should expungement be wholly automatic, mandatory upon fulfillment of the prescribed conditions as the New York bill
sought to make it; or wholly discretionary, as the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency recommends?180 Bluntly put, if the grant of expungement is wholly automatic, some will get it who should not; if it is
wholly discretionary, some will not get it who should have i t Closely tied
to this problem is another desideratum: effective accessibility. Consideration of the latter issue may help to illumine the former.
It makes no sense whatever to provide statutory means for redefinition of
status and then surround their utilization with such procedural obstacles
that they are not invoked. Really, the problem is twofold: the reformed
offender must be made aware of the remedy (else its incentive value is lost),
and he must be able to invoke it with a minimum of difficulty. Quite similar to the expungement problem is the matter of restoring competency following discharge from hospitalization for mental illness, and experience
with such procedures is of significance to this inquiry.
A recent study in the District of Columbia compared the means there
available for restoration: automatic restoration on certificate of discharge
from the hospital superintendent, and petition for restoration upon conditional release."1 Of 329 persons studied, 327 were "officially restored" to
competency by certificate (mandatory on discharge as cured). Only one
had gained restoration by petition following conditional release. One other
person had filed an application, but after six months it had not been processed. The study concluded that although the precise reasons for the extremely small number of applications for restoration on conditional release
were unknown, "lack of knowledge of the necessity for taking such action is
probably a factor."1"
On the other hand, the CalfforniajrtatisrJcs on the invocation of the
youthful offender expungement statute1** suggest that requiring the offender
to petition for the relief does not necessarily deter him from procuring rt*
His awareness of the existence of expungement and the means of achieving

jt, and his expectation that it may be gained without undue trouble, hujniliation, and time, would seem far more significant factors.
Typically, the reformed offender may hold a dim view of the law and its
pjocesses, and be chary of invoking their aid. On the other hand, he has
committed an offense, and it is surely not unreasonable to expect him to take
tome steps to initiate the process of expungement. It will be recalled that
even the "automatic" New York act required the offender to commence the
amnesty by filing an affidavit. The procedures necessary should be kept to
a high degree of simplicity and a low degree of cost. It would not be inappropriate to permit the court to hold the hearing informally, in chambers,
after appropriate notice to the agencies involved.
A satisfactory resolution of these points can be reached if the court is
required to inform the first offender at the time of imposition of sentence of
the possibility of expungement. Notice should be included in any copy of
the sentence order given him. At the termination of his sentence, a letter
informing him of the availability of the expungement remedy and of the
probationary interval should be sent by the clerk of the court to his last
known address. It would seem desirable to have the probation department
assist in the preparation of the simple petition and any necessary supporting
documents, and the offender should be informed of this in the clerk's
letter and instructed to contact the probation department for assistance.184
The statute authorizing the expungement should be mandatory rather
than directory; that is, the court should be required to order expungement
if the person has not suffered further conviction during the probationary
interval unless the court finds strong affirmative cause to deny it (a finding
that the person is a "dangerous offender"). In that sense, the process should
be "automatic," and the filing of a simple request with a supporting document should be prima facie entitlement to expungement.
For yet another reason it seems wise to the writer to require that the
offender initiate the proceedings, and that is the reason of incentive. As
**& paper has attempted to show, our penal law, in its present state, is
one-sided, providing only negative motivation for reform—the avoidance of
future focarceration.1" If the offender is provided with a positive stimulus
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150.

8 C M M I k DELINQUENCY 99

(1962).

151. Zenoff, Civil Incompetency in the District of Columbia, 32 GBO. WASK. I*
243 (1963).
152. Id. at 249.
153. GAL. Pan. GODS | 1203.45. See note 81 supra and accompanying tent.
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154. While this suggestion might teem unrealistic in view of the fact that probation
P*rtments are often overworked and understaffed, it must be pointed out that the
J^Hfcd documents are very largely pro forma and the task is essentially a clerical one.
^•Printed petition and affidavit forms may be helpful The restoration of the reformed
endcr to his place in society is the goal of any probation program, and the specialized
•*«« of probation personnel would seem particularly useful in assisting the eligible
***t offender to avail himself of the relief. The availability of expungement can be a
***rful asset in a casework plan.
US. Professor Graham Syket has aptly pointed out that the system of punishment
de
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and is given an initiating role in the process by which the readjustment of
status is achieved, it is likely that he will regard it as more meaningful**
As a means of social control, reward for achievement of the conduct winch
punishment was designed to attain is more effective than punishment
alone.1" If the transgressor is forgiven by the law as he was condemned by
it, he may hold the legal process in better esteem and be less impelled to
violate its dictates.1*
Since the expungement procedure here proposed requires a certain discretion and since the sealing process should extend to agency records, it
is preferable that it be a matter of judicial order rather than administrative
direction. The court is likely more accessible than an administrative body
and its power is better known.1** The National Council on Crime and Delinquency has concluded that authorization of expungement by judicial
order should produce wider and more uniform invocation of the power,
while allowing for sound discretion to take individual circumstances into
account.1*9 The regular purgation of police department files is desirable
from several standpoints,1*1 but for the foregoing reasons it seems unwise
to expect that expungement can be accomplished by such agency action
alone.
V. ASUMMTNG-UP

Creating a "model" statute is more often a matter of conjury than of
construction, and it will not be attempted here. However, as a starting
point for future discussion, it may be useful to summarize the requisites of
an effective expungement statute and some of the means by which those
requisites are most likely to be achieved, and to add a few interstitial
remarks.
_
implies a scheme of reward, and that it is precisely upon this point that our systeinj*
penal law founders—at feast from the point of view of the individual it seeks to ccatt*
Though he spoke in particular of the prison and its administration, his remarks •**
germane to the correctional law as a whole. SYKES, T H E SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES 50-W

(1958).
;
156. Cf. Goldstein, Potic* Discretion Not to Invoke the Crimtntl Proeess: Um**+
biUty Decisions m the Administretion of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 590-92 (I960). * '
157. Cf. MANNHEIM, MAW AKD SOCIETY m AW Aox<*>r RECONSTRUCTION 2Sl-*»

(1940). This observation assumes the point that we punish with a purpose of ^
habitation, and not solely to satisfy our urge for vengeance.
w «
158. Professor Mataa observes that delinquency is facilitated when the "moral "*j
of the law is neutralised." MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 98 (1964). A

"**g

injustice (*.«., that even if one reforms, one will not be forgiven and cannot rid ***^
of the stigma of the crime) supports the processes by which the neutralization «xon>^
159. 8 CRIME A DELINQUENCY 99 (1962).

^

160. Ibid. The same conclusion was reached by the commentators to the W*T
Penal Code. MODEL PEWAL CODE f 6.05, comment at 30-S1 (Tent Draft No. 7, **
•

161. MYREN ft SWANSOK, POLICE WORK WITH CHILDREN 79 (1962).
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If it is to serve its purpose, the action of expungement should be complete,
accessible, realistic, and at least acceptable to the public taste. T o that
end, the following observations are offered.
(1) The expungement of the adjudication of guilt of a juvenile defoquent or an adult first offender should be made mandatory, upon petition
of the offender, if the court finds that he has not reoffended, unless strong
affirmative reason exists for denial The court should have the power to
deny expungement upon a finding that the person is a "dangerous offender,"
either because there is a likelihood of further criminal conduct or because
the offense was sufficiently grave. A judgment denying expungement
Aould be made appealable.
" (2) A probationary interval following the completion of sentence as a
precondition to expungement is a wise precaution. There is no magic in
a metric of time, but what we are seeking is the man who can remain
stable in his community life without the need even of minimal correctional
restraint or supervision. He must be able to succeed "on his own," and
expungement immediately upon discharge seems ill-conceived.
Unfortunately, there is evidently no period of time beyond which social
Kientists can say there is any given likelihood that the offender will not
reoffend, and so we must strike a balance of common sense. An apt selection would seem to be two years (after termination of supervision) in the
case of a juvenile delinquent or in the case of a misdemeanor, and five
years in the case of a felony, with the court empowered to accelerate the
expungement in its discretion. Whatever time selected should not be so
k>ng as to render the relief useless. (In the case of a dependency or neglect
adjudication in the juvenile court, expungement should be made available
•^mediately upon attainment of majority.)
(3) The expungement statute (or statutes) should include juvenile and
*dult offenders, and extend as well to dependent children of the court.
°n the juvenile court level, expungement should not be limited to first
winders, since a minor may commit a number of misdeeds before
"^ghtening out" through maturation.
(4) At both adult and juvenile levels, the statute should reach not only
*e officially adjudicated case but cases of arrest-release and cases of acquit13
well. It should extend the order of sealing to all law enforcement and
* Ilcr agency records, including those in cases disposed of intra muros. Bet
**3s*tiiepetitioner may wish to permit limited inspection of the records at a
time—for example, in making application for a security-critical job—
***ute should provide for sealing rather than destruction of the records.
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Records so sealed should be required to be removed from the mam cr
master file and kept separately.
The widespread dissemination of records is an aid to effective law enforcement, but it poses a problem for effective expungement. The order of
sealing should be directed to each enforcement agency having a record of
the petitioner, and should be sent as well to all central indices and repositories. As one commentator has put it: "It seems that when the Moving
Finger writes these days, a dozen Xerox copies likely are made." m In
this respect, consideration must be given to records and identification data
forwarded by the police department to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
These submitted materials are considered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to be the property of the transmitting agency, which must authorize any changes or deletions. 10 When a card reporting an arrest is returned
to the contributor at the latter's request, the arrest entry is deleted from
the individual's identification record at the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Therefore, the order of expungement should direct the local enforcement
agency to request the return of any transmitted records.
Provision should be made for certification of compliance by the agenda
named in the order, and, upon receipt of the certifications, the judgment
reciting the order of sealing should itself be sealed, to remove any chance
of unauthorized public access.
(5) The statute should expressly set forth the effects of the order in
restoring the civil rights of the redeemed offender, and it should expressly
annul the conviction and the offense. In addition to specifying that the
person will thereafter be regarded as never having offended, it should provide that in all cases of employment, application for license or other civil
privilege, examination as a witness, and the like, the person may be ques*
tioned only with respect to arrests or convictions not annulled or expunged.
Exceptions should be set out in cases of high-risk employment where very
great interests are at stake, such as law enforcement positions and the*
directly involving the national security.
The adoption of the "limited inquiry" provision will do more than enable the accommodation of the conflicting need! of the individual and
the overriding public good; it will remove much of the public objection *>

this type of statute In commending Governor Rockefeller's veto of the
Hew York bill, the District Attorney of Manhattan is reported to have
said that the bill was unrealistic because "it permitted a person to lie about
his former conflict with the law."1*4 It is perhaps hard to articulate but
there is—to the writer's mind, at least—something objectionable about
legalized prevarication even though one can rationalize the point by the
worthiness of the end. It impairs the law's integrity by creating a fiction
where none is needed. To only allow the offender to deny his offense leaves
the burden on him; 10 restrict the questioning about his offense places the
focus where it belongs, on the attitudes of society.1*5
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162. Baum, Wiping Out a Criminal or Juvenile Record, 40 CAL, S.B.J. 816,
(1965).
163. Information on the policy of the F.B.I. regarding submitted record* " *
tained from identification division administrators in Washington, D.C., through tht I
of special agents of the San Jose, California, field office. The author gratefully
knowledges their assistance.
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(6) Because of the differences in kind and the overwhelming need for
records in the control of thoughtless and irresponsible drivers, the privilege
of expungement should not be extended to traffic offenses. Moreover, these
violations are regarded by society in an entirely different light than the
usual order of crimes and leave no such residue of stigma; hence, there
is no compelling need for their inclusion in the scope of an expungement
provision.
(7) The statute should provide that upon subsequent conviction, the
expunged record of an adult violator may be considered by the court for
the purposes of sentencing or appropriate disposition.
In conclusion, most offenders do not remain criminals all their lives, and
we should not treat them as if they do. It is manifestly not the purpose
of the penal law to ascribe permanent criminality to a first offender, though
that is largely its effect 1M This article is not intended as a panegyric for
a soft-headed penology. It is rather an attempt to point up a serious flaw in
164. New York Tunes, July 23, 1965, p. 1, col. 7; p. 32, col. 6. The objection that
expungement and vacation of conviction laws permit the "rewriting of history" is frequently raised. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE f 6.05, comment at 30 (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1957).
165. The adoption of a "limited inquiry" rule does not solve all the former offender's
employment problems or insure that the employer will not discern the offense. It
"trely blocks the route of direct inquiry, and its virtue in so doing is that it makes
**tch more clear the spirit of the statute by cutting off the main source of forced discfcxure. Total compliance with that spirit can never be assured, and employers will be
*°k to learn by indirection what they cannot learn directly. Customarily, inquiry is
**de about past employment; personnel officials desire to know when, where and why
*• longer. Thus, an employment gap because of a jail sentence may be all too apparent
While questioning of this kind can allow the employer to evade the statute's intended
tn
»* it is neither realistic nor desirable to attempt to foreclose all questioning about past
^or». The "limited inquiry** mode can substantially reduce the potential for forced
^^osure of offense, but it cannot wholly eliminate it.
166. People v. Pieri, 269 N.Y. 315, 327, 199 N.E. 495, 499 (1936).
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our present legal system: the failure to provide means for redefining the
status of the rehabilitated transgressor. It is submitted that an expunge,
ment process will not serve to hamper effective law enforcement, but will
stand as an adjuvant to the goal of the correctional law. It should provide
a potent incentive to reformation, and should render our response to
criminality less febrile and more effectual. At the very least, it is deserving
of serious trial.
We would do well to bear in mind that
it is a legal principle that correctional law is forgiving. Forgiveness is
part and parcel of rehabilitation, whether of criminals or anyone else
who has erred, or who has, in fact, what all of us have—the defects of
being human.1*7
167.
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Model Rules mth Commentary
Introduction
These Model Rides set forth guidelines governing the di
semination and retention of arrest and conviction records and recoi
information by law enforcement agencies. Unlike other Model Rult
prepared by the Project on Law Enforcement Policy and Rulemakinj
they are not aimed principally at the street police officer. They ai
intended to provide guidance for law enforcement administrators an
recordkeeping personnel They cover an area where law enforcemer
discretion has, in the past, been virtually unguided by legislative c
judicial pronouncement To the extent practicable they draw upo
existing statutes, judicial decisions and agency policies- For the men
part, however, no such sources exist and a variety of other material
have been relied upon.1
These Rules have been drafted to provide for the legitimat
need of law enforcement agencies to have access to information witt
out violating therightsof privacy of individual citizens. Their nugc

AO0 D 8 8 C vOVBvBp ^fUfflyTTiff I B ii.rl l l W U n w UKvvV A i m I H W M I V *

0) MODEL ADMINISTRATIVE' REGULATIONS *OR CRDflNAl
OFFENDER RECORD INFORMATION, Technical Memorandum No, 4, Maicfa 1972, prt
p«ed by Project SEAilCH^ystcm for ElcctioafcAni^
torks (hereinafter referred to at SEARCH MODEL REGULATIONS*
0 0 Uniform Jtrfenflc Omit Act, approved by the National Conference o
Commhrioners on UmTotm State U w t aM the Ainwkra Bar Aaiodatlonm 1968;
( $ ) PoBcks aad practice* of tba poflcc departments of ancfamatl; OaDaf
Daytc*; District of Cctnmo^
Qt) RETORT OFTOECOMMIT1CT TO I N V E S T O R
POLICE ARREST RECORDS ON EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES WTHEDBTWC]
OF COLUMBIA 0567) (commonly and hereinafter lefened to as t * ^
adofrtedly the District of Colom^^
arrest and conviction records;
„^~*
(Y) NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE CRIME 0973X * * * * * 2
,e|«rt of the National Adtiaoiy C c « ^ ^
<vi) CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ( W 3 X prepared by the^National AcM
scry Commission on CdmJnat Justice Standards and Goals (berein#ftcr referred to as tn<
NAC REPORT).

feature is the Habitation on dissemination of arrest and conviction
record information to prospective employers. This reflects the view
that a Strang law enforcement interest exists in preserving the confidentiality of such records, particularly when easy access for prospective employeii serves to make persom with a criminal histo
unemployable, and, as such, more likely to continue or resume their
criminal activities. Furthermore, it now seems likely that unless law
enforcement agencies take positive steps to control the dissemination
of arrest and conviction records legislatures and the courts will do so
in ways that might harm legitimate law enforcement needs.2

2* Since the pobtcarlon of the original approved draft of these Rnkt in May 1973,
(hoe have been rigm^.^ developments in efforts by the Federal government to legulate
the dlnfMlmllon and setention of anest and conviction records. Although these efforts have
not yet leachedfruition,they axe likely to have a substantial Impact c* the practices of law
enforcement agjenciet.
Of greatest long term importance is the legislation now under consideration by the
93d Congress, Two principal bills are Senate Bills 2964 introduced during the administration
of then-President Richard I I Nxon (hereinafter referred to as the administration bill) and
2963 (hereinafter refetred to as the Ervin bill). The sponsors of mis legislation have made it
dear that they are not committed to the present language of the bills, but are more concerned
with eliciting comments regarding the problems of criminal justice data collection and dissemination and the right to privacy. However, considering die widespread support in the
Congress for some kind of legislation to regulate die use of criminal justice data, it is probable
that legislation v/ffl be forthcoming.
Both bills provide for the sealing of a person's crimirua record siter the i«son has o ^
free from the supervision of any criminal justice agency for seven years Of convicted of a misdemeanorX In ad^9tio% bom bOb would req
the dale of an anest if no conviction occurs during mat i»ric^ no prc«ec«tic« is pending at
the end of that period, and the person is not a fugitive. The term seating, as used in both
bffis, means that the record b to be closed and thereafter made available onty for strictly
limited purposes ( e ^ research, icview by the ihdrvidud), or rnusu^
administration bill requires a specific determination by the US. Attorney General
Both bflb generally limit access to and dissemination of crhninalJustice record knforsnation to crinmul jautioe aa^ndes only9 and m
tiomase provided for bona fide research im^jects, for me indivttud
m the Ervmbity for the purpose of deter^^
by staaa or federal statute (or federal ewcuthe order, m me adrninistiati^
also provide piooedases for ensuring that record information is secure and accurate. Arrest
records must contain the ultimate disposition or current status of the case.
The bffis differ in their implementation and control schemes, in the limits placed on
teswsauldtaasisnattdlcaitf
ofrecords as opposed to only their seafing. Tlieadmiiristmtionbffl places snost of te
of Implementation and control on the US. Attorney General, while the Ervin bftl would
estabhsh a new federal agency, the Federal Information Systems Board, to oversee the implemcyntatkm and functioning of the legation.
_. 4
The more objectionable features of the legislation from a law enforcement standpoint
are the provisions in the Ervin bill calling for prompt sealing or purging of criminal history
record information when the police do not refw the case to the prosecutor or fte

SECTION L PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
For the purposes of these Model Rules, the foUowing definitions are operative.
Rule 101 Definitions.
Anest Record: A compilation of information, centrally
maintained in law enforcement custody, of any arrest or temporary detention of an individual. It also is known as a rap sheet and
includes the identity of die person arrested or detained, the

elects not to initiate formal criminal proceedings, strict limitations on the dissemination of
arrest record information even to other criminal justice agencies, purging and seafing criminal
history records.
However, the set of security and privacy guidelines designed to regulate the dissemination of criminal record and history information which were issued by the VS. Department
of Justice on February 8, 1974 is viewed as the most significant development to date (Federal Register, Volume 39, No. 32, Feb. 14,1974, pp. 5636 et seq.) (hereinafter referred to as
the Proposed Rules.) The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration subsequently held
public hearings and solicited written comments on the rules. Thefinalregulations are expected
to differ in some respects from those proposed, although the substance of the proposed rules
will remain largely unchanged.
The Proposed Rules are divided into three parts. Part A consists of general provisions;
Part B covers state and local criminal justice information systems; and Part C deals with the
federal system and the interstate exchange of criminal Justice information.
Part A states that the purpose of the regulations is:
to assure that criminal Justice information systems are operated In a manner
to ensure that adequate provisions are made for: The completeness, integrity, accuracy, system security, and the protection of individual privacy.
Proposed Rules * 20.1.
A criminal justice information system involves the equipment, faculties, procedures,
etc for the collection, processing, preservation or dissemination of criminal justice information. Criminal Justice information includes criminal intelligence information plus information
compfled by a criminal justice agency consisting of identification data, notations of arrests,
nature and disposition of criminal charges, sentencing, confinement, rehabilitation, pardon
and release. Proposed Rules ( 20.2(a) (b) (c).
Part B provides that the ree^tiom contaaeed merem appfy
svstoiastf any rnrt of the system fe
by the Uw Enforcement Assistance Adiiiinhliation under Title I of the Omnibus Crime Controt and Safe Streets Act, and to state and local systems which exchange information with
any information system operated by the VS. Department of Justice to the extent that the
state or local system participates. Proposed Rales | 2020(a). Excluded from the operation
of Part B are systems employed to identify or apprehend Ihghtves or wanted persons. Proposed Rales 5 20.20(b). (The reguUtiom do not attempt to define such systems.)
Part C applies to all VS. Department ofJustice (*£, Federal Bureau of Investigation)
criminal justice information systems that serve two or more states and to all state and local
criminal justice agencies to the extent that they utilize the Department's systems. Part C also
applies to both manual and automated systems.

n

nature cf the police contact («£.. arrest or detention), the charge
Of any), andfliefinaldisposition or presentstate ofeach charge
or arrest incfaded in the record. Compilations of general or inresttfrtlrc ipfonnation (often referredtoas investigative reports
fr*ttnementtoffacts),*adurcst books, if pubhc records accordingtostate orfederallaw, are not inclnded within'the definition'
of arrest record.
Owwicfion Record: Any record maintained in law enforcement custody which indicates that the indhidnal who is the
subject of merecordhas been convicted of committing a criminal
offense.
Crhninal Justice Personnel: Judges, clerks of courts, prosecutors, correctional officers (including officers in juvenile institutions), parole boards and officers, and probation officers.
Juvenile Record: An arrest or convictionrecordof any
person who is defined as a juvenile according to state or federal
^^ Law Enforcement Agencies: All local and municipal police
Apartments, sheriffs' departments, and states and federal
agencies with criminal law enforcement responsibilities.
Law Enforcement Purposes: The prevention, detection and
control of crime, and the identification, location, and apprehension of criminal offendeis.
Temporaiy Detention: A restraint on liberty (such as a
stop) not resulting in a full-custody arrest and booking.

the date and place of the arrest, the offense(s) and the status or
F ^ i ! of *'.<**&&' The SEARCH Model Regulations simiL
taut the definition of arrestrecord,and California has taken
same approach through legislation. CaL Penal Cede § 11120 (19:
Investigativereports
are not included in thistennand are not cove
by these Rules.3
Arrest books are chronologicalrecordsof all persons
carcerated by law enforcement personnel. If they are public reco
acconhng to state or federal law (see, e.g.t District of Columbia Q
8 4-135) and are, therefore, open to inspection by the public or
press, they are outside the scope of these Rules. If they are not put
records, they are included within the definition of an arrest rect
and are subject to the Rules.
.. . . T h e t e r m conviction recordrefersto anyrecordwhich
dicates that a person has been convicted of any crime. Often «
yictionrecordsare the same as updated arrestrecords,but they a)
include conviction data on persons summoned to appear to answ
criminal charges and never subject to arrest Originally, the Rul
attempted to combine arrest and convictionrecords,but it was f<
that in certain instances agencies may want to distinguish betwa
arrest records and conviction records for purposes of dissemination
outside recipients.
The term detention includes, along with stops, those fu
custody arrests which are promptly followed by release.*

Commentary
^ ^
The term arrest record includes records of all full-custody
wrests and temporary detentions of juveniles as well as of adults. It
raters to centrally maintained records which list an arrestee's identity
3. Lew Enforcement •feades need Btife eneooi*«ement to strive foe selntasl nvbfi
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A juvenile record is to be distinguished fromrecordsof court
proceedii«s involving juveniles; the latter frequently arc treated in
statutes providing for eventual sealing or expungement Few slates,
SISTuL i ,fari,ar P 1 0 ^ 0 1 * Pertaining to juvenile records mainII / ^ J * " ' enforcement
agencies, although some states require
1
a n d a d u l t rccords
E2£
r^t***
*
*P***e (see, e.g.f Missouri
H
^ " d y c t f « C 3 o d e § 211J21)andafew provide for return of
ponce records relating to juveniles when the record of court proceedings has been expunged.
Law enforcement agencies include (those) various public
agencies which exercise the police function. Excluded are (persons
acting as) private detectives, personnel investigators and private security agents.
Law enforcement purposes is a term frequently used by
? ? ! ? t 0 d i s c u s s ttit permissible scope of release of records. It
includes those duties normally performed by law enforcement agencies m carrying out the police function.
Oimlnal Justice personnel denotes public officers-other
than law enforcement officers-who are part of the system of criminal
justice.

SECTION IIL PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE RECORDS AN
RECORD INFORMATION
Rule 301 General Rule.
Only departmental personnel expressly authorized by la*
or by the (insert title of head of agency) pursuant to his authoi
ity, may release arrest or conviction records or information con
tained therein.
Commentary
This Rule requires that authority to release record informa
tion be delegated to a specific person or persons. In some cases,
authority is provided specifically by law (as in the District of Columbia). In other cases, the head of the agency provides the authorization
(as in Dallas). Confidentiality and accountability are more easily
ensured by restricting and clearly defining the authority of Department
personnel to release records. Cf. SEARCH Model Regulations, Regulation 6.

SECTION IV. PERSONS TO WHOM AND PURPOSES FOR WHICH DISSEMINATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORD INFORMATION IS
AUTHORIZED
SBCnONIL SCOPE OF THE RULES
Rule 201 General Rule.
^ J ^ n w t or conviction records and information contained
therein may not be released except as authorized by these Rules.
Commentary
^ This Rule expressly limits authority to disseminate arrcst or
conviction records and information contained therein to that provided
by the Model Rules.

i*

Historically, the decision to collect, retain, and release arrest
and conviction records has been regarded as being almost exclusively
within the scope of law enforcement discretion. Courts generally have
recognized that where such records are compiled following a lawful
arrest, their retention in confidential files for use as an investigative
tool, including dissemination to other law enforcement agencies for
such (purposes), is justified in the interest of promoting effective law
enforcement. See Walker v. Lamb, 259 A.2d 663 (DeL 1969); CisseU
v. Brostron, 395 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. App. 1965); and Fernlcoh v.
Keenan, 39 A.2d 851 (NJ. Chan. 1944). Further, the courts traditionally have refused to interfere with the practice of limiting access
to such records to certain persons. See cases cited, Comment, Retention and Dissemination of Arrest Records: Judicial Response, 38 U.

CM. L. Rev. 850 0971)- Although records are fieely exchanged
among taw enforcement agencies, certain limits have often been
placed on public inspection on the grounds that the public has no
light to inspect criminal records maintained bytawenforcement agencies. See CaL GcVt Code § 6254 ( 0 (1968);Pec*fe v. Wttkms, 287
P.2d 555 (CaL App. 1955); Cal. Ops. Atfy Gem 1 (I960). Recent
Congressional legislation has similarly limited the right of pubHc inspection, specifically exempting law enforcement records from the
Freedom of Information Act On the other hand, when release ofsuch
records to the pubfic has been challenged as an improper invasion of
individual privacy, the majority view has been to reject the contention.
See Purdy v. Mutkey, 228 So.2d 132 (Fb. App. 1969); KoW v.
O'Connor, 142 NJb\2d 818 (in. App. 1957); Voelker v. Tyndatt.
IS NJB^d 548 (1947).
The retention of arrest and convictionrecords,and the release of information they contain, only lately have been subject to
successful challenge, and then only in a handful of cases generally involving unusual facts. See United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968
(D.P.R. 1967); United States v. Jones. Crim. No. 36388-69 (D.C
Gen. Sess., April 1970) (return of record required after dismissal of
charge because of a case of mistaken identity); Irani v. District of
Columbia, 272 A.2d 849 (D.C. App. 1971) (court may order some
relief on affirmative showing of innocence including, perhaps, expungement of arrestrecord;case remanded to lower court for determination
of appropriate relief); In re Alexander? 259 AJJd 592 (D.C App.
1969) (return of arrest record might be justified in rare cases involving unusual facts); Henry v. Looney, 317 N.YJ5.2d 848 (Sup. CL
Nassau Co. 1971) (arrest record ordered expunged on affirmative

5. Utwba^oCkv.OMiktarCUa^bk2S3A.3dl40>.CApp.l971X>adTJbtiict
ctOohmAUr.So^^y»A.U6S2(P.C.App.l973XT^Vbi^<ACUmBa^OMXtot
shown, the proper ninety k not to destroy or seal the m o i d of arrest bat to darttythe
record by a ""titton reflecting the bet tint no ddpabOity existed. Furthermore, records
already ofctiS^ted need not be setawned provided a suitob^
fr. 8M
fM fWMBI
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fftfl agCNCM*
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wthereto.
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For this latter point tea Sophia, tL, at-654. The Coarfs rulings are bated o a t 4-137 of the
Ebtrfct of Cohanbb Cade which provides that aB r e c c ^ of the Metropolitan poOcesboold
be preserved, except that the Board of Comwtaiooers might cause Obsolete or nsek» records
to be
bo destroyed.
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showing of innocemce); and Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp.
(WJ>. N.C. 1969) Cyouth of "hippies- arrested under vagrancy si
utes and extreme musbehavior of police justified order expung
arrest records), vacated and remanded for reconsideration in fight
Younger v. Harris. <401 U S . 987 (1971).
More recant cases, however, have expanded the rehthn
narrow principles o f these decisions. In SuuTvan v. Murphy, 478 F
938 (D.C Or. 1973), a class action on behalf of persons arrested
connection with May Day demonstrations in the District of Columl
during the week o f May 3,1971, the Court stated that in an acti
brought to remedy the denial of a federal constitutionalright,t
Federal Court's "broad and flexible equitable powers call for,
order that limits tihe maintenance and dissemination of the arn
records, and of all materials obtained from persons taken into ct
tody..., in the absence of affirmative evidence produced by t
Defendants to demonstrate the existence of probable cause either
the time of the arrest or subsequent thereto.*' Id. at 971. Furthf
more, the Court held that when an infringement of constitution
rights is involved the need for an effective remedy is paramount, ai
a federal court in fashioning such a remedy need not be bound by tl
law of the jurisdiction where the acts took place (ie., District <
Columbia Code § 4-137,supra, note 5.) See also Davidson v. Dili, 5(
P.2d 157 (Colo. 19>72);£tfdfy v. Moore. 487 P.2d 211 (Wash. Apj
1971) (requiring return of photos and fingerprints after dismissal <
criminal charges in the absence of a compelling showing of necessif
to justify retention); and Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316F.Sup
401 (CD. Cal. 1970) (employer found in violation of Cm] Righ
Act of 1964 when use of arrest records resulted in discriminatk
against black job applicant and no business necessity was showi
Court ordered payment of damages and fees, and enjoined defendai
from denying employment to job applicants on the basis of arresi
not resulting in convictions unless required by national security clea
anceregulations),modified, ATI F.24 631 (9 Or. 1972) (injunctio
vacated as being neither incidental nor necessary to theresolutionc
the litigation; otherwise judgement tffinsed).
There are three principal reasons for this judicial trend
(i) Increasing pubfc concern about the loss of pr
vacy as a "natural by-product of our modern technology,
Davidson v. Dili, supra, at 158;
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(ft The belief that a person with a criminal record is
mote Ekely to be subject to police scrutiny and other governmental disadvantages. See cases cited id. at 1S9;
On) The economic harm that might inure if the arrest
of a person becomes known to present or prospective employers and credit reporting agencies*
Primary concern has focused on the harmful effects of a
criminal record upon employment, whether with government or private employers. Documentation of the use of such records to assist in
employment decisions is extensive. Perhaps the best known example
j* the Duncan Report, which examined employment practices in the
District of Columbia and found that information on arrest records was
supplied to 350 to 400 persons daily by the D.C. Metropolitan Police
Department, and that the use of such records very often resulted in
denial of employment See Duncan Report at 6; cf Morrow v. District
of Columbia, 417F.2d 728 (D.C. Or. 1969). Another study indicated
that 75 percent of New York employment agencies surveyed would
not even refer someone with an arrest record to a prospective employer. See President's Commission on Law Enforcement & Administration
of Justice Report: The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 75 (1967).
In still another report it was found that many employers ask a job applicant whether he has ever been "arrested," "detained;' or "taken
into custody." See Karabian, Record of Arrest: The Indelible Stain,
3 Pacific LJ. 20, 32 (1972); cf. Note, Civil Liability for Illegal
Arrests and Confinements in California, 19 Hastings LJ. 974, n. 17
(1968).
Conviction records also lead to difficulties in obtaining employment See Schwartz and Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma,
10 Soc. Plrobs. 133 (1962); Special Project-The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 929,1001 et seq.
(1970). See also The Closed Door: The Effect of a Criminal Record
on Employment with State and Local Agencies (1972) for a recent,
comprehensive study on the effect that release of arrest and conviction
records has on employment opportunities. (This study is reproduced
in Hearings on HJR. 13315 Before a Subcommittee of the House
Comrtt on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1971).)
Evidence of this concern is found in the summary report of
of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals, supra, which contains several recommendations concerning
retention and dissemination of criminal offender record information

t>0

(including arrest and conviction records as defined herein). The major
recommendations of the National Advisory Commission were:
(i) That each state establish through legislation a
Security and Privacy Council having the authority to adopt
and administer security and privacy standards for criminal
justice information systems;
(ii) That strict security and privacy procedures be
established to insure that no dissemination of criminal his*
tory files occurs outride of government, except in very
limited circumstances;
(iii) That all copies of informationfiledas a result of
an arrest which is legally terminated in favor of the individual shall be returned to that individual within sixty days of
final disposition, upon order of a court or if requested by
the agency which disposed of the case. Id. at 58,59.
See the NAC Report for elaboration and explanation of these and additional recommendations.
Clearly developing is the belief that dissemination and retention of arrest record information should be limited and yet consistent
with valid law enforcement interests. Some police departments already
have acted on their own to restrict the scope of record dissemination,
viz., Dallas; the District of Columbia; Kansas City, Missouri; and San
Antonio. The Rules in Section IV provide for modernizing record retention and release practices.
Rule 401 General Rule.
Unless otherwise specified by state or federal statute or
federal executive order, arrest and conviction records or infofination contained therein may be released only under the following
circumstances:
(i) To law enforcement agencies of any jurisdiction
for law enforcement purposes;
(fi) To criminal justice personnel for purposes of executing the responsibilities of their position in a matter relating to the individual whose record is requested;
(in) To defense counsel for purposes of providing
representation in a criminal or juvenile proceeding to the
person whose record is requested, upon acceptable proof of
that representation;

?!

<iv) To the individual who is the siritfert^^
wquested for purposes of hisrepresentinghimself in any
criminal or juvenile proceeding, or for assisting his counsel
fa nch representation;
(•) To projective employers, governmental or pri»
^rte, to the extent expressly and specifically required by
state orfederalstatute or federal executive order*
Commentary
This Rule Efts those agencies and persons who are permitted
• o o « to arret and conviction records and information contained
therein. It also limits the purposes for which access is allowed. The
compilation, retention and dissemination of such records is still, in
general,recognizedas a proper law enforcement function. See Davidson v. Dill, supra; Spock v. District of Columbia, supra, note 5\Morrow F. District of Columbia, supra. Only by curtailing access to such
records andrecordinformation, however, will thisrecognitioncontinue to be ensured.
Rule 4010) permits thereleaseofrecordsandrecordinformation to law enforcement agencies for law enforcement purposes.
The Rule agrees with the SEARCH Model Regulations, the Duncan
Report, provisions of statutes which apply to the records of various
state Bureaus of Criminal Identification, (See Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann.
§ 41-1750); the Proposed Rules; the NAC Report, Standard 8.3(4)
(to flie extent that the record has not been "pinged"fromthe files);
and the administration MIL The Ervin bill, however, would limit the
dissemination of arrestrecorddata to other law enforcement agencies
to certain enumerated purposes, eg., the individual who is the subject of therecordhas applied for employment at therequestingagency and the information sought is to be used solely to screen the application. The Rule is substantially similar to the existing policies and
practices of C&cinnati;Dall^; Dayton; Kansas Qty, Missouri; the Distact of Columbia; Oakland; Phoenix; San Antonio; and San Diego.
Rule 401 (fi) authorizes thereleaseof records and record
information to criminal justice personnel and agencies for use in the
performance of their official functions while dealing with the individual who is the subject of therecordrequested. Release to these persons and agencies is generally in accord with the existing policies of
the Police Departments on the Project's Advisory Board, although,
unlike the Model Rules, criminal justice personnel are usually placed
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together hi one category with law enforcement agendes, &&,asfa
enforcement agents in the Duncan Report, or criminal Justice agenck
in the SEARCH Model Regulations and the Proposed Rules, and t
the Dallas and Kansas City, Missouri, Pofice Departments. The Mod
Rules have adopted separate categories of law enforcement agenck
and criminal Justice personnel (see Section 1(c) and (e)), to perm
distinction to be made between the information which may be release
to each and the circumstances under which release is authorized. Tfc
distinction also gives law enforcement agencies its more commo
meaning.
Some of the purposes for which release of arrest and convfc
tion information may be made to criminal justice personnel are
(i) in deciding whether to chaige an individual wit]
an offense;
(ii) in determining the severity of the offense to b
charged;
(Hi) in deciding whether to arrest or to summon
(iv) in determining whether to release the accuse*
prior to trial or appeal (see, eg., Russell v. United States
402 F.2d 185, 186 (D.C. Or. 1968));
(v) in impeaching a witness with a prior convictioi
(see, e^., Suggs v. United States, 407 F.2d 1272 (D.C Or
1969) and Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C
Cir. 1967));
(vi) in sentencing6 (see £.&, Powell v. State, 22!
P.2d (Ok. App; 1951) and Murphy v. State, 40 A.2d 231
(Mi App. 1944); and
(vii) in determining whether to grant parde (see 1 ^
can Report at 16. See also, Comment, Retention andDts
semination of Arrest Records: Ju<Bdal Response, supra, a1
855.)
Rule 401 Oil) provides for thereleaseofrecordsor record
information to defense counsel upon presentation of proof that the
attorney-client relationship exists. Release is limited to the purpose ol
providingrepresentationin any criminal or juvenile proceeding. This
provision is largely in accord with the practice in the District of Coium
Ma. The Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department permits a defense

6w The Aduiiiihtutrne Office of the United States Court! l i locomroftndcd the inctpsiot
of jncfionf ancrti not resulting in convictionsfapic icntfncciepotti. The Presentence Repon
at 110965). '

23

attorney to have access to record information if the request is approved by the department's legal advisor. The Dallas Police Department permits a defense attorney to have access to conviction records,
but not to arrest records. The SEARCH Model Regulations exclude a
defense attorney and legal aid societies from having access to record
information. The Errin bill permits a defense attorney to have access
to record information for the purpose of reviewing it for accuracy and
compliance with the bill's provisions. The administration bill is silent
regarding access to record information by defense counsel, as are the
Proposed Rules. Finally, the NAC Report, in Standard 8.4, recommends permitting a defense attorney to examine his client's record
upon presentation of a sworn authorization from the client together
with proof of identity.
The Model Rules permit a defense attorney to have access
to record information because it may be relevant in preparing a defense or in plea bargaining. Moreover, it does not seem necessary to
require a defense attorney to seek a court order before being permitted access to the record.
Rule 401 (iv) provides access to record information to the
individual who is the subject of the record in cases in which he appears pro l e i n a criminal or juvenile proceeding. No comparable
specific provision was found, although several departments seem to
follow the Rule under more broadly phrased provisions, e.g., San
Antonio; Dayton; and the District of Columbia. In any event access
would be permitted pursuant to Rule 402.
As a result of developments occurring since May of 1973,
the text of Rule 401 (v) has been altered, and an alternative subsection 401 (v) has been eliminated altogether.
^ The subsection now permits the dissemination of record
information for employment purposes only to the extent that the release is required by state or federal law or by a federal executive
order. Previously the subsection permittedreleasewhen, in the judgment of an agency head, reasons of national security so required.
In the alternate version, it allowed the release of conviction record
information for a limited number of years following the conviction.
However, the best policy is for law enforcement agencies to
eliminate altogether the voluntary dissemination of record information for employment related purposes. First, the national security
situation usually will be covered by statute or executive order;
see Exec. Order No. 10, 450, 3 CJF.R. 936 (1953) and Cole
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v. Young, 351 UJS. 536 (1956). See also Booth, The Expungement
Myth, 38 L.AJB. BulL 161, 163 (1963), pointing out that even the
sealing of records probably will not prevent the obtaining of record
information when a top security clearance is required, and Gregory
v. Litton Systems, Inc., supra, where the Court made clear its intention not to prohibit the defendant employer from complying with
anyrequirementsof national security regulations. Second, all the
current and recent efforts at regulating the dissemination of record
information severely restrict the use of such information for
employment related purposes, including information contained in
conviction records. See the Ervin Mil, §§ 201(aXc), 202(a)(bXl)
(cXD, 204, 207(5XB)(c); the administration bill, §§ 5(dX4)(e),
6(d), 8(d); The Proposed Rules, §§ 20.22, 20.33; and the NAC
Report, Standard 8.3. Where record information is permitted to
be used for employment related purposes, it is (with a few limited
exceptions) only pursuant to statutory provisions-state or federal,
or both-or federal executive order. Sometimes release would not
be permitted at all for employment purposes, notwithstanding
contrary statutory provisions, e.g., sealed records under the Proposed
Rules § 20.22(b).
The alternative of giving government employers access to
records while barring private industry was considered by the Project
Advisory Board, but it was felt that the government should not ask
private industry to do what it is unwilling toriskdoing itself. Except
in cases of national security, government, when acting as an employer,
isreallyno different from a private employer. Indeed, it can be argued
that government agencies should take a leadership role in hiring selected individuals with a (prior) criminal history, in the hope that prK
vate industry will follow suit
Rule 402 Inspection By the Subject of a Reconl
Any person desiring to inspect his own arrest or conviction
record shall be allowed to do so for a period of up to (one hour)
at the place where the record is kept, provided that he conforms to (insert appropriate application, fee, and identification
procedures).
The person may obtain a copy of hisrecordupon payment
of (insert a reasonable fee) or may take notes or make a written
summary in his own handwriting. If a copy is obtained it shall
be clearly identified as such. If a person is unable to inspect his
25

ownrecordbecause of illiteracy, he may select a person to provide asststanoeto him.
D* * person is unable to inspect his own record because he is
focwcerrted, appropriate arrangements shall be made either to
allow Mm to inspect the record at the [dace of detention or to
*How anot&erpecson to inspect the record on his bdbaH]
Commentary
Therightto personal inspection on one*s own arrest or conwtion records exits now in California, whererecentlyenacted legisl^onspecificallyaffonlsthiscvportunity^
1112011127 (1971). Similar provisions allowing individual inspection are
contained in the SEARCH Model Regulations, Regulation 13; the
™ J Ml. § 207; the administration bill, § 6; the Proposed Rules,
§ § 20.22(d), 2034; and the NAC Report, Standard 8.4.
The Modd Rule is designed to permit an individual to ascertain if an agency maintains an arrest or conviction record pertaining
tohim and, ifso, to inspect therecordfor accuracy and completeness.
The Rule has been modified to permit an individual to obtain an actual copy of his record, which was not permitted in the original
approved draft This change has been made to bring the Rule into
greater compliance with the provisions of the Ervin and administration bills, the Proposed Rules, and the NAC Standards. Also, the revision makes the Rulesimilar to the policies of San Antonio; Dayton; the
District of Columbia; and Kansas City, Missouri,7 Police Departments.
A potential problem with permitting an individual to obtain a copy of his record is the possible abuse by prospective em-'
ployers. They mayrequirethe furnishing of a copy of dierecordas a
condition of employment It was to protect against this possibility
that the Rule as previously drafted did not permit an individual to obtain an actual copy of hisrecord.Subsequent developments and reflection have effected modification. There is nothing to prevent
* prospective employerfromrequiringa person to turn over his handwritten notes, and a copy is a more accurate and an easier method for

7. TlwcuepoBcfatifcitwcie fa effect at the time of the pqfaBcHkm of the oririmfl
*P«w«d daft and do not leflect subsequent changes.
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an individual to obtainrecordinfonnation about himself. The i
effective protection Oat can be offered an individual would be
enactment of legislation prohibiting or limiting potential emplo
from seeking arrest or conviction record information from pros
tive employees. Agency regulation alone can only be of lim
effectiveness.
Rule 403 Release to Bona Fide Researchers.
Upon written application and approval thereof by (in
title of head of agency or his designee), infonnation contai
in arrest or conviction records may be released to bona,
researchers forresearchpurposes, provided they agree no
make public or otherwise to disseminate information that id<
fies particular individuals or to attempt to contact such i
viduals.
Commentary
Rule 403 permits thereleaseofrecordinfonnation for b
fide research uses. What is or is not bona fide is, of necessity, lei
the judgment of the appropriate agency officials. Presumably they
act in good faith in making the determination and will carefully sci
the credentials of those seeking access to record data for resa
purposes.
Affording access to record information can provide an
portunity for importantresearch.See Kogan and Loughery, Sec
and Expungement of Criminal Records-The Big Ue9 61 J. C
L.L. and P.S. 378 (1970). The SEARCH Model Regulations,
Ervin bill, the administration bill, the Proposed Rules, and the)
Report all contain provisions permitting the release ofrecordhi
mation for bonafideresearchpurposes.
In many cases aggregate data that does not identify oi
den by name will suffice. Where this is true, anonymity of reo
should be preserved. The Proposed Rules § 20.22(eXl) prohibit
release of record information for research purposes which ident
an individual except as authorized by state or federal statu*
federal executive order. This approach is rejected by the 1
as being toorestrictiveonresearchactivities. Suppose, for exam
that the purpose of theresearchis to compile aggregate data regar
a particular aspect of arrests made by a law enforcement agenq
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Rule 501 Statement of Disposition or Present Status.
No information concerning an arrest or conviction th*t
occurs after (insert effective date of adoption o T t t ^ o S
Rules) shaU be released unless it includes a^tainent of riSS
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Rule 501 provides that information concerning an arrest or
conviction may not be released unless the information is complete
Le it shows not only that an arrest occurred but also what hamSnS
or is happening as a result of the arrest
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( hereinaf ter referred t o £
UCR). While the UCR makes no estimate of the percentage of arrests
followed by fonnal charging, it does state
that 83 percent o f X s e
arrested for crime index type offenses9 were prosecuted. It islikelv
that the percentage is less for offenses of a minor nature i e that
more persons arrested for felonies are formally charged than'those
arrested for misdemeanors. Of those who are formally charged manv
n o r o ^ ° n V i C t e d * , ^ U C R C S t i m a t c s m o n e tebte * £ ouHf
i,8y6,936 persons formally charged, 60.8 percent were found guilty
as charged, 4.4 percent were found guilty of a lessor offense 17 7
percent were referred to juvenile command 17.1 percent were acquitI S S •?"• f f ^ r V* d i s m i s s e d - « * at 113. One author has estimated that half of the 1,340,000 arrests made in California uTl971
resulted in release without formal charging, dismissal or acquittal.
Karabian, supra, at 21, n. 1.
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!> LL t - j ^ t e °f the large number of arrests that do not result in
^ ° ™ dMS^B-^nudi less conviction-it has been suggested that 35
percent of all anest records do not include any information conceal*
fagthcfinaldisposition of fee case. See Presidents Oommission on Law
tttforoment and Administration of Justice: The OiaUenge of Qime
™ ^ ™ Society 268 (1967). It is not surprising that fte widespread
wease of incompleterecordshas led to criticism of law enforcement
•Sacks (and efforts to correct the problem). See Hess and LePoole,
Abuse of the Record of Arrest Not Leading to Conviction, 13 Crime
md Delinquency 494 (1967); Kaist, The Files: Legal Controls Over
the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 Law and
Contemp. Pwb. 342 (1966).
The FBI has recently become concerned with assuring that
***** wbmitted to it are kept complete. In a letter dated June 2,
1971, from then-FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to all law enforcement
agencies, the Director asked that "special attention- be given "to the
urgent need toreporta final disposition for each charge submitted to
the FBI . . .•• Citing Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., supra, and
Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Or. 1970), on remand, 328
F. Supp. 718 (DJXC. 1971, 10 Mr. Hoover noted that:
[T] here is an answer to this problem, one answer and
one only. Report thefinaldisposition in each case at whatG W level • . . the public interest in safety from criminal
attack demands it, as well as our own interest, and the interests of other dements in the criminal justice system in
performing professionally and efficiently toward that same
objective.

^HLJ^T??9
* • • « * ww «pfa « * subject o f t decision by the Mstrk* of ColnnAia
arotfCOnnt of AppeaJa, Menard r . Saxbe, 15 O X . 2105 (Apr. 23,1974).
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Concern with the problem of inaccurate and incon
criminalrecordinformation isreflectedin provisions of the NA
port, Standard 7.5; the Proposed Rules, § § 20.21, 2037; the
bill, § 206; and, the administration bill, § 7.
Rule 501 is given prospective application only becai
the immense administrative burden that would be involved in sear
out the final disposition of thousands of old cases. In some inst
such information may not be available or, if available, may be
difficult to discover. Limiting the Rule to prospective applicati
similar to the approach taken in California where the Cat Penal
§§ 1115 to 1117 (1961) washdd to apply only to post-1961 ai
53 Cat Ops. Atty. Gen. 109 (1970). Also prospective in applic
are the provisions of the Proposed Rules § 20.21 relating to
pleteness ofrecordinformation.
The fact that the Rule is prospective does not mean
law enforcement agencies should not make every effort to bring
records up to date. There is little difference between did and
records insofar as the reasons for requiring completeness are
cerned, and except for the administrative burden involved, Rul<
would have beenretroactiveinstead of prospective.
Rule 502 Certification of Purpose; Indemnification.
Any nongovernmental person or agency authorized by
Rules to receive information contained in arrest or convi
records shall be furnished such information upon applicati
writing accompanied by a certification stating:
(i) That the requesting person or agency is far
with the limited purposes set forfli in the policies o
(insert name of Otereleasingagency) for which arres
convictionrecordinformation may be used;
(ii) Thatflieinfonnationrequested mil be used s
for fliese limited purposes and not to harass, degrad
humiliate any person, (nor shall the information be
for any employment orrelatedpurpose);
(Hi) The specific purpose for which the inform
sought is to be used; and,
(hr) That therequestingperson or agency will in
nify flie (insert name of thereleasingagency) for any I
ity arising out of the improper use of the inform
provided.

Commentary
^ p w i w r e ofrequiringa f o r ^
not, ft reduces the burden of verifying proper purpose by requiring
fje agency or penon requesting flic information to state, in writing,
J e puipoee for which it will be used. Second, it places the onus of
demonstrating the propriety of the purpose, and the liability for any
fa^P01" " * of the information, on the requesting agency or person.
TWra, it creates a written official record-thereby protecting the
integrity of the parties involved.
Ttoe language of certification is a revision of that contained
in the San Diego Police Department's Instruction on Official Department Correspondence. It is very similar to the certification required
JyCaL Penal Code § 11105. The indemnification provision was
jargdy taken from a notarized request form used by the City of
Spokane, Washington (see Winner, Police Court Records-Problems
Now Confronting Cities In Light of Eddy v. Moore, Municipal Research and Service Center of Washington) which was in keeping with
* JSru C s t a t u t o i y Provision. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 72.50.170
established a cause of action to anyone whose record was released in
t !X? n ° f * * r d c a s e $ t a t u t c s - W1* statute was repealed in 1972.)
to addition to protecting the releasing agency from potential liability,
the indemnification provision should assist in assuring that the information is used properly by the requesting person or agency.
m

Rule 503 Maintaining Records of Persons and Oiganizations Receiving
Information.
A record shall be kept of all persons and organizations receiving information contained in arrest or conviction records, and
of flie purposes for which such release is authorized. If applicable, the statutory authority under which the information is
released shaO be indicated.
Commentary
A

complete record shall be kept of all persons and agencies
to^whom arrest and conviction records are released—so that these
recipients may be informed of the destruction or dosing of a record,
of any change in the status of a charge, and of any correction of the
record. The Rule insures that the releasing agency can identify those
pereons to whom records are released, and that release was made
within permissible limits.
32

The SEARCH Model Regulations, Regulation IS, contain a
similar provision requiring a listing of agencies to whom criminal
offender information is released; the Proposed Rules § 20.22(aX3)
require that releasing agencies maintain a list of all noncriminal justice
dissemination being allowed within the state and showing, in addition
to the identity of the recipients, the specific purpose andtirestatutory citation requiring dissemination. Record keeping provisions are
also included in the administration bill, § 5(f). The Ervin bill § 301
(cX8) gives the Board established by the legislation authority to
require reports from agencies concerning their collection and dissemination of record information.
Role 504 Responding to Requests for Non-Rdeasable Information.
When a request for information contained in arrest and conviction records is received, and the requested information may
not be released under these Rules, the following reply shall be
made:
The arrest and conviction records of tiie (insert
name of agency) are not public records and are not
open to public inspection. As a matter of department
policy, release of such records is limited almost entirely to law enforcement agencies and criminal justice
personnel. The purpose of this policy is to protect the
rights of privacy of individual citizens. Accordingly,
the department has not conducted a search of its records for information relating to your request
Commentary
This Rule requires a standardresponsefor use in denial of
access to arrest or conviction record information. This response is to
be used for all inquiries where release is not authorized, irrespective of
whether or not there is a record for the individual who istiresubject
of the inquiry. This approach is necessary to implement the department's policy of limiting disclosure. If requesting persons are informed
in one case that "the subject has no criminal record" and in another
that "the subject's record cannot be released," the nondisclosure
policy might be defeated by those sophisticated enough to note the
difference in response.
33

. **: J * » Note rtatat that > mref at fopns collected in m Aaeoricaa aftmjwnimt
Awnrh(k« Book of Emptoyaient Foam 167-274 0 9 6 7 ) Aowi that 66 percent of private
mmpiiiili i asfaod whether an appScant tot employment bad ever been attested. CORNELL
L REV. at 471, a. 5.

(jhr) Certain convicted persons often have to acknowledge their presence in a community by registering with a
law enforcement agency, e&, persons convicted of specified sex offenses are required to register with the county
sheriff (Ariz. Rev. Stat Amu § 13-1271); and,
(v) Destruction does not erase the memory of persons connected with a given event who may appear later
and unexpectedly with their recollection warped to the
detriment of the subject individual.
Third, it is unclear that destruction will truly protect the person
who was the subject of the destroyed arrest record. As Judge
Nebeker notes in his concurring opinion in Irani v. District of
Columbia, supra, at 851, there are numerous circumstances in which
a person might have to reveal the fact of arrest regardless of the destruction of his arrest record. Further, the majority opinion in Irani
expressly states that, absent specific statutory authorization, courts
may lack authority to permit persons to give a negative answer to
questions concerning their criminal history because the courts have
no inherent power to grant those persons immunity from prosecution
for perjury or other criminal offenses. Fourth, retention of arrest
and conviction records allows for the conduct of research which
ultimately may be of service to the criminal justice system. See
Kogon & Loughery, supra, at 386 n. 33, quoting an extract
of a letter from the Director of the Ohio Youth Commission
which states: "Many of the psychiatrists and psychologists wish
to retain the records for research purposes." Fifth, the availability
of the record may be a benefit to the individual in some cases,
&&, where it provides proof that no conviction occurred. Sterling
v. City of Oakland, 24 Cat Rptr. 696 (App. 1962). Sixth, andperhaps the most important, the retention of records may be
necessary to protect the department and individual officers from
civil liability. These records may be material in a civil case tried
long after the event Spock v. District of Columbia, supra, at 17,
expressly notes the possibility of a charge against a police officer
as a valid justification for retention of records.
The first optional provision of Rule 601 permits destruction when the subject of a record readies the age of seventy. This
provision reflects a judgment that when a person readies an advanced
age, the likelihood of his engaging in further criminal actmty is minimized, and, therefore, the continued maintenance of his records is of
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SBCHONVL DESIKULIION AND CLOSING OF RECORDS
Rule 601 Destruction
A. Geneal Ride. Unless required by statute or judicial
order, arrest or conviction records shall not be physically destroyed until the subject thereof readies the age of (seventy).
B. Exception. Upon a written determination by the (insert title oftihehead of agency) that manifest injustice would
result from die maintenance of such record, destruction may be
authorized.
Commentary
The Model Rules adopt the position that; unless required
by law, die destruction of arrest or conviction records is not dearable. A number of considerations have influenced this position.
Fist, it is believed that adoption of and adherence to these Modd
Rules will vastly reduce the record dissemination abuses which destruction is designed to eliminate. Second, attempts to eliminate
every vestige of an actual event seem futile, since an individual's
past brushes with the law can very often be reconstructed through
indirect sources. See Kogen & Loughery, supra. Indelible traces still
remain:
(i) Present limitations exist on the success of requesting full return of records distributed to other agencies;
(it) Employers may ask the employee whether he has
ever had an arrest record expunged or destroyed. There may
even be available a record of expungement (perhaps sealed).
See Note, Discrimination on the Basts of Arrest Records,
56 CorneD L. Rev. 470 (1971) 11 ;
(Hi) In the case of conviction and actual incarceration,
the time seived is hard to explain on an employment form
asking for past history, see Kogen and Loughery, supra, at
385;
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Commentary
As an alternative to requiring physical destruction ol
records, Rule 602 provides that the arrest or conviction record of i
person who has been arrested or convicted be closed if that person
stays "clean" for a period of ten years after a conviction orfiveyean
after an arrest not resulting in a conviction. The concept of closing
records is drawn from the proposed SEARCH Model Regulations,
Regulation 12.
In the original approved draft the various provisions dealing
with dosing of records was made optional. However, developments1*
since May, 1973 have convinced the drafters that it is now necessary
to have mandatory closing provisions.

12. The Proposed Rules, the administration bill, the Ervin bin, and the NAC Report
each contains mandatory closing (or seating) provisions. The Proposed Rules ft 20.22(b)
require that an arrest record be sealed when the arrest does not result in a disposition adverse
to the person arrested, or no disposition is provided withinfiveyears of the arrest, or upon
receiving formal notice from the agency that made the arrest. When a record is sealed it
means that dissemination of information contained therein is limited to criminal Justice
agencies solely for criminal Justice purposes, to qualified researchers for research purposes,
to the individual himself for purposes of review, and where necessary, to resolve a claim by
the subject of a record that it is misleading, inaccurate or incomplete. See Rule 604.
The administration bin, ft 9, provides for the sealing of records pursuant to a court
order, state or federal statute, or regulations issued by the US. Attorney GeneraL At a minimum, the U.S. Attorney General's regulations'must provide for sealing a persons records if
he has been tree from the jurisdiction or supervision of a criminal Justice agency for seven
years, if previously convicted of a crime penm^ting the imriosition of a sentence in excess of
one year;fiveyears if convicted of a crime where the maximum sentence is not greater than
one year;fiveyears following an arrest that did not result m a convictioa during the period
(ff no prosecution is pending and the Individual is not a fugitive at the end of the period).
Access to a sealed record would be permitted for purposesof review by the indhiduil, on the
basis of a court order, or pursuant to a specific detenninatkmof the U^. Attorney GeneraL
IheErvinbll, ft 206(b)* contains sfcnflar provisions to fheadmtoistiationbulbut,
in addition, provides for the seafing of recordfaifonnationtoany case where the p
refer the natter to the prosecutor or where
ceedmgs. Once a record is sealed, information contatocd to H may be mate
research, to the individual or his attorney for review, for an audit, ortoresponse to a court
order.
Finally, the NAC Report, Standard 7.S, recommends that information be purged
from activefileswhen, because of its age or for other reasons, h is swlcoger a rcfiable guide
to the subject's present behavior. Sjpecificalry, information concerning convictions should be
purged ten years following release from sur^rvkuon if the conviction wis for a serious o ^
orfiveyears if for a less serious offense, provided the individual remains "dean" for the prescribed period. Purged information is not necessarily destroyed; but may be disseminated
oruy when necessary for in-house custodial activities or the regulatory needs of the Security
and Privacy Council, for research, for review by the individual, for adjudication of a claim
that the information is inaccurate or incomplete, and to meet the demands of a state statute.
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Closing of records can serve many of the functions Oat
destruction is intended to save, but without the adverse effects on
law enforcement Oat destruction entails. In vetoing a bffl passed by
theNew tasey kgidature (which provided for destruction of arrest
records when (he anest did not result in a conviction) the Governor,
*nhis *eto message* expressed some of die advantages of dosing
records compared wifh destroying them:
The primaqr objective of any expungement statute is
to insulatefeeperson from any disabilities or adverse effects
resultingfromthe information sought to be expunged The
only danger in maintaining arrest records is the possible
effects of dissemination of the fact of the arrest or the
practical necessity that an arrested person must indicate
that he has been arrested on employment applications.
The possible adverse effects of an arrest record can be
prevented without physically destroying the information or
removing it from police files. Police records can be sealed
so that there will be no dissemination and provision can be
made so that an arrested person, whose arrest record has
been sealed, can answer in the negative when an application for employment requests information concerning that
arrest Sealing, therefore, achieves the purpose of both the
police and the arrested person. It enables law enforcement
agencies to retain the record for their needs and protects
file arrested person from the possible adverse effects resulting from the arrest
Application ofRaynor. 303 A.2d 896,897,898 (NX Sup.
Ct, App. Kv. 1973).
Shorter time periods prior to (requiring the) closing of
record* were considered by the drafters and rejected as being unrealisfic and unmindful of criminal patterns and activities. H.R. 13315,
*2d Cong^ Seas. (1972), proposed destruction of arrest recordsincluding those with a disposition of conviction-after a two year
dean period. It came under heavy criticism from the police commumty. See, e&9 Commentary on HJL 13315, Police Legal Center,
IACP Research Division (1972).
^ ^
Rule 602 does not distinguish between serious and less
senous offenses. To do so would involve administrative judgments
Perhaps possible with a computerized infonnation system, but otherwise placing a huge burden on law enforcement agencies. Where an
3S

agencyfsfilesare computerized, consideration might be given to setting
lesser time periods prior to closing of records when conviction is for
less serious offenses.
Rule 603 Opening a Closed ReconL
A closed arrest or conviction record may be opened if fee
individual who is the subject of fee record is subsequently
dunged wife a crime. If fee charge does not result in conviction,
fee opened record shall be redosed, but fee record of fee new
charge shall remain open until dosed pursuant to Rule 602. If
fee diarge does result in conviction, fee opened record will remain open until dosed pursuant to Rule 602.
Commentary
Rule 603 provides for reopening a dosed record if the
subject thereof is later charged wife a crime. Reopening is provided
for because the subject's entire criminal history may have relevance
to the treatment and disposition of the new charge.
Rule 604 Rdease of a Closed Record.
Infonnation contained in a dosed record shall be hdd in
confidence and shall not be released to any person or organization except as follows:
(i) Where necessary for in-house custodial activities
of the department;
(u) Where fee infonnation is to be used for bona
fideresearchpurposes as allowed by Rule403;
(ffi) Where access is allowed by Rule 402 (personal
inspection by fee subject offeerecord);
(iv) Where necessary to permit the adjudication of a
claim that fee record is inaccurate; and
(v) Where a statute or court order specifically provides otherwise.
Commentary
The purpose of dosing arecordis to insulate an individual
from the liabilities which normally attach simply due to fee existence
of arrest or conviction records. The principal justification is that
"careful purging programs would contribute significantly to effective
programs ofrehabilitation/*SEARCH Modd Regulations at 53. Where
an arrested individual has not previously been convicted of a crime
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and his arrest does not culminate in a conviction, dosing or expunging
his record is required by state or court decision in some jurisdictions.
See, e.g.. U.S. v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5 Or. 1967); U.S. v. Kalish,
supra.
Closed records would not be available for dissemination to
employers or law enforcement agencies, for example, unless allowed
under the exceptions: for in-house custodial activities; bona fide
research; the individual's own access; adjudication of a claim that the
record is inaccurate; and compliance with a statute or court order.
These are instances where release is for the subject individual's benefit,
or where it poses a minimal threat to his privacy.
Rule 604 permits dissemination of information contained
in a closed record under many of the same conditions as the Proposed
Rules, the administration bill, the Ervin bill, and the NAC Report.
See, supra, note 12, for a discussion of the conditions under which
dissemination of information contained in closed records is permitted
by these proposals.
Rule 60S Notification of Other Agencies.
When a record has been destroyed or deemed closed,
all persons or organizations who are known to have a copy
of the record shall be notified at the time of destruction or
closing and shall be requested to destroy or return all copies
of the record.
Commentary
This Rule simply provides that if the records are destroyed
or closed, or if release is otherwise limited, all law enforcement
agencies to whom such records have been released shall be notified
of the requirement. This is similar to California practice. California
provides, for example, that when a custodian is informed of a sealing
of records which wore sent to him by another law enforcement
agency, subsequent requests for such records are to be answered with
"We have no record on that named individual." 40 Cal. Ops. Atty.
Gen. 50 (1962). Similar requirements are imposed by the Ervin bill,
§206.

be permitted to challenge its contents is included in the Proposed
Rules, § 20.22(d); the NAC Report, Standard 8.4; the Ervin bill,
§ 207; and the administration bill, § 6. The Rules herein are based
largely on the recommendations of t|ie NAC Report (which were in
turn based on the SEARCH Model Regulations).
Rule 701 Notice of Right To Challenge.
When an individual requests therightto inspect his own record pursuant to Rule 402, he shall be told that he may submit
written exceptions to the contents of the record on a form supplied by the agency, challenging its accuracy or completeness/3
Commentary
Rule 701 is complimentary of Rule 402. If an individual
has the right to inspect his own record, he should also have the right
to correct any mistakes therein. The requirement that he be told of
this right imposes no great hardship on the agency maintaining the
record, and will encourage its exercise. This will be of benefit to both
the agency and the individual, as each has an interest in seeing that
the record is as accurate as possible. This requirement is taken
from the NAC Report, Standard 8.4(2). See also the administration
bill, § 6(b) (2) and the Ervin bill, § 207(b) (2).
Exceptions must be made in writing because otherwise
administrative review is difficult. To discourage frivolous and untrue
claims, the individual or his counsel should be required to affirm that
any exceptions are made in good faith and are believed to be accurate.
NAC Report, Standard 8.4(2) (f).
Rule 702 Administrative Review of Exceptions.
The completed exception form shall be forwarded to (insert title of appropriate agency official) for review (in accordance
with such procedures as the agency may wish to adopt). If the
record is found to be accurate no changes shall be made. If inaccuracies or omissions are found they shall be corrected. After
the review is completed the individual or his counsel shall be
notified in writing of the results.

SECTION VH. PROCEDURES FOR CHALLENGING RECORD CONTENTS
This section is an addendum to the originally approved
draft of the Model Rules. A requirement that the subject of a record

13. This form should require the individual or his counsel to affirm that the exceptions
are made in good faith and that they are true to the best of the individual's knowledge and
belief.
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nmentary

SECTION Vm. WHEN FOREGOING RULES MAY BE DISREGARDED

Rule 702 requires each agency to establish its own internal
cedures for reviewing challenges to the contents of its records,
cific procedures have not been addressed in the Rule, except that
xmsibility for their implementation should be with the one agency
icial who is most familiar with the agency record practices. Other
ails of the review procedure will depend on such factors as the
} of the agency, the volume of records kept and the number of
llenges anticipated, and the resources available to the agency to
>ose of record challenges.
Written notification to the individual or his counsel of the
llts of the review is mandated. This will facilitate any additional
ew that the individual might wish to pursue, will create a written
?rd for the agency's files, and will assure the individual that his
m has been given proper consideration.
For a further explanation of the requirements of this Rule,
the NAC Report, Standard 8.4(2) (g); the Proposed Rules,
10.22(d); the Ervin bill, § 207(b) (2) (3); and the administration
, § 6(e) (0(g).

Whenever it appears that any of the foregoing Rules should
be modified or disregarded because of special circumstances, specific
authorization to do so shall be obtained from the department's legal
advisor or (insert name of other appropriate police or prosecution
official).
Commentary
Section VIII recognizes that there may be a few unanticipated situations where the application of the foregoing rules will
interfere with or impede reasonable law enforcement action. For
these unusual circumstances it provides the opportunity for certain
designated high officials to suspend application of the Model Rules.

e 703 Notification of Other Agencies.
When a record has been modified as the result of a challenge,
all persons or organizations who are known to have a copy of
such record shall be notified that the record has been modified
and shall be requested to modify all copies of the record in their
possession.
nmentary
This Rule is quite similar to Rule 60S and serves a similar
pose. If an agency's own records are found to be inaccurate or iniplete it is not unreasonable to require that all possible measures
taken to insure that the inaccurate or incomplete information in
hands of others is corrected. This is necessary to be fair to the
ject of the record and may be important to whoever holds the
xurate or incomplete record. See the commentary to Rule 501,
ra.
Similar notification requirements are included in the NAC
K>rt, Standard 8.4(2) (g); the Ervin bill, § 207(b) (5) (A) (B); and
administration bill, § 6(e).
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/ery healthy prison inmate
) earn at least a part of his
ration of rehabilitation dewith productive work, with
/ith this must come an exigious counseling to instill

Report of the President's Task Force
on Prisoner Rehabilitation, April 1970

ger. Exerpts from a speech
ice on Corrections, Decem-

PARTl
Introductory
Of the several things America can and should do to reduce
the incidence of crime, one with a particularly great potential
for reducing it significantly and soon is improving the ways in
which the nation's jails and prisons, its juvenile detention
homes and training schools, its probation and parole services
induce or help or enable criminals and delinquents to become
law-abiding men, women and children. This big expensive
"correctional system"—which is not a system at all, really,
but a fortuitous agglomeration of a Federal system, 50 state
systems and well over 3,000 county and municipal systems—
has under its authority on any given day something like a
million and a half people, and during a year it deals with
perhaps twice that many. No one knows how many of them
return to the community willing and able, as the result of
their contact with corrections, to lead constructive lives; however, there is little doubt that the number, whatever it is, is
too small. A substantial part of the correctional population,
including perhaps a majority of serious offenders, are people
who are being "corrected" for a second or third or fourth
time. Furthermore, very many of those repeaters began their
criminal careers by committing minor offenses, often when
they were not more than 14 or 15 years old.
Those facts define with some precision the two great challenges the correctional system faces: The present safety of the
community requires that thousands of dangerous and persistent criminals somehow be steered away from destructive pursuits, and the future safety of the community requires that
hundreds of thousands of minor offenders, especially young
195

ones, be given the opportunity, the means and the desire to
choose careers that are not criminal. Moreover, the magnitude
of these challenges is increasing year by year not only because
the amount of crime is increasing but because throughout the
nation police and court operations will be improving; an inevitable consequence of better work by the police and the courts
will be more work for corrections. In short, if the correctional
system expects to perform only as well during the next few
years as it does now, it will have to change considerably. To
improve its performance will take great changes, indeed.
Locating specific places in the correctional system where
Federal action now, beginning in 1970, can give impetus to
such changes was the assignment the President gave this Task
Force on Prisoner Rehabilitation.
He instructed us
to review, in broad perspective, what the public and private sectors are now doing in the area of prisoner rehabilitation and to recommend what might be done in the
future, providing an overview of problems faced by the
ex-offender in order to determine how he could best
achieve a lastingly productive and rewarding return to
society.
He gave us wide discretion about which aspects of corrections
we considered, specifying only that what he particularly
wanted was some practical proposals for actions he or the
Congress could take at once.
We concluded early that there was no need for us to search
for new ideas about rehabilitating prisoners. The voluminous
literature on the subject—in the last two and a half yean;
alone, according to the Library of Congress, almost 500
books, articles and monographs on corrections have been
published—overflows with excellent ideas that never have
been implemented nor, in many cases, even tested. We conceived our task as one of devising mechanisms through which
the Federal government might help convert a few of the most
promising of those ideas into action. We have made no attempt to be comprehensive, to deal with every aspect of corrections. We have been guided in our selection of what to
discuss and what not to by the criterion of immediate feasibil-

ity. We have recommended only such actions as seem to us to
be publicly acceptable and financially supportable right now.
Under the circumstances this report may appear to be more
a patchwork quilt than a tapestry. However, we believe that
our specific recommendations, unrelated to each other as they
may seem to be at first glance, have a common general context and that it will be useful for us to describe it briefly.
First, anyone concerned with prisoner rehabilitation also is
concerned, perforce, with the reason people commit crimes.
Obviously a program designed to restore offenders to the
community must be based on some views about why they left
the community in the first place. We have no novel thoughts
about this much-discussed subject. We simply wish to record
our agreement with the National Crime Commission, the Riot
Commission, the Violence Commission, and scores of other
thoughtful and painstaking analyses, that some of the toughest roots of crime lie buried deep in the social conditions,
especially poverty and racial discrimination, that prevail in
the nation's inner cities. These conditions not only make it
difficult for millions of Americans to share in America's well
being, but make them doubt society's good faith toward
them, leaving them disposed to flout society. America's benefits must be made accessible to all Americans. How successfully America reduces and controls crime depends, in the
end, upon what it does about employment and education,
housing and health, areas far outside our present mandate or,
for that matter, our particular competence. This is not to say
that improvements in the correctional system are beside the
point; on the contrary, many more improvements than those
we call for in this report are needed, in fact overdue. Our
point is that improvements in the correctional system are necessarily tactical maneuvers that can lead to no more than
small and short-term victories unless they are executed as part
of a grand strategy of improving all the nation's systems and
institutions.
Second, perhaps the greatest obstacle to improvement in
the correctional system always has been the tendency of much
of the public to regard it and treat it as a rug under which to
sweep difficult and disagreeable people and problems. The
myopia of this attitude scarcely requires demonstration. After
all, the overwhelming majority of offenders do not stay under

the correctional rug. Sooner or later, they and their pfoblems
emerge and inflict themselves once more upon the community; as a matter of fact, the two-thirds of the correctional
population who are on probation or parole are in the community right now in body, if not in spirit. "Community-based
corrections" is no visionary slogan but a hard contemporary
fact. We support wholeheartedly the proposition that the
community is the appropriate place in which to prepare offenders for useful participation in community life. Doubtless
the public safety demands that certain dangerous people be
kept behind bars, but we think it unlikely that custody in itself
helps them learn how to be good citizens in a free society. In
any case, a prerequisite of successful community-based corrections is public helpfulness toward offenders. The President
put it well in his November 13, 1969 statement on correctional
problems:
One of the areas where citizen cooperation is most
needed is in the rehabilitation of the convicted criminal.
Men and women who are released from prison must be
given a fair opportunity to prove themselves as they return to society. We will not insure our domestic tranquility by keeping them at arm's length. If we turn our backs
on the ex-convict, then we should not be surprised if he
again turns his back on us.
Third, significant improvements in corrections are going to
cost large amounts of money—and Federal money at that,
since the states and localities barely can meet their present
obligations. Because of our instructions to come forth with
proposals meant to be adopted at once, we have avoided suggesting anything that would cost large sums in Fiscal Year
1971. However, a Fiscal Year is not long distant when there is
no such thing as a commitment to a better correctional system
without a concomitant commitment to spend money to get it.
What the money is needed for mostly is people; of correctional
bricks and mortar there are plenty on the whole—though of
course there are in many places antique and squalid jails and
prisons that urgently need remodeling or replacing if on no
other ground than that of common humanity. But the real
shortage in the system is of skilled personnel, particularly in

non-custodial jobs—teachers, therapists, counselors, probation and parole officers. It is a shocking fact that between 80
and 90 percent of the billion dollars or more a year America
spends on corrections is spent on custody and its administration. When at most 15 percent of the system's annual budget is
spent on what presumably is the system's chief objective, it is
small wonder that that objective is all too seldom achieved.
Moreover, for most of the people now working in the system,
including those in custodial jobs, the pay is far too low, with
resulting failure to attract the best people, and training is inadequate with a resulting less-than-optimum performance even
by talented and dedicated people. Unless money is found to
staff the correctional system adequately with respect to both
quantity and quality, even the modest proposals we offer in
this report will be difficult to translate into action. A program
can be only as effective as the people who operate it.
Fourth and finally, it is probable that no discussion of corrections makes as much sense as it should because there is
available so little precise information about correctional successes and failures. Extraordinarily enough, until some three
years ago when the National Crime Commission made a
survey, no one even knew the size or the composition or the
cost of the correctional system in the United States—and
most guesses about these matters by knowledgeable people
had been so inaccurate that the survey's figures, when they
were published, caused general astonishment in the field. Particularly little is known about either the amount or the causes
of recidivism. Guesses about the percentage of prison leavers
who commit new offenses range from 30 to 70. No one even
ventures to guess about the percentage of crimes that are
committed by prison leavers. And, most importantly, there is
little or no hard information about which offenders repeat
and why—or, even more to the point, which offenders do not
repeat and why. Until some light is thrown on this last matter,
the success of any correctional program will depend at best on
intuition rather than on knowledge and planning.
We are reasonably confident that the recommendations in
this report are sound, but we would be even more confident if
they had arisen not only from our hard thinking and considerable experience, but from solid objective data as well. Indeed, we are sure that many ongoing correctional programs

would be strengthened or altered or abandoned, and many
new ones would be organized, if correctional authorities knew
a little more about the way offenders of various kinds respond
to treatments of various kinds. Therefore, as one early and
essential step toward assembling those basic facts about offenders that every correctional authority—and, for that matter, policemen, prosecutor and judge needs—we recommend:
The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of
the United States Department of Justice should proceed
at once to put its National Criminal Justice Information
and Statistics Service into full operation.
As another early and essential step, we recommend:
The United States Bureau of the Census should in
each decennial census make a comprehensive enumeration of institutional inmates, and should make plans to
conduct, using sampling procedures, regular interdecennial enumerations of all adjudicated offenders.
A fully operating crime information center will cost a lot of
money—though when compared with the billions of dollars a
year crime and the efforts to control crime cost America. If
such a center makes it possible for not only corrections but
every agency of law enforcement and justice to plan and
evaluate its works rationally, it will be more than worth its
price.
PART II
Jobs and Job Training
A constructive member of the community, by definition, is
a working member. A common characteristic of offenders is a
poor work record; indeed it is fair to conjecture that a considerable number of them took to crime in the first place for lack
of the ability or the opportunity—or both—to earn a legal
living. Therefore, satisfying work experiences for institutionalized offenders, including vocational training when needed,
and the assurance of decent jobs for released offenders,

should be at the heart of the correctional process. To subject
people with poor work habits and a low work motivation to
the enforced idleness that prevails in most prisons and airbut
a few jails, or to the meaningless chores and humiliating
working conditions that are characteristic of many prison programs, is simply to reduce further their capacity'to derive
Satisfaction from, or even take part in, workaday commumty
life And of course the best institutional job and job-training
program is futile if it does not lead on the outside to reasonably rewarding jobs.
.,:,«„„ ;„hc
It is pertinent to note that, when it comes to providing jobs
outside, those very entities that are responsible for renaDi'itating prisoners, the states and the Federal government set a
most unedifying example. Most states either arc barred by
statute or bar themselves by habit from hiring ex-offenders.
The Federal government let down its bars somewhat a tew
years ago; it will now hire ex-offenders on an individual basis
if the agency that wants their services presents a strong Dnei
and after an elaborate and time-consuming screeningj by the
Civil Service Commission. In other words, it is a great deal
more trouble to hire an ex-offender than somebody eIse and,
as a general rule, only agencies with a stake in «h« m a ^ r ' J ™
Bureau of Prisons or the Law Enforcement Assistance Ad
ministration, for example, are willing to take that much
t

T u V h e - y first step toward improving its correctional
process that any government-municipal, state or hederai
should take is to allow ex-offenders to be employed by government. The government is scarcely P ^ ^ ^ . ^ X J d S
industry to adopt employment policies toward ex-offenders
that it itself is unwilling to adopt. We recommend:
The United States Civil Service Commission should
devise and put into operation a plan to stimulate Federal
employment of ex-offenders.
We also recommend:
The National Institute of Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice of the Department of Justice should
frame guidelines for state and local governments concerning the employment of ex-offenders.

What is required to make correctional job and job-training
programs fruitful is close day-by-day collaboration between
correctional agencies on the one hand and industry and labor
on the other. The Federal correctional system has been a
pioneer in establishing such relationships, and some of the
results have been extremely promising, as with the training
program for electronic welders operated by Dictograph in the
Danbury, Connecticut prison, and a similar program for aircraft sheet-metal workers run by Lockheed in the prison in
Lompoc, California.
Some state correctional agencies are beginning to work
along the same lines, and this year the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration will fund local and state community-based employment and training programs for offenders
to the extent of several hundred thousand dollars.
Taking these good, but small, beginnings as a cue to go
farther and faster, we suggest a mechanism that could expand
such efforts, coordinate them, bring additional expertise to
both economic and correctional planning, disseminate information about programs to correctional authorities throughout
the country and to the public, stimulate with ideas and money
innovations and experiments, and evaluate ongoing programs.
We recommend:
The President should establish a national agency
whose function would be to stimulate, in the states and
localities particularly, the adoption of programs for the
employment and training of criminal offenders.
One form such an agency might take would be a public
corporation with a presidentially appointed chairman and half
a dozen directors representing industry, labor, voluntary
agencies and the public.
One example comes to mind of how such an agency might
work. Suppose it learned that the aircraft industry in the Pacific Northwest had projected its labor needs for the next
several years as so-and-so many workers of this and that skill.
The agency would find out from state and Federal correctional authorities in the area how many offenders might be
available during those years for training in those kinds of
skills, and broach to leaders of labor and management in the

industry the idea of locating a certain number of training
programs in nearby correctional institutions. It would participate in the contractual negotiations leading to such programs
between the industry and the correctional authorities, or, if
necessary, itself contract to administer the programs. It would
make sure that the standards of instruction in the programs
were of the same quality as those the industry insisted upon
on the outside, and that the working conditions were equivalent to those enjoyed by outside labor. It would preserve a
relationship with the programs only until industry and the
correctional authorities were able to operate them without its
help; it would then withdraw. However, the agency would
retain in an obligation to evaluate each program or project so
that the experience that it produced was widely available. The
industry probably would be willing to pay all or part of the
operating costs of the programs; after all, it would have to
pay as much or more for training programs elsewhere. The
chief cost to the taxpayer would be the agency's overhead
expenses.
Some programs might require that ex-prisoners be bonded
when they move into certain kinds of jobs. The agency would
explore the various ways this might be done, seeking to expand the use of Federal funds to provide back-up financial
service.
The agency would by no means confine its activities to
programs within institutions but would seek to encourage
training and employment programs for prisoners granted
work release from institutions, for prisoners in halfway houses
and community rehabilitation centers, and for probationers
and parolees. Indeed, no matter how effective an employment and training program behind bars may be, one of
equivalent quality in the community is bound to be more
effective for most offenders. The agency, therefore, would
have a particular interest in testing a variety of communitybased employment and training programs for offenders.
Another important opportunity at the local level would be
for the agency to arrange for the establishment of community
workshops and vocational training schools that offenders
would be required to attend as a condition of probation or
parole or early release from correctional institutions. Such an
innovation would reduce the population of institutions, would

be cheaper than institutional placement, and, if used selectively, would better protect the community. Programs and
projects of this sort, though initiated by the agency, should be
transferred as soon as feasible to local interests to run.
The agency could arrange regional and local conferences on
the training and employment of offenders, and thus involve
management, labor and the local community in defining and
launching local projects. It could also contribute, through
public relations programs, to educating the public to special
needs and problems of the ex-offender, and the importance of
the individiual citizen's role in his successful return to the
community.
The agency could initiate and support experimentation with
a variety of industrial programs in prisons. For example, the
time has come for experimentation with a "prevailing wages"
or "factory" prison. In establishing such a program, arrangements might be made for prisoners to support their families;
or, to pay some of their wages towards the cost of room and
board, or for that matter in income taxes. Consideration
would have to be given also to grievance procedures and collective bargaining in relation to working conditions in a factory-prison. A factory-prison must not be a "sweat shop."
One distressing holdover in the criminal process from less
enlightened times is the "thirty-days or thirty-dollars" kind of
sentence in the misdemeanor courts, which means that each
year many thousands of petty offenders are imprisoned for
lack of money to pay fines—for debt, not to mince words.
Often imprisonment causes them to lose their jobs. The
agency could stimulate experiments with time payments, with
loans to offenders who appeared to be good risks, and with
"weekend jailing," which would allow offenders to serve their
time in a series of two-day weekends. If such techniques were
successful, many misdemeanants could continue to support
themselves and their families while paying the price that society exacts from them.
The agency should review jointly with labor and management all laws, regulations and practices concerning the purchase of prison-made products and beyond that look into the
possibility of the sale of such products to government agencies
and through voluntary non-profit channels for domestic and
foreign use.

The agency should encourage and stimulate the employment of selected ex-offenders in correctional work. One place
it would appear entirely appropriate for ex-offenders to serve
would be on an advisory committee to the agency, which
would also include, of course, representatives of other parts
of the community. Support should be given to the development of associations of ex-offenders for employment and
therapeutic purposes.
The agency should maintain the closest liaison with Federal Prison Industries, Inc. There is larger need for the work
of the agency in state and local corrections than in the Federal system, but there is certainly an opportunity to develop
experimental models and test them in Federal institutions
and programs. It may be that the agency should collaborate
with Prison Industries in this regard, or it may be preferable
for Prison Industries itself to assume the same functions in
the Federal sphere as those we have suggested for the
agency at the state and local levels. In any event they should
draw strength from each other. One possible source of such
strength is the annual dividend to the United States Treasury
that Prison Industries declares which in 1969 amounted to $5
million. Instead of going into the Treasury, this dividend
might well be earmarked for use in rehabilitation work. It
very likely would be more than enough, for one thine, to
fund the agency we have been discussing. We recommend:
The Board of Directors of Federal Prison Industries,
Inc. should undertake a study of the ways its annual
dividend to the Treasury might be used in the area of
prisoner rehabilitation, with special emphasis on job and
job-training programs.
Finally, we have no illusion that the recommendations we
have made here about employment and training for employment, even if fully implemented, will meet the immediate
needs of all offenders. A lamentably large number of members of the correctional population are so educationally deficient, so lacking in self-confidence, so hostile to society, that
before they will be able to learn vocational skills, much less
work at them as free men, they must undergo extensive
schooling and therapy and controlled experiences in commu-

nity living. Enlightened correctional authorities in many localities and states, and in the Federal system, are devoting
themselves to these problems. We applaud their efforts and
urge that they be given every possible Federal support, by the
Department of Justice, of Labor, of Health, Education and
Welfare, and on any other agency with technical expertise or
funds that can be applied to this all-important purpose. Only
to the extent that offenders are made employable can employment programs for them be worthwhile.
PART III
Regional Institutions and Programs
Inefficiency and ineffectiveness due to jurisdictional fragmentation are pervasive and endemic in America's correctional system—as in its entire system of criminal justice.
Thousands of administrative units in villages and rural counties are too small to provide any services at all to offenders,
and even some of the sparsely populated states cannot afford
the facilities and services needed for offenders whose problems are in any way out of the ordinary. At the other end of
the spectrum are those big-city, big-state systems that are so
grossly overcrowded that their personnel barely manages to
keep them going administratively, and has little or no time for
any work in the field of rehabilitation. Gross inequality of
institutions and services from jurisdiction to jurisdiction is the
rule in corrections. One state may be relatively generous to
corrections, while its neighbor may be parsimonious to the
point of demanding its system show an annual profit. The
penal code of one state may be liberal about probation and
parole, and that of its neighbor restrictive. The misdemeanants in one county may be put to useful work during their
incarceration, while in the adjoining county people serving
the same sentences for the same offenses may sit idly in their
cells.
The political and financial, not to say the Constitutional,
obstacles to converting this vast nest of eels into a rational
system are formidable. However, there are few promising and
inexpensive steps toward regionalizing or pooling facilities

and services that could be taken right now to eliminate some
of the system's anomalies and correct some of its injustices.
Jails
The most glaringly inadequate institution on the American
correctional scene is the one that affects more human lives
than any other—the jail, be it county or city. According to
the report of the Corrections Task Force of the National
Crime Commission, there were 3,473 jails in operation in
1966, about three-quarters under county governments, the
rest under cities or cities and counties combined. During 1966
the number of persons held for the service of a sentence—as
distinct from suspects being detained pre-trial—was 1,016,748
and the average daily population of those serving sentences
was 141,303. A jail can be anything from a two-cell hovel in a
small rural county to a concrete and glass skyscraper in a big
city. Whether it is one or the other of those or, more likely,
something in between, more often than not the living conditions within it are squalid, whether because of obsolescence
or overcrowding or just plain indifferent housekeeping by the
staff. And the vocational, counseling, educational, psychological and even medical services and programs it offers its
inmates range from skimpy to nonexistent.
The anomaly of this situation is that offenders who commit
small transgressions against society are treated more harshly
than those who commit large ones—for, with a few egregious
exceptions, both living conditions and correctional programs
are far better in state prisons than in county jails. And the pity
of the situation is that the small transgressors who make up the
bulk of the jail population, many not being as yet confirmed
criminals, may well be more susceptible to rehabilitation than
prison inmates. We believe that if jails—and juvenile detention
homes—did as much as they should do in the way of rehabilitation, a great many fewer young men and women would
choose to pursue criminal careers than now do. If prisons confirm many offenders in crime, jails first turn them toward it
and, in that sense, are the real "schools of crime." Bui b e that
as it may, the conditions that prevail in many jails are <*o abominable that they are nothing less than an affront to o,mmon
humanity, and every American who knows the facts, regard-

less of his philosophy about corrections, must insist they they
be drastically bettered. We recommend:
The Federal government, through subsidies, should
encourage individual states or combinations of states to
establish, by conversion or construction, regional jails of
approved standards of construction and operation for
persons serving sentences of more than one month or
less than one year.
We further recommend:
The Federal government should withhold all subsidies
for conversion or construction of correctional facilities of
any kind in any state that fails to initiate a program for
the establishment of regional short-term institutions
where needed.
There are two corollaries to the above.
First, large local jurisdictions should be encouraged, by a
system of subsidies and standards, to establish county or metropolitan Departments of Corrections, so that not only jails
but also juvenile detention halls and adult and juvenile probation services would be under professional correctional administrators.
Second, every local jurisdiction should be encouraged,
again by a system of subsidies and standards, to reduce its
local jail population. Two ways of doing this that many jurisdictions already have adopted are to institute special programs for chronic alcoholics, who now make up perhaps half
the jail population, and by bail reform, so that as few suspects
as possible undergo pre-trial detention for lack of money bail.
Juvenile Detention Homes
To say that juvenile detention facilities in well-organized
local jurisdictions are, on the whole, better than adult facilities
is not to say much. What is more to the point is that the basic
deficiencies of the jail system—overcrowding, obsolete facilities, unprofessional supervision, inadequate programs—can be
found in somewhat less aggravated form in the juvenile deten-

tion system as well. And, of course, in those small or poor or
callous jurisdictions where there are no separate juvenile detention facilities the situation is far more aggravated.
Part of the solution to this problem, clearly, is to expand
programs under which juveniles are released—to their parents, to foster homes, to a social agency of one kind or
another—rather than detained. More juvenile officers are
detained today than need be. We urge the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration to search with special diligence for
programs of release for juveniles, and to fund them generously.
A second part of the solution may be regionalization, as
with jails. No doubt removing a child or youth from his family
would work a hardship on both him and them, but it is a
hardship that can be better borne than the damage an inadequate and squalid local detention home may do him.
In sum, we have only one specific recommendation about
juvenile homes other than those we have made out of jails.
We recommend:
The Federal government should withhold correctional
funds from any jurisdiction that does not have detention
facilities that separate juveniles from adults, or at the
very least a plan for creating such facilities at once.
Offenders Who Have Been Adjudicated
Mentally Abnormal or Deficient
The Joint Information Service of the American Psychiatric
Association and the National Association for Mental Health
has recently completed a national survey of the resources currently available to meet the needs of adult mentally ill offenders, who always have posed a very difficult problem for
the entire criminal justice system.
A significant finding was that nearly 40 percent of all offenders admitted to the state hospitals or psychiatric wards
the survey covered were being held for competency determination pending trial. The survey did not inquire into how
much of their time the professional staffs in those facilities
spent on diagnosis and on testifying at competency hearings,
but one can reasonably suppose that it is a substantial enough

percentage to reduce sharply their ability to administer therapy to the offender patients under their care.
We believe that both increased administrative efficiency
and improved therapeutic care for offender patients would
result from relieving the staffs of treatment facilities of the
responsibility for diagnosing those charged with crimes, and
lodging it in special community mental health centers. There,
the staffs of such centers do the diagnostic work for the
courts, and develop experimental programs for dealing with
special kinds of mentally ill offenders in collaboration with
the police, the courts and corrections. We recommend:
The Federal government should establish centers in
selected metropolitan areas for the purpose of providing
diagnostic clinical services to both Federal and state
courts, and to offenders on probation and parole.
Some offenders who are hospitalized for mental illness are
being reasonably well treated in existing state facilities.
Others receive little more than bed and board; the psychiatric
therapy, the education, the skill training and vocational guidance that have a direct bearing on their behavior after discharge—or, for that matter, on their eligibility for
discharge—are inadequate or even lacking altogether. A
chief reason for such deficiencies, where they exist, is that
many jurisdictions do not have enough offender patients to
justify the operation of up-to-date, full service mental health
programs and hospitals for them. We recommend:
The Federal government should establish regional
mental health programs and institutions for offenders, in
which the states should be permitted to board prisoners
needing such care at one-half the per capita operating
costs, including treatment.
The fifty-fifty figure for cost-sharing is arbitrary, but the
principle behind it is not. In our opinion, even if Federal
regional mental health facilities were vastly superior to state
ones, no state would make much use of them unless lodging a
patient in one cost it no more than keeping him in the state.

The Long-Term Tractable Prisoner
In every prison system there is a small percentage of offenders who, although presenting minimal custodial problems, are serving life sentences or their equivalent. Programs
of counseling, vocational education and the like are irrelevant
as far as they, and the correctional authorities, are concerned.
They need constructive employment, but few state prison systems have sufficiently well developed industrial programs to
provide it. Moreover, the current trend in many institutions is
in the direction of using industries less for productivity than
for on-the-job training in preparation for release into the
community. We recommend:
The Federal prison system, which has as good a prison
industries organization as any in the country, should accept long-term tractable prisoners from the states on a
low-cost basis. Existing Federal prisons could become
the regional facilities for this kind of prisoner.
A corollary to putting the above proposal into effect would
be to divert certain prisoners now in the Federal system to the
states. For example, there is a large number of Federal offenders who violated a state law at the same time that they
violated a Federal one. We call attention, especially, to those
convicted under the Dyer Act, which makes it a Federal offense to transport a stolen vehicle across a state line. More
than 3,000 Dyer Act violators are committed annually to the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, which is not only inappropriate
use of a statute designed to deal with professional car thieves,
but also costs the Federal government better than eight million dollars a year. Dyer Act offenders who are not professional criminals or members of car-theft rings should be left to
the states to prosecute. The substantial savings made possible
could be spent to better purpose on operating regional institutions and programs, which ultimately would be of financial
benefit to the states.
A second group that might be diverted from Federal to
state facilities are the between one and two thousand Federal
prisoners serving sentences of a year or less.
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The Narcotic Addict
Though many cities and states have programs of one sort or
another for narcotics addicts, and the big states of New York
and California, where many of the country's addicts reside,
have extensive programs of civil commitment, the extent of
the problem is such that much more must be done. Federal
help is needed, especially, for those many metropolitan areas
where the number of addicts, though large enough to cause
serious concern, is not so large as to justify embarking upon
the kind of elaborate program of long-term treatment and
supervision that experience indicates is essential to making
headway against addiction. Regional facilities, each one of
which could handle patients from several such areas, appear
to be a sensible way to deal with the problem, and the United
States Public Health Service, with the great amount of
knowledge it has acquired over the years from operating its
institutions for addicts in Lexington and Fort Worth, is well
suited to fill the gap in those regions where there is as yet
little local expertise. We recommend:
The Federal government should establish regional care
and treatment programs for narcotic addicts.
Such programs should, of course, be situated in metropolitan areas, perhaps in existing facilities in Veterans Administration hospitals.
Recent legislation that authorizes civil commitment of addicts by United States courts has two serious defects, in our
opinion. One is that the program is available only to "first
offenders," a term that has little practical meaning when applied to addicts, since as a rule and addict does not come to
the attention of the criminal justice system even for the first
time until he is a veteran user. The other is that it does not
call for intensive post-detoxification supervision, which we believe is essential in any treatment program for addicts. We
recommend:
The Federal government should restudy its program
for addicts with a view to making it consistent with the
best current practice in the field.

The Problem of the Female
Long-Term Offender
Only a few states have a large enough number of female
prisoners serving long terms to justify establishment of separate, well-staffed institutions. Such states as Idaho, New Mexico and Utah have fewer than fifty such prisoners at any given
time; some have scarcely any. The Federal government operates two institutions for females, one in the east and one on the
west coast, with none in intermediate locations. In addition,
many county jails have female prisoners serving sentences as
long as six months to a year under the most inadequate circumstances of housing and program. We recommend:
The Federal Bureau of Prisons should study the need
for establishing, in appropriate locations, regional institutions for female prisoners to accommodate such prisoners in institutions with a capacity not to exceed 300
each.
Such institutions should be built or converted at Federal
government expense, and the states should be permitted to
board female offenders in them at one-half the per capita cost
of operation. We note that interstate compact have been negotiated in some regions, but financial, political and administrative difficulties have militated against their successful operation. Some of these problems might be solved, at least in
part, by Federal participation in the capital outlays and operating cons.
PART IV
Toward Community-Based Corrections
The argument for conducting as much of the correctional
process as possible in the community rather than in custodial
institutions is a simple one. What is wrong with most offenders is that for any number of good or bad reasons they
are unable or unwilling to respect the standards of the community, to adhere to its customs, to fulfill their obligations to

i, or use to advantage the opportunities it provides. Hence
"correction" or "rehabilitation" or "reintegration"—use what
polysyllable you will—is at bottom a process intended to give
offenders the ability and the desire to be good citizens. The
difficulty of pursuing this objective in the authoritarian, monotonous and, above all, artificial environment of a jail or
prison is obvious; you do not train aviators in submarines.
The way to learn how to solve the problems of community
living is to tackle them where they exist. The way to learn to
understand and appreciate community life is to become immersed in it.
However, if offenders could do this on their own, most of
them would not have become offenders in the first place.
They need help and supervision, a great deal of both. As
things stand now, most of that two-thirds of all offenders who
do live in the community—i.e., those on probation and parole—receive little of either. The prime, though not the only,
reason for this is numerical. There simply are not enough
probation and parole officers. The National Crime Commission suggested that a proper ratio of officers to offenders in a
probation or parole service was one to thirty-five. It found
that most adults on probation, including felons, reported to
officers with caseloads of over 100, and that parole officers
and juvenile probation officers were in only slightly better
straits, with caseloads that commonly ran around 75. It does
not take much of a mathematician to calculate how much
time, on the average, an officer with a caseload of 100 can
spend on each of his cases during a 175-hour working
month—even assuming he writes no pre-sentence reports and
does no other paperwork or traveling, which actually consume as much as half of the time of many officers. In this
connection, we note that many probation and parole officers
spend much of their time on routine investigatory and reporting duties that could be handled just as efficiently by paraprofessionals, thus freeing them for the expert counseling and
guidance work the\ were trained for. We recommend:
The Federal government should grant funds to the
states and localities for the training and employment of
substantially greater numbers of qualified probation and
parole workers, both professional and paraprofessional.

Along with adequate numbers, adequate training is the kev
to effective programs of probation and parole. Thorough, upto-date training programs, pre-service and in-service/cost a
great deal more money than any small jurisdiction can afford
and most large jurisdictions have so far been willing to spend.
This is particularly true of in-service programs, which arc the
best possible means for seeing to it that working professionals
keep abreast of new developments in the field and have an
opportunity to exchange experiences with colleagues they
otherwise might not meet. We recommend:
The Federal government should establish regional
training programs to provide continuing in-service training for probation, parole and all other correctional officers.
We further recommend:
The Federal government should promulgate national
standards for parole and probation services, and condition its aid to the states and localities on their willingness
and ability to meet those standards.
In connection with the last recommendation, we suggest that
the American Correctional Association's Manual of Correctional Standards, a revised edition of which is now in preparation, might be a useful guide to those entrusted with formulating national correctional standards not only for institutions,
but also for services. The accreditation plan for correctional
services the Association is now developing also merits Federal
attention and, in all likelihood, support.
Probationers and parolees are, of course, people who have
been through the full criminal process from arrest through
sentencing—and, in the case of parolees, incarceration.
There is also a part to play for corrections—or. if "corrections" is the wrong word under the circumstances, for people
who also perform correctional services—with respect to certain defendants against whom criminal or delinquency charges
have not yet been adjudicated, and sometimes also with respect to their families. This applies especially to children and
young people. A prudent rule to follow for those waiting to

conserve both human and fiscal resources, is that whenever
an offender, especially a juvenile offender, can be diverted
from going through the full criminal process without jeopardizing the safety of the community, he should be. However,
this kind of diversion, which, of course, presumes the consent
of the offender to a carefully worked out alternative to trial
and punishment, is possible only if there is available in the
community pre-adjudication services of many kinds: diagnostic, therapeutic, counseling and guidance, educational, employment, the entire spectrum. We recommend:
The Congress should enact legislation and appropriate
funds for the creation, within existing community and
mental-health facilities, of special units to provide preadjudication (as well as post-adjudication) services of all
kinds to defendants, and information about defendants
to prosecutors and judges, with the object of diverting as
many defendants as possible from full criminal process.
We further recommend:
The Federal government should fund an experimental
program to determine the effectiveness, first, of pre-trial
counseling and supervision of defendants and, second, of
deferred adjudication of certain defendants under probation.
One way of stimulating diversion, as California has demonstrated with its "probation subsidy'* program, is for states
(under%the Safe Streets Act) to reimburse local governments
operating programs that succeed in keeping both defendants
and convicted offenders out of penal institutions.
Juvenile offenders rather commonly, and sometimes adult
offenders also, are members of so-called "multi-problem"
families—families that have a host of difficulties, financial,
medical, marital, criminal, educational and so forth—and are
the objects of attention of half a dozen different social
agencies, from welfare agencies to the police. It appears probable that the best way to rehabilitate many offenders who are
members of such families is to treat the families as a whole,
not just the offenders as separate individuals. One program

along these lines that appears promising, though its results are
still not conclusive, is the Family Centered Program in Columbus, Ohio, operated by the probation service. It deals
with recidivist delinquents in multi-problem families by using
intensive case work on the family, coordinating the work of
all the agencies that deal with it, and insisting on uniform
documentation. It is a kind of experiment that should be tried
in other localities. We recommend:
The Federal government should undertake a demonstration project to test the effectiveness of non-institutional therapeutic family-oriented programs for treating
offenders from multi-problem families.
In some ways, only an ex-offender can understand fully the
problems offenders face upon their return to the community.
The use of ex-offenders as counselors to probationers and
parolees is already being explored. That exploration should
be intensified. We recommend:
The Federal government should extend its support of
demonstration projects to test the effectiveness of using
ex-offenders as counselors to probationers and parolees.
Finally, as we noted in the introductory part of this report,
the feasibility of a comprehensive program of communitybased corrections depends on the attitudes of the community
itself. The community must be more than passively accepting;
it must be actively helpful.
This means that community organizations and agencies of
every kind—schools, churches, settlement houses, family services, mental-health clinics and all the rest—must develop a
desire to help offenders and an expertise about their special
problems, so that a policeman has somewhere else to take a
wayward child then to the lock-up, so that a judge can order
probation for a person in the reasonable expectation that a
wealth of community resources are accessible to that person,
so that a parole officer can get the kind of expert help he so
often needs.
It means that newspapers, radio and television should expand their interest in corrections to include its workaday

problems and achievements, rather than confine their reporting, as so many do, to scandals and riots and the lapses from
grace of "ex-convicts"—a favorite word in the media.
It means that homeowners' and businessmen's groups
should think about human lives as well as real estate values
and the "tone" of their neighborhoods when proposals for
halfway houses here or there are made.
It means, as we said at length in Part II, -hat jobs and
training for jobs should be easily accessible to ex-offender's.
One very specific way of easing an ex-offenders way
through life is to make sure that his criminal record is not
permanently attached to him. We recommend:
The Federal government should adopt, and urge the
states to adopt, legislation that would, with appropriate
exceptions, prohibit non-judicial use of a misdemeanant's criminal record after a defined period of time; in
the case of felons, legislation should provide that, after
an appropriate period of law-abiding behavior, the supervising agency could recommend pardons for them.
In sum, making a place for ex-offenders in their communities rather than giving them the cold shoulder is one way to
help convince them that there is another life besides one of
crime.
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Illegal thinking has moved increasigjy toward a sociologically meaningview of die legal system. Sanctions,
fc particular, have come to be regarded
ID functional terms.1 In criminal law,
Jet instance, sanctions are said to be
feigned to prevent recidivism by re•bilitating, restraining, or executing
Ac offender. They are also said to be
btended to deter others from the perfennance of similar acts and, sometoks* to provide a channel for the
Oppression of retaliatory motives. In
fcch civil actions as tort or contract,
^ttooetary awards may be intended as
jttributive and deterrent, as in the use
[ « Punitive damages, or may be re: t^ded as a quid pro quo to compen(*f« the plaintiff for his wrongful loss.
j^while these goals comprise an ini?*?J P«t of the rationale of law, lit* ? * *nown about the extent to which
^ih aiC ^ ^ ^ m practice. Lawmen
j*° not as a rule make such studies, be^ r ^ * e ^ traditions and techniques
W n o t ^ 8 ° * * *or a systematic ex^•ounadon o f the operation of the legal
tax?* m a c t i o Q , c s P e d a U 5 r outside the
coa
ta!!!0^
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^gj^pjjed version of paper read at the
t^t J** Meeting of the American Soaologi^-Asioaation, August, I960 This paper
f
*f th* t ^ 0 0 m a t c r i * l s P' c P» rc d by students
W fk \F. ***& Behavioral Science Division
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ladT?cr».T^° »««sted in the experiment,
l ^ ^ ^ j r that of Dr. Robert Wyckofif,
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E ^ w J 0 ^ , valuable commencs and 'uggrs
t^ttf?** tactions are denned as changes
ictiojj ^5°°d ltl ons imposed through court

count at all, it is through the JJJ
creaonary actions of police, prosecutor,
judge, and jury. Systematic information on a variety of unanticipated outcomes, chose which benefit the accused
as well as those which hurt him, might
help to inform these decision makers
and perhaps lead to changes in substantive law as welL The present paper
is an attempt to study the consequences
of stigma associated with legal accusation.
From a sociological viewpoint, there
are several types of indirect consequences of legal sanctions which can
be distinguished These include differential deterrence, effects on the sanedonee's associates, and variations in the
degree of deprivation which sanction
imposes on the recipient himself.
First, the imposition of sanction,
while intended as a matter of oven
policy to deter the public at large,
probably will vary in its effectiveness
as a deterrent, depending upon the extent to which potential offenders perceive themselves as similar to the sanctionee. Such "differential deterrence"
would occur ii white-collar and-crust
violators were restrained by the conviction of General Electric executives,
but not by invocation of the Sherman
Act against union leaders
The imposition of a sanction may
even provide an unintended incentive
to violate the law. A study of factors
affecting compliance with federal income tax laws provides some evidence
of this effect,3 Some respondents reported that they began to cheat on their
* Richard D. Schwartz, T h e Effectiveness
of Legal Controls: Factors in the Reporting
of Minor Items of Income on Federal Income Tax Returns.** Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Chicago, 1959.
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tax returns only after convictions for
tax evasion had been obtained against
others in their jurisdiction They explained this surprising behavior by
noting that the prosecutions had always
been conducted against blatant violators and not against the kind of moderate offenders which they then became.
These respondents were, therefore, unintentionally educated to the possibility of supposedly "safe" violations.
Second, deprivations or benefits may
accrue to non-sanctioned individuals by
virtue of the web of affiliations that
join them to the defendant. The wife
and family of a convicted man may, for
instance, suffer from his arrest as much
as the man himself. On the other hand,
they may be relieved by his absence
if the family relationship has been an
unhappy one. Similarly, whole groups
of persons may be affected by sanctions
to an individual, as when discriminatory practices increase because of a
highly publicized crime attributed to a
member of a given minority group.
Finally, the social position of the defendant himself will serve to aggravate
or alleviate the effects of any given
sanction. Although all three indirect
consequences may be interrelated, it is
the third with which this paper will
be primarily concerned.
FINDINGS

The subjects studied to examine the
effects of legal accusation on occupational positions represented two extremes: lower-class unskilled workers
charged with assault, and medical doctors accused of malpractice. The first
project lent itself to a field experiment,
while the second required a survey design. Because of differences in method
and substance, the studies cannot be
used as formal controls for each other.
Taken together, however, they do suggest that the indirect effects of sanctions can be powerful, that they can
produce unintended harm or unexpect«1 Henefit. and that the results are re-

lated to officially unemphasized aspects of the social context in which
the sanctions are administered. Accordingly, the two studies will be discussed
together, as bearing on one another.
Strictly speaking, however, each can,
and properly should, stand alone as a
separate examination of the unanticipated consequences of legal sanctions
Study 1. The Effects of a Criminal
Court Record on the Employment
Opportunities of Unskilled Workers
In the field experiment, four employment folders were prepared, the
same in all respects except for the
criminal court record of the applicant.
In all of the folders he was described
as a thirty-two year old single male of
unspecified race, with a high school
training in mechanical trades, and a
record of successive short term jobs as
a kitchen helper, maintenance worker,
and handyman. These characteristics
are roughly typical of applicants for
unskilled hotel jobs in the Catskill resort area of New York State where
employment opportunities were tested.3
The four folders differed only in the
applicant's reported record of criminal
court involvement. The first folder indicated that the applicant had been
convicted and sentenced for assault;
the second, that he had been tried for
assault and acquitted; the third, also
tried for assault and acquitted, but with
a letter from the judge certifying tbe
finding of not guilty and reaffirming
the legal presumption of innocence
The fourth folder made no mention
8
The generality of these results rem**0*
to be determined. The effects of crifl*in£
involvement in the Catskill area are pr°|J~
ably diminished, however, by the tempo13**
nature of employment, the generally P°?e
qualifications of the work force, anc *. } rj
excess of demand over supply of unskil***
labor there. Accordingly, the employ**1^
differences among the four treatment £f£?*g
found in this study are likely, if a^V 1 ft
to be smaller than would be expected
industries and areas where workers *
more carefully selected.

Two Studies of Legal Stigma
Of any criminal record.
- A sample of one hundred employers
was utilized. Each employer was assigned to one of four "treatment"
froups.4 To each employer only one
folder was shown; this folder was one
of the four kinds mentioned above, the
election of the folder being determined by die treatment group to which
the potential employer was assigned.
the employer was asked whether he
could "use" the man described in the
fcldcr; To preserve the reality of the
i'tuarion and make it a true field experiment, employers were never given
•ny indication that they were participating in an experiment. So far as they
w w , a legitimate offer to work was
J**ng made in each showing of the
Wder by the "employment agent."
*4The experiment was designed to de•Bnune what employers would do in
«ct if confronted with an employment
•pplicant with a criminal record. The
^tionnaire approach used in earlier
Jjwjes5 seemed ill-adapted to the prob^ a n c e respondents confronted with
»j?P°thetical situations might be par^ w l y prone to answer in what they
^ttdered a socially acceptable manner.
*** second alternative—studying job
, {w^ammes of individuals who had
lF*^i involved with the law—would
:

I ^ J ^ f ^ l e groups of applicants and
UhMR***' emP^°5rers- * o r &csc reason,
r'Sn* ^ experiment reported here was
'deception:was involved in the
yen were not approached in pre* * 2 r f t n < ^ o m o'der, due to a misunderg
l i £ r k °* ^tractions on the part of
rterii!?* student who carried out the exI J e r S ^ during a three and one-half week
£*fcntai ^ c a u s c of this flaw in the experi[ t f ^ 4 ^pcedure, the results should be
&^2» # 5 * *PP'opriate caution. Thus,
liJJlj^yred analysis may not properly, be
rfco!« # (For those used to this measure,

P & k ' t ua b l e L)

?Zm*rz * bin, Crim* and Juvmilt D#^ 5 o ? ' N e w York: Oceana, 1958, pp.

Bc»

study. The "employment agent"—the
same individual in all hundred cases—
was in fact a law student who was
working in the Catskills during the
summer of 1959 as an insurance adjuster. In representing himself as being
both an adjuster and an employment
agent, he was assuming a combination
of roles which is not uncommon there.
The adjuster role gave him an opportunity to introduce a single application for employment casually and naturally. To the extent that the experiment worked, however, it was inevitable that some employers should be
led to believe that they had immediate
prospects of filling a job opening. In
those instances where an offer to hire
was made, the "agent" called a few
hours later to say that the applicant
had taken another job. The field experimenter attempted in such instances
to locate a satisfactory replacement by
contacting an employment agency in
the area. Because this" procedure was
used and since the jobs involved were
of relatively minor consequence, we
believe that the deception caused little
economic harm.
As mentioned, each treatment group
of twenty-five employers was approached with one type of folder. Responses
were dichotomized: those who expressed a willingness to consider the applicant in any way were termed positive;
those who made no response or who
explicitly refused to consider the candidate were termed negative. Our results consist -of comparisons between
positive and negative responses, thus
defined, ior the treatment groups.
Of the twenty-five employers shown
the "no record" folder, nine gave positive responses. Subject to reservations
arising from chance variations in sampling, we take this as indicative of the
"ceiling" of jobs available for this kind
of applicant under the given field conditions. Positive responses by these emplovers may be compared with those in
the other treatmenr irrrnim tn

nhtam

136

SOCIAL PROBLEMS

an indication of job opportunities lost
because of the various legal records.
Of the twenty-five employers approached with the "convict" folder,
only one expressed interest in the applicant. This is a rather graphic indication of the effect which a criminal
record may have on job opportunities.
Care must be exercised, of course, in
generalizing the conclusions to other
settings. In this context, however, the
criminal record made a major difference.
From a theoretical point of view, the
finding leads toward the conclusion
that conviction constitutes a powerful
form of "status degradation"6 which
continues to operate after the time
when, according to the generalized
theory of justice underlying punishment in our society, the individual's
"debt" has been paid. A record of conviction produces a durable if not
permanent loss of status. For purposes
of effective social control, this state
of affairs may heighten the deterrent
effect of conviction—though that remains to be established. Any such contribution to social control, however,
must be balanced against the barriers
imposed upon rehabilitation of the
convict. If the ex-prisoner finds difficulty in securing menial kinds of legitimate work, further crime may become an increasingly attractive alternative.7
Another important finding of this
study concerns the small number of
positive responses elicited by the "accused but acquitted" applicant. Of the
twenty-five employers approached with
this folder, three offered jobs. Thus, the
individual accused but acquitted of assault has almost as much trouble finding even an unskilled job as the one
who was not only accused of the same
offense, but also convicted.

From a theoretical point of view,
this result indicates that permanent
lowering of status is not limited to
those explicitly singled out by being
convicted of a crime. As an ideal outcome of American justice, criminal
procedure is supposed to distinguish
between the "guilty" and those who
have been acquitted. Legally controlled
consequences which follow the judgment are consistent with this purpose.
Thus, the "guilty" are subject to fine
and imprisonment, while those who are
acquitted are immune from these sanctions. But deprivations may be imposed on the acquitted, both before and
after victory in court. Before trial, legal
rules either permit or require arrest
and detention. The suspect may be
faced with the expense of an attorney
and a bail bond if he is to mitigate
these limitations on his privacy and
freedom. In addition, some pre-trial
deprivations are imposed without
formal legal permission. These may include coercive questioning, use of violence, and stigmatization. And, as tbtf
study indicates, some deprivations n&
under the direct control of the legal
process may develop or persist after &

7
Severe negative effects of conviction oj
employment opportunities have been notp
by Sol Rubin, Crime and Juvenile &elJ*
quency, New York: Oceana, 1958. A *«£
ther source of employment difficulty is »£
herent in licensing statutes and security rtjj
ulations which sometimes precludere cc^\u,
from being employed in theirtraPcS" *JjK
tion occupation or even in the 4 JJ?!^
they may have acquired during im^t^.
ment. These effects may, however, be <#*£
tttzcztd by bonding arrangements, Pf*£j
associations, and publicity programs *~\$f
at increasing confidence in, and s^Etij*,
for, exconvicts. See also, B. F. MC7L>
"Finding Jobs for. Released Offender
Federal Probation, 24 (June, I960).*£*
12-17; Harold D. Lasswell and R ^ i *
Donnelly, 'The Continuing D ^ ^ i J t f Responsibility: An Introduction to Iso* ^
the Condemnation Sanction," Y***„tfc*
6
Harold Garfinkel, "Conditions of Suc- Journal 68 (April, 1959), PP- ?Z&t
cessful Degradation Ceremonies," American Johs Andeneas, "General Prevention ^
Journal of Sociology, 61 (March, 1956), lusion or Reality?", /. Criminal W",
(July-August, 1952), pp. 176-98.
«n 420-24.
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TABLE 1.
EFFECT

0* Fou*

Positive respond
Negative response
Tool

TYPES OF LEGAL FOLDER ON JOB OPPORTUNITIES
(IN PER CENT)
Acquitted Acquitted withNo record
with letter
out letter
Convicted
Total

<N=25)
36
64

(N=25)
24
76

(N=25)
12
B8

4
96

100

100

100

100

(N=25)

(N=100)
19
81

100

8
official decisi011 of AI 14u 111 a 1 I nv, beenthis fact. Possession of such a document might be expected to alleviate
made.
Thus two kgal principles conflict post-acquittal deprivations.
Some indication of the effectiveness
in practice. 0 Q the one hand, *'a man
is innocent tf°til proven guilty." On of such a measure is found in the rethe other, the accused is systematically sponses of the final treatment group.
l created as guUty under the administra- Their folder, it will be recalled, contion of criminal law until a functionary tained information on the accusation
or official body—police, magistrate, and acquittal of the applicant, but also
prosecuting attorney, or trial judge or included a letter from a judge addressjury—decide* that he is entitled to be ed 'To whom it may concern" certifyfree. Even then, the results of treating ing the applicant's acquittal and rebun as guilt/ persist and may lead to minding the reader of the presumption
of innocence. Such a letter might have
serious consequences.
The conflict could be eased bv meas- had a boomerang effect, by reemphasiztttcs timed At reducing the depriva- ing the legal involvement of the aptions impose^ on the accused, before plicant. It was important, therefore, to
*nd after acquittal Some legal atten- determine empirically whether such a
tion has been focused on pre-trial dep- communication would improve or
rivations. The provision of bail and harm the chances of employment. Our
COu
nsel> die availability of habeas cor- findings indicate that it increased empus, limitations on the admissability of ployment opportunities, since the letcoerced confessions, and civil actions ter folder elicited six positive responsfoe disfe %xteSw is* tsassqtaa t>i ?s«i&» es. £w& ^tawgsk *A& i*SL &&R. *£ ^
***** aimed *t protecting the rights of nine responses to the "no record" fold••Ac accused b*&>** trial. Although theseer, it doubled the number for the "ac'mt* often lijjiited in effectiveness, es- cused but acquitted" and created a sigpecially for individuals of lower socio- nificantly greater number of job offers
^tconomic s&nis, they at least xepresent than those elicited by the conviaed
***** concert w*d* implementing the record. This suggests that the proced'presumption of innocence at the pre- ure merits consideration as a means of
offsetting the occupational loss resulti^stagc.
&vBy contr»5t, the courts have done ing from accusation. It should be not*
$*}* toward alleviating the post-ac- ed, however, that repeated use of this
^uittal consciences of legal accusa- device might reduce its effectiveness.
The results of the experiment are
?OQ. One effort along these lines has
'{**a employed in the federal courts, summarized in Table 1. The differences
j«owever. Wl**re an individual has been ^in outcome found there indicate that
^•ttttsed and exonerated of a crime, he
&*? petition the federal courts for a
• 2 8 United Si ices C )dc„ Sees 1493,
"ate of Innocence- certifying 2513.
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various types of legal records are systematically related to job opportunities. It seems fair to infer also that the
trend of job losses corresponds with
the apparent punitive intent of the
authorities. Where the man is convicted, that intent is presumably greatest.
It is less where he is accused but acquitted and still less where the court
makes an effort to emphasize the absence of a finding of guilt. Nevertheless, where the difference in punitive
intent is ideally greatest, between conviction and acquittal, the difference
in occupational harm is very slight. A
similar blurring of this distinction
shows up in a different way in the
next study.

Study II: The Effects on Defendants
Of Suits for Medical Malpractice
As indicated earlier, the second study
differed from the fust in a number of
ways: method of research, social class
of accused, relationship between the
accused and his "employer," social support available to accused, type of offense and its possible relevance to occupational adequacy. Because the two
studies differ in so many ways, the
reader is again cautioned to avoid
thinking of them as providing a rigorous comparative examination. They are
presented together only to demonstrate that legal accusation can produce unanticipated deprivations, as in
the case of Study I, or unanticipated
benefits, as in the research now to be
presented. In the discussion to follow,
some of the possible reasons for the
different outcomes will be suggested.
The extra-legal effects of a malpractice suit were studied by obtaining
the records of Connecticut's leading
carrier of malpractice insurance. According to these records, a total of 69
doctors in the State had been sued in
64 suits during the post World War
II period covered by the study, Sep-

tember, 1945, to September, 1959.9
Some suits were instituted against more
than one doctor, and four physicians
had been sued twice. Of the total of
69 physicians, 58 were questioned. Interviews were conducted with the approval of the Connecticut Medical Association by Robert Wyckoff, whose
extraordinary qualifications for the
work included possession of both the
M.D. and LLB. degrees. Dr. Wyckoff
was able to secure detailed response to
his inquiries from all doctors contacted.
Twenty of the respondents were
questioned by personal interview, 28
by telephone, and the remainder by
mail. Forty-three of those reached practiced principally in cities, eleven in
suburbs, and four in rural areas. Seventeen were engaged in general practice and forty-one were specialists. The
sample proved comparable to the doctors in the State as a whole in age,
experience, and professional qualifications.10 The range was from the lowest
professional stratum to chiefs of staff
and services in the State's most highly
regarded hospitals.
Of the 57 malpractice cases reported,
doctors clearly won 38; nineteen of
these were dropped by the plaintiff and
an equal number were won in court by
the defendant doctor. Of the remaining
nineteen suits, eleven were settled out
of court for a nominal amount, fou*
for approximately the amount vf
plaintiff claimed and four resulted &
judgment for the plaintiff in court.
The malpractice survey did not reveal widespread occupational barm *?
the physicians involved. Of &e ;
respondents, 52 reported no negan
effects of the suit on their practice
and five of the remaining six, all sp<^
° A spot check of one county tJv^Ltf
that the Company's records covered *vj^
malpractice suit tried in the courts ot ^
county during this period.
u+tirtC*
10
No relationship was found t # t r ^ j
any of these characteristics and the
-t
or extra-legal consequences of the 1*

Tuo Studies of Le^il aftgma
oaKsts, reported that their practice
mproied after the suit. The heaviest
loser in court (a radiologist), reported
(be largest gaia He commented, f,I
is all the doctors in town felt sorry
me because new patients started
«ming in from doctors who had not
t lent me patients previously." Only one
jfcoor reported adverse consequences
^D his practice. A winner in court, this
«un suffered physical and emotional
ttess symptoms which hampered his
Iwcr effectiveness in surgical work. The
temporary drop in his practice appears
to have been produced by neurotic
fflptoms and is therefore only inrecdy traceable to the malpractice
*ut Seventeen other doctors reported
laying degrees of personal dissatisfac*to and anxiety during and after the
*ut, but none of them reported imP^nnent of practice. N o significant
ftlarionship was found between out^ffte of thr suit and expressed dissatwaction.
#t A proteaive institutional environ**&t helps to explain these results. N o
£^* were found in which a doctor's
"fcpical privileges were reduced fold i n g the suit Neither was any phys•Gan unable later to obtain malpracp* insurance, although a handful
J*"*d it necessary to pay higher rates.
'%?5 State Licensing Commission,
j / ^ h is headed by a doctor, did not
^ r v e n e in any instance. Local medi^ societies generally investigated
r**ges through their ethics and griev•**e committees, but where they took
J2^lct*0n» it was almost always to
,^commend or assist in legal defense

r

J

IK
||^,rt

DISCUSSION

^Accusation has different outcomes
[ t f i ^ ^ N c d workers and doctors in
'*"*
«m,J.*
TT
1
I.
l > ltWO
^ ^ studies.
How may these
be exust
mi nt
W / u * > ^^
8
be nothing
CT* than artifacts of research method.
K v L L BV&uoieBb & was possible
***** wiavior directly, Le^ to de-
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termine bow employers act when confronted with what appears to them to
be a realistic opportunity to hire. Responses are therefore not distorted by
the memory of the respondent. By contrast, the memory of the doctors might
have been consciously or unconsciously
shaped by the wish to create the impression that the public had not taken
seriously the accusation leveled against
them. The motive for such a distortion might be either to protect the
respondent s self-esteem or to preserve
an image of public acceptance in the
eyes of the interviewer, the profession,
and the public Efforts of the interviewer to assure his subjects of anonymity—intended to offset these effects
—may have succeeded or may, on the
contrary, have accentuated an awareness of the danger. A related tvpe of
distortion might have stemmed from
a desire by doctors to affect public attitudes toward malpractice. Two conflicting motives might have been expected to enter here. The doctor might
have tended to exaggerate the harm
caused by an accusation, especially if
followed by acquittal, in order to turn
public opinion toward legal policies
which would limit malpractice liability. On the other hand, he might tend
to underplay extra-legal harm caused
by a legally insufficient accusation in
order to discourage potential plaintiffs
from instituting suits aimed at securing
remunerative settlements and/or revenge for grievances. Whether these
diverse motives operated to distort
doctors* reports and, if so, which of
them produced the greater degree of
distortion is a matter for speculation.
It is only suggested here that the interview method is more subject to
certain types of distortion than the direct behavioral observations of the field
experiment
Even if such distortion did not occur, the results may be attributable to
differences in research desiga In the
field experiment, a direct comparison
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is made between the occupational position of an accused and an identical
individual not accused at a single point
in time. In the medical study, effects
were inferred through retrospective
judgment, although checks on actual
income would have no doubt confirmed these judgments. Granted that income had increased, many other explanations are available to account for
it. An improvement in practice after
a malpractice suit may have resulted
from factors extraneous to the suit.
The passage of time in the community
and increased experience may have
led to a larger practice and may even
have masked negative effects of the
suit. There may have been a general
increase in practice for the kinds of
doctors involved in these suits, even
greater for doctors not sued than for
doctors in the sample. Whether interviews with a control sample could have
yielded sufficiently precise data to rule
out these possibilities is problematic.
Unfortunately, the resources available
for the study did not enable such data
to be obtained.
A third difference in the two designs may affect the results. In the
field experiment, full information concerning the legal record is provided
to all of the relevant decision makers,
i.e., the employers. In the medical
study, by contrast, the results depend
on decisions of actual patients to consult a given doctor. It may be assumed that such decisions are often based
on imperfect information, some patients knowing little or nothing about
11
See Eliot Freidson, "Client Control
and Medical Practice," American Journal
of Sociology, 65 (January, I960), pp. 37482. Freidson's point is that general practitioners are more subject to client-control
than specialists are. Our findings emphasize the importance of professional as compared to client control, and professional
protection against a particular form of client
control, extending through both branches of
the medical profession. However, what
holds for malpractice situations may not
Vv true of routine medical practice.

the malpractice suit. To ascertain how
much information employers usually
have concerning the legal record of the
employee and then supply that amount
would have been a desirable refinement, but a difficult one. The alternative approach would involve turning
the medical study into an experiment
in which full information concerning
malpractice (e.g., liable, accused bur
acquitted, no record of accusation) was
supplied to potential patients. This
would have permitted a comparison of
the effects of legal accusation in two
instances where information concerning the accusation is constant. To carry
out such an experiment in afieldsituation would require an unlikely degree
of cooperation, ffor instance by a medical clinic which might ask patientsto
choose their doctor on the basis of information given them. It is difficult
to conceive of an experiment along
these lines which would be both realistic enough to be valid and harmless
enough to be ethical.
If we assume, however, that these
methodological problems do not UJ*
validate the basic finding, how may *J
be explained? Why would unskilled
workers accused but acquitted of J5*
sault have great difficulty getting job*
while doctors accused of malpractice-^
whether acquitted or not—are left unharmed or more sought after than K-,
fore?
First, the charge of criminal assauk
carries with it the legal allegation ^
the popular connotation of ^ n r e ° C ^
harm. Malpractice,, on the other h ^
implies negligence or failure t 0 5 ^ . '
cise reasonable care. Even though .,
tual physical harm may be ff*****^»f
malpractice, the element of intent JT
gests that the man accused of *&* 4
would be more likely to repeat tn*£
tempt and to find the mark. Ho** -i
it is dubious that this fine dlstl Jv!
could be drawn by the lay P ubIl \
oil A&i
Perhaps more important, ***
-j*]
tors and particularly specialists & J <
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immune from the effects of a malpractice suit because their services are
is short supply.11 By contrast, the unbilled worker is one of many and
therefore likely to be passed over in'
fan* of someone with a "cleaner"
fecord.
> Moreover, high occupational status,
•xh as is demonstrably enjoyed by
doctors,12 probably tends to insulate
«ke doctor from imputations of incompetence. In general, professionals
ire assumed to possess uniformly high
Aility, to be oriented toward comBtoftiry service, and to enforce adequate standards within their own or|HUiation.1B Doctors in particular re<*j*e deference, just because they are
*ctors, not only from the population
* t whole but even from fellow pro".fttiionals.14
^Finally, individual doaors appear to
* Protected from the effects of ac*»»rioa by the sympathetic and powJJ^J wpport they receive from fellow
T™**s of the occupation, a factor
•»*at in the case of unskilled, un* J £ ^ laborers,15 The medical sok 2^9 provides advice on handling malf ^ c e actions, for instance, and re****** by other doctors sometimes inr ^ * *s a consequence of the sympwft
7 felt for the malpractice suit v i o
•j^atioiul Opinion Research Center,
££»*** Occupations: A Popular Evalu-

H\nP?J0n
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tun, buch assistance is further evidence
that the professional operates as "a
community within a community/*10
shielding its members from controls
exercised by formal authorities in the
larger sociery.
In order to isolate these factors, additional studies are needed. It would be
interesting to know, for instance,
whether high occupational status would
protect a doctor acquitted of a charge
of assault. Information on this question is sparse. Actual instances of assaults by doctors are probably very
rare. When and if they do occur, it
seems unlikely that they would lead to
publicity and prosecution, since police
and prosecutor discretion might usually
be emplpyed to quash charges before
they are publicized. In the rare instances in which they come to public
attention, such accusations appear to
produce a marked effect because of the
assumption that the pressing of charges,
despite the'status of the defendant, indicates probable guilt. Nevertheless,
instances may be found in which even
the accusation of first degree murder
followed by acquittal appears to have
left the doctor professionally unscathed. 11 Similarly, as a test of the group
protection hypothesis, one% might investigate the effect of an acquittal for
assault on working men who are union
.members. The -analogy would be particularly instructive where the union
plays an important part in employment decisions, for instance in indus-

too^y** -More recent studies in several
|T^»o tend to confirm the high status
#?*>Physician. See Alex Inkeles, -Indusi ^ ' The Relation of Status to Ex£*****» Perception and Value,** American
l*See William J. Goode, "Community
IjjJ1^0/ Sociology, 66 (July, I960), pp. Within
A Community: The Professions/'
0
I C U ^ " Parsons, The Social System, American Sociological Review, 22 (April,
1
F w c PrefS
pp. 194-200.
'^V^L ^
' W51. PP. 454- 1957),
17
For instance, the acquittal of Dr.
f
^ M Ju51 *'Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958. John Bodkin Adams after a sensational
kfiSII? Z*****.
Arthur R. Cohen, and murder trial, in which he was accused of
\¥<4hpf 0 §sst0ns
*ol§ Motions m the Mental deliberately killing several elderly women
£** $t*il! l
' Ana .Arbor: Institute itients to inherit their estates, was folg ^ j f ^ a r c h , 1957. *
wed by his quiet return to medical prac[J^i^^^'ornetimes
act to protect the tice. New York Times, Nov. 24, 1961,
o f mcm
i S T i i ^ L u nben who, discharged p. 28, col. 7. Whether the British regard
^•HenTL/i
P° ****** *«k re-em- acquittals as more exonerative than Ameri^ ^ allowing their acquittal.
cans is uncertain.

C
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tries which make use of a union hiring
halL
In the absence of studies which isolate the effect of such factors, our findings cannot readily be generalized. It
is tempting to suggest after an initial
look at the results that social class differences provide the explanation. But
'subsequent analysis and research might
well reveal significant intra-class variations, depending on the distribution of
other operative factors. A lower class
person with a scarce specialty and a
protective occupational group who is
acquitted of a lightly regarded offense
might benefit from the accusation.
Nevertheless, class in general seems to
correlate with the relevant factors to
such an extent that in reality the law
regularly works to the disadvantage of
the already more disadvantaged classes.

nature of the accusation and the characteristics of the accused. Deprivations
occur, even though not officially intended in the case of unskilled workers who have been acquitted of assauli
charges. On the other hand, malpractice actions—even when resulting in a
judgment against the doctor—are not
usually followed by negative consequences and sometimes have a favorable effect on the professional position
of the defendant. These differences ifl
outcome suggest two conclusions: one,
the need for more explicit clarification
of legal goals; two, the importance of
examining the attitudes and social
structure of the community outside the
courtroom if the legal process is to
hit intended targets, while avoiding innocent bystanders. Greater precision ifl
communicating goals and in appraising consequences of present practices
CONCLUSION
should help to make the legal process
Legal accusation imposes a variety an increasingly equitable and effective
of consequences, depending on the instrument of social control.

THIEVES, CONVICTS AND THE INMATE CULTURE
JOHN IRWIN and DONALD R. CRESSEY
Departments of Anthropology and Sociology
University of California, Los Angeles and Santa Barbara
In the rapidly-growing literature on
the social organization of correctional
institutions, it has become common to
discuss "prison culture" and "inmate
culture" in terms suggesting that the
behavior systems of various types of inmates stem from the conditions of imprisonment themselves. Use of a form
of structural-functional analysis in research and observation of institutions
has led to emphasis of the notion that
* We are indebted to the following
persons for suggested modifications of the
original draft: Donald L. Garrity, Daniel
Glaser, Erving Goflman, and Stanton

internal conditions stimulate lfl *?\!
behavior of various kinds, and tfc
has been a glossing over of the o ^
notion that inmates may bring a ^ u f "
ture with them into the P1^500: ^
aim is to suggest that much of ^ j ^ *
mate behavior classified as part 01 ^
prison culture is not peculiar^ to •>
prison at all. On the contrary, it ^ ^ . f
fine distinction between P r i ^ ^ J
ture" and "criminal subculture
^<
seems to make understandable ^ ^ Q
distinction between behavior p a 5ft
of various categories of in*11**[!L«<51
A number of recent P u b . ^ f * f f
have defended the notion that D& o |
patterns among inmates develop
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The Collateral Consequences
of a Criminal Conviction
The language of these statutes, in the absence of other recognized
and established principles of law, would seem to divest a citizen of all
rights whatsoever and render him absolutely civiliter mortuus, but the
principles of law which this verbiage literally imports had [their]
origin in the fogs and fictions of feudaljurisprudence and doubtlessly
(have] been brought forward into modern statutes without fully
realizing either the effect of [their] literal significance or the extent of
[their] infringement upon the spirit of our system of government.
Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 41 Okla. 728,731,139 P. 948,
949(1914).
As a general matter [civil disability law] has simply not been
rationally designed to accommodate the varied interests of society
and the individual convicted person. There has been little effort to
evaluate the whole system of disabilities and disqualifications that has
grownup. . . .As a result, convicted persons are generally subjected
> numerous disabilities and disqualifications which have little
relation to the crime committed, the person committing it or,
consequently, the protection of society. They are often harsh out of all
proportion to the crime committed.
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:

CORRECTIONS 88 (1967).
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demands that public affairs be administered by officers bearing ao
stigma of a conviction.4*
Although the courts seem to agree that provisions excluding
convicted citizens from public office are reasonable, some courts have
been more restrictive than others in applying the provisions to specific
problem areas. One area in which the states are in conflict involves the
question of whether a convicted person can seek public office after his
rehabilitation or after receiving a pardon.411 In the absence of a pardon,
the offender, even though rehabilitated, will be unable to hold public
offices in most states.40 The courts have reached conflicting decisions
when considering the effect of a pardon on public office
disqualifications.41* There also is judicial disagreement on the question of
whether a conviction in one state prevents an offender from holding
public office in another state.41* Some courts have held that only a
conviction in the state where the person is a candidate for office renders
him ineligible.449 Others, however, hold that criminal offenders are
disqualified from office, regardless of where they were convicted.411
Although the courts have upheld laws disqualifying convicted
persons from public office, these laws have been criticized by the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration
of Justice. The Commission has suggested that the states should rely on
the judgment of the voters for elective officials and on the appraisal of
the persons with appointive power for appointive positions.441 The
Swedish already follow the policy suggested by the President's
455. State ex ret. Guthrie v. Chapman. 187 Wash. 327.329-34.60 P-2d 245.246-47 (1936).
456. For a general discussion of the posuble way* to remove civil disabilities see aotes 570659 on pages 1143-54 infra and accompanying text.
457. People ex rH. Symonds v. Gaalano. 97 111. App. 2d 24S. 240 N.E-2d 467 (1968)
(candidate disqualified even UMMgh the courtrecognizedthat he had been rehabilitated since bis
conviction more than a quarter of a centnry earlier). Contm. Webb v. County Court, 113 W. Va.
474.476-78,161 S.E. 760.761 (1933). The case involves an interpretation of a West Virginia stats*
excluding persons convicted of certain crimes from public office "whits such conviction remains
BttTCvcrsed." W. V*. CODE ANN. f 6-5-5 (1966).
45S. People ex ret. Symonds v. Gaalano. 2(0 N.EJd 2S4 0»-App. C t r970) (governort
certificate of restoration removes dw^ficatioa); Stale c* *«£ Ckwd v. Ekctto
363.366,36 P2d 20.23 (l934)(paf*Mfcc4mda*«afifkatto^
Ark. 323.379 S.WJd 277 (1964) (disqualification Respective of pardon), noted as 7S HAS*. t~
Rev. 1676(1965).
459. Fnr a detailed disnmion see notes 142-71 smprm and accompanying lent.
460. See. *f.. HSdtctb v. Heath. 110. App. 12 (1S7S* Suit ex ret. Mitchell v. McOoaftM.
164 Miss. 405.145 So. 508 (!933).S«r e t o Goltermaa v. State. 141 So. 2d 21 (Fta. 1962).
461. £ * . . Cramptoo *. O'Mara. 193 lad. 551. 139 NX. 360 (1923). error dismissed. #*
VS. 575 (1925).
462. PRESIDCHT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENroactMixT AND TNC AOMiNtsTnATtON or
JUSTICE. TASK FORCE RETOKT: CORRECTIONS 90 (1967) (hereinafter died as TASK FORCE REPORT).

!00t

CIVIL DISABILITIES

1970)

Commission, reasoning that if an ex-convict becomes a candidate, his
former conviction probably will become an issue during the campaign. If
the voters are informed about the candidate and nevertheless choose to
elect him, the Swedes believe that the legislature should not interfere with
their choice.40
VI.

Loss OF EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

The right to work has been acclaimed ~thc most precious liberty
that man possesses."*4 For the ex-convict, however, the right to work in
an occupation of his choice is at best a qualified right and in many
instances is nonexistent. A job applicant with a criminal record may face
substantial prejudice on the part of many prospective employers. In
addition, the ex-convict is confronted with a vast array of federal, state,
and local regulations labeling him unsuitable for public employment and
a host of licensed occupations.
A. Exclusion of Convicted Criminals by Private Employers
Conviction of a crime can have lasting social and economic
consequences for the offender.4** Depending upon the nature and gravity
of his offense,444 employment opportunities in the private sector may be
severely limited. Numerous studies have surveyed the extent and effect of
private employers* discrimination against former convicts.4*1 Although
findings have not been consistent, it is generally concluded that
substantial discrimination is practiced.411 Many employers, for example,
flatly reject applicants with criminal records. Most employers avoid
hiring released convicts if other personnel are available.4* Moreover,
463. Damaska. Adverse Legmi Consequences Of Conviction mni Their RemovL A
Compor*tlveStm4ty.&I.C™.L.C.**S.W.}5*0?g).
„
n
464. B « * y v . Board of R e « e * ^ ^
Alaeyer v. Loaisiaaa. 165 VS. 37S. 5t9 (1S97); Crowley v. ChtaHinsin. 137 U.S.M.S9 (IS90).
« J . S ~ Plrter *. Ellis. 362 VS. 574. 593*4 (I960) (Warn.. CJ„jHs^thsg). See
Kmrmtfy D. GLASS*. Tmj EmcrtvEiaas or A
r^m^sMrAB^Srvmtm^mn^.
466. A a e s ^ o s ^ i i c l i a b M ^ i i o l s m i e l n ^
c««*kind.Statistkssin1icaie,h^
«ne.arelemlkelytoiet*wtocrfcm.$«ef^^
467.

S«.e*.D.GtASEK.i*l^i*te465,«32*^

Jl-33 (1967); MeUchcrc*. Employment Problems of Former Offenders. 2 NATY PKOIATION *
*AIOU ASS'N J. 43 (1956).
465. S a r i H A e 4 6 7 s » s v * S . R t » w . T « L A W o r C * o ^

^_

D. CLASEK. smprm note 465. at 361 (saggestinf that a former com;iflprmiary bamer to
•»0oymcnt h not his criminal record, bm rail** Ws lack of catcnsivew^
469. SeeS. R U B I N . * * * note 468. at 63S-*>, Note, Employment of Former Crbnmeb.»
CotMEU. L. REV. 306.307 (1970).
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since most fidelity insurance companies refuse to bond ex-convicts, the
released offender is often ineligible for employment in positions that
require bonding.479 Past criminality is usually overlooked only in
employing persons for low-skilled jobs.47,Xonsequcntly, many exconvicts who are successful in obtaining meaningful employment
probably did not disclose their criminal records.472
Discrimination by private employers based on age, sex, or race is
unlawful.47* Moreover, in a recent federal court decision a private
employer's refusal to hire a job applicant because of his arrest record
was held to be violative of the Civil Rights Act.474 Convicted criminals,
however, may be refused private employment with impunity.
Elimination of private prejudice and discriminatory practices against
former convicts was long thought to be the task of educators and social
scientists.47* There is increasing awareness, however, that equal
employment opportunity for released convicts, like other minority
groups, requires government action.47* At present, nevertheless, an exconvict probably stands a better chance of gaining entrance to private
employment than to either public employment or licensed occupations.477
B.

Exclusion of Convicted Criminals from Licensed Occupations

No member of society is more likely to forfeit his right to engage in
a licensed occupation than a convicted criminal. Laws of the federal government,47* every state,47* and countless municipali470.

Lykke, Attitude of Bonding Companies Toward Probationers and Parolees. 21 FED.

PROBATION 36 (Dec. 1957).

471.

See. e*.. Harris. Chanting Public A ttitudes Toward Crime and Corrections. 32 FED.

PROBATION 12 (Dec. 1968).

472. See D. GLASER. supra note 465, at 350-55.
473. 29 U.S.C. §5 621-34 (Supp. IV. 1969) (age); 42 U.S.C. | | 2000e-a (1964) (race, sex,
and religion).
474. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 39 U.S.L.W. 2049 ( C D Cal. Aug. 10, 1970) (enjoining employer from denying job to applicant because of his arrest record on the ground that
the practice discriminates against Negroes since they are arrested more frequently than whites).
475. SeeS.Kvitfi,
supra *ot*A6&. *l 639.
476. See note 34 on page 1160 infra and accompanying text.
477. See. e*.. D. GLASER. supra note 465. at 414; S. RUBIN, supra note468. at 640.
478.
Eg.. 7 U.S.C. f l2a(2KB) (Supp. IV. 1969) (Secretary of Agriculture may refuse to
register fdons as futures commission merchants and floor brokers); 46 C.F.R. | 10.02-1 (1969)
(persons convicted of narcotics violations ineligible for licensing as deck or engineering officers for
10 years after conviction).
479.

ALA. CODE tit. 46. f f

1-345 (1958 a Supp. 1967); ALASKA STAT, f f

08X)IJ010-.99.100

(1968); ARIZ. REV. STAT. A N N . f f 32-101 to-239! (1956*Supp. 1969); ARK. STAT. A N N . f f 71101 to -2423,72-121 to -1717 (1947 * Supp. 1969); CAL. BUS. A PROF. CODE f f 1-300047 (1962 *
West Supp. I970X CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. f f ,20-1 to -395 (1968); DEL. CODE A N N . tit. 24, f f
101-3536 (1953 * Supp. 1968); D.C CODE ANN. f f 47-2301 to -2350 (Supp. III. 1970); FLA. STAT.
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ties*** single out the ex-convict for possible exclusion from the majority of regulated occupations. In general, if a trade, profession, business,
or even an ordinary job requires licensing, conviction of any serious
crime may disqualify the offender from obtaining or holding a license.4*1
1. Scope of Occupational Licensing.—Under licensing laws, an
individual's right to engage in an occupation becomes a privilege granted
by the state.4*1 Entrance to and continued participation in a licensed
occupation is conditioned upon the applicant's ability to meet
qualifications prescribed by the legislature.4*3 Unlicensed participation
in a regulated activity may lead to criminal prosecution.4*4 Until the end
ANN. f f 454J0M9356 (1965 a Supp. 1969); GA. CODE A N N . f f 84-K)I to-9980 (1970); HAWAII
REV LAWS f f 25-436 to-471 (1968 * Supp. 1969); IDAHOCODE A N N . f f 54-101 to-2705 (1947 a
Supp. 1969); IND. A N N . STAT, f f 63-101 to -3617 (1961 * Supp. 1970); IOWA CODE f f 147.1158.11 (1949 * Supp. 1970); KAN. STAT. A N N . f f 65-1001 to-3101 (1964 ft Supp. 1968); KY. REV.
STAT, f f 311.250-333.990 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. A N N . f f 37.l--.2368 (1964 ft Supp. 1970); ME.
REV. STAT. A N N . tit. 32. f f 1-4803 (1964 ft Supp. 1970); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 43. f f 1B-754
(1957ftSupp. 1969); MASS. A N N . LAWS ch. 112, f f 1-107 (1965)ftSupp. 1970); MICH. STAT. ANN.
ff 18.1-1259(1957 * Supp. 1970); MINN. S"TAT. A N N . f f 147.01-157.15 (1947* Supp. 1970); Miss.
CODE ANN. f f 8632-01 to 8923-51 (1956 ft Supp. 1968); Mo. A N N . STAT, f f 326.001-343 J50 (1960
ft Supp. 1970); MONT. REV. CODES A N N . f f 66-101 to-3l 14 (1970); NEB. REV. STAT, f f 71-101 to
-3715 (1966); NEV. REV. STAT, f f 623.010-654.210 (1969); N.H. STAT. A N N . f f 309:1-332:17
(1955 * Supp. 1969); N J . STAT. A N N . f f 45:l-:25 (1963ftSupp. 1969); N.M. STAT. A N N . f f 67-1I to -36-18 (1953 ft Supp. 1969); N.Y. EDUC. LAW f f 6501-7713 (McKinney 1953 * Supp. 196970); N.C. GEN. STAT, f f 83-1 to93D-!6 (1965 * Supp. 1969); N.C. CENT. CODE f f 43-01-01 to
-34-14 (1960 ft Supp. 1969); OHIO REV. CODE f f 470IX)I-4749.99 (1964 ft Supp. 1969); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. lit. 59. f f 1-1408 (1963 ft Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. A N N . lit. 63, f f 9.1-1015 (1963 ft
Supp. 1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS A N N . f f 5-1-1 to -44-25 (1956ftSupp. 1969); S.C. CODE A N N . f f 56I to-1617 (1962 ft Supp. 1969); S.D. CODE f f 36-1-1 to-25-30 (1967 a Supp. 1970); TENN. CODE
ANN. f f 62-101 to 63-1521 (1955 ft Supp. 1969); UTAH CODE A N N . f f 58-1-1 to -34-9 (1953 ft
Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. A N N . tit. 26, f f 1-2598 (1967 ft Supp. 1969); VA. CODE A N N . f f 54-1 to
-915 (1954 ft Supp. 1970); WASH. REV. CODE A N N . f f 18J04.O2O-.92.90O (1961 ft Supp. 1969); W.
VA. CODE A N N . f f 30-1-1 to-21-15 (1966 * Supp. 1970); WYO. STAT. ANN. f f 33-1 to-385 (1957 ft
Supp. 1969). Licensing provisions appear throughout the codified statutes of Colorado, Illinois,
Texas, and Wisconsin.
480. Municipal ordinances excluding former criminals from occupations are generally upheld
when the regulation bears reasonable relation to public health, safety, and welfare. See. e.g..
Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau. 236 Md. 476,204 A.2d 521 (1964), cert, denied. 382 U.S. 849 (1965)
(taxicab operator); Moyant v. Borough of Paramus, 30 N J . 528,154 A 2d 9 (1959) (solicitors); cf
Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251,183 A. 534 (1936) (regulation of paper hangers held unresonable).
See generally E. MCQUILUN. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS f 26.74 (3d rev.ed. 1964).
481. A license may be refused if an applicant has committed any act for which a licensee
would be subject to disciplinary action. See. e*.. CAL. BUS. ft PROF. C o o t f 4511 (West Supp
1970) (psychiatric technicians).
482. See. r*.. In re Morris, 74 N. W. 679.681,397 PJd 475,476 (1964) (license to practice
law confers no vested right, but is a conditional privilege, revocable for cause).
483. Statutory qualifications often embrace the applicant's character, criminal record, age
education, skill, experience, and entrance examination scores. See generally Barron, Business and
Professional Licensing—California. A Representative Example. 18 STAN. L. REV. 640 (1966).
484. See. e.g.. N.J. S T A T . A N N . f 45:25-13 (Supp. 1969-70) (misdemeanor to seek
employment as x-ray technician without license).
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of the nineteenth century, few occupations other than medicine and law
were subject to license requirements.4*1 Since that time, however,
occupational licensing has proceeded at afoerishpace.*** In addition to
licensed professional callings,*1 modem routes regulate semi-skilled
and unskilled workers ranging from ambuh^ce attendants418 to billiardroom employees:,t* Regulations for many A these licenses are imposed
by local ordinances.4* Although no define* figures are available, it is
clear that a substantial portion of the working population is subject to
licensing.
The United States Supreme Court has sbeld the local regulation of
essential occupations as a valid exercise of police power necessary to the
safety, health, good order, and morals of oe community.m The Court,
however, has consistently emphasized thn a state cannot, under the
guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily deny access to lawful
occupations by imposing unreasonable restrictions."* Consequently,
patently unreasonable regulations have ben stricken by a number of
courts.4" As a general rule, however, cour-i arc reluctant to substitute
their judgment for that of the legislature.4*
Access to licensed employment h tnost often a matter of
485.
486.

See W. GELLHORN. INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND VAOWESTAL RESTRAINTS 126 (1956).
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCCUPA-O**L LICENSING LEGISLATION IN THE

STATES 7-8 (1952) (indicating that approximately 80 ocaaxum **rc licensed by state laws).
487. £>.. ALA. CODE tit. 46, }} 258-94 (Supp. 19TCT%*aans);ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
| | 32-2016 to -2755 (Supp. 1969-70) (attorneys): CAL. BS. « Ptof. CODE | | 1600-1808 (West
Supp. 1970) (dentists); FLA. STAT. ANN. } } 461J01 to .'> Siec 1969) (podiatrists); GA. CODE
ANN. I I 79A-501 lo -521 (Supp. 1969) (pharmacists): 4/ ^ STAT. ANN. {{ 322J0IO-J8O
(Baldwin 1969) (engineers): MICH. STAT. ANN. | | 18.1 -2t Sax 1970) (accountants); N.C. GEN.
STAT. | | 83-1 to-15 (Supp. 1969) (architects).
488.

£ . / . . MICH STAT. ANN. | 14328(59)(1970).

489. Eg.. N Y . GEN. BUS. LAW {{ 460-72 (MCKJQET .*»«>. See also ALA COOE tit. 46,
I I 64(38)-(70) (Supp. 1967) (cosmetologists); CAL. BUS « ^of CODE | | 9540-45 (West Supp.
1970) (dry ckancrst IND. ANN. STAT. | | 63-2301 to - 1 3 m\) (watch makers); N.C. GEN.
STAT. | | 72-31 to -45 (1965) (tourist camp operators); N_ ir 4 T \ s v | | 45:4-27 to -56 (Supp.
1969-70) (barbers).
490. Slates often delegate broad regulatory power it numeral corporations. 1 n some states,
the power of municipalities extends to the licensing of -ssaboaans. trade, business, vocations,
occupations, and professions conducted within the mumccakv See generally E. MCQUILUN | |
26.22-J1, supra note 480.
491. Dent v. West Virginia. 129 US. 114 (1889).
492. Eg.. Jay Burns Baking Co.v. Bryan, 264 VS 5* 5U (1924).
493. £.g.. State v. Ballance. 229 N.C. 764,51 S.E2t~l «9«9) (licensing of photographers
held an unreasonable restriction of a lawful and harmless acaesocn. bearing no relation to public
health, morals and safety); Livesay v. Tennessee Bd. of tanners. 204 Tenn. 500,322 S. W26 209
(1959) (licensing of match repairmen bdd unnecessary).
494. Ej.. Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Cc. 31 L5. 220 (1949) (upholding state
statute regulating insurance agents).

1970]

CIVIL DISABILITIES

1005

administrative determination.41' Federal"* and state4" statutes, as well as
municipal ordinances,** confer licensing authority on administrative
agencies such as licensing boards and boards of examiners. In some
instances, authority is vested in a single official.41* Most agencies are
composed of appointed members of the regulated occupation and
exercise broad discretion in processing applications and supervising
licensed personnel.***
!t is well settled that licensing authorities may not refuse, revoke, or
suspend a license without informing the applicant or licensee of the
reason for the proposed action and giving him an opportunity to be
heard.*1 In the absence of a hearing satisfying due process standards,
mandamus or similar relief is available in most state courts."*
Moreover, it has been held that arbitrary action by licensing authorities
is a violation of civil rights cognizable in federal courts.*** When an
agency determination is contested on the merits, however, the scope of
judicial review varies considerably between jurisdictions.**4 A number of
courts, for example, have held that licensing authority actions are
exclusively administrative and have refused to accord review on the
merits.*** In other jurisdictions, however, expanded judicial review is
either authorized by statute*** or assumed by the reviewing court.**7
495. See generally W. GELLHORN. supra note485. at 105-51 (1956).
496. Eg.. 47 U.S.C. ff 303. 318 (1964) (FCC licenses radio operators); 49 U.S.C.
H 1421-22 (1964) (FAA establishes eligibilityrequirementsfor civil airman).
497. Eg.. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71. | 102 (Supp. 1969).
498. See generally E. MCQUILLIN. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS f f 26.62-.67 (3d rev. cd. 1964).
499. Ej.. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. f 3905.01 (Baldwin 1964) (insurance).
500. See W. GELLHORN. supra note 485, at 105-18. See also AfTeldt a Scaey, Group
Sanctions and Personal Rights—Professions. Occupations and Labor Law. 11 ST. LOUIS U.L.J.
382.399-414 (1969): Barron, supra note 483, at 649-57.
501. Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (refusal of Bar
admission without hearing b denial of procedural due process).
502.

See generally L. JAFFE. JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 176 (1965).

503. See.e,f..Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605.612 (5th Cir. 1964) (arbitrary refusal of liquor
license held to be w violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983(1964)).
504. See L. JAFFE. supra note 502, at 107-09; Note, DeNovo Judicial Review of State
Administrative Findings. 65 HARV. L. REV. 1217 (1965).
505. See. eg.. DcMond v. Liquor Control Comtn'n, 129 Com. 642, 30 A.2d 547 (1943);
State Bd.v.Scherer. 221 Ind. 92.46 N.E.2d 602 (1943); Johnson v. Sanchez,67 N.M. 41.351 P.2d
449 (I960); State v. Huber, 129 W. Va. 198,40 S.E.2d 11 (1946).
506. £*.. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59. f 689 (1963) (appeal from refusal or revocation of
veterinarian's license); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. f 5-31-11 (1956) (appeal fromrevocationof dentist's
license); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. art. 4506 (1966) (appeal from revocation of license to practice
medicine).
507. State v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 229 Ore. 543, 368 P.2d 386 (1962);
Commonwealth v. Cronin, 336 Pa.469,9 A.2d408 (1939); McAnemey v.State.9 Utah 2d 191,341
P.2d2l2(l959).
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Some courts have found that pursuit of an occupation Is a propon
right, the deprivation of which requires a trial de novo on review."*^
2. Effect of Criminal Conviction under Licensing Statutes.~-i$i
United States Supreme Court, in Hawker v. New York,m recognized the
power of local governments to bar individuals from occupations on the
basis of past criminality. In upholding a provision prohibiting convicted
felons from the practice of medicine, the Court noted that a legislature
might reasonably require that members of a profession be of good
character and provide that conviction of crime demonstrates a lack of
this requisite character.*" More recently, in Barsky v. Board of
Regents*11 the Court upheld suspension of a practicing physician's
license because of his conviction for refusing to produce records
subpoenaed by a congressional committee. In Schware v. Board of Bar
Examinerst,,, however, the Court indicated a readiness to examine more
closely character standards that bar citizens from professional life. In
reversing on due process grounds the refusal of an application for Bar
admission, the Court noted that any standard by which an applicant is
measured must have a rational connection with his fitness for the
profession. ,u In its most recent decision in this area, DeVeau v.
Braisted*u the Court upheld a provision of the New York Waterfront
Commission Act of 1953 prohibiting convicted felons from holding
office in waterfront unions. Although this latest decision cites Hawker
with approval, it is clear that the Court attached special significance to
the circumstances that prompted the challenged legislation. In light of
the conditions then existing on the waterfront, the Court found the
legislature's judgment entirely reasonable.il, Read together, Schware
506. See, ej., Laisne v. California State Bd. of Optometry. 19 Cal. 2d 831. 123 P26 457
(1942) (license to practice optometry is a vetted property right). See also Milljgan v. Board of
Registration in Pharmacy, 348 Mass. 783.204 N.E.2d 504 (1965): "There is growing recognition
. . . that administrative decisions on applications for licenses and permits to engage in a lawful
occupation . . . directly affect the personal rights, property, or economic interests of the applicant,
and . . . that fundamental considerations of fairness require such decisions . . . to be made
objectively, under reasonable procedures and with appropriate opportunity for judicial review
. . . . The problem is important because of the increasingly large numbers of occupations now
being subjected to administrative regulations.*' 14, at 788.204 N.E.2d at 508.
509. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
510. "It is not open to doubt that the commission of crime . . . has some relation to the
question of character . . . . When the legislature declares that whoever has violated the criminal
laws of the State shall be deemed lacking in good moral character it is not laying down an arbitrary
or fanciful r u l e . . . ." Id. at 196.
511. 347 VS. 442 (1953).
512. 353 VS. 232 (1957).
513. Id. *t 239.
514. 363 VS. 144 (I960).
515. Id. at 158.
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tad DeVeau indicate that in the future the United States Supreme Court
trill subject legislative restrictions on occupational choices to greater
scrutiny than is suggested by the Hawker decision. Even so, recent
legislation"* and judicial decisions*17 make it clear that a criminal
conviction remains a serious obstacle to the pursuit of a licensed
occupation.
For a significant number of former convicts, the barriers to
employment created by licensing laws may be insurmountable.*"
Entrance to a licensed occupation may be especially difficult for an
individual with a criminal record because he has the burden of
establishing good character.*1* The person already holding a license is in
a more favorable position, since he has the benefit of prior performance
in the occupation as evidence of his fitness. Moreover, the burden of
demonstrating unfitness rests with the licensing authority.09 On the
other hand, the licensee convicted of crime may be faced with a
presumption that he has betrayed the trust conferred by the license,
thereby forfeiting his privilege to continue in the occupation.m Once
expelled, reinstatement is unlikely.m
As a general rule, acquittal of criminal charges does not preclude
refusal or revocation of a iicense.m Moreover, it is usually held that
neither suspension of sentence nor pardon will prevent exclusion from
licensed employment.04 Even in states that provide for expungement81* of
516. See. e.g.. Mo. ANN STAT, f 334390 (Supp. 1969) (conviction of felony or crime
involving moral turpitude bars licensing as physical therapist); N.C. GEN STAT § 89A-7
(Supp. 1969) (convicted felons may be excluded from practice of landscape architecture). See also
Model Professional and Occupational Licensing Act. 5 HARV J. LEGIS 67, 77 (1967)
(conviction of felony or crime involving moral turpitude suggested as basis for possible exclusion
from all licensed professions and occupations).
517. See. e*.. Kaufman v. Taxfcab Bureau, 236 Md. 476.204 A.ld 521 (1964). cert, denied.
382 U S. 849 (1965) (taxicab license refused because of applicant*! prior convictions of
pantctpmting in student civil disorders); In re Morris. 74 N.M. 679,39* P.2d 475 (1964) (attorney's
conviction of involuntary manslaughter justifies suspension from the Bar).
519. It is likely that many former convicts barred from licensed employment do not seek
judicial relief due to the prohibitive expense of litigation.
519. S<w.e.g.. Application of Patterson. 213 Ore. 398,410,318 P.2d907,912 (1957) (casting
on petitioner "the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he is of good moral
character," but failing to define "good moral character**).
520. See, ej , Ska v. Board or Police Comm*rs, 200 Cal. App. 2d 137,19 Cal. Rptr. 277
(1962) (public dance hall permit).
521. S«.e^../nf»Morris,74N.M.679,6Sl-S2,397 P.2d475T476(l964).
522. In re Flynn, 52 Wash. 2d 5S9,596,328 P.2d 150,154 (1958).
523. Cases cited note 549 infra.
524. See. ej . Page v. Watson, 140 Fla. 536, 192 So. 205 (1938) (physicians); Stone v.
Oklahoma Real Estate Comm'n, 369 P.2d 642 (Okla. 1962); State Bd. of Dental Examiners v.
Breeland, 208 S.C. 469,38 S.E.2d 644 (1946).
525. £.g.. CAL. PENAL CODE f 1203.4 (West Supp. 1970).
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penalties and disabilities incident to conviction, it is generally held that
this relief does not extend to licensed employment.*"
The extent that occupational freedom is diminished by licensing
laws is uncertain. Conviction of an abominable crime will probably
make an individual unsuitable for most licensed employment. Petty
offenses, on the other hand, seldom bar the offender.127 Between these
extremes there is a broad range of criminal conduct that invariably
casts a shadow on an individual's employment future. Disqualification
depends largely on the nature of both the occupation pursued and the
crime committed. To determine the exact effect of his conviction, a
former convict must look to the applicable licensing provisions of the
jurisdiction in which he seeks employment. In some instances, federal
law is pertinent,*2* but more often state or municipal regulations control.
Licensing laws vary considerably among the states and even among
regulated occupations within a state. Municipal regulations contribute
further to the lack of consistency. Thus, a conviction that bars a person
from an occupation in one state may not preclude licensing in another.42*
Similarly, within the same state an ex-convict may be excluded from
some occupations and qualified for others.*** Exclusion may be
mandatory for certain occupations and for others discretionary.**1 In
some instances, the conviction's proximity in time may be
526. Copctand v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control. 241 Cal. App. 2d 186.50 Cat.
Rptr. 452 (1966) (beer license denied on basis of lack of good character evidenced by expunged
conviction).
527. Misdemeanors involving moral turpitude, however, may disqualify the offender. Set,
e*.. CAL. BUS. * PROF. CODE « 3094 (West 1962) (optometrists); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-4
(1965) (real estate brokers).
52S. See. eg, 18 U.S.C. | { 922(g)(1). (h)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969) (unlawful for any person
under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to ship, transport, or receive firearms or ammunition in
interstate or foreign commerce).
529. Alabama requires mandatory license revocation when an engineer is convicted of a crime
mrorriag moral turpitude. ALA. CODE tit. 46, f 128(20) (Supp. 1967). California provides for
discretionary revocation for a felony in connection with engineering or any crime involving moral
turpitude. CAL. Bus. * PROF. CODE | 6775 (West 1964). Michigan bases revocation on an
engineer's professional negligence. MICH. STAT. ANN. f 18.84(21) (1957).
530. Arizona, for example, no longer lists felony convictions as a ground for refusing a
barber'sticense(ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. | 32-353 (1956)). but still prohibit* issuance of a license to
practice cosmetology if the applicant has been convicted of afelony.ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 32552 (Supp. 1969-70).
531. The reason for the distinction is often not dear. North Carolina, for example, requires
mandatory refusal or revocation of a physical therapist's license for any act derogatory to the
standing or morals of the profession. N.C. GEN. STAT, f 90-265 (Cum. Supp. 1969). In the same
state, however, revocation of a physician's license is discretionary. N.C. GEN. STAT. §90-14
(1965).
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determinative.18 A few jurisdictions have enacted provisions mitigating
the effect of a criminal record on employment opportunity ,m Although
these statutory variations and inconsistencies make it difficult to gauge
accurately the effect of a criminal conviction on future employment, it is
possible to determine the extent of probable exclusion from licensed
employment by examining typical statutory provisions.
(a) Common grounds for excluding convicted criminals.—Prior
criminal conduct may disqualify an individual in several ways. Most
licensing laws exclude persons convicted of relatively serious crimes or
crimes indicating lack of moral character. Moreover, general character
requirements often preclude licensing of ex-convicts. Professionals
convicted of a crime may be disqualified on the basis of unprofessional
conduct.
(i) Lack of good moral character.—Statutes and ordinances
frequently establish character standards that must be met for admission
to an occupation.04 Some statutes also authorize revocation of licenses
for immoral acts.*** Most, if not all, professional callings require
applicants to prove good character.13* In addition, a surprising number
of non-professional occupations impose character requirements. Thus,
failure to demonstrate good moral character may prevent an individual
from operating a dry-cleaning plant,**7 selling hearing aids,*** or
becoming a forester.*** Although character standards bearing little or no
relationship to a regulated activity may be stricken, courts have found
good character to be a reasonable prerequisite in a wide variety of
vocations and activities.*49 Even when character is not a statutory
532. See. rg.. MICH. STAT. ANN. f 19.803 (Supp. 1970) (authority to deny or revoke a
real estate broker's license because of afelonyconviction is limited to cases in which an applicant
has been convicted within the past 5 years).
533. See notes 568-71 infra and accompanying text.
534. Character standards are now so firmly embedded in admission requirements thai little
thought b given to their relevance. See. ej.. A Model Professional and Occupational L icensing A ct.
5 HARV. J. Lects. 67,81 (1967) (good moral character should be an entrance requirement for all
licensed professions and occupations).
535. Teachers* certificates may be revoked on the basis of immoral conduct. See. eg., ALA.
CODE tit. 52. | 337 (I960); N.Y. Eouc. LAW | 3020 (McKinney 1953). In Anions a dental
hygienist*s license may be revoked for acts of gross immorality. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. | 32-1290
(1956).
536. See generally AfkMt^Scocy.nayranoU 500, *t399-4\0.
537. £*.. CAL. BUS. ft PROF. CODE f 9551J (West Supp. 1970).
538. £*., MICH. STAT. ANN. f 18.276(6) (Supp. 1970).
539. £*.. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, f 1212 (Supp. 1969-70). See also ALA. CODE tK. 46,
| 120(35) (Supp. 1967) (dental hygienists); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. f 20-80 (1968) (mkfwires);
Mo. ANN. STAT, f 329.050 (1966) (cosmetologists); N.C. GEN. STAT. | 87-74 (1965) (water wdl
contractors); PA. STAT. ANN tit. 63, $ 642 (1968) (poultry technicians).
540. See. ej.. Movant v. Paramus. 30 NJ. 528, 154 A .2d 9 (1959) (ordinance imposing
character requirements on solicitors and canvassers).
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requirement, some courts find that the licensing authority has the
implied power to bar persons who are found morally unfit for participation in the licensed activity.141
Conviction of a crime is quite generally held to be evidence that the
offender lacks the requisite character for either a professional calling10
or the most ordinary pursuit.*43 Some reviewing courts look beyond the
conviction in determining whether an individual's exclusion on character
grounds is justified.*44 A court may conclude, for example, that denial of
a license is unreasonable in light of the applicant's rehabilitation.94*
More often, however, a record of conviction will be conclusive evidence
of bad character. Exclusion on character grounds may be upheld even on
the basis of an applicant's association with criminals.*4*
(ii) Conviction of crime.—Most statutes expressly make
conviction of certain types of crimes a ground for exclusion.*47 The
record of conviction is normally a sufficient basis for the licensing
authority to act.*41 In a few cases, licenses have been revoked even though
the holder was acquitted of the criminal charge.*49
541. Eg.. Dorf v. Fielding. 20 Misc. 2d IS. 197 N.Y.S.2d 2*0 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (denial of
license to sell secondhand goods because of convictions for running house of prostitution).
542. Eg.. Application of Brooks, 57 Wash. 2d 66.355 P.2d 840 (I960), cert, denied. 365 VS.
813 (1961) (denial of application to practice law because of conviction for failure to report to work
camps for conscientious objectors during World War II).
543. See. eg . H inch v. City and County of San Francisco. 143 Cal. App. 2d 313,300 PJd
177 (Oist. Ct. App. 1956) (merchant); Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, 236 Md. 476. 204 A .2d 521
(1964). cert, denied. 382 U.S. 849 (1965) (taxicab operator).
544. A few states expressly provide for the exercise of similar discretion by licensing
authorities. See. e.g.. CAL. BUS. a PROF. CODE § 1 1 7 (West 1962) (record of conviction only
conclusive of the fact of conviction and authorities may inquire into the circumstances to determine
if the offense involved moral turpitude). Butcf. CAL. BUS. a PROF. CODE fl 95403(d) (West 1964)
(conviction of felony or crimes involving moral turpitude constitutes evidence that applicant for
license to operate dry cleaning establishment lacks moral character).
545. See. e.g.. Tanner v. DeSapio. 2 Misc. 2d 130. 150 N.Y.S.2d 640 (Sup. Ct. 1956)
(reversing a refusal to license former convict to operate beauty parlor).
546. H o n v. City and County of San Francisco, 233 Cal. App. 2d 375.43 Cal. Rptr. 527
(Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (denial of application to operate massage parlor because applicant's wife,
running same establishment, had been convicted of morals violations). Contra. Roosevelt Taxi, Inc.
v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 27 App. Div. 2d 753.279 N. Y.S.2d 1016 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (reversal
of denial of taxicab license because applicant's brother, a known criminal, was applicant's business
associate).
547. A few statutes provide for license revocation upon the commission of a crime. See. *,f..
ARIZ. REV. STAT. A N N . fl 32-1263 (1969-70) (mandatory revocation of dentist's license upon
commission of a felony).
548. See. e.g.. Otash v. Bureau of Private Investigators a Adjusters. 230 Cal. App. 2d 568.41
Cal. Rptr. 263 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (private investigator).
549. See. eg. Freeman v. Board of Alcohol Control, 264 N.C. 320.141 S.E.2d 499 (1965):
accord. Silver v. McCamey. 221 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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Conviction of afelony*1*is often a ground for denial or revocation
of a license. Felons are barred from occupations ranging from practical
nursing**1 to selling horsemeat.1** Crimes, irrespective of where
committed, are generally classified as a felony or misdemeanor
according to the law of the licensing jurisdiction.**3 When a license is
refused or revoked on the basis of a felony conviction, courts are
reluctant to disturb the licensing authority's determination.*** There
have been instances, however, when reviewing courts have found the
exclusion of felons unreasonable.*9*
Crimes involving moral turpitude are frequently grounds for
disqualification from a licensed occupation. A few statutes exclude
persons convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude,*** but the usual
provision embraces any crime involving moral turpitude.**1 Thus,
misdemeanors involving moral turpitude may exclude the offender under
most statutes.*** Irrespective of statutory language, both licensing
authorities and courts have experienced considerable difficulty in
applying the moral turpitude standard.***
A few statutes bar persons convicted of enumerated crimes. These
provisions may limit exclusion to crimes that indicate unfitness for a
550.

For a discussion of the definition of felony, see notes 108-20 supra and accompanying

text.

551. £ * . . N.C. GEN. STAT. fl 90-1713 (Supp. 1967).
552. Eg.. 111. A N N . STAT. ch. 56Vi. fl 2422(d) (Smith-Hurd 1967). See oho CAL. BUS. a
PROF. CODE fl 17769 (West 1964) (trading stamp dealers); N . Y . A L C O . BEV. CONTROL
LAW fl 102 (McKinney 1970) (night dub employees).
553. Eg.. Erdman v. Board of Regents. 24 App. Div. 2d 698, 261 N.Y5.2d 634 (1965)
(conviction of felony in federal court was a misdemeanor under state law). See notes 151-61 supra
and accompanying text.
554. Eg.. Barton Trucking Corp. v. O'Connell. 7 N.Y.2d 299.165 N.E.2d 163.197 N . Y S .
2d 138 (1959) (denial of public cart license because of felony conviction 20 years earlier). The court
stressed that the petitioner's conviction had been for criminal activities linked to the business
in which he sought to be licensed. Id. at 313.165 N.EJd at 170.
555. See. e*.. Brown v. Murphy. 3 Misc. 2d 151. 224 N.Y.S.2d 423 (S«p. Ct. 1962). A
license to drive a tow truck was refused by the New York City Police Commission based on the
applicant's court-martial conviction of carrying a concealed, loaded weapon and subsequent bad
conduct discharge from the Navy 15 years earlier. The New York Supreme Court reversed because
of the Commissioner's failure to accord a proper hearing, but noted hi dictum that deprivation
based solely upon the stated grounds would be capricious in light of the applicant's commendable
record since discharge from the service. Id. at 157-59.224 N.Y.S.2d at 429-31.
556. See. e.g.. A w z . REV. STAT. ANN. fl 20-289 (Supp. 1969-70) (insurance agent's license).
557.

£\g., ARK. STAT. ANN. fl 72-1613 (Supp. 1969) (inhalation therapist's license refused

or revoked for conviction of moral turpitude crime).
558. £\g.. ALA. CODE tit. 46. fl 16 (Supp. 1967) (revocation of architect's license authorized
for misdemeanor involving moral turpitude).
559. For a discussion of what constitutes moral turpitude set notes 139-41 supra and
•ccompanying text.
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particular occupation. The offense of receiving stolen property, for
example, may prevent licensing as a junk dealer.119 Revocation may also
be confined to offenses involving use of a license."1 As a general rule,
however, specificity is lacking in licensing legislation.
Statutes also may provide that persons separated from the Armed
Forces under less than honorable conditions are barred from licensed
employment. New York, for example, refuses to issue a peddler's license
to a former serviceman who failed to obtain an honorable discharge.**
Court-martial conviction of a wide variety of military offenses may
subject the offender to dishonorable discharge.1" Moreover, Armed
Forces personnel may be separated administratively as undesirables
under less than honorable conditions.1*4
(iii) Unprofessional conduct.—Professionals such as doctors,
lawyers, and accountants may have their licenses revoked or suspended
for unprofessional conduct.*** Courts have upheld this vague criterion
despite attacks on the failure to prescribe specific standards of
conduct.*** Conviction of a crime is generally regarded as unprofessional
conduct, and revocations frequently are sustained even though criminal
proceedings are dismissed.**7
(b) Mitigating provisions.—A few states have enacted legislation
mitigating the effect of criminal conviction under licensing laws. Several
statutes, for example, provide for reinstatement of revoked licenses
following specified periods of time, normally one to five years.*" A
similar remedy is available in New York where a certificate of good
conduct may be issued to former criminals after five years of satisfactory
conduct.*** Although this statute expressly states that issuance of a
360. N.Y. GEN BUS. LAW | 61 (McKinney 1968). See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32.
9 575 (Supp. 1970) (embezzlers barred from becoming collections agents); N.Y. GEN. BUS.
LAW § 74 (McKinney 1968) (conviction of illegal possession of weapons disqualifies for guard
duty).
561. See. ej.. Ana. REV. STAT. ANN. f 32-2322 (Supp. 1969-70) (structural pest control).
562. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW $ 32 (McKinney 1968).
563.

£\f..

MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL. UNITED STATES 1 127c (rev. ed. 1969) (absence

without leave, violation of a lawful general order, feigning illness).
564. See generally Lynch. The Administrative Discharge: Changes Needed? 22 ME. L. REV.
141 (1970).
565. See. eg. MICH. STAT. ANN. f 14.533 (Supp. 1970) (physicians).
566. E.g.. Irwin v. Board of Regents. 304 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1969)
(upholding statute revoking license of accountant for unprofessional conduct, defined as acts
evidencing moral unfitness).
567. See. eg.. Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners. 34 Cal. 2d 62. 206 P.2d 1085 (1949)
(physicians).
568. See. e.g.. N.Y. GEN BUS. LAW | 409 (McKinney 1968) (reinstatement of
cosmetologist's license possible after one year).
569. N.Y. EXEC. LAW { 242 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).
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certificate shall not proscribe licensing authority discretion, a few New
York licensing statutes require recognition of the certificate."*
California recently enacted legislation requiring licensing authorities to
recognize prison training *hen passing upon a former criminal's
application.171 Under this provision, an inmate who has received training
for an occupation in the course of a prison rehabilitation program cannot be denied the right to take the examination required to obtain a
license for that occupation. In effect, if the applicant is otherwise
qualified, his conviction will not bar licensing.
Most licensing statutes, however, make no provision for mitigating
the effect of a criminal conviction. In these jurisdictions, an applicant
excluded from licensed status on the basis of his criminal record must
depend upon the courts for relief. In many instances, judicial review of
the agency determination may be of limited scope.1" In the absence of a
showing of arbitrary or capricious action, it is unlikely that a licensing
authority's exclusion of a convicted criminal will be disturbed by the
reviewing court.*7*
C.

Exclusion of Convicted Criminals from Public Employment

The difficulties experienced by the ex-convict in securing public
employment are no less formidable than those he encounters in seeking
entrance to licensed occupations. The restrictions excluding convicted
criminals from public employment affect a large number of job
opportunities. Federal, state, and local governments employ more than
twelve million people.474 One out of six civilian workers is a public
employee.*7* Moreover, three and one-half million men and women
currently serve in the Armed Forces.*7*
A number of government employees are elected or appointed to
positions of public trust. Individuals occupying these positions are
generally thought of as public officers. The many restrictions on the
convicted criminal's privilege of holding public office, as well as the
distinction between officers and employees, are fully discussed
elsewhere.*77 The present inquiry embraces the many public occupations
570. £.*.. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW % 74 (McKinney 196S) (private investigators).
571. CAL. BUS. * PROF. CODE § 23% (Wert Supp. 1970).
572. See note 505 supra tnd accompanying text.
573 See. eg . Stephens v. Dennis, 293 F. Supp. 589. 595 (K.D. Ala. 1968) (revocntion of
pharmacist's license). See generally W. GELLHORN. supra note 485, at 118-25.
574.

U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE L'MTED STATES: 1969, at

430-31 <90thed. 1969).
575. Id. at 211.
576. Id at 255.
577. See notes 342-60,363-77 supra and accompanying text.
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that are not appreciably different from jobs in the private sector.
Although a number of these positions appear particularly suited to exconvicts, both federal and local governments have been slow to recognize
this fact.*7* Thus, it is not unusual to find constitutional and statutory
provisions barring convicted criminals from a wide variety of routine
public occupations. Additionally, regulations requiring that public
employees be of good moral character may disqualify many offenders.
The decision whether to employ an applicant with a criminal record
is often discretionary with governmental agencies. Available
information indicates, however, that examining and certifying agencies
actually hire few ex-convicts.*7* It is likely that those offenders who do
succeed in obtaining employment are most often placed as unskilled
laborers.**4 Even an acquittal of a criminal charge will generally not
prevent the offender from being denied employment if the public agency
regards him as unfit.**1 Similarly, neither pardon nor expungement
preclude exclusion.**2 There may even be instances in which members of
a convicted criminal's family will be barred from public employmcnt.• ,,
For some offenders, the passage of time may lower the barriers to
employment.** 4 Others may be employable by reason of positive
rehabilitation measures initiated by the federal government and certain
states.*** Under a few court decisions, pardoned offenders may have
increased employment opportunities.*** It is apparent, however, that
under current practices many ex-convicts are barred from public
employment. It is equally clear that reviewing courts arc not likely to
578. See. e.g.. C. RHYNE. MUNICIPAL LAW f 8-2 (I9S7) (typical public employees include
architects, medical inspectors, engineers, matrons, janitors, park attendants, superintendents of
nurses, switchboard operators, and watchmen).
579. See Wise, Public Employment of Persons with a Criminal Record. 6 NAT'L PROBATION
* PAROLE ASS'N J. 197 (I960).

580. See D. GLASER. supra note 465. at 359-61.
581. See. e.g.. Berman v. Gillroy. 198 Misc. 369,97 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1950). affd. 305
N.Y. 688,112 N.E.2d 771 (1953), cert, denied. 347 U.S. 921 (1954).
582. Taylor v. Macy. 252 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (upholding dismissal from United
States Civil Service even though state conviction of vagrancy had been expunged).
583. Eg., Sheridan v. Gardner. 347 Mass. 8. 196 N.E2d 303 (1964) (upholding provision
that convicted person's immediate family cannot score on crime commission).
584. Eg.. MASS. ANN.. LAWS ch. 31, § 17 (1966) (convict eligible for public employment
one year following conviction).
585. See. eg.. Mo. A N N . CODE art. 64-A, { 19 (1968) (expressly declaring ex-convict*
eligible for civil service appointment).
586. See. e.g.. Slater v. Olson. 230 Iowa 1005. 299 N.W. 879 (1941) (application for civil
service position as assistant smoke inspector): Commissioner of Metro. Dist. Comm'n v. Director
of Civil Serv., 348 Mass. 184. 203 N.E.2d 95 (1964) (disabled veteran applying for police
department position).
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intervene unless exclusion is found t o be arbitrary or patently
iiiireasonable.*w
1. Federal Employment.—The United States Constitution does
not require exclusion of convicted criminals from federal employment
Congress, however, has enacted legislation barring certain types of
offenders from many federal positions. A number of disqualifying
provisions under the Federal Criminal Code have already been discussed
in connection with the prohibitions against convicted criminals holding
public office."* Many of these provisions apply equally well to public
employees. M f Other federal statutes, however, make it clear that
individuals convicted of certain crimes are barred from all federal
employment. Conviction of either advocating the overthrow of the
government990 or promoting insubordination in the Armed Forces,**1 for
example, disqualifies the offender from employment by the United
States government or any department or agency thereof for a period of
five years following the conviction. Moreover, under the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,*** a person convicted of inciting a
riot or civil disorder and sentenced to imprisonment for one year will be
ineligible for federal employment for five years subsequent to conviction.
Under the Study Draft of the New Federal Criminal Code,***
disqualification from federal office or employment because of criminal
conviction is discretionary with the sentencing court.**4 Moreover, the
Draft provides for automatic removal of the disqualification five years
after the defendant has completed his sentence.***
Conviction of a serious crime often disqualifies the offender from
military service. Only in exceptional cases, for example, are convicted
felons permitted to enlist in the Armed Forces.*** In addition, a wide
587. City of Aurora v. Schoberlein. 230 III. 496. 82 N.E. 860 (1907) (removal from civil
aervice is administrative and not to be judicially tried de novo on the merits); accord. Appeal of
Fredericks. 285 Mich. 262.280 N.W. 464 (1938); City of Jackson v. McLeod, 199 Miss. 676,24 So.
2d 319 (1946).
588. See notes 365-74 supra and accompanying text.
589. Eg . 18 U 5 . C . § 1905 (1964) (disclosure of confidential information); id. f 1913
(lobbying with appropriated moneys).
590. Id. f 2385.
591. Id. ft 2387.
592. 5 U.S.C. f 7313 (Supp. IV. 1969) (inciting, organizing, promoting, encouraging,
tiding, or abetting a riot or civil disorder or any offense determined by the head of an employment
agency to have been committed in furtherance of civil disorder).
593.

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS. STUDY DRAFT OF A

NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1970).

594. Id. f 3501.
595. Id. % 3503.
596.
10 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. IV. 1969) (Service Secretaries may authorize exceptions in
meritorious cases).
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variety of civil and military offenses may result in a serviceman's
separation from the Armed Forces under less than honorable
conditions.**7 Servicemen who fail to receive an honorable discharge are
ineligible for preferential Civil Service appointments available to other
veterans. m
In certain instances, convicted criminals may be barred from
employment in activities regulated by the federal government. Under the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,,H for
example, felons are ineligible to serve as offleersor directors of any labor
organization. Similarly, an individual convicted of an offense involving
dishonesty or breach of trust normally is not employable by a bank
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 1 * Convicted
criminals also may be denied employment with either the federal
government or defense-related industries because their criminal records
preclude issuance of the requisite security clea^ance.••,
Even in the absence of direct prohibitions against hiring convicted
criminals, federal agencies exercise broad discretion in deciding whether
to employ applicants with criminal records. United States Civil Service
regulations, for example, provide that "criminal, infamous, dishonest,
immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct" may be the basis for
disqualifying individuals from the federal service.*** Formerly, before an
applicant could be considered for a responsible position, the Civil
Service Commission required two years to elapse following discharge
from a felony sentence, and one year following discharge from a
misdemeanor sentence.*** Since employment of rehabilitated offenders
has recently received special emphasis in the federal service,** however,
the Commission now accepts applications from ex-convicts at any time.
Determination of the applicant's suitability embraces the nature,
seriousness, and circumstances of the crime, the offender's age, social
and economic environment, and rehabilitation. The Commission,
however, neither requires applicants to disclose information concerning
convictions by juvenile authorities that occurred prior to age 21, nor
considers arrests that were not followed by conviction. Moreover,
597.
59S.
599.
600.
601.
602.
603.
604.
Form 941

See note 563 supm.
5U.SC. If 2108(1).(2)(Svpp. IV, 1969).
29 U.S.C. f 504(a) (1964).
I2U.S.C. f 1829(1964).
32C.F.R. | f 155.5,156(1970).
5 C.F.R. I 731201(b) (1969).
D.GLASER.jipranotc465>at4l4.
See Employment of the Rrhabilitated Offender t* tk* FedermiService, m CW9 Sarke
(Feb. 1968). reprinted in 32 FED. PROBATION 50 (Sept. 1968).
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current Civil Service regulations** authorize employment of federal
prisoners participating in work-release programs pursuant to the Federal
Prisoner's Rehabilitation Act of 1965.**
2. State and Municipal Employment.—Many
states and
municipalities bar convicted criminals from public employment."7 The
disability may be imposed by constitutional provision,** statute,** or
ordinance.*1* In some instances, former criminals are permanently
barred,8" while in others employment is permitted at a specified time
after conviction.*12 In most states, ex-convicts are barred from holding
police or correctional employment.*M
Many constitutional and statutory provisions disqualifying
convicted criminals appear to limit the disability to public office.*14 It is
clear, however, that a wide variety of routine government jobs may fall
within these proscriptions. Recently, for example, the dismissal of a
school bus driver upon disclosure of a felony conviction 24 years earlier
was upheld under a constitutional provision barring convicted felons
from holding "office or appointment of honor, trust, or profit."*1*
State and municipal civil service provisions usually authorize
exclusion of convicted criminals. Typical regulations provide that both
state and municipal commissions may refuse to examine or certify an
applicant guilty of either a crime, or infamous or notoriously disgraceful
conduct.*1* Thus depending on a commission's policy, a criminal
conviction can be a serious obstacle to civil service appointment. In
addition, immoral or criminal conduct may disqualify employees even in
605.
606.
607.

5C.F.R. § 213JI02(x)(1969).
18 U.S.C. § 4082 (Supp. IV, 1969).
S«S.Ru»iN,*$>r«note468.at6l3-l4.625-26 (listinf 27 states).

608

E*..

DEL. CONST, art. 2, $ 21; LA. CONST, art. 8. | 6; PA. CONST, art. 2. f 7; Wis.

CONST, art. 13, % 3.
. . . Jfci
609. £*.. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. | 38-912 (Supp. 1969-70); FLA. STAT. ANN. f II2XH
(I960); N.M.STAT. ANN. | 5-1-3(1966).
610. See generally E.MCQVILLW. supra note 498, If 12.58. .*»-.**>.
611. Eg.. CAL. GOV'T CODE f 1029 (West 1966) (felons prohibited from being peace
officers).
^ . Mm
612. £*..MASS.ANN.LAWSCII.3M 17 (1966) (civil scrvfcedoaed for one year).
613. S«rS.RuniN,jia>/«nole468,at628.
614. See note 344 supra and accompanying text.
._,.,.
, - - . - . .
moi
615. Thomas v. Evangeline Parrish School Bd.. 138 So. 2d 658 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App. 1962).
The Louisiana Constitution was recently amended to provide that convictedfelonscan hold public
employment not involving responsibility for public funds. LA. CONST, art. 8. | 6.
616. Eg CAL GOV'T CODE 5 18935 (West 1963); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW f 50(4)
(McKinney 1959). See.eg.. Alder v. Lang. 21 App. Div.2d 107.248 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1964) (denialof
application for job as assistant mechanical engineer because of prior arrest record that included
misdemeanor conviction, reversed because of civil service commission's failure to scrutinize
circumstances surrounding the petitioner's record).
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the absence of a conviction.*" One state supreme court, for example,
recently upheld the dismissal of a water tradesman with fifteen years*
service on the ground that he had committed adultery and that this
conduct was wantonly offensive to the public and unbecoming an
employee of the city.4* Under the reasoning of this case,*1* it is likely that
many individuals with criminal records will be disqualified from civil
service.
VII.

Loss OF JUDICIAL RIGHTS

The American judicial system imposes a number of disabilities on
the citizen with a criminal record. In some states, for example, the prison
inmate lacks the capacity to sue, although he or his representative may
be sued. Similarly, the offender may be unable to execute judicially
enforceable instruments, such as contracts and wills, or to serve as a
court-appointed fiduciary, such as an executor, administrator, or
guardian. A criminal conviction also may affect the offender's
participation in the judicial process as a witness or juror. Convicted
persons, for example, generally cannot testify in judicial proceedings
without their testimony being impeached. Persons convicted of perjury
lack the capacity to testify in some states. Moreover, convicted persons
often are precluded from serving as jurors, irrespective of their individual
qualifications or sentiments.
A.

Capacity to L itigate

At common law, citizens imprisoned in a penitentiary lacked the
capacity to sue,** but their imprisonment did not prevent them from
being sued.'21 This rule developed from the practice that a criminal
617. See. eg.. 4 N.Y.C.R.R. f 3 2 (1969). appearing in N.Y. Civ. SE»V. LAW. Rules and
Regulation* of the Dep't of Civil Service % 12 (McKinney Supp. 1969) (applicant who lacks good
moral character or satisfactory reputation may be disqualified from examination or appointment).
See also Berman v. Gtliroy. 198 Misc. 369, 97 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1950), affd. 305 N.Y. 688, 112
N.E.2d77l (1953), cert.denied. 347 U.S. 921 (t9tt)(iipholdii« civil engineer's removal because of
sodomy charge, even though criminal prosecution dismissed).
618. State ex ret. Gudlin v. Civil Serv. ComnVn, 27 Wis. 2d 77,133 N. W J d 799 (1965).
619. "(T]here must be an area where conduct of an employee of a municipality . . . in
violation of important and fundamental standards of propriety is of legitimate concern to the
municipality.. . . When an employee's unacceptable conduct falls within this area of concern, we
find no implication in the statute or ordinance that such conduct cannot be cause for discharge
unless it can be shown directly to impair performance of duties.** Id. at 86-87,133 N.WJd at 804.
620. See, eg.. Avery v. Everett. 110 N.Y. 317,18 N.E. 148 (1888); Miller v. Turner, 64 N.D.
463,253 N.W.437 (1934); Kenyon v. Saunders. 18 R.I. 590.30 A.470 (1894).
621. See. eg.. Gray v. Gray, 104 Mo. App. 520, 79 S.W. 505 (1904); Green v. Boney. 233
S.C. 49,103 S.E.2d 732 (1958).
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conviction resulted in a forfeiture of the offender's goods to the crown.**
Since prisoners had no property or rights for which suit could be
brought, there was no reason to give them the right to sue.01 Today,
forfeiture has been abolished in all states,04 but states that have retained
civil death statutes generally do not permit prison inmates to maintain
civil actions. Most states, however, now permit prisoners to bring civil
actions. The common law rule permitting prisoners to be sued has
remained unchanged.
1. Capacity of Prisoners to Sue.**—The majority of states today
permit prison inmates to institute civil suits either in their own names or
through personal representatives or committees appointed to manage the
estates of prisoners. Persons imprisoned in the penitentiary, however,
lack the capacity to sue in most of the thirteen states that have retained
civil death statutes.** The overwhelming majority of states, including
many states that have civil death statutes, provide that imprisonment is a
disability that tolls the statutes of limitations. Consequently, upon
release, most prison inmates, including those who are unable to sue while
incarcerated, can maintain a cause of action that accrued during
imprisonment.
(a) Capacity of prisoners to sue in their own names.—In most
states without civil death statutes, citizens imprisoned in the penitentiary
retain the right to sue in their own names.*27 In the absence of a specific
statute, the courts have ruled that prisoners have the capacity to sue since
the legislatures have not provided that criminal offenders lose their civil
rights during imprisonment.*1* Some non-civil death states have enacted
statutes dealing with suits instituted by prisoners. Both New Hampshire
622. Kenyon v. Saunders. 18 R.I. 590.30 A. 470 (1894).
623.
Id.
624. See notes 103-19 on pages 1080-82 infra and accompanying text.
625. This section win not review general restrictions on prisoners or the remedies available to
prisoners who are mistreated. See. eg.. Hanna, The Convict and the Compensation Law. 34 CAUF.
L. Rev. 167 (1946); Vogelman. Prison Restrictions—Prisoner Rights. 59 J. CMM. L.C. a ?S. 386
(1968); Note, Remedies Available to Penal Inmates For Injuries Received While Incarcerated. 34
IND. L J . 609 (1959); Note, Federal Remedies for Lawfully Committed Prisoners Who Claim
Mistreatment. 2 J. Pun. LAW 181 (1953); Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing
Law. 110 U. PA. L. REV. 985 (1962); Note, Prisoners' Remedies for Mistreatment. 59 YALE LJ.
800 (1950).
626.
For a discussion of the civil death statutes, see notes 70-79 supra and accompanying text.
627. See. eg.. Willingham v. King. 23 Fla. 4 7 8 , 2 So. 851 (1887); Department of Welfare v.
Brock. 306 Ky. 243, 206 S.WJd 915 (1947); Bosteder v. Duling. 115 Neb. 557, 213 N.W. 809
(1927).
628. £4.. Bosteder v. Duling. 115 Neb. 557,564,213 N.W. 809,812 (1927).

